Thomas M. Miovas Jr.

I didn't "omit" anything. I was concerned over the fair use of how much of the article I could quote from the SEP, and besides, it's arguments that Whewell was not a Kantian are not in terms of philosophical fundamentals.

As to how McCaskey is supporting Whewell over Dr. Piekoff and Harriman, he is a professor of studies on induction and makes no reference to "The Logical Leap" on the front page of his website. If he was for Peikoff and Harriman, given his background, he would be fully supportive of their efforts and that they resolved the problem with induction. It's shameful that he is not more supportive of those Objectivist intellectuals.

I don't know why West took down his post about the NoddleFood posting regarding the controversy, but I thank him for supplying the link. In that post there is a letter from David Harriman saying that he cannot support Whewell because Whewell was a 19th century Kantian. I have the same views on Whewell and do not understand why an Objectivist or a rational man would continue to support Whewell over Dr.Peikoff and David Harriman who have solved the problem of induction. So, I definitely see no reason to support McCaskey. But I will add that I cannot condemn him at this point since he doesn't seem to be promoting the Kantian aspects of Whewell. In other words, I am in the same position as before the NoddleFood post: I see no reason to support McCaskey on intellectual grounds and I don't see the evidence that he is a good Objectivist, his work at ARI and Anthem notwithstanding.

Here's the link to the NoodleFood posting:

http://blog.dianahsieh.com/2010/10/resignation-of-john-mccaskey-facts.html

I looked up the work "inchoate" which McCaskey uses in regards to the presentation of induction, and basically it means that it is not formed correctly or is incomplete, so McCaskey is disagreeing with the presentation of induction in both Harriman's book and in Dr. Peikoff's lecture series on induction. Definitions of inchoate. This might imply that McCaskey thinks that the Objectivist epistemology is also inchoate, which would imply a non-acceptance of the Objectivist epistemology.

I certainly agree that all new theories coming out of leading Objectivists need to be scrutinized to see if they are both coherent with Objectivism and with reality, and I don't think Dr.Peikoff would disagree with that. But obviously from the letter presented, Dr. Peikoff is proud of his achievement and proud of Harriman's contribution, so I would see where he would think calling these inchoate would be an insult. It will be interesting to see the correspondence of McCaskey and the other scientists if that is ever released.

Anyhow, not having taken the course and not having read Harriman's book, I won't be able to comment further on the disagreements. I'm ordering the book so that I can read it over.

I'd like to state my position on John McCaskey a little more clearer, especially since David Veksler, the owner of objectivismonline.net is taking a definite stance against Dr. Peikoff. After having read "The Logical Leap" twice carefully, and with my background in physics and philosophy, and as a long-term Objectivist, I have to say that "The Logical Leap" presents an astounding answer to the problem of induction, so certainly David Harriman and Dr. Peikoff deserve praise for their efforts. The answer is not only the Objectivist epistemology whereby referents of a concept differ by only a measurement, thus justifying going from some to all of a class in a generalization, but also Harriman's presentation that generalizations have many parallels to concept formation, that there is a hierarchy going from the perceptually self-evident to higher-level generalities, just as there are for concepts. And Harriman presents the evidence in a very clearly logical form.

Recall that logic is the non-contradictorily identification of the facts of existence as given by observation. And the facts as presented by Harriman lead to a necessitation of coming to the generalization oneself, if one is familiar at all with the physics, simply by following the facts. And yet, McCaskey does not positively support the book and continues to support William Whewell, who at a minimum has very many mistaken philosophical views. So, unless McCaskey simply doesn't see it, just doesn't get the presentation of "The Logical Leap", then I think he is committing an injustice by not going into the philosophy behind the book and not supporting it enthusiastically. If there are factual errors in the book -- and even McCaskey is hesitant to say they are actual factual errors -- then these can easily be corrected and it wouldn't change the philosophical importance of the book. Even with the errors McCaskey hesitantly points out, if true, do not detract from the evidence and the philosophy presented in "The Logical Leap." All that would be required is deleting a few sentences or adding a paragraph to conform to scholars who have also studied the history (if they are correct in their understanding of the history).

So, "The Logical Leap" objectively deserves much praise and deserves to be a part of the philosophy of science teachings at major universities. Whether it will get this type of audience is unknown at this point in time, but certainly McCaskey's review won't help it get into academia. The philosophy of Objectivism, when it hits upon a great solution to a long-standing philosophical problem, deserves praise and admiration, not a dismissal because maybe a few facts are wrong.

