DonAthos

I'll give it a try (speaking as myself). Happiness is an emotional state accompanying the periods of time when things are going well for you, existentially and psychologically. It would be a contradiction in terms to say that happiness is a means to survival, since in the causal chain, happiness is the result of survival. Legitimate happiness cannot ever be in conflict with (or periclitate) survival, period.
One of the major virtues of the Objectivist ethics is that it respects the epistemological principle of context. You cannot make valid ethical judgements, unless 1). you hold the entire lifespan in mind, and 2). you hold the entire hierarchy of your (proper) values in mind. In other words, Objectivism is not concerned with half of a lifespan, or with three quarters of it, or with a single year of it. And it recognizes that there are no isolated facts, that nothing can ever happen outside of a context. The need to sacrifice lower values in order to pursue higher values is metaphysicaly inherent in the universe. Time is finite, so you're bound to make compromises upon compromises in order to make all of your values play togheter well. Not all pain is wrong, and not all 'happiness' is right.
That you are happy now might be irrelevant - your next 10 years of happiness might lead to disastruous consequences later on, consequences that you cannot justify to your own self. If you endure suffering right now, your effort might lead to a bright future that will be worth every single moment of misery that you endured. How are you to decide? The full context. In some cases, it is right to shorten your lifespan. In some, it is outright insane. Some compromises are worth it, some aren't.
Let's assume that the Hero's dream is some kind of career. There are legitimate situations where you might love something so intensely (maybe the love became part of your psyche during your formative childhood years) that you simply can't find a replacement, no matter how long and conscientiously you try.
Let's do some horizontal integration and scan for other factors. Quitting his dream in order to live five years longer will not make the Hero live five years longer. The Hero will have to earn a living. If he doesn't resent his new job for always reminding him of his compromise, he will spend around 1850 hours every year doing something that will never give him the same intellectual and spiritual fulfillment that his other job would have given him. His self esteem will run into the ground. His personal sense of identity will suffer, since he can't identity with the job he truly loves. His recreation will become an escape, not a complement and reward for his achievements. He probably won't have the same types of friends or lovers he would have if he had the other job. Your central purpose is a sensitive subject, since it controls an exceptionaly vast array of things in your life.
When a person acts immoraly, a chain of factors start to domino into every aspect of his existential and psychological situation. Which in time corrodes his desire to live, as well as his physical and mental health. After many years, the pain might become too great, and the hero might say: 'I could have lived the best life possible to me. Yet, I am here - by my own fault'. If the pain overrides his rationalist/dutiful approach to ethics, he might find himself drinking a lot and escaping into the antipodes of his mind via certain substances - which will further speed up his demise. 
When people mention survival, they do not actually refer to survival. Their definition is limited to the Bear Grylls type of context where you eat bugs to remain alive for yet another day. If staying alive was the pupose of ethics, everyone in the world right now is a master of the Objectivist ethics. Things change if you expand 'survival' to include the best possible functioning and resillience to adverse conditions, taking in consideration both the mind and the body. When the Hero will understand that each action he takes will get him either closer, or further away from that state, he will know what to do.

If y'all wouldn't mind, I'd like to try something a little different: I would like to play "devil's advocate," and -- since no one here will lay claim to the title "survivalist" (even if I believe that some extant arguments amount to the same thing), I shall adopt that mantle, for the purpose of exploring these issues further.
I should say from the outset that I do not typically enjoy "devil's advocate" style arguments, on either side of them, and I do not expect that I engage in them particularly well. But I struggle with the impression that, as yet, I still have not successfully conveyed my thoughts on these matters... and I hope that a fresh perspective might help me to do that better. (Or, if I am wrong about any aspect of this debate, perhaps taking on a fresh perspective will show me something I hadn't seen before.)
In an attempt to keep things at least somewhat clear, I'll adopt the convention of using Comic Sans MS font while taking the "survivalist" side (and the default of Arial when providing straight commentary).
Like this.
Happiness is a means to an end. Man's proper ultimate end is his own survival. It is proper, therefore, to value happiness insofar as it functions as a fuel, to help one to survive, and no more than that.
Valuing a pleasant feeling emotion at the cost of one's literal survival is choosing non-existence over existence, and is thus immoral.
It is not always the case that one gets positive emotions from ethical action, or negative emotions from unethical action; if that were so, then yes -- one could simply be guided by his positive emotions. But sometimes unethical actions (meaning: actions which work against the literal survival of the organism) will produce positive emotions in some individuals, or ethical actions may trigger some negative-feeling experience of emotion. This is precisely when the rational application of a survival-oriented code of ethics is necessary, to guide our actions.
The case you describe is just such a situation. If our "Hero" is guided by his emotions, then they will lead to his literal destruction. That is whim worship.
Whatever it is you mean by "continuing to live," it is not possible without "simple survival." Valuing "continuing to live" at the cost of "simple survival" is illogical, it smuggles subjectivity into the standard of "life" (emotionalism).
For remember, "it is the bare fundamental alternative of survival versus death that stands at the root of all values." Our hero faces that bare, fundamental alternative and chooses death over survival -- for what? The experience of some emotional thrill.
It may not be the "only factor of significance" whether he continues to carry out the process of life, as such, but that does function as "the basic criterion of ethics": "the literal alternative of life versus death, existence versus nonexistence."
"Continuing to live," objectively, requires continuing to carry out the process of life. It is therefore immoral to value anything above one's very ability to carry out the process of life, and since your hypothetical stipulates that pursuing "his life-long dream"* will impair his ability to carry out the process of life (more substantially than the alternative), it is choosing literal death over literal life, nonexistence over existence.
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* A rational person should not value anything more than his own survival in the first place; a rational person -- a true Hero -- would not value a "dream" if pursuing that dream came at the cost of his own life, and it should consequently not provide him happiness, either in contemplation or actuality. A true Hero would be happier staying safely at home (not that this happiness is material, of course, except as a fuel towards further survival).
Remember that, "although Ayn Rand made it clear that she meant her morality to ensure a rich, fully human life, it is the bare fundamental alternative of survival versus death that stands at the root of all values."
Therefore, this "health" you speak of, if it is to have objective value consistent with these ethics, must fundamentally contribute to the organism's life with respect to the bare fundamental alternative of survival versus death.
If our Hero's choice is to go, satisfying his emotions, then his emotions are working against his own survival; they are not healthy.
This is a situation where "following one's emotions would not be right": they are not consistent with "the most basic criterion of ethics," which is survival, "the literal alternative of life versus death, existence versus nonexistence."
If one's "dreams" and "emotions" lead one to literal destruction, then they are unhealthy, and to follow them against an objective code of morality is whim worship, subjective, and immoral. Whether it is the case that this trip would bring a person happiness, or not, is immaterial; it is worth keeping in mind that "an ethical person examines the facts and determines which alternative best promotes his survival." In this case, the alternative which best promotes the Hero's survival is to find another dream.

