Shading Inc.

Do you mean you think countries shouldn't have militaries as well (in a world where having one for defensive reasons would be advisable)? If I radically think through what you're saying, there shouldn't even be a government at all. Or perhaps it's just not clear to me what your saying.

Yeah, what would be wrong with free (government subsidized) healthcare? Of course, it would mean taxation (or some very generous billionaires, but let's not count on that), and as for example Nozick showed (in his Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974), taxation is forced labor; something anyone in his right mind (any reasonable person) would object to. But then, anyone breaks a leg some day. Or well, maybe not exactly that, but the point be clear; we all need to be in a hospital some day, and medical care is a very expensive thing. One might argue that it actually enhances one's freedom not to have to worry about keeping some money for medical emergency cases, or having to decide whether to take a health insurancy or not. An obligatory health insurance for everyone, one could argue, is not unlike obligatory taxes used to finance an army: A military protects a country's citizens from external macro-scale violation of their freedom; an obligatory health insurance would protect a country's citizens from internal micro-scale violation of their freedom. The question thus amounts to: Should a government be allowed to rule that every one of its citizens participate in a health insurance system? A counter-argument might be that one can't say "I won't pay taxes for a bunch of guys with guns; I'll take care of myself when the barbarians come!", because every one of the country's citizens enjoys the protection of a military, so basically 'taking care of yourself' means 'having protection for free - while others still pay. Then, if 'taking care of yourself' would be allowed, probably nobody would want to pay - but then there wouldn't be a military. This might be accepted as a reason why if a country is to have a military, every single of its citizens should help to pay for it. However, so the counter-argument goes, this doesn't apply to an obligatory health insurance. One can say "I'll take care of myself", and actually be excluded from the protection of this system (that is, actually not having protection for free). Therefore, if anyone would want to exclude himself from this measure of internal protection, he or she should be allowed to do so. If you accept this counter-argument, there might not really be a political issue anymore, but it might still be interesting to think about whether you're rather safe than sorry. But wait! If you'll allow a little collaboration with good ol' Kant: If it is reasonable to rather be safe than sorry, if that is your maxim arrived at by correct use of reason, and assuming reason operated the same way in all rational beings, shouldn't you at the same time will that your conclusion would become a universal law? An obligatory health insurance system after all? Jan.

It seems that this is coming down to just a quarrel on the correct definition of the word 'metaphysics', which really wasn't exactly the thing I was after; but then, who am I to try to swim upstream the current of the conversation? I'll float along. Let me try to elucidate with an example why I think that if objectivist metaphysics is actually about real things, it should be called physics instead: Not doing so, would be like Big Bang-theorists calling their theory creationism, because it is about the same thing creationists try to explain with their theory. That would be silly wouldn't it? I think you'll think so, and that's why I think 'objectivist metaphysics' sounds silly. Compare philosophy to religion, metaphysics to christianity and physics to wicca. Now, I don't think wiccans or christians would have serious problems with calling each other's ideas a religion; there can be multiple kinds op religion. The same goes for there being different kinds of philosophy; we can call both physics and metaphysics philosphical views. However, would wiccans want to be called christians? I think not, and don't think that scientists should want to be called metaphysicians either. That's one reason why I allow this to work for philosophy in general, but not for metaphysics. Another reason I will give in reply to your last paragraph. I'm sorry, I thought it was you who quoted Wikipedia, but it wasn't; τα μετα τα φυσικά means "that/those beyond/after the physics". It's highly ambiguous. And well, of course Aristotle thought his metaphysics was what we would call physical. I don't think any philosopher ever thought his metaphysical theories were not about something; of course they all thought their theories were about the universe as a whole. That's exactly the problem. That's why I say that if objectivist metaphysics is about something real, it should be called physics: You don't want to go about making claims about things you can't know something about, not even whether they're real - do you? Assuming then, for the sake of the argument, that you do; what difference would there be between a science of being qua being (for as far as we know it; for as far as it's real to us) and physics? Am I supposed to accept or reject a proposition when I don't know the answer to it? Am I to guess? Because I will never know whether there exists more than I what know exists. If we allow ourselves to be guided by contemporary facts (although I can't see how these wouldn't in fact be eternal facts), I claim we will end up with no metaphysics at all, or, if you like, an agnostic one. I do realize there is a problem here, but I will wait and see if that is how far you would take it. Cheers, Jan.

Of course, a "nay" is a metaphysical claim just the same as is a "yeah". And of course it's rather ridiculous to have a science of the unknowable and unobservable. Well then, if we think objectivist metaphysics is actually about something real, shouldn't it be called physics (in the broader meaning of the word), or something like that? I don't know how much metaphysical writings you're familiar with, but if you think of objectivist metaphysics as a viable science, you probably don't want it to be associated with what metaphysics usually means. By the way, even statements like "a supernatural exists" or "a supernatural does not exist" aren't scientific, because how will you prove you're right, or how would anyone prove you're wrong? If, as you say, we can't go by the majority, then there's no reason to follow "most authors in epistemology, [who] have ended up in skepticism or mysticism of some sort," is there? Same goes for following philosophers who were wrong. This does not mean that we are to abandon philosophy altogether; it only means that if we allow our common sense to be guided by contemporary facts, we will end up with a kind of philosophy radically different from classical and enlightenment ones. As pointed out, even a rejection of metaphysics is a metaphysical claim, and if viewed as such, quite a silly one actually. I think the only scientifically correct way of dealing with things metaphysical is a "Who knows? Not I..." kind of attitude. Here I will probably find a lot of opposition..? Jan.

