DonAthos

Oh man, I dunno who you are or where you've been, but you need to stick around! I have nothing to add to your post except my agreement and thanks. (The "like" option isn't showing up for me on your post, so consider this my "like.")

I wasn't around for the 60s protests, but I remember the controversy over flag burning from my childhood (the 80s). It may be that many folks on the left were simply motivated by a sort of "anti-Americanism," but I still think it right that a person should be able to "burn a flag" (i.e. destroy their own property) without interference from the government. Casting it as "free speech" or even "political free speech" may be besides the point (or it may be a vital component), regardless I still think it's a right which needs protection. Also, I had an awareness of, say, the ACLU defending even Nazis in their right to peaceably assemble -- which is one of those areas where, now, the left may be faltering and the right may be picking up the slack. I'm still unsure about some of the motivations behind these shifts, but regardless: Nazis ought to have their right to peaceably assemble protected. In these, and other matters, it seemed to me growing up that the left was the better defender of "free speech." But as I say, I think that might be changing... As for respect towards individual rights or the Constitution, I think it's a case-by-case basis. I don't think that many people on the left or the right have a sincere interest in those things today, except that they are sometime useful leverage for some battle. That said, there are people on both the left and the right who do take those things seriously; part of my long journey to my current Objectivist beliefs was based on my respect for individual rights and the Constitution -- and I came from the left. Oh yeah, there were also the leftist crusades against obscenity in rap and violence in video games, and so forth (where we sometimes see alliances between elements on the left and right, like Christian activist groups), not to mention today's "hate speech" and so forth. Quickly though, Google and YouTube, being private entities, do have the right to their own policies (just as this website does "censor" certain posts). This should take place without governmental interference, obviously. Bleh, screw those people. You follow your passion.

I think this is perfectly reasonable, even if I come to a slightly different position. Red and Blue? A pox on both their houses -- they're all statists. But I prefer the Dems on immigration (which I'm sure we'll discuss at some point), and certain rights issues (you've mentioned a couple of them), so that's probably how I lean. And so, I would rather live in a blue state (and I do). It's funny, because I think this is changing -- but one of my most important issues (from childhood, well before my Objectivist "conversion") has always been free speech. And I've always found the Democrats to be the more consistent (though by no means consistent) guardian of free speech rights. This is probably no longer true; I don't know how things will shake out over the next few years, but it seems like the Republicans are taking up the free speech mantle (though maybe not as quickly as the Dems are dropping it). If that shakes down culturally to the red states, I might prefer to live there before too long. I think tendencies like these are often about what is most important to us personally. Since neither Red nor Blue are champions of liberty, which violations are most egregious to us probably depend on the context of our own lives. For instance, support of slavery and Jim Crow laws made Democratic support in the south untenable for most blacks for a very, very long time -- and I think that's understandable. And I know a few women who, however much they might be willing to discuss "economic issues" and liberty, would never vote Republican so long as the Republicans are hostile to abortion rights. Again, I think that's understandable. Why should anyone laugh at you for your project? You may be interested in a book I've read called "The Console Wars" which, among other things, discusses the creation of the Sonic character. We also disagree about Trump, deeply, but we'll have occasion to discuss that in the future, I'm sure. If I haven't said it before, welcome to the forum!

