[what to do about Israel/Palestine?]

First of all, Vladimir, what do you mean by "artificially created" Israel? The land that became Israel already had a clear Jewish majority and had been under de facto Jewish rule for some time. And I feel obliged to point out that there has never been a nation called "Palestine," so the state that was "artificially created" came out of a land mass that, at the time, wasn't a state at all.

By artificially created I refer to not only the UN stage but the British one prior to that and Zionism in general. The jews which created the population for proto-Israel were coming from everywhere in the world, rather than it being an instance of a pre-existing population seeking national self-determination. Zionist influences on the British created the initial support for Jewish self-rule. The UN stage and partition was the tipping point, however, because it recognized an ethnic state where neither the state or the ethnicity had largely existed prior.

Israel, to the extent Israel is a "Jewish" state I think is a bad idea in part because of this artificiality. Israel to the extent it is a semi-free country is a good idea, and should be supported. This is why the hard-line Jewish influences who want radical military action by Israel are a large problem for the region.

And what, praytell, in the history of the United Nations makes you think that it would do a good job administrating anything in the region? The anti-Semitism of the UN has made the conflict exponentially worse. It funds schools that usually do little else than train future HAMAS members and its incessant anti-Israel resolutions only show the Palestinian terror groups that, if nothing else, their efforts are making the rest of the world hate Israel. In short, the UN is showing them that terrorism works.

I don't think the UN is the solution, I just said it was the logical choice. The main requirement for the peacekeepers is that they be seen by both sides as being fair and relatively neutral. This is why I actually think the US is a bad choice. There is simply too-much animosity towards the US from Arabs in the region. I think even a EU force would likely have more credibility as peacekeepers.

[what to do about Israel/Palestine?]

That is not the only option for the Arabs, nor is it their best option, if they were to think selfishly about it.

All that really matters, though is what they perceive to be their options. They are not going to see the value in living under Israeli jurisdiction, but they are going to see value in blowing themselves up trying to kill Israeli soldiers and civilians. Islam is certainly a big factor in this for sure.

One thing which I think complicates the matter in this regard is actually the purpose of the Israeli state to begin with. The creation of a "Jewish state" was simply bound the cause problems regardless of the actual status of arabs within it.

You would likely have similar problems if half of Texas was declared to be a "Mexican state," Spanish the national language, and Mexicans started pouring in to live there. The anglo population would likely feel under attack and the new state would be the logical target, regardless of how they are treated under its domestic laws.

[what to do about Israel/Palestine?]

The big problem I see is that the only solution would require some sort of outside "peacekeeper" force, to enforce a two-state system for instance. Creating a two-state system will still mean terror attacks against Israel, and Israeli retaliation and territorial occupation. You need some sort of intermediary to keep the border stable. The UN seems like the logical candiate.

The whole Israeli problem seems to stem from the UN in the first place, though. By artificially creating the state of Israel the UN virtually guaranteed war. And once Israel became the dominant power in the region, you end up with a situation where Israel has a military presence in Arab areas and where terror attacks are the only option for Arabs to retaliate.

It is hard to fix such a problem once "the cat is out of the bag" so-to-speak. It might take the total destruction of one side or the other. I am not an enormous fan of Israel (mainly for their domestic policies, not the foreign policy ones) but they are far preferable to the alternative. If it comes down to a choice of Israel being wiped away or the surrounding Arab states I would prefer the US chose Israel.

[Ayn Rand's use of language]

Another word that bothers me, but in a different way, is the way she uses the word "selfish". I do agree that people who have no sense of self cannot be good people, but a guy like Jim, for example, IS selfish; in a different way, of course. He is greedy, too.

People like Jim are selfish in a certain way, but it is not the dominant thread of their character. They are by nature second-handers who look to others to create their mental "self" even if they do desire the aquisition of physical or material goods.

[On the question of free-will vs. determinism]

You are evading the question via pure argumentation. Both of us agreed that "nearly" omniscient would suffice. The question is: Can you alter your predetermined destiny? And this question is of the same ilk as the God question -- they are both illogical, they are self contradictory. They make no sense starting, as they do, from fallacious premises. There is no evidence in support of propositions such as God, omniscience or destiny. Such propositions, literally, are nonsense.