I certainly don't think it's subjective. Subjective vs objective isn't about whether something has a clear line, as if something that is objective just can't have any debate about and everyone will agree. Objective means having mind-independent qualities that are what they are, subjective means existing in the mind without relation to external reality.
Theres always going to be interpretation over certain objective facts, including flourishing. Many people might think Hugh Hefner lived the ultimate flourishing life, while other accounts might think he lived a sad and pathetic existence. Having different interpretations of facts is just part of life.
Life or death is a very important distinction, but not every decision is a life or death one, and it's important to understand varying degrees of living because that's where most of our choices are.

But, to also answer part of your question, there just isn't going to be one single "undisputed" account, just like there isn't one single undisputed account of what "health" includes.
Health is individual, contextual, but also generic and inclusive. Health isn't just "I don't know what it is, but I know it when I see it," it is an objective state that is scientifically describable. But still my health may be different from yours. There may be a cutoff point below which you don't have it, and above which you do, but at the same time degrees in which this person has more than that person. Flourishing is individualistic like this. My flourishing is different form yours. To get a complete description you're going to have to take multiple accounts and multiple approaches and integrate them with your observations.

I can't quite agree that her starting point is question begging. It would seem to me that there is a set of principle data that the philosopher starts off with in every branch. A sort of foundation that any philosopher as such starts out with.
The metaphysician starts by outward look at things and noticing that there is something rather than nothing, that he is a something, that he has questions. The epistemologist starts off with noticing that he has been correct sometimes, and incorrect other times, that he has selective awareness, that being wrong has consequences for him, and that he doesn't not automatically know which things are correct and incorrect. Unless he had noticed that he has fallen into error, he would not have reason to examine the processes that led him there. If we had a mode of operation that provided us with automatic knowledge, then we wouldn't need to distinguish between certitude and error, and thus wouldn't need epistemology.
The ethicist proceeds in a similar manner. The ethicist must start from the fact of human action, that we deliberate between alternatives, say A or B, that we can't not act as long as we are alive and awake, and that our actions have consequences for us. Asking "why do we need ethics at all" is, in my view the exact right question. After all, maybe we don't need ethics, if we were provided with automatic action we wouldn't need to deliberate between alternatives. Or maybe our action automatically is aimed at life-sustainment or some other end. Rand follows Aristotle in starting with examining the concept of action, and differentiating between vegetative action, sensitive action (animals), and deliberative action. She does differentiate between types of action, volitional and non.
Analyzing human action is just about the most non question begging way to start off ethics. In that she defines it as code of values, she doesn't mean values in a normative sense. As Smith points out, sometimes she uses "value" as "that which one ought to act for" and value as "that which one acts to gain/keep." But regardless, when she defines ethics as a code of values, value just definitionally refering to the object of action. "Values," descriptively, are interchangeable with "ends." Thus, saying it's a code of values is simply recognizing that man acts to attain ends, and deliberates about them. 
True there is deontology, divine command, consequentialism, emotivism, nihilism, Stoicism, all sorts of different codes, and that code man needs could be any of these things. But all of these things has to start out with the principle data, that the philosopher notices that man acts to attain ends (values), and has no automatic guide to them. This, I see as Rand's reformulating the first line of the Nicomachean Ethics, that every inquiry and activity aims at some good, into more modern language.