I agree with this. I would only note, to try to further press the point that I have been attempting to make, that Peikoff uses the term "assessment," and so do I. The decision that I am "certain" of something is only so good as the assessment I have made, the conclusion that I've reached (in my particular context). Considering myself "certain" of some conclusion, in itself, doesn't speak to whether I've made proper assessments along the way -- and many people consider themselves "certain" of things, and are wrong. And so, I think it a poor policy, in general, to refuse to examine or reconsider those matters of which we are certain. This is, again, easy to understand when we're talking about other people who hold beliefs we consider to be obviously false (the people who are "certain" that Jesus rose from the dead, say) -- "stop," we would say to such people, "forget that you're 'certain' of your belief and check your premises!" -- and yet I do not exempt myself from the requirement, because even an Objectivist may consider himself certain of a thing and be wrong. I agree with Peikoff here, too. If we try to translate all of this into concrete terms, or a situation (even a hypothetical), we might have a better appreciation for this sort of "certainty." Which is to say "certainty in context." Let's suppose (as is true) that I believe that Bigfoot does not exist. Let us suppose that I consider myself certain of this knowledge. I hold myself to be certain in this way because, "in a given context of knowledge [that is: my knowledge of the world], the evidence for X [here: the non-existence of Bigfoot] is conclusive." With due respect to the supposed difficulty of "proving a negative," let us say (in the manner of Sagan's "Dragon in My Garage," if that means anything to you) that I'm satisfied that all of the extant "evidence" (that we have not found fossils, skeletons, living Bigfeet, etc., etc., despite having explored so much of the planet's surface) supports the hypothesis that "Bigfoot does not exist" and that there is no evidence to support any alternative. Okay, I think this is fair enough, if I understand Peikoff right (and I invite correction if you think I do not). Bigfoot does not exist and I am justifiably certain of it. Yet now let's suppose that a close friend approaches me and asserts that he has found Bigfoot while roaming in the woods. My context has now changed. I now have information I did not have before -- or as you put it, "the facts available to me" have increased. And my assessment of evidence (whether all of the evidence now points to the non-existence of Bigfoot, or whether there is evidence to support an alternate) must accordingly change (depending on a host of factors, including my assessment of my friend's reliability, and etc.). Suppose I go with my friend to trace his steps (perhaps expressing substantial doubt in his narrative, yet wanting to humor him out of affection)... and... I find large footprints in the woods. That's yet more information. And then suppose we track the footprints and discover a cave, and in that cave I find an eight foot tall, hairy ape-like man (or man-like ape, or whatever). At some point (perhaps not yet this point; perhaps some point in the future, following DNA testing and consulting a psychiatrist and what not), it may well be that I now consider myself certain that Bigfoot exists. (We can expect stages in between, from the first "certainty" to the second, where I consider myself unsatisfied, or doubtful, of all sorts of things.) What this means to me here and now is not that I "doubt" the claim that Bigfoot does not exist. Bigfoot does not exist. I am certain of it. Yet I also recognize that there are things which could theoretically happen which would necessitate me to revise my beliefs. And as to why that recognition matters, it may influence me if/when I'm in a situation (or an analogous one) where a friend of mine insists that he has seen Bigfoot. If I am certain that Bigfoot does not exist, and if that "certainty" means to me that I will never discover evidence to the contrary (because no such "evidence" could possibly exist), then maybe I am less inclined even to humor my friend. Maybe I would miss out on the discovery of the century (and also the opportunity to exchange a false belief for a true one). I think this is on the right track. The danger is when we sunder some conclusion from the possibility of re-evaluation, even in the face of important or relevant new information (there's more to be said on this point); if human beings need criteria by which they can decide when it is not necessary to re-evaluate their conclusions, then we also need criteria by which we can decide when it is necessary -- and then we need the willingness and ability to do so.

Now see, your question leads me to the problem I have with how people typically conceive of "certainty" (or at least how that conception presents itself in discussion). I think I'd mentioned elsewhere that "certainty" (like evasion) needs further exploration, and I don't know if I'm equipped for it at present. But as a shorthand, if we look at the skills necessary for what I believe to be "good thinking," which includes strategies for rooting out one's own potential for evasiveness, and etc., and say -- "well, yes -- but when can we be certain?" -- then we are looking for the wrong thing. The process of being willing to examine (and re-examine) one's own beliefs, in the face of new evidence or new arguments (or even a fresh perspective) doesn't have a stopping point, a point at which you can rest and not perform any of that work anymore. It is an ongoing process. Certainty, whatever it is, cannot be threatened or compromised by the idea that we must be on guard against the possibility of our own evasion. Peikoff says of "certainty": "Idea X is 'certain' if, in a given context of knowledge, the evidence for X is conclusive. In such a context, all the evidence supports X and there is no evidence to support any alternative..." And this is fine; I use "certainty" in, I'm sure, this way (or very nearly so). But all of these assessments that we make (for instance, when we decide that "all the evidence supports X" or "there is no evidence to support any alternative") -- there is yet the potential that we may make a mistake in such an assessment. When we consider ourselves certain about X, that is not some guarantee for the correctness of X (or the correctness of our evaluation of our own certainty) such that we are permitted to stop thinking. I'm not saying that we cannot consider ourselves "certain" on some given point. We can. (And in fact, I think we must.) But this does not relieve us from the duties of thinking, of rooting out the potential error -- even in those cases where we consider ourselves certain.