I am honestly not sure what your point is. There is no way I can answer a question dealing with whether a human, with omniscient knowledge, can alter actions determined in advance. There is certainly no way to test any hypothesis, and I am not even sure how it would come out as a hypothetical. You say it is because both concepts are illogical. But it would seem that even assuming only the concept "omniscience" to be illogical but "determism" logical the same result would be obtained and the question be impossible to answer.

I am not particularly amused by the hostile tone of your post so this is the only response you will get from me on this matter.

[Communication Issues]

I may be oversimplifying what you just said, or I may misunderstand it entirely, but it appears to me that you are suggesting that Objectivism be changed for the sake of popularity with the academia. I would not expect that to be what you mean. I would expect you would say that it should be changed because there is something wrong with it that does not reflect reality.

Perhaps I should clarify. Objectivism should try to conform to accepted usage of terms as much as possible. This may mean that it forgoes some of its "pet" terms that have been redefined, so to that extent I guess I am advocating change. But this sort of change is one of language, not one of substance. I simply think that Objectivism can operate with words defined the way they are in everyday use and academic philosophy.

I think Objectivism could be less dogmatic, so I suppose you could say that is a change, even if only a procedural one. The problem as I said above is that Objectivism has so far resisted any change simply because it is change. I think this is one reason why there are so few (if any) Objectivism-influenced philosophers or books written from a Randian or Objectivist point of view. I view this as a bad thing.

I absolutely do not think that the tenets of Objectivism should be changed merely to make academics happy. For one thing, most academics are leftists and thus to appease them by changing the philosophy to be more left-leaning would be absurd. The part that needs to be changed to be more in conformity with academics is the terminology, not the substantive tenets.

I would tend to agree with the argument that the way it's presented by some may have a negative impact on it's acceptance, but I wholeheartedly disagree with changing something one thinks is right just for the sake of popularity or growth.

I agree. I don't think the philosophy should be "watered down" just so it is more popular with the masses. It is important, however, not to go out of the way to alienate the masses or academics when there is no good reason to do so. This is why I think redefinition and dogmatism are problems.

[On the question of free-will vs. determinism]

Is it reasonable to have a law against grimacing at another man? Volition says no; determinism says maybe?

Actually neither volition nor determinism determines whether it is reasonable or not. What determines it is the specific circumstances, the goal of the law in that context, the various policy determinations underlying that law, the evidentiary concerns, etc. You are wrong to look to a sub-issue of causation as being entirely determinative in any legal situation regardless of context.

Your difference (human action vs. human inaction) still doesn't distinguish reasonable/unreasonable.

As I said above, you are looking (wrongly) at only one factor. Of course human action/inaction doesn't determine liability in all instances. For instance, you may be liable for your inaction (omission) in several different circumstances. The determinative factor in your original hypothetical, however, was the lack of an act (or qualifying omission, for that matter) on Jerry's part which could lead to legal liability. Your new added information just complicates the anaylsis, I can go through its analysis if you wish.

[Communication Issues]

I absolutely hate that I can't mention Rand without getting flak for using her as a source.

I agree with this 100% and it completely describes my efforts at discussing objectivism in the mainstream academic community.

I was thinking of starting a new post called something like "The future of Objectivism?" but perhaps the thoughts would work just as well with this thread which already exists.

I agree with nimble about the redefinition problem. As I have said on the "possibility" thread, there is a problem with objectivism and redefining words in a way which is non-essential to the philosophy. For example with the possibility argument, it is easy to communicate Peikoff's position using only terms with the accepted philosophical meanings. Any small advantage which is gained by redefinition is lost ten-fold by the confusion and suspicion it creates. In some areas I can see the point in clarifying which definition objectivism uses, such as with the words "sacrafice" or "altruism" for example. The problem is that even with these words, objectivists seem to then assume everyone else uses their definition, even non-objectivists who rightly use the term according to its dictionary-accepted usage.

The related problem I see with objectivism in terms of its use in influencing the culture/academia is that it is entirely a static philosophy. Objectivism is, technically, the philosophy of Ayn Rand. There cannot be any changes to Rand's explicit views or methods in objectivism in order for it to be called "Objectivism." For instance, Peikoff is really just an editor, not a philosopher. His job was to create a unified source for Rand's views in OPAR, drawing on the scattered discussions she has in her numerous novels and papers. Peikoff could not add anything meaningful to the philsophy.