Ayn Rand said that the purpose of morality is to teach us, 'not to suffer and die, but to enjoy ourselves and live.' Well, let's ask whether the purpose of morality is primarily for survival or flourishing. Which is the end and which is the means?
If it's flourishing then our moral code is fully applicable to any action of every single individual*, since there isn't a single choice that doesn't bear some consequence for our psychological equilibrium (indeed, most have a myriad of subtle and intricately multifaceted consequences) - especially those which impact our actual survival! It applies to serial killers regardless of whether or not they're ever caught (for reasons I just sketched, albeit not-too-neatly), to serial killers of the soul (like Kant or Toohey), to giants like Roark and to suicide bombers - equally.
If survival then it doesn't apply to serial killers who don't risk their own capture (or even those who do risk it in a state without the death penalty); you can try to discourage them on the basis of "the survival proper to man" but if anyone presses you on why he has to live as a proper man - good luck. It doesn't apply to Roark's non-survival-related choices and so has nothing to say about him beyond "yeah, that's a good way to do architecture" (and even then there are scenes like his refusal to alter his design for the bank which, like Galt's promise of suicide in the event of Dagny's torture, we'd be hard pressed to even justify). Furthermore, if a suicide bomber doesn't want to live then it doesn't apply to him, either; we can call his actions "unfortunate" or "tragic" but we simply could not call him a bad guy** (a stance which, in terms of moral advancement, would leave us somewhere behind the fundamentalist Christians).
 
But this is what I find truly essential.
When I think of Egoism I think of Howard Roark (specifically Gary Cooper's rendition), the perfect and archetypical Egoist. He doesn't ask what he ought to want because he already knows (not which TV shows he wants to watch or what he wants for dinner but what he wants out of his entire life). He doesn't ask what he should do because he figured that out, too, decades in advance. In fact, he doesn't usually say anything; he mostly just does things (and he does them flawlessly, on the first try, every time). As slippery as the concept of "flourishing" is, what I mean by that is what Roark does, all day, every day, regretting nothing and making it all look easy. Howard Roark could make Chuck Norris his bitch if he ever stopped to notice his existence.
And not a single one of the qualities which make him worth aspiring to have anything to do with his survival!
You could easily survive just fine like a Keating or a Toohey (the literal living proof of that is all around us - literally)! It wouldn't be fun or a pretty thing to look at, but it'd be a life. James Holmes, who took a machine gun to a movie theatre full of strangers, survives in Colorado to this very day! Even Immanuel Kant, the diabolical one himself, could tell you how to survive as long as you truly wished not to!
When we say that morality doesn't apply to non-survival-related issues (or imply it in various ways) we're amputating all of the best parts of Egoism; the very things that make it all worthwhile, worth arguing about and worth fighting for, if necessary. We know that it does matter whether you spend your time sitting around, killing time, or working to better yourself; that it's important because the way you choose to spend your life is important - and that that's important because your own happiness is important! We have the blueprints for how to "flourish" like Roark and we're sitting here asking each other whether the upper half of its skyscraper is really necessary!
 
Given the existential threat that actual suicide bombers could potentially pose to us at some point down the road, it's not necessarily hyperbolic to call our ability to condemn them a matter of life and death (maybe a little bit over the top but not out of the question). To put it perfectly bluntly, though, if we're pulling out the supports which make man-worship conceivable then I really don't give a damn about the Jihadis. And brother, if we're saying that Egoism has no direct (non-instrumental) role in human happiness then we are either messing around with exactly that or else playing some kind of conceptual game which I am not familiar with.
 
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I'm sorry for the length and general tone of that; chopping my thoughts into acceptable-sized chunks was getting to be exhausting.
But I'm done now!
 
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*This doesn't mean that allegedly-amoral choices, such as which flavor of ice cream to eat, must be carefully pondered for days on end. Rather, it means that there is only one correct answer for you (and for your mood and tastes right now) which you probably already know. If you'd most prefer chocolate today then that's the moral thing for you to get, and any other option would be a sacrifice (and immoral) and don't do that to yourself.
Your emotions are not tools of cognition but they are facts (just like gravitation) which you must take into your consideration of any relevant choice. They would not be "whatever you felt like" if you lied to yourself about them (which regular people do actually attempt alarmingly often) nor will knowledge of them automatically enter your skull if you fail to look inward in the first place; your emotions are specific mental things, with specific identities, as perceived by your (introspective) consciousness. The nature of some emotional responses is immediately self-evident after paying a fraction of a second of attention to them, which is precisely why your preferred flavors of food make such great toy-examples. Knowing the nature of other emotions (romance comes to mind again) will actually demand some careful studying. If you act consequentially (say eating cyanide instead of chocolate ice cream) on some emotion, without understanding what it is or where it comes from, that's whim-worship.
So much for that.
 