Agreed. (And yes, those are the sorts of things I had in mind.) Absolutely. And sometimes people are dishonest. I agree. Someday I plan on digging fully into evasion, which is one of those topics I find fascinating, but for now: if we allow that an evasive person does not necessarily know when he's being evasive (at least with full, conscious awareness), then I would argue that it yet falls on those who do not consider themselves to be evading to develop strategies for rooting out their own evasiveness... even when and where they don't think it applies to them! Primarily this comes down to behaviors, or habits, or, as you say, "rules." I've noticed that a lot of times in threads and running conversations, people will just let a question sit there and go unanswered. And the question can come up again and again, and still the second party will not answer the question (oftentimes without outright refusal, but just through ignoring it). There may be a variety of reasons why this is so, yet I also associate this potentially with evasion; and so, I've made it my policy to try to answer questions asked of me throughout a debate, even (or especially) when my first "instinct" is to leave the question unanswered. It may not be a magic bullet, and I might not always succeed in my efforts, but that's one of the ways I seek to guard against my own evasiveness, even when I am utterly convinced of the correctness of my position. I have come to believe that there are several behaviors that can be associated with evasion, and I'm working to identify and address them in my personal habits. I agree with you that this sort of thing is not exclusive to the "orthodoxy," and may be true of many "heretics" as well, but I do believe that it is characteristic of the current Objectivist "orthodoxy" (and sometimes, in itself, constitutes a point of departure with perceived "heretics"). I believe it's one of the things (though not the only thing) holding Objectivism back. It's also what would, in part, sink any potential Objectivist society, as raised in this thread. Splintering, schisms, denunciations... no thanks to all that. The spirit which would characterize a truly rational community -- the kind of place good human beings would actually want to live in, and associate themselves with -- has been underserved in Objectivist literature, imo.

I'm currently reading Blink by Malcolm Gladwell, which I find fascinating for many reasons (and recommend for the same). At one point within the book. Gladwell discusses market research where, for instance, one brand of whiskey (Christian Brothers) was losing market share to a similarly priced competitor (E&J Gallo). When tested blind, consumers preferred the Christian Brothers; when tested, knowing which was which by name, consumers preferred the Christian Brothers; when tested after seeing the drinks poured from their bottle, only then did consumers prefer the E&J; and when tested after switching the bottles, pouring Christian Brothers from the E&J bottle and vice-versa, consumers preferred the Christian Brothers by a wider margin than ever before. Every time the consumers described themselves as preferring the choice they did according to taste. I bring this up because I like the questions Carts raises in the OP. Over the last several years, I have come to believe that one of the things the Objectivist community needs to begin considering is how we present ourselves in society. Perhaps if more of the world gave Objectivism a sincere reading -- a real chance (whatever we think would constitute that) -- they would come to agree with the essential arguments and ideas therein. But currently they do not allow Objectivism that sincere reading, that real chance, because their initial associations dissuade them from it. I think it at least possible that the Objectivist brand is toxic, or perhaps our "packaging" is insufficient, or both, and if Rand expected Objectivist ideas to spread more quickly through society than it has done, this is perhaps part of the reason why.

How people behave with or without PTSD in these sorts of situations -- unable to move, or etc. -- I think is mostly a question for scientists (including psychologists), and what we find "likely" or "unlikely" (especially to a layperson) seems to be a poor standard for settling such questions. Regardless, I think that PTSD is besides the point (and it wasn't mentioned in the original example). Sally "froze up," not because this is typical or even realistic, but because the author said so. The entire example is contrived, and poorly described, and it was probably a mistake to introduce it as a conversation starter (if we want the resulting conversation to be reasonable, at least), but if we're going to discuss it then we have to take it as it is: Sally froze up. No PTSD required, it's simply what she did, plausible or not.