This is one of the reasons I think Rand is treated so harshly in academia. It is the fact that for real objectivists, you either accept Rand 100% or else you cannot be called an "Objectivist" at all. In a way this is understandible, as Rand herself was very demanding in terms of philosophic conformity. This is good in the sense that it preserves the essential meaning and purpose of the philosophy, but bad in that it means that objectivism can never be improved upon or changed, even if the changes are for the better. To quote a Bushism, with objectivism, "either you are with us or against us" there is no middle ground.

This is why objectivism is sometimes seen as a cult among academic circles. It is not seen as a cult because of the substantive tenets of objectivism, it is seen as a cult because it, to academics, seems structured as to inhibit communication between "members" (Objectivists) and outside academics, and because there is no room for academic debate within the realm of "Objectivist dogma."

Personally, I think this can change. And in changing, objectivism might finally get a fair hearing among academics who oftentimes are not even hostile to many of Ayn Rand's views. The one things academics like, though, is procedure and the exchange of different ideas. And to the extent that objectivism is hostile to this, academia will always be hostile to objectivism.

To those who think academia is "bunk" and academics frauds, then of course what I just wrote above may be discarded. But I think it is dangerous in the extreme to abandon the realm of ideas in the academic world thus I think this is an important issue.

[Do Objectivists Believe in Categorical Imperatives?]

As I said, if you have no counterargument or assertion that Peikoff's claim is something different than the quotes I found indicate, I think our discussion is at an end. I have neither the time nor the interest in finding every single quote in OPAR on the subject which might satisfy you.

[Do Objectivists Believe in Categorical Imperatives?]

It's your responsibility to provide substantive support for your position, not someone else's responsibility to shoot it down. If you don't have time for that, that don't make the assertion to begin with.

I did provide substantial support. What I am saying is that if KendallJ thinks my support is wrong, that is fine, it would then be easy to disprove with other quotes from Peikoff's book. The problem is that KendallJ seems to be saying I have mischaracterized Peikoff's position without saying how or what he thinks Peikoff's position actually is.

[On the question of free-will vs. determinism]

No, I'm not asking about that. We know that both Jerry and Terry are, to use the term, factual causes. And I'm not asking about intent; we know that both Jerry and Terry had intent to harm Harry.

1. Terry's intent is applied to Terry being a factual cause.
   
2. Jerry's intent is applied to Jerry being a factual cause.
   

I'm asking: can you prove (or even make a strong case) that one is reasonable and the other unreasonable?

I am afraid I just don't see what the problem is. I don't see how it is hard to see a difference between human action and human inaction in a legal context (that is exactly what the difference between them is.)

You're saying that determinism can answer the Jerry/Terry/Harry question, it's just that you either haven't, can't, or don't want to answer it qua "legal problem".

I never said determinism was the "answer" to the problem. I said from the start the question was a legal one and thus I could only really answer it as a legal problem, and then went on to explain what the compatibilist position was as applied to the problem. If you don't like the compatibilist position, that's fine. But that doesn't mean it doesn't provide an explanation of a legal framework of liability.

[Do Objectivists Believe in Categorical Imperatives?]

That's it???

I'm not even sure how your first quote is relevant to the request since it is a part of a phrase taken out of context, in a paragraph beginning "There is another derivative virtue to consider.." Hmm Peikoff keeps his essential arguments hidden in the discussions on derivative aspects of topics. I might think that he'd covered it better under the discussion of primaries which ought to come before this, eh.

To get to the 2nd quote you skip over the Chapters on "The Good", and "Virtue", and take this one out of the subsequent chapter on "Happiness". (which by definition ought to deal with some psychological factors, one might think). Are you suggesting that nowhere in the first 2 chapters does Peikoff give a basic reasons against intiation of physical force, considering that is where he develops the arguments.

I always marvel at your selection of passages.

If you have a counter-argument or better passages, go ahead and cite them. I explained that I don't have time to search through the entire OPAR book to find the absolute "best" quotes to support my argument. If you think the quotes don't conform with Peikoff's views, then find some you think do.

[On the question of free-will vs. determinism]

You say that it is reasonable to punish X if and only if X causes harm and X weighs the prohibitions of causing harm in such a way that it is applied/attached to the causing of harm.

This is oversimplied, for instance harm is not required in criminal law, only in torts.

How do you determine whether a person's weighing of the prohibitions of causing harm is applied/attached to the causing of harm?