**Have I mentioned that I am not advocating ethical subjectivism? 

No. That's the very opposite of both what I had intended in your quote of me, and my entire meaning in this, and every other thread in which I've commented upon this subject. Invictus said, "both quantity and quality of life are ethically relevant," and when I responded, "precisely my point," it meant -- as I thought clear -- that I agreed with his statement.
But obviously I have done a poor job of explaining my position, despite all of the pains I have taken. I shall have to reflect upon how I can communicate myself more clearly in the future.

Different in degree, but no, not different in kind.
The reason why I "stopped" where I did, was because I thought five years (which is not insignificant; I wanted something heavier than the single day I'd proposed as the "cost" for ice cream) was severe but not extraordinary. I thought it more or less relatable -- that people could understand it in terms of their own experience; that yeah, maybe we all have some pursuit that, perhaps, we'd be willing to trade a few years in our extremity for some grand adventure in the interim. In my opinion, it would require a truly extraordinary context, a truly extraordinary person, to be able to understand an individual who would be willing to embark on such a "one way trip" in any fashion that I would regard as moral, but I'm not willing to say that no such context or person exists.
As a writer, I perhaps flatter myself to believe that I could one day write a story with such a compelling character.
Maybe the first thing we need to suss out here is who we expect the (primary) beneficiary of "moral action" is meant to be. Is it the individual? Or surrounding society?
I ask, not merely as a preface to addressing your scenario (which I will presently), but also because I've noted that you've sometimes referred to morality in a negative way -- that it represents "restraints" to action. But that's not how I see it at all. Morality is not a set of restraints on our action, but it is a guide for achievement: for achieving the good life (howsoever we think that is constituted). It isn't some series of "Thou Shalt Nots," but more like a treasure map, leading to the most valuable thing in the universe: moral action should be consequently joyful.
Obviously you would like to say that the Sadist you've proposed is immoral. So would I. But why? Are we primarily concerned with what the Sadist does to society? Or to himself?
It is the latter that I think we need to address, if we agree that the only true basis for ethics is "rational self-interest"; if our conclusion is that the Sadist leads a truly wonderful life, but surrounding society suffers for it, then I believe we have failed to establish his behavior as immoral (or at least we will have a markedly harder time of it). The goal of morality is not to convince others to spare us in the pursuit of their own happiness; and it is not for our own sake (primarily) that we hold the Sadist to be immoral... it is for his.
And what does the Sadist lose by acting the way that he does? I do not think it's that he loses (potentially) in lifespan, because he might be caught and executed for his crimes; the freedom fighter runs much the same risk when he resists tyranny; Kira risks everything in her flight to freedom, with tragic results; and if we see some issue of manmade versus metaphysical in examples such as these, well, people have taken extraordinary risks in every type of endeavor imaginable, since the dawn of man. Many of those risks were understood ahead of time and taken on anyways; many people have died in the pursuit of their passions -- or following their bliss -- in industry, scientific discovery, invention, exploration, etc., etc., etc. So if it is not incurring a greater risk of death (or even certain knowledge of it, in some cases), and not the damage done to society, then what is it about the Sadist's actions that makes them immoral?
I think it is this: that he is not going to have so wonderful a life, acting in this way, than he could otherwise have. And by "wonderful," I am referring not alone to longevity, not alone to whatever "pleasures"/thrills he might find in his actions, and not alone to happiness, but a complex and interrelated melange of all three. Yet perhaps this is chiefly represented by happiness, as a ubiquitous emotional evaluation of man's state -- and that's the chief thing I find missing in your description of the Sadist. I read that he experiences many things that he finds to be pleasurable (just as a dope addict might), but I do not read him as being happy (just as a dope addict will not be). I shudder to think at what his internal/emotional/spiritual state would be like -- it is nothing that I would ever want to experience, and I say that having had my own lows.
If we think we can amend this by simply asserting, "Well, let's make him 'happy' then! What now?" then I don't think we are describing anything more real than a squared circle, because I do not believe that human happiness can be achieved in any imaginable way. I do not believe that sadism is the path to happiness, not even if the Sadist mistakenly believes that it is.
Rand (through Galt) says:
I believe our Sadist will not alone experience the "torture of frustration," but deep terrors and a profound unhappiness. Though I have no specialized knowledge in this field, I expect that if we were to survey actual mass murderers, and the like, we would not discover a group of happy folks who simply happen to value things a little differently; we would not discover "hedonists," either, even if they conceived of themselves as seeking pleasure (which I doubt they would describe themselves as doing; I expect that they would likelier describe themselves as being driven by "compulsions" or etc.). I expect we would find a group of depressed, ignorant, and terrified individuals with a strong correlation with alcoholism and drug abuse; if clinical examinations were available, we would discover a history of trauma or abuse, and consequent anhedonia, etc.
They would not by any reasonable measure (I doubt even their own) be living "the good life."
So yes, the Sadist is acting immorally (and is immoral), because he is sacrificing a life of pleasure and happiness (of any duration). And if that is not enough to convince him to do otherwise (because his "compulsions" are too strong; or because he thinks the "pleasure" he's chasing is too great), then the promise of "longevity" certainly will not either. He must be convinced that moral action will be to his own benefit -- just as we ourselves require -- and what benefit will he see in "more life"? "Life," such as he conceives of it, is not sufficient to inspire him to want "more" of it. Rather, it must be better life. Not a life of "less pleasure," but more pleasure, and specifically and importantly: a life of the greatest of all pleasures -- happiness.
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But here's a question for you:
Suppose the same Sadist, but he has managed to keep a lid on his compulsions (or "passions" or "pleasures") throughout his life, because he has believed that "survival is the standard of value," and he did not wish to die early, through execution or etc.
But now he has some incurable, terminal disease -- and only a few months to live. Considering that his actions will have no appreciable effect on his ability to survive, he considers himself finally free of the shackles/restraints of morality, and free to indulge his every sick and twisted whim. Finally free to enjoy himself.
What say you? "Is this immoral according to an objective standard?" Why or why not?
I apologize, but I can't give this a full response at the moment, though I've tried to address just such questions, at length, in many of the threads I'd linked to earlier (most centrally "Pleasure and Value," which you'd also participated in, before... er... excusing yourself).
If you have further questions, we can pursue them here or there, or anywhere (including a more general conversation regarding "objectivity," which you've mentioned a couple of times) -- but I'm currently feeling the stress of trying to respond to a lot of deep and difficult questions (not to mention a lack of time, etc.)!
And speaking of which, Invictus, Easy Truth, Harrison, et al., my apologies for delayed responses. I'm not trying to ignore anyone or any responses... I hope to get to everything and everyone eventually...