The nature of certainty, I believe, is something which needs to be explored further. I think that many folks (Objectivist and other) are looking for some permanent, final fix, such that whatever ideas or opinions they hold, they never need be challenged again, or subject to error, or revisited. I guess I understand the emotional motivation, but I question the pursuit overall, and I think its fruits rotten. Once someone reaches the point that they no longer are willing to entertain the possibility of their being mistaken, they are cut off from further rational discourse. If we read this as me talking about, oh, religionists, then we within the Objectivist community will typically have a reaction of "oh, of course!" or similar. We would advise a religionist to "check his premises," even if he considers himself quite certain of the truth of his beliefs, and if he is not willing to do so, we would recognize that he will never be in the position to correct his errors. But if we read this as me talking about people within the Objectivist community, then all sorts of defenses are typically activated: what's this about "possibility" (and how does it relate to the "arbitrary"), and aren't some things proven beyond the point of doubt (and aren't the axioms immune), and what specific Objectivist ideas do I find questionable, and etc. Yet there are a plethora of debates within the Objectivist community (to which this forum stands testament), and on that basis alone, we should not be insensitive to the need to continue to examine and re-examine our own ideas, to "check our premises" even against our own experience of certainty (which, again, needs further exploration). We all seem to consider ourselves "certain" -- even when and where we disagree with one another. Without what you describe as "an openness to seemingly untrue ideas," we are all sunk. We rely on that openness from people outside of the Objectivist community, if we mean to spread our ideas (without an openness to seemingly untrue ideas, I would never have read Ayn Rand in the first place); and we must recognize it as virtuous in ourselves, as well, if we mean to continue to eliminate the errors in our thinking. I think no one has the obligation to try to convince another person of the truth of any given position (except as is necessitated by the pursuit of one's own values). So we all have the right to communicate, or not, as best suits our individual lives. But it is a separate question as to when we may justly conclude that another person cannot be reached by reason. (And, further, to distinguish this from failures in communication; I may present a sound argument well or poorly, in a given context, and if I present my argument poorly, it may not be your "fault" if you reject it.) It's a tricky question, especially since I've found that some people may be quite rational with respect to certain subjects, and highly irrational or dishonest or evasive or etc., with respect to others. In general, I try to extend the "benefit of the doubt" as far as I can, and to keep all of the relevant context in mind; some people are very bad at expressing themselves (and we all struggle at times), and in my experience there's great potential to confuse such poor communication with moral failure. This does not even begin to touch the subject of the process by which people discard bad ideas and adopt good ones; I have again found that "coming to truth" is a process which plays out over time, and it does not always proceed in a clear, straight line, or instantaneously. Some people express confusions honestly, or are mistaken honestly, or take (sometimes large amounts of) time to process ideas, and the ability to distinguish this from someone who is fundamentally irrational is... hard won, at best. And then: people can change. But, as above, I think we can recognize approaches that are not conducive to reasoning, and work on improving our own mental (and social) habits.

While we might think that philosophical compatibility should help to create a more cooperative group, there are seeming features of the Objectivist community that lead me to wonder... Many Objectivists approach the philosophy quite dogmatically. It sometimes seems like the smallest deviation from what is perceived to be orthodox opinion (or behavior) is met with strong rejection. Regardless of whether someone thinks this kind of behavior is appropriate for rational human beings, I'm not certain it makes for a cohesive or cooperative society. I think these are issues that we can overcome, and probably should, before we try to create our own community.

Yes. If the morality of actions were only assessed ex post facto, then morality would not serve us as a guide to action in the present. Choices must be made and they must be made in context. That context includes an individual's knowledge of consequences -- which, yes, may be incomplete or faulty. Yet he must choose regardless. The kind of morality that is available to men (that is to say, the only kind of "morality" that is possible, or worth taking seriously) is based upon anticipated consequences, even when a given individual turns out to have been mistaken. It is a mistake to morally judge a person (importantly including the self) for consequences that were not available to that person, in reason, in the context in which the choice was made or action committed. Yet there is also an important connection between anticipated and actual consequences; when these diverge, actual consequences are the very things which might (or must) lead us to "check our premises." We only arrive at "anticipated consequences," in reason, through the ongoing examination of actual consequences.

I had tried to anticipate this sort of thing here: If one takes "selfish" to include those acts which destroy others (i.e. via the initiation of the use of force), then neither is selfishness necessarily moral. But if one is rational in his selfishness, I would argue that he is moral; and, too, a moral man would make a rational appeal to consequences. An Objectivist would reject the supposed morality (or the morality of the actions) of a man who wound up justly and characteristically impoverished, downtrodden, etc., etc., yet accidentally stumbled over some sort of buried treasure, say. But why? Have we sundered morality from consequence? Not at all. In the first place, we recognize that one may not be assured of stumbling over such treasures; that acting in the ways that characteristically lead to impoverishment are, more often than not, going to result in impoverishment, not wealth. And that this will probably be true over a long enough span of time as well (if the lucky man who stumbled over the treasure above does not amend his ways, it is likely he will return to his poverty and poor fortune soon enough). And then there is the fact that "life" in the sense of "that which causes life" or "consequence of enhancing life" is rather broad. It is not wealth alone, it is not longevity alone, and so forth. The full flourishing that we seek is unlikely to be found accidentally; and the man who has death as his just due but is kept alive through accident (as in tripping over buried treasure) will probably yet be suffering in many aspects of his life, and perhaps also through psychological awareness of his precarious state. Yet in all of this, supposed "virtues" are not accounted virtue for their own sake; they are virtuous due to the consequences that the Objectivist expects in adopting them as principled approaches to living -- with the ultimate consequence being the Objectivist's experience of his own life, or happiness.