This essentially is asking two questions. First, how factual cause is determined. Second, how is it possible to judge intent or culpable mental states. Determining factual cause is relatively easy because it is a fact-based, essentially scientific inquiry no different than in any other area of scientific knowledge. Determining culpable mental states is much harder because it is (at least today) impossible to determine what a person thought at any given instance when they acted. Determining what type of mental processes or levels of consciousness a person had is almost always a circumstantial inquiry.

In terms of the philosophic question, if you can't objectively determine this, then you can't determine when/if it is reasonable to punish someone and when/if it is unreasonable.

Again, it depends on what you mean by "objectively." If by it you mean a 100% certain process, then no, there is no "objective" way to tell. If you mean by "objective" simply a reasonable process to determine the correct result which is applied across all individual fact-patterns, then yes, there is an objective way to determine it. You simply cannot demand too high a level of accuracy in law/morality.

[On the question of free-will vs. determinism]

And because Jerry's reasoning didn't cause the bodily harm, it is unreasonable to make Jerry accountable for the bodily harm?

First off, it is rather annoying to deal with these questions. If you have some line of questioning you want to put forth to me, please just bring it out at the same time if possible.

To answer this question, the law would say that it would be unreasonable to hold him accountable. The problem with discussing the whole line of questioning is that people should be held accountable for is essentially a legal, not a philosophical, question. Philosophy tells you the goals and principles, law turns those into a workable, practical framework. Because of this legal responsibility doesn't always track moral responsibility.

[Do Objectivists Believe in Categorical Imperatives?]

Could you provide references for this?

"The brute stifles at the root the process on which his own survival depends" OPAR p. 315

"The irrational man is inevitably tortured. Success of his kind ... is a threat, attainment brings anxiety, desire is guilt, self-esteem is self-loathing...." OPAR p.337

There may be more support in OPAR but this will likely do for now, it can be hard to find specific topics in OPAR because they are often discussed in multiple sections and subheadingless paragraphs.

I think the two main objectivist justifications for the blanket prohibition on rights violation are not really at issue here, but their application is.

I am mainly worried that there is slippage at the edges of the justifications. There seems to be a risk/benefit disparity in holding that the initation of force always has great practical detriments to the initiator due to its degradation of society. There also seems to be a lot of risk in holding that psychological harms will always exist. Neither Rand nor OPAR provide any psychological evidence for their conclusions, it is based entirely on the opinions of lay-persons. Too, the psychological harms (even if all true) seem to stem from the violation of societal norms, not from the violation of rights. IE, if you had a society in which what we could call "rights" were routinely violated yet this society did not consider this a moral wrong, you would likely have none of the psychological harms.

[On the question of free-will vs. determinism]

Pretty much.

[Do Objectivists Believe in Categorical Imperatives?]

Could you provide references for this?

I would have to find the other threads on this forum where the topic was discussed. I might just search up the relevant sections in OPAR later tonight and provide references to that.

[On the question of free-will vs. determinism]

But what do you mean there was no conduct on his part?

I understand that you're saying he didn't intend his conduct, but nevertheless there was conduct (perhaps unintended) on his part, wasn't there? He did act in such a way that caused harm to another person.

The law would say that he didn't act at all. The fact that he was historically involved in a causal chain doesn't mean he acted. In a similar example, you could say that Jerry was asleep, and Terry put a gun in his hand, pointed it at Harry and squeezed Jerry's finger against the trigger until the gun fired.

[On the question of free-will vs. determinism]

How do you know his involvement wasn't guided by reason?

Because there was no conduct on his part. There is no point where Jerry weighed the legal/moral prohibition on injury and then acted. You might still argue that Jerry was causally involved, although even this is debatable depending on how broadly you draw the "but for" test.

Again, I am working on the basis of the facts provided. If Jerry had decided to stand where he was with the expectation that he would be pushed by Terry, then the situation is different.

[Do Objectivists Believe in Categorical Imperatives?]

The fact that, if you want to live, it is never in your interest to violate the rights of others is just that: a fact of reality.

This is false. At best, objectivism't argument for not violating rights is that it increases the risk of your own rights being violated plus some rather murky psychological harms. But due to the assymetry of benefit/risk there are some situations in which violating the rights of others is in your interest. That doesn't mean it is morally right however.

[On the question of free-will vs. determinism]

Even the moral issues in the problem are complicated, and with the legal angle added even more so. I am trying to keep the thread from turning into a discussion of the extent of moral responsibility for actions.