You're waiting till you have something coherent to say? LOL, you really are new around here, aren't you?
Absolutely right.
But I raise it because I suspect it might sound different than the ice cream discussion to some, which perhaps seems a little unserious, and why can't a person just learn to live without ice cream anyways -- what's so bad about that? (I'd say there's plenty bad about it, but then I'm more familiar with my own perspective on this matter than I can expect anyone else to be.)
But when we're looking at questions of people following their dreams, pursuing their passions -- even at the expense of longevity (though I recognize you have disavowed that's your meaning; yet I continue to use the term for what I consider to be good reason) -- then I think (or hope) it might be easier for others to see the essential issue I'm driving at.
I think these are good questions, but by asking them we've already made a decision of a kind that I don't believe has yet been conceded: that we can call something a "benefit" at all if it results in the shortening of one's life.
For if our ultimate end -- or our standard of value -- is "survival," and if "survival" is (per Kelley) "the literal alternative of life versus death, existence versus nonexistence," then we cannot describe taking the mission to deep space as a benefit at all; rather, it would be highly immoral -- it would be an instance of self-harm.
But I don't believe it is immoral or self-harm. Do you?
I don't think survivalism provides a sufficient basis for ethical reasoning. I think it looks at one aspect of life (a key aspect), but that life is more than mere survival, more than a simple question of "existence versus nonexistence" -- and fundamentally so, such that when we talk in terms of "ultimate ends" or our "standard of value," even there we must mean more than survival.
Otherwise, you're right: we should ultimately prefer "a cheerless, pointless existence as a comatose vegetable tended by hordes of well paid medical experts" over "a [shorter] life full of happiness -- and risk," or Harrison's offer of endless (but pointless) existence. If existence, as such, is truly our ultimate end, then our ethics should counsel us to pursue existence at any (supposed) cost -- but it does not.
So it is not, in truth, our ultimate end.
I agree.
This is as much as saying that it is not "existence," as such, that we value -- but a particular kind of existence. I've described it, at various times, as a life "characterized by pleasures and happiness" or "filled with pleasures and happiness," or "of maximized experience," or "the good life." I'm not satisfied that I've formulated this (let alone conveyed any part of it) particularly well, but I'm trying to find my way to such a formulation.
This is the reason why, for instance, Galt was willing to die (even by his own hands) rather than allow harm to come to Dagny (or rather than live with the results). In my experience, survivalists do not want much to discuss such topics, shunting them off to some "amoral" or even "pre-moral" area of decision making... and over the course of this conversation, we've found that StrictlyLogical (taking him to be a "survivalist") considers a good deal of what we choose to value and pursue to be outside of moral consideration altogether.
But then, this is precisely what we should expect if, as I've claimed above, survivalism fails to provide a sufficient basis for ethical reasoning. It means that some of our decisions may be arrived at through ethical reasoning... and some (the majority?) cannot, leaving them to be inspired by... what? Whim?
It renders Ethics, as a discipline, unsuitable "to guide man’s choices and actions." Or, if we reject that seeming consequence and cling to survivalism the more tightly, then we will make decisions to prolong our longevity... at the cost of our actual experience of life and our happiness.