I can't speak much to the term "consequentialism" in the context of the history of philosophy, but I wonder... If I said that I planned on pursuing a flourishing life by any means necessary -- and that I will judge (and amend) my efforts by their success in winning me a flourishing life -- what would we make of it? Would this put me in the "consequentialist" camp? Would it be outside the bounds of Objectivism? It is potentially a danger to reject principled thinking in the face of some accident. If I stop at red lights because I do not want to get into an auto accident, but one day I stop and... BANG, someone hits me from behind, I would not therefore abandon my strategy of stopping at red lights. But this does not change the fact that I adopt and maintain the approach of stopping at red lights in order to avoid such accidents. What an Objectivist means to do by adopting "principles" -- isn't this according to the consequences he expects through the adoption of such principles? Maybe that's not what's conventionally meant by "consequentialism," but it is what it is.

Maybe this remains true. It seems that few in this thread take seriously the idea that war could erupt from these Tweets going back and forth -- and truly it is an absurd notion. Maybe Nicky's idea that this is all going according to some widely endorsed political strategy is sound, and will prove correct. But I find this to be a concerning development.

I think the problem really starts because self-improvement is not the focus. I think you're both right. The outward/political focus versus self-improvement or the pursuit of personal happiness, and also the combative style... though not necessarily so much Rand's (though that's part of the issue), as that of Objectivists who try to ape her style. In my experience, most Objectivists have no idea how to talk to people outside of the Objectivist community, and no apparent desire to try to distinguish those who might be fundamentally open to reason, yet mistaken on one or several points. How to talk to people, to discuss ideas, to persuade -- both within and outside of Objectivism -- is a topic that is not only under-explored, but is regarded with outright suspicion by some. Some people seem content to pass moral judgement and condemn others to hell, rather than the (admittedly more difficult) project of examining their own methods of communication. I have found that many Objectivists have the reputation of being "assholes"; so much so that it's arguably regarded as characteristic. I don't think it's even undeserved. But it doesn't have to be so. I've known many utterly pleasant and polite Objectivists, and I see no reason why someone cannot be both correct and nice. Even our expressions of anger, where merited, can stand critical examination and improvement. Above all, I think that empathy is a vital characteristic (I would not go so far as to say that it is a "virtue," because I am not prepared for the argument -- but I'm not dismissing it either). I've used this analogy before, and I think it still serves: Objectivists have the best product on the market. We have truth. We have reason and reality on our side -- and despite what you may have heard (and despite humanity's checkered history), reason and reality are fairly persuasive forces. They keep all of us alive, every day, and have formed the basis for all of humanity's many achievements. So despite everything we're working against (deeply ingrained cultural forces, including academia, the media, and political institutions), I think Objectivism stands poised to remake the world. What we need -- what any great product needs -- is sales. We need to examine and re-examine (and re-examine again) our means and methods of communicating our ideas to a world which is frankly starving for reason, for peace, for happiness. We must continue to improve upon our approach until we succeed.