[On the question of free-will vs. determinism]

So from Vladimir's viewpoint, [T]erry is legally "reponsible", but morally neutral since he was determined?

That would be the position of a "hard" determinist, which I am not. On the more modern compatibilist view, Terry may be held responsible to the extent that his actions were guided by reason.

You give two criteria for " person X intentionally did action Y":

X had a conscious objective or desire to do Y.

X caused the action Y.

• Jerry had a conscious objective or desire to harm Harry.
  
• Jerry caused harm to Harry.
  
• Therefore, Jerry intentionally harmed Harry.
  

In determinism, it is impossible to determine who fundamentally caused Harry's harm. A long chain of people "had to" act in order for Harry to be ultimately harmed, and any of these people, all of them, or none of them could be (according to determinism?) reasonably held accountable. In your case we add the conditional of desire, but isn't the essential point the same?

In criminal law all the liability I discussed presupposes "conduct" on the part of the person in question. The reason why Jerry's mental intention doesn't matter is because in criminal mental intention only matters to the extent it is applied to some conduct, and in this case Jerry didn't "do" anything. There was no conduct by Jerry to which a culpable mental state might be attached.

As to causation, in short there are two issues there. There is factual cause, in which you really do have a "long chain of people" brought in as factual causes. There is also the scope of liability (aka "proximate cause") which decides to cut off the chain at certain points for normative reasons. And, remember, before causation is even an issue you need to have an intentional, reckless or negligent act, a duty and breach, or some other element to form a basis for liabiltiy. Causation doesn't act alone to establish legal responsibility.

In a volitional system, causing (i.e. choosing to) harm is fundamentally different from being caused to harm. With such a distinguishing premise, we can categorize a legal system that punishes Jerry as unreasonable.

Volitional (aka "libertarian") systems of legal responsibility have all sorts of wierd results and problems of their own, but the subject is rather beside the point here. I will try to post my law review student note I am writing on the subject on forum when it is complete.

Philosophically, determinism doesn't have such a luxury. Punishing Jerry is (in determinism) just as reasonable as punishing Terry; it's merely a legal question as to which "reasonable" system is (deterministically) enacted.

In the compatibilist system, that is not the case. It would be unreasonable to punish Jerry because Jerry's causal involvement in the ultimate harm was not guided by reason in any way. Terry, however, was guided by reason to the extent he disregarded the moral and legal imperatives not to cause intentional harm to another.

[On the question of free-will vs. determinism]

Oh, it's philosophical all right...

In a deterministic world, what do you mean by "intentional"?

As I said, this is essentially a legal question. Conduct is intentional when it is in his conscious objective or desire to cause the result.

[On the question of free-will vs. determinism]

Man, this thread is getting intricate!You might like this one, Vladimir.

Terry, Jerry, and Harry are standing together. Terry and Jerry both want to harm Harry, but Terry acts on this desire. Terry pushes Jerry into Harry, which causes Harry to break an arm.

Jerry's decision to break Harry's arm is guided by reason; can Jerry be held responsible?

This is essentially a legal question, not a philosophical one. For Terry you have the possibility of civil and criminal liability. For Jerry at best you have the possibility of civil liability.

Terry is going to be liable criminally for assault by intentionally causing the bodily injury to Harry. He is also going to be liable for the (civil) tort of battery and perhaps also assault. Proving causation would likely be the same in each instance.

Jerry is not going to be held criminally liable because there was no intentional or reckless act on his part based on the facts given. Likewise there is no intentional tort liability. Perhaps you could find him liable under a negligence standard because of his location at the time of Terry's act but this seems a stretch.

Remember, that under the law causation does not equal legal responsibility. Causation is simply one element that must be proved in various areas. Thus you can have situations where an individual is the factual cause of an injury but not liable for the harm.

[On the question of free-will vs. determinism]

??? O...???K...???, so let us construct this hypothetically semi-omniscient computer. I go to visit this crystal ball, I mean computer, and discover that I am going to get hit by a bus the minute I leave. Can I then avoid the bus?

This is essentially a problem dealing with the concept of omniscience, rather than one dealing particularly with free will. I really have no way to answer it, in the same way I can't answer the question "Can God create a stone so heavy he can't lift it?" The truth is that we really have no idea how omniscience would actually work, and how telling someone their predicted future would or would not influence the result.