Okay, in the spirit of the OP's request, this is my two cents:
There is the psychological plane of existence, the experience of life, pain pleasure, happiness.
Then there is the epistemological plane, the abstraction of life, the concept of flourishing and the moral code.
And then the metaphysical plane, the organism, existence or nonexistence.
From the metaphysical plane, the main thing that I learned from Rand was that there was no "my reality" vs. "your reality". There was just reality and the search for the truth is honorable.
From the psychological/experiential plane:
Objectivism taught me that I have a right to my life. 
I understood that when someone calls me selfish "they want something". 
I learned to strive for greatness rather than strive to look great.
I found that if I held onto things that didn't make sense, if I went along for too long, I suddenly drowned in anxiety. I learned that living as a parasite can creep up on people. Objectivism gave me a path to follow to find my way back, to happiness. 
She awoke me to the existence of unearned guilt. I learn that when I have a sense of having achieved something, the pleasure was moral, it was good.
And of course, I learned that the good was not what religion said and what a majority believed did not mean wisdom.
Ultimately, with her attack on altruism, I learned that defining my boundaries, determining who I am and what I want was my fundamental responsibility and a never-ending task. She reminded me that the merging and melding with others, at the cost of my core self, was being dead before my time. And in the process, I have fought to hold on to who I am, to be myself.
And now, I am here to learn what I put aside for later.
 

Huh? Pretty sure this is the exact meaning of second handedness. Being first handed is a disposition towards reality, not other people.
If I can interpret this charitably, I think you're saying something like, let's look at the work of Ayn Rand when trying to philosophically analyze the work of Ayn Rand. But... okay? This seems rather obvious. A scholarly paper, for example, would include the practice of making references and notations.
In any event, of course people are going to have differing interpretations of any philosopher when doing philosophy. The reason for this is that rationality is a independent process that is self initiated and requires sustained effort. Underlining tautologies and bold font does nothing to change this or coerce belief. See Locke's Letters Concerning Toleration and Essay concerning Human Understanding for detailed argumentation why. 

I've been trying to give myself some breathing room here -- partly because softwareNerd recently said something about thinking that it's best when people step back from contentious conversations quickly, and that's stuck with me.
But I've also been tossing Harrison's hypothetical around in my mind, and what finally tumbled out was another hypothetical of my own, to try to further elucidate points of view (not just my own)...
Suppose a man who, from childhood, loves space and space travel and science and exploration and all that. He grows up to be a scientist, and then one day he receives an incredible offer: if he chooses, he can be the first to perform some incredible form of deep space exploration (where am I getting "deep space" from... Buck Rogers?).
But. Because shielding technology hasn't kept pace with the rest of the technological developments, or something, if he accepts this mission, it will shave as many as five years of his life off of the back end.
What would we make of it -- in terms of morality -- should he choose to accept the job anyways, because he wants so badly to do this thing?

https://www.theobjectivestandard.com/2016/07/liberal-right-vs-regressive-left-and-religious-right/
https://www.theobjectivestandard.com/2012/06/political-left-and-right-properly-defined/
For context and definitions...

Booyah!!! 

This is the belief I have issue with.  There are at least a million things you will never do... you do not have the time.  You could literally live life to the fullest in millions of different ways.  It's not a zero sum between staying alive and the values life makes possible... there are too many possible values, pleasures, and sources of happiness out there for you to even hope to experience in even 100 life times!  To say changing an activity for an alternative which is more life supporting prevents you from living life to the fullest is not tenable IMHO.
Thank you for the discussion, it has been liberating for me (I get stuck in conceptual ruts which lack rigor until I've been pushed to examine them more properly). 
Good luck in pursuing the good life!
 

Really good work from you guys. As for 'objective value' in the minor things like taste preferences which are sometimes considered "subjective", I think of it exactly as in the manner in which one gains knowledge of facts from the senses, to the percepts, to identifications, integrations, to evaluations of facts - and so on. All the senses contribute to knowledge, bottom up, in one's cognition - equally, all the senses contribute to enjoyment, from top down, in one's value/evaluation. A hierarchy of value then, is congruent with one's hierarchy of knowledge. Hierarchical clarity answers most uncertainties attached to this, in my view. I think my opinion is consistent with Objectivism.
"Survival" ~ for an individual choosing a life proper to man qua man ~ is identical to "flourishing", in my simple take on that matter. And happiness is to be found, taken and/or sought here and now - as well as in one's short and long future - especially not forgetting the "simple" pleasures.