Is that even the argument others are making, that "she means yes now"? I mean, we have her inner experience as well as her thoughts afterwards -- at no point does she decide, "yes, I want this." I mean, maybe I'm being naive, but at least we can all agree on that much. Right? It seems to me that the best argument the "not rape" folks can make is that Sally's communications were ambiguous, so that either 1) in a courtroom, it would be hard or impossible to prove rape; or 2) it was reasonable for Chris to think Sally was okay with his penetration, so he's acting morally in the situation. With respect to 1) I agree that it might be hard or impossible to prove rape, but such a legal context (which you'll note comes up time and again in certain arguments) is not the only context in which we can discuss rape; if rape were made legal tomorrow, we could still recognize a rape for what it is -- even if there were no associated criminal penalty. With respect to 2) I cannot agree that it was reasonable for Chris to think Sally had changed her mind from earlier, and I do not think that the details of the narrative support the idea that Chris did think Sally had changed her mind, whether that would be reasonable for him or not. We do not know Chris's internal experience as we do Sally's -- just as in life, we are restricted to a single point of view -- but his actions take Sally by surprise, and I think that it is reasonable to infer that he designed them for just such a purpose. Given that she had told him (on more than one occasion, including that very night) that she did not want to have sex, and given that he penetrated her by surprise, in the darkness, I think it reasonable to conclude that he selected his means as a way of circumventing her expressed will, her lack of consent. Whatever we believe happens thereafter, Chris knew Sally did not want this, yet he did it to her anyways. Whether we call that "rape" or not (though we should, because it is), it is not innocent, moral behavior. I agree -- and I also think that much of the "not rape" argument hinges on this idea that if you do not actively resist a thing, then you must consent to it. Recently in my community, a bank was robbed. From what I've been told, the robber approached the teller's window and gave the teller a slip of paper, indicating the fact of the robbery. There was no weapon involved -- or at least, no weapon indicated, no overt threat made. The teller received the paper and proceeded to give the bank's money to the robber, as per bank policy. There was no struggle. No shootout. No frantic screams for help. So was this, perhaps, not really robbery? Maybe the teller was consenting to the transfer of property -- because he did not say "no" -- and maybe it was reasonable for the robber to think that the teller had decided to give up the funds of his own accord. Perhaps we should not call a mugging a mugging unless the "victim" winds up with scraps of the muggers' flesh under his fingernails. For many people do not actively fight back against a mugging -- they simply comply with the muggers' demands. And if I ask to borrow some item from you, and you say "no," perhaps a few hours later it is reasonable for me to suppose that you have changed your mind, and take that item from you (even under cover of darkness, taking you unawares). Perhaps that is not theft. Besides all of this analogical thinking (which I know no one hostile to my conclusions will support, because analogy always is subject to the critique that "these are different situations," though that is rather the point of an analogy), I did introduce a study about people "freezing up" during rape. Here is another article talking about the same sort of phenomenon. I know some have said that such a reaction is unrealistic, that it's not human nature, that it doesn't happen in reality, etc... but suppose that this does happen, as these scientists and studies seem to indicate? Then I think we have to reconsider the idea that a "failure" to actively resist a rape somehow makes it other than a rape.

Yeah, it was clearly a joke. Whether it's a joking matter or not is a separate question, but I think this whole thing is an overreaction regardless. Outrageous, but not particularly surprising. Bravo to that nurse, except that I think many people trying to assert their rights (or the rights of others) in the face of the police are playing a very dangerous game. At least we have bodycams, cell phones, etc., now, to better document some of these kinds of incidents.

Could you provide any specific reference to help me see the point you're making?

Here's a recent, well-written article touching on many of the topics discussed in this thread.

Broadly, I agree. Rather, I would say that the political aims which we would see as characteristically Nazi or socialist (or liberal or conservative), that is anti-liberty, would be constitutionally disallowed. Rand wrote about a "separation of state and economics" (or something to that effect), and given such a separation, there would be no (constitutional) reason why a Nazi or a socialist could not perform the legitimate offices of government. Assuming that those offices were subject to election, recall, impeachment, etc., then a Nazi or socialist who acts as a Nazi or socialist could not expect to hold office long or do much damage while in power... of course, this is assuming two further things: 1) A proper system of checks and balances. 2) A culture which supports liberty. Given these things: a constitution enshrining liberty, proper checks and balances on our political institutions, and a culture which further supports liberty, then I think we have nothing left to fear from Nazis or socialists in the political sphere.

To me, all such questions fundamentally resolve as: when does the individual have the right to defend himself against the initiation of force? And my answer to that question is: always. The specifics of how that defense may best be prosecuted depend upon a wealth of complicated information, and upon what we may expect, in reality, to follow from our choices. If a group of Objectivists could found Galt's Gulch in all of its glory tomorrow, and successfully defend it against foreign invasion, etc., then would there be a good (i.e. moral) reason why they ought not do so? I think not. But that is not to say that it would be good to throw up some compound today and stockpile arms, etc., because in reality that would only lead to destruction (and to be frank, I'm not yet convinced that the Objectivist community is ready to found their own nation in any event; we have a lot of work yet to do). A milk producer has every right to defend himself against those who come to collect, but morality further requires that he only do so without self-sacrifice, without self-immolation. Currently my life, and I expect the lives of most people (especially within the context of a country like the US), runs far more smoothly with general adherence to the law. That said, if someone's life could be improved, in reason, through disobedience to the law -- well, what is the reason why he ought not act to improve his life? To what greater good would we ask him to sacrifice his own, personal interests? As to the question of whether those who vote for the initiation of force are responsible for that initiation of force, of course they are (as are the bureaucrats and enforcers). But the use of force in self-defense -- which is a topic that I believe could stand far more examination in Objectivist circles -- is not a free-for-all. That force has been initiated does not, I believe, justify retaliatory force outside of the reasonable expectation that something better can be won by it (and in no case would it ever justify the targeting of the innocent); the fight to create Galt's Gulch may be justified, in certain contexts, but terrorism would not.