David Harriman brings up an interesting issue regarding causation and patterns that I think is germane to the current debate over Peikoff and McCaskey. Some people are basically taking the position that because Dr. Peikoff is the common element for all of the schisms in Objectivism over the past 30 years, then he must be the cause. They see a continual pattern between Dr. Peikoff and him having a philosophical falling out with certain (formerly) respected members of the Objectivist community. David Harriman calls this the fallacy of substituting an observed similarity for a cause. Starting on page 194 "Acidity", he outlines a few examples of this error.

Back when chemists were trying to figure out what made something an acid, one of the leading chemists thought that the cause must be oxygen because oxygen was common to all acids. Turns out this wasn't the case anyhow, since there are a few acids that don't even have oxygen in them, but he kept insisting this was the case. After further investigations, the cause was found to be hydrogen, which was common to all acids and was identified as the cause because of its chemical reactiveness. Harriman gives the example of someone going to parties and drinking Scotch and Soda, Whiskey and Soda, and Bourbon and Soda, and concluding since Soda was common to all, then it must be the Soda that is getting him drunk. Another example from me is that a common element of house fires is windows. All houses have windows, so this being a common element, windows must be the cause of house fires. Obviously this isn't the case, as one is substituting a common pattern or element if one thinks that windows is the cause of house fires.

So, in the current conflict and in most all of the other conflicts with former Objectivists, yes, Dr. Peikoff was involved; but one has to look at the other elements. There were other people involved in these schisms, and one has to take a look at their disposition regarding being objective and presenting Objectivism consistently. And in all cases so far, it can be shown that those who had a falling out failed to uphold Objectivism properly in all contexts. This is especially true for those having worked for The Ayn Rand Institute as writers or board members. For the most part, they left or were kicked out because they failed to uphold Objectivism properly in all circumstances when it was required to take an objective stance on some issue or another. That is the actual common element that is the cause of the schisms -- a failure to be objective. So, though Dr.Peikoff was involved and was usually the whistle blower, he wasn't the cause, since he has consistently been a great Objectivist in the past and upholding an objective standard each and every time.

This is interesting, and I appreciate the replies to my previous posts. It seems as if some people are reading what I read on Whewell and coming to different conclusions. I basically said: THERE'S A KANTIAN IN THE ROOM! and others are saying: Paleese, he's not a Kantian, he's just mistaken. Even though Whewell seems to take the position that one's ideas control at least our perception of reality, some of you are saying this isn't Kantian. But our mind does not create reality, our physiology does make sensations into percepts, however it is not saying that ideas create percepts, and that is what I am questioning. If our ideas create perception and these ideas are innate, then what about the ideas that we do create as we observe reality? and how would this change our perceptions over time? or doesn't Whewell think this is the way it works? If our conscious mind creates perception, then we have no basis for being objective on the perceptual level without a method. In other words, if our conscious mind of ideas controls our perception, then we are in big trouble without an objective method of perceiving, and Whewell does not offer that in my reading of him. Unless Whewell is rejecting free will and all our ideas are automatic and create perception. But don't you see that if our conscious mind creates perception, then our vision of the world -- our perceptions -- would change as we gain knowledge, and this isn't the case at all. Getting sharper ideas doesn't improve our eyesight or give us super vision. Whewell's position undercuts the whole theory of knowledge, which has to be based on the automatic nature of perception that comes from physiology, not ideas. Ideas do not control, how we literally see the world.

Philosophers have to be taken literally and not figuratively. If Whewell is saying our conscious mind controls perception and perception is our contact with the world, then he is effectively saying that our mind creates reality, which is a Kantian premise.

So, again I lay down this challenge: If you want to defend Whewell as having something rational to say, then the onus of proof is on you to point that out. And if you are siding with McCaskey, and he is supportive of Whewell, then you have to show how Whewell is rational. I don't see it at all, unless one is going to be wishy-washy about the meaning of words. Taking Whewell literally, how is he rational?

Thank you for your input. I realize I don't know much about Whewell and may do further reading on him, but probably by reading his own books. I don't generally like to go by anything other than the originals versus reviews or second hand sources for the philosophers I study. It may be a while, however, as I am way behind on Objectivist reading material and can't run out and buy books right now due to my economic situation. I do appreciate the paper you wrote, but I don't think it brings out enough of what made Whewell so great. So, I'll keep all of that in mind when I do further research.