Try harder next time. You could at least get some gallstones or something.
This isn't (or it oughn't be, at least) any sort of pissing contest. There's no award for having endured the most pain, either physical or mental. And personally, I thought it was strikingly bold of you to relate such distressing experiences so directly. As someone who regularly invokes details of his personal life in order to help describe his beliefs, I know how difficult it can be. Yet if I had endured what you have, and felt as you did, I'm unsure that I would be willing to discuss it.
Beyond that, I don't know about this talk of "extraordinary." We each of us, individually, only ever deal with the circumstances of our own life. And when we're discussing our relationship to suicide -- or anything else, actually -- we can only ever really understand it in terms of our own experience... though it is crucial to try to understand the experience of others, and this is why we share. So thank you for sharing your own.
Hey now, don't put down pontification -- it's virtually the forum's lifeblood.
I recognize that these are "off-the-cuff" comments, and not quite the same as a published essay on the topic, for instance... but it's interesting to hear Rand speak about "moral reasons" and "valid reasons" both for and against suicide (in individual cases, depending on context). Again, I think this squares largely with my views -- not that this would prove anything regardless; but where and when I conflict with Rand, or other prominent Objectivist thinkers, I like to be aware of the fact.
I only mentioned it to give epistemologue his due; he did not shy away from the fact of disagreeing with Peikoff (and perhaps Rand by extension, though I think only Peikoff is named). It is admirable.
Hmm...
It is possible that we'll have to "agree to disagree" on this point, at least temporarily. I'm unsure. But I suspect that you're still conflating the two senses of the "no-win scenario": the idea that there are Kobayashi Marus -- no-win scenarios, as such, which I disavow -- and an unwinnable scenario in context, which I affirm.
A defective heart is a solvable problem. Man can develop heart transplant technology and he can perfect that technology (asymptotically, at least). A defective heart is not a no-win scenario -- it is a problem which can be fixed.
But in context? For much of human history, a defective heart was not a problem which could be corrected at the time, given the tools and know-how available. These are not "rare exceptions," but they are the circumstances of life. Everything may one day be cured, be solved, be fixed, and it is fine to hold that in mind (and soul) -- but it is a far cry from supposing that everything may be cured, solved, and fixed today, which is unreasonable to expect, given what we currently know.
Answering this sort of question properly would require research I'm not prepared to undertake at the moment, but do you understand what an expansive wealth of knowledge underlay an invention such as the light bulb? (I'm sure you do, but please take a moment to reflect on it.)
I'd expect that there were genius cavemen, doing genius things given the standards and conditions of the time (which is no knock; this could be said of the geniuses of any era). But a caveman capable of developing all of the preconditions necessary for a light bulb (in terms of scientific understanding; in terms of tools; in terms of production), let alone the invention itself...? It utterly beggars belief. It is a science-fiction more outlandish than any talented author could make either plausible or palatable, and if we were to discover a cave painting of a caveman holding aloft his electric light bulb, I'd think we'd sooner revisit the "ancient aliens" hypothesis than conclude he'd invented it himself.
I understand what you mean by "perhaps not impossible" in an analytic sense, but synthetically I would argue that this was not at all possible -- and, so far as we know, it did not happen in all of human history... until the 19th Century!
I hope you realize that I was fully aware of the irony of that statement when I wrote it; it was purposeful (and indeed, I had been contemplating a minor "suicide," in abandoning the thread to its own devices).
Really, though, while these things are routinely put together (and for good reason), I think I would like to make the case that suicide is not necessarily an act of despair -- or at least that it does not necessarily conform to the negative emotional connotations of the term.
Read over the essay I'd linked and ask yourself whether the author sounds despairing in her choice. It may be that she has no hope of surviving her brain cancer; it may be that she has no good reason to hope for it (whatever tricks Imhotep or Hippocrates may have whipped up in similar circumstances); but I think that what characterizes Maynard's approach to her own death is a sense of calm and acceptance -- that her recourse to suicide, and her ability to set the terms of her own exit, in fact, lends her a kind of strength. It is a powerful human statement, in my opinion: this is what I will allow to happen to me, this is what I will allow myself to become -- and this is not.
And whatever the bitter, pain-ridden, misanthropic Gregory House might feel about the subject, yes, there is even a dignity to it.

Yes, it was mine. I understood eating ice cream as an example of a minor action intended to improve the felt quality of one's life.  There are many things that would qualify, and not all of them involve pleasure  Things that relieve pain, save time, etc., would also qualify.  Consider NSAID's; they relieve pain, but can have nasty and occasionally lethal side effects.  When taken to relieve minor pain, you get the same ethical problem as with eating ice cream, but pleasure isn't part of the equation.

It'd also violate Newton's Third Law.
Also, just a few hours ago I asked an illiterate hobo whether or not his mind could influence the physical world. I had to rephrase the question a few times (he seemed drunk) but once he grasped it he responded: "What kinda ****** question is that?!! Get your head outta your ***, kid!"
 
Seriously, though, if your mind can't effect reality (as in "weak epiphenomenalism") then there is no way for you to communicate with me. Your mouth might make noises and your fingers might type things, but if it's only the firing of random synapses then I have no more reason to listen to it than to the incoherent babbling of an escaped mental patient. In the very least it precludes any possibility of communication (let alone "persuasion" or "proof").
The "strong" form of epiphenomenalism doesn't allow one mental state to directly cause another (as in a train of thought), which couldn't permit the existence of logic, reason or objective validation, which invalidates knowledge itself.
 
I don't know about the weak version yet but the strong form absolutely is a stolen concept.
 

I think there is. There are many problems with this "survivalist" interpretation. A survivalist end can support a bare-bones Hobbesian ethics, but not a full Aristotelian virtue ethics.
I don't need all of these virtues for long range survival. I need only the basic Maslowean virtues pertaining to physical safety and maybe a little psychological safety, but I don't need self-actualization and flourishing. Flourishing is not the same as avoiding death.
Rand's trenchant "survival as what kind of being" should be enough to refute this, and often mentions survival as "survival proper to a human being." Aristotle asks whether a short happy/flourishing life is preferable to a long mild life. Many of Rand's heroes risk their survival for important values that give their life meaning. All of this points to a more rich Aristotelian conception of the final end, something more like the Greek conception of eudaimonia. This is going to include not only basic physical needs, but psychological, social, career, and things like self-acceptance, personal growth, purpose, self-actualization. Of course survival is a necessary component of eudaimonia, but you can't build an entire ethic off that.