For that matter, I'm sure we would have difficulty, too, drawing a line on a spectrum of color between green and blue. But green is green, not blue; and blue is blue, not green. There may be similarities between Marxists and "run-of-the-mill leftists," and similarities between Nazis and "run-of-the-mill rightists," but that does not make everyone on the left a Marxist anymore than everyone on the right is a Nazi. And the run-of-the-mill rightist is not? Maybe this will come down to what we consider to be "mainstream," but if we consider the right to constitute about half of the country, and to hold power in the Executive, Legislative, Judicial and majority of State governments, and to dominate our rural areas, and the southern portion of our country, and to be strongly represented in our majority ethnicities and religions... well, I'd consider that fairly mainstream. Do you mean that leftists prescribe textbooks and rightists do not? But if we're talking about run-of-the-mill rightists (who may or may not aspire to the school board), I'd guess that there are plenty of places in and across the country where there's watercooler talk in admiration of President Trump and praising the sort of nationalistic, populist garbage Trump and his ilk advocate. Why, it even happens on this board, to what ought to be our disgust. I think it worth keeping in mind that when we discuss taking down statues of Robert E. Lee, et al., those statues (and parks and flags and associated memorials) only exist in the first place because the Confederacy was a real thing that existed in what is today this country, and because those societies chose to erect those statues (and maintain them thereafter) to celebrate that Confederacy and its institutions. Whatever Marxists have accomplished in academia (which was the specific context under discussion earlier -- tenured professors), and whatever the ills of the mixed economy, the United States has never been a Marxist country. It has countenanced actual human slavery, however. Not the metaphorical kind of slavery that we Objectivists like to lament, but the actual kind, with genuine chains and whips. And if that seems like a too-remote past to be worth our consideration, we have also had institutionalized racial discrimination in our laws, since our inception, until so recently that there are still people able to participate in these sorts of discussions who lived through those times, both suffering under it and causing others to suffer. Whatever success Marxism has had in infiltrating this country, I'd guess it has been wildly less successful than the kind of racism that stood behind the Confederacy, and Jim Crow, under the sorts of banners that were yet again on the march at Charlottesville.

So, here's something I find funny... Earlier in the thread, New Buddha had said: And I agreed to this, in a certain sense -- that I reject the "left versus right" dichotomy. The reason why, when I compare Antifa to neo-Nazis (or the "alt-left" to the "alt-right"), or the sides more specifically in Charlottesville, that I find the "right" more worrisome (and more immoral) than the "left," is because that's my analysis of these specific, actual groups and individuals (whether I am right or wrong). But the "left" and "right" labels are otherwise meaningless to me, and I employ them for the sake of convention and ease of communication. I don't otherwise care about "left" or "right," and I would be just as happy if we considered Antifa to be a "far-right" group and the supporters of the Third Reich, etc., "far-left," or all of them on the "right," or all of them on the "left." They're all statists (or, as 2046 said, "socialists") to me. But that's not the sense I get from others here. I think that it matters very much to some that Antifa is purportedly "left" and the groups they were protesting are "right"; I think that there are people in this thread who have perhaps long taken side with what they consider to be the "right." And perhaps even more specifically, with Donald Trump. For instance, tenured Marxist professors are an interesting thing to discuss in relationship to the events in Charlottesville, or white supremacists in general. I had raised a hypothetical, wherein such academic Marxists (among others) organized a "Unite the Left" rally in the defense of the statues of communist leaders, marching with weapons through the streets and chanting communist slogans -- but it was only a hypothetical; so far as I'm aware, that didn't actually happen. The academic Marxists (troubling and destructive as they are) do not, so far as I can tell, seem to be organizing, rising up, or doing anything other than what they've been doing for the last century. Meanwhile, if our actual response to this (real, happening) alt-right movement is, "But there are bad people on the left, too!" then not only are we buying into the false "left versus right" dichotomy, but we are apparently taking a side, and giving support to the alt-right by minimizing or obfuscating the very real threat that they represent to our society. After all, the alt-right marched, and they adopted the symbolism of Nazi Germany and the Confederacy. They are being given tacit support by the sitting President of the United States (and even if you don't believe he intends it as such, that seems to be how they are receiving it). But perhaps that's the point: that folks here recognize this as true (on some level, at least) and mean to defend Donald Trump, even if that means providing cover for actual Nazis and racists along the way...