I'd like to state my position on John McCaskey a little more clearer, especially since David Veksler, the owner of objectivismonline.net is taking a definite stance against Dr. Peikoff. After having read "The Logical Leap" twice carefully, and with my background in physics and philosophy, and as a long-term Objectivist, I have to say that "The Logical Leap" presents an astounding answer to the problem of induction, so certainly David Harriman and Dr. Peikoff deserve praise for their efforts. The answer is not only the Objectivist epistemology whereby referents of a concept differ by only a measurement, thus justifying going from some to all of a class in a generalization, but also Harriman's presentation that generalizations have many parallels to concept formation, that there is a hierarchy going from the perceptually self-evident to higher-level generalities, just as there are for concepts. And Harriman presents the evidence in a very clearly logical form.

Recall that logic is the non-contradictorily identification of the facts of existence as given by observation. And the facts as presented by Harriman lead to a necessitation of coming to the generalization oneself, if one is familiar at all with the physics, simply by following the facts. And yet, McCaskey does not positively support the book and continues to support William Whewell, who at a minimum has very many mistaken philosophical views. So, unless McCaskey simply doesn't see it, just doesn't get the presentation of "The Logical Leap", then I think he is committing an injustice by not going into the philosophy behind the book and not supporting it enthusiastically. If there are factual errors in the book -- and even McCaskey is hesitant to say they are actual factual errors -- then these can easily be corrected and it wouldn't change the philosophical importance of the book. Even with the errors McCaskey hesitantly points out, if true, do not detract from the evidence and the philosophy presented in "The Logical Leap." All that would be required is deleting a few sentences or adding a paragraph to conform to scholars who have also studied the history (if they are correct in their understanding of the history).

So, "The Logical Leap" objectively deserves much praise and deserves to be a part of the philosophy of science teachings at major universities. Whether it will get this type of audience is unknown at this point in time, but certainly McCaskey's review won't help it get into academia. The philosophy of Objectivism, when it hits upon a great solution to a long-standing philosophical problem, deserves praise and admiration, not a dismissal because maybe a few facts are wrong.

David Harriman brings up an interesting issue regarding causation and patterns that I think is germane to the current debate over Peikoff and McCaskey. Some people are basically taking the position that because Dr. Peikoff is the common element for all of the schisms in Objectivism over the past 30 years, then he must be the cause. They see a continual pattern between Dr. Peikoff and him having a philosophical falling out with certain (formerly) respected members of the Objectivist community. David Harriman calls this the fallacy of substituting an observed similarity for a cause. Starting on page 194 "Acidity", he outlines a few examples of this error.

Back when chemists were trying to figure out what made something an acid, one of the leading chemists thought that the cause must be oxygen because oxygen was common to all acids. Turns out this wasn't the case anyhow, since there are a few acids that don't even have oxygen in them, but he kept insisting this was the case. After further investigations, the cause was found to be hydrogen, which was common to all acids and was identified as the cause because of its chemical reactiveness. Harriman gives the example of someone going to parties and drinking Scotch and Soda, Whiskey and Soda, and Bourbon and Soda, and concluding since Soda was common to all, then it must be the Soda that is getting him drunk. Another example from me is that a common element of house fires is windows. All houses have windows, so this being a common element, windows must be the cause of house fires. Obviously this isn't the case, as one is substituting a common pattern or element if one thinks that windows is the cause of house fires.

So, in the current conflict and in most all of the other conflicts with former Objectivists, yes, Dr. Peikoff was involved; but one has to look at the other elements. There were other people involved in these schisms, and one has to take a look at their disposition regarding being objective and presenting Objectivism consistently. And in all cases so far, it can be shown that those who had a falling out failed to uphold Objectivism properly in all contexts. This is especially true for those having worked for The Ayn Rand Institute as writers or board members. For the most part, they left or were kicked out because they failed to uphold Objectivism properly in all circumstances when it was required to take an objective stance on some issue or another. That is the actual common element that is the cause of the schisms -- a failure to be objective. So, though Dr.Peikoff was involved and was usually the whistle blower, he wasn't the cause, since he has consistently been a great Objectivist in the past and upholding an objective standard each and every time.