"Virtue is not an end in itself. Virtue is not its own reward or sacrificial fodder for the reward of evil. Life is the reward of virtue—and happiness is the goal and the reward of life."
-John Galt (from John Galt's speech)
Atlas Shrugged
by
Ayn Rand

A Knight's Tale is the medieval story of a peasant boy who wants to be a knight. It's theme is underscored periodically with the recurring question: "can a man change his stars?"

I don't disagree. And if the primacy of existence, the necessity (and exact nature) of reason or that of acting in my own self-interest are ever legitimately disproven, I will not call whatever result I convert to "Objectivism" (nor any prefixed or suffixed variation of it). However, considering that she was the very first philosopher in history to define and consistently uphold these fundamentals, I'd give her namesake to any philosophy which uses them as the foundation from which to consistently* derive the rest.
 
I think it's a conceptual thing. It's not about the specific word "Objectivism" (that would just be silly); it's about whether slightly-divergent views can still be fundamentally the same as those of Ayn Rand or whether any disagreement, of any size and over any issue at all, constitutes a full break with "reality, reason, egoism, Capitalism, Romanticism".
 
*Within the context of everything we know, so far. There can only be one ultimately "true" form of Objectivism, but that doesn't mean that whichever form that is will be obvious to us (or even the greatest minds among us) anytime soon. Andeven if it were I'd still grant that title to reasonable, level-headed newcomers, while they come to grasp it for themselves.

Now see, your question leads me to the problem I have with how people typically conceive of "certainty" (or at least how that conception presents itself in discussion). I think I'd mentioned elsewhere that "certainty" (like evasion) needs further exploration, and I don't know if I'm equipped for it at present.
But as a shorthand, if we look at the skills necessary for what I believe to be "good thinking," which includes strategies for rooting out one's own potential for evasiveness, and etc., and say -- "well, yes -- but when can we be certain?" -- then we are looking for the wrong thing. The process of being willing to examine (and re-examine) one's own beliefs, in the face of new evidence or new arguments (or even a fresh perspective) doesn't have a stopping point, a point at which you can rest and not perform any of that work anymore. It is an ongoing process. Certainty, whatever it is, cannot be threatened or compromised by the idea that we must be on guard against the possibility of our own evasion.
Peikoff says of "certainty": "Idea X is 'certain' if, in a given context of knowledge, the evidence for X is conclusive. In such a context, all the evidence supports X and there is no evidence to support any alternative..."
And this is fine; I use "certainty" in, I'm sure, this way (or very nearly so). But all of these assessments that we make (for instance, when we decide that "all the evidence supports X" or "there is no evidence to support any alternative") -- there is yet the potential that we may make a mistake in such an assessment. When we consider ourselves certain about X, that is not some guarantee for the correctness of X (or the correctness of our evaluation of our own certainty) such that we are permitted to stop thinking.
I'm not saying that we cannot consider ourselves "certain" on some given point. We can. (And in fact, I think we must.) But this does not relieve us from the duties of thinking, of rooting out the potential error -- even in those cases where we consider ourselves certain.

Obviously, and it might need re-stating, virtues are the means to an end. Nobody has stated otherwise, I believe. The inversion, of placing virtue over value - and isolating virtues "in a vacuum" - is an error of intrinsicism sometimes made. To put it this way, as much as one prizes his virtues, moreso does he prize the values that follow from them. They have a hierarchical relationship and also a causal relationship, based and dependent upon one's cardinal values and virtues.   
"As a consequence, it [a lack of virtue] may cause reconsideration". (ET)
No. And there is no "may" about it.  What one reconsiders is: rational, virtuous action -> rational outcome.  A rational action presupposes it has virtue.
What result did I accomplish? Is it good (for me)? Was it what I wanted it to be? Could it be better? Which actions could I change? Simply, as one does for any endeavor, I am matching up my intentions and efforts, with what I finish up making (with the purpose of improving my performance).
This isn't consequentialism, which judges the 'good' (whether subjective, intrinsic, or objective) by results, "solely". Applied to rational selfishness, then, since I gained an achievement -- therefore I MUST have practiced the virtues of Objectivism... Not necessarily. Good conclusions often arrive from mixed premises. How much rationality, independence, justice, integrity - etc.- one brings to the actions is a prior commitment, not - only - to be reviewed and assessed after the fact.
And it could be overlooked that it is not only for the 'gaining' of goals that virtues are crucial, but equally for the ongoing 'keeping' of those values already attained. Also, one never knows, in reality, which specific virtue, or combination of, may be called upon next, from moment to moment. This and more, as I've learned by experience, settles for me the necessity of a conscious commitment to every "objective" virtue, full time. This morality is not called "rational" selfishness for little reason.
(Consequentialism seems like baking a cake without the recipe. See - it turned out fine and tasty! Therefore, it follows, I can repair an engine without using the engine's manual...)