Not entirely certain where you're disagreeing with me, or even if you are... so I'm just going to respond broadly to the ideas you raise. I don't advocate punching Nazis -- or anyone else -- except in retaliation/justice/self-defense, responding to force with force. But I have heard many people on the left say something to the effect that it is good to "punch a Nazi," meaning: to initiate the use of force against them. To me, that seems a fine shorthand for the Antifa mindset. If a Nazi crosses into an objective threat -- meaning committing violence (including terrorism) or threatening to do the same -- then of course retaliatory violence is warranted. That goes for Antifa and everyone else. Well, this is where "rights" come into play, which is why I'd said that Antifa wind up undermining their own efforts -- because their means of fighting against Nazis wind up undermining the very rights we otherwise mean to preserve, and thereby help to create fascism. Otherwise, they're not wrong to see pro-Nazism as a threat to their life and others; that's exactly what the Nazis are. All irrationality is a threat to life, and the Nazis are a fairly explicit and extreme example of the fruits of irrationality. This is why we take these things so seriously. Why we argue against the Nazis with such vigor. And it is why we are so careful to suit our means to our ends. Because our lives are at stake. Antifa are not wrong to see Nazis as villains which must be defeated; they are wrong to initiate the use of force against Nazis. If we believe that force may only be used against force, retaliation in response to initiation, then we must respond to ideological threats accordingly. It certainly may be that any number of groups would turn more-or-less violent (by which I here mean: initiating the use of force) given sufficient power -- and actually this has been true, and remains true, of every ruling body in human history. We do not argue against that, in principle, by initiating force ourselves against them -- instead, if we adopt those same means, we surrender the essential fight, and we make it likelier that our own rights will be violated in turn. The FBI should investigate both neo-Nazis and Antifa (to the extent that any Antifa organization actually exists, such that it can be investigated). No group that promotes the initiation of violence, either directly or in the abstract (or even in some hypothetical future), deserves any benefit of the doubt. That said, I'm uncertain about the idea of "violent rhetoric" being an exception to free speech, or voiding one's right to "a place to speak." I would need to see an objective and specific threat before I could agree that force was initiated, and retaliatory force warranted, rather than any general rhetorical statement. Someone who says "all Jews should be put to death" (or "all Nazis" for that matter) is awful, but I cannot agree that they have initiated force against another -- not even if someone else decides to try to put that into practice. Yes. I mean, I have no idea about George Soros, et al., but look: if Charlottesville (or to make this more likely, perhaps Seattle) had been a "Unite the Left" rally featuring not just wishy-washy college kid "socialists," but also actual, honest-to-God Maoists and Stalinists (and they exist), hoisting the Soviet flag, marching in the defense of "historical" statues of Marx and Lenin and Castro, chanting about eliminating the bourgeoisie, openly carrying weapons... and if one of them had run his car into a crowd of counter-protestors... and if the President (we may imagine Bernie Sanders in the role) had failed to offer any kind of direct criticism of the Communists involved, in part because he is perhaps relying upon their support... well, in that case, I think some of the people involved in this debate would see the situation a bit more clearly.

I don't think that's either ironic or unexpected -- I think it's a perfectly normal reaction. Here's another user's comment (Tranquilo): "One look at your cancerous comment section and I'm starting to understand why leftists like punching Nazis. Absolute retards." Exactly. What people who take this seriously (too seriously) fail to understand is that punching people who have not struck you first (even Nazis) -- which is to say the initiation of the use of force -- undermines the very argument of individual rights which we wish to preserve from the Nazis. This is why the Nazis must be protected in their rights of free speech, peaceful assembly, etc., etc., and why Antifa, and all those who want to "punch Nazis," are fundamentally wrong (apart from whatever other collectivist/socialist premises such individuals might also entertain). Both Nazism and anti-Fascism (in the sense of initiating force against Nazis/violating their rights) are wrong and lead to the same place, eventually: fascism. But that is not to say that both groups (or individuals within those groups) are morally equivalent, at any given time or in any given place. The Nazis in that comment section are not morally equivalent to Tranquilo. If an analogy might serve..? Stage one cancer and stage four cancer are both bad, and both will take you to the same place in the end, but stage one cancer is not the same thing as stage four cancer.