This is interesting, and I appreciate the replies to my previous posts. It seems as if some people are reading what I read on Whewell and coming to different conclusions. I basically said: THERE'S A KANTIAN IN THE ROOM! and others are saying: Paleese, he's not a Kantian, he's just mistaken. Even though Whewell seems to take the position that one's ideas control at least our perception of reality, some of you are saying this isn't Kantian. But our mind does not create reality, our physiology does make sensations into percepts, however it is not saying that ideas create percepts, and that is what I am questioning. If our ideas create perception and these ideas are innate, then what about the ideas that we do create as we observe reality? and how would this change our perceptions over time? or doesn't Whewell think this is the way it works? If our conscious mind creates perception, then we have no basis for being objective on the perceptual level without a method. In other words, if our conscious mind of ideas controls our perception, then we are in big trouble without an objective method of perceiving, and Whewell does not offer that in my reading of him. Unless Whewell is rejecting free will and all our ideas are automatic and create perception. But don't you see that if our conscious mind creates perception, then our vision of the world -- our perceptions -- would change as we gain knowledge, and this isn't the case at all. Getting sharper ideas doesn't improve our eyesight or give us super vision. Whewell's position undercuts the whole theory of knowledge, which has to be based on the automatic nature of perception that comes from physiology, not ideas. Ideas do not control, how we literally see the world.

Philosophers have to be taken literally and not figuratively. If Whewell is saying our conscious mind controls perception and perception is our contact with the world, then he is effectively saying that our mind creates reality, which is a Kantian premise.

So, again I lay down this challenge: If you want to defend Whewell as having something rational to say, then the onus of proof is on you to point that out. And if you are siding with McCaskey, and he is supportive of Whewell, then you have to show how Whewell is rational. I don't see it at all, unless one is going to be wishy-washy about the meaning of words. Taking Whewell literally, how is he rational?

John McCaskey Emails

http://www.johnmccaskey.com/emails.html

"For those who don’t know him: William Whewell (1794–1866) was the last major advocate for a conception of induction that gained currency in Copernicus’ time and then dominated the philosophy and practice of science from the time of Galileo and Harvey to that of Darwin and Maxwell. It is too bad a discussion of writings on induction from those times was not part of Mr. Harriman’s book. Comparisons between what the scientists were taught to do and what Mr. Harriman said they actually did do would have helped highlight the new and distinctive features of the theory Mr. Harriman presents."

So, I looked up William Whewell on the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, and here are a few choice quotes:

William Whewell (1794–1866) British Philosopher

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/whewell/#SciInd

"These ideas, which he called "Fundamental Ideas," are "supplied by the mind itself"—they are not (as Mill and Herschel protested) merely received from our observations of the world. Whewell explained that the Fundamental Ideas are "not a consequence of experience, but a result of the particular constitution and activity of the mind, which is independent of all experience in its origin, though constantly combined with experience in its exercise" (1858a, I, 91). "

"Each science has a Particular Fundamental idea which is needed to organize the facts with which that science is concerned; thus, Space is the Fundamental Idea of geometry, Cause the Fundamental Idea of mechanics, and Substance the Fundamental Idea of chemistry. Moreover, Whewell explained that each Fundamental Idea has certain "conceptions" included within it; these conceptions are "special modifications" of the Idea applied to particular types of circumstances (1858b, 187)."

"This is important because the fundamental ideas and conceptions are provided by our minds, but they cannot be used in their innate form. Whewell explained that "the Ideas, the germs of them at least, were in the human mind before [experience]; but by the progress of scientific thought they are unfolded into clearness and distinctness" (1860a, 373). "

The article relates some historian of philosophy consider Whewell to be a Kantian, because of these innate ideas that govern our experience. But the article claims this may not be true because Whewell thought we could gain information about the world using these innate ideas. However, clearly, Whewell is in the Plato / Kantian axis and should not be promoted by any Objectivist. I consider this to be the smoking gun on Dr. Peikoff's dismissal of McCaskey. Since he is promoting Whewell, he has no authority or philosophical credentials whatsoever of serving on the board of directors of The Ayn Rand Institute.

I disagree. McCaskey clearly promotes Whewell on his home page, and at the bottom of his emails link quoted above. Whewell is not a philosopher Objectivists or Objectivist wannabes ought to be promoting.