That is exactly the question most authors in metaphysics answer, be it explicit or implicit, with a big 'yes'. I can't imagine Plotinus, Augustine or Spinoza writing the things they did if they thought there were only 'those things contemporary physics is about'. I'm saying 'those things contemporary physics is about', instead of natural things, because these pre-modern (Spinoza is a borderline case of course, but fits the pattern) thinkers had very different notions of nature than we do. If we were to clear that up, things would get very complicating. Jan.

First, I would like to humbly excuse myself for not being a native speaker. Then, Wikipedia isn't exactly the authority on the subject of metaphysics, is it? And yes, we all know the tale about Andronicus and his ordering of Aristotle's works. He didn't know what category to put these particular texts in, but he thought it best they were read after the Physics, so he put them μετα τα φυσικά, etc. But if that's how things went, we are left with a name that doesn't directly refer to what it is (like calling a cow 'in the meadow'). It would have been convenient if 'metaphysics' just meant what it's constituent components mean taken together, but if it doesn't, we're left to see if we can work out a definition. Well then, what is it that endeavors that claim to be, or are said to be metaphysical have in common? It is that none of them is about any physically observable thing; they concern τα μετα τα φυσικά, those things trans physicam, the supernatural, the things beyond nature. The scholastics were right after all - or can you show me an unmoved mover, free will, God, the good, an ίδεά, a cause, a natural right; the way I can show you my face? Of course, metaphysics as a word refers to prima philosophia, but there are a lot more philosophies called metaphysical than those of Aristotle and Descartes: I repeat, the scholastics that read metaphysics to mean "the science of what is beyond the physical" were not so mistaken as one might think, regardless of whether the tale about Andronicus is true or not. Jan.

It is not just my view; it is a quite common ethymological interpretation. It is my point of view though, that if objectivism really is about real things (which I'm sure you don't want to contest), it would be more proper for it to speak of physics, rather than of metaphysics. Jan.

For as far as sources go, he can be considered to be closer to Plato than to Aristotle. However, since he never wrote down a single line; or at least, since not a single line he might have written down has stood the test of time, we can't be entirely sure. Most of the things we think we know about Socrates come from Plato's dialogues, in which he figures as one of the main speakers. There actually are theories claiming that the person of Socrates never even existed and that the things he says are in fact Plato's own ideas. The most important things to know about Socrates concern his method of philosophizing: Socrates's aim was to dismantle false knowledge and to draw forth real truth. He went about this by asking his discussion partners to explain (for example) what exactly 'justice' is. His victims usually think they know the right answer and boldy go about explaining things, but by asking the right questions, and placing shrewd remarks, Socrates usually manages to realize a state of aporime; all knowledge before deemed true turns out in fact not to be so, and no fitting answer can be thought of (a- = not; poros = passage; there's no way through the problem). Socrates didn't want to just give the correct answer, as he believed that each man himself could, by proper reasoning, come to know real truths. Socrates is willing to help, though. By asking the right questions he leads his discussion partners on the right way. Socrates compared himself to a midwife, but instead of helping give birth to babies, he helped giving birth to knowledge. Don't think too much of this though. Socrates's 'helping to give birth' is often more a kind of 'pulling the thing out'. One last small remark about the topics Socrates talked about, then: Socrates is said to be 'the philosopher to pull philosophy down from the heavens'. What is meant by this, is that he was the first of the anient Greek philosophers not to talk primarily about the world, the things living and growing on it, and the heavens around it: Rather, Socrates's main concern and topic were ethics and politics. Very sketchy, but who knows; it might be useful? Jan.

To take the word literally; metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that busies itself with those things that are beyond (= meta-) the scope of physics. What then, is physics? Well, you probably know that, but I find it helpful to define physics as the branch of philosophy (in this case 'science' is the more word you're probably used to) that busies itself with the observable. So metaphysics is about things we don't have sense data of. You know, metaphysics literally mean 'supernatural'... Jan.

Makes a lot of sense. I don't really see the problem, actually. Isn't 'reality' the crystal clear example of a concept? Why can't we differentiate reality from non-reality? Isn't that roughly the same as taking 'reality' as being the common denominator for all things that are? On a side note: Isn't concept a very platonic concept? Or perhaps I should ask what exactly you take 'concept' to mean. Jan.

I'm sorry if I took so much time replying to y'all. I just have been so busy enjoying my first few days of vacation... DavidOdden: I would agree with you that opinions don't change the nature of a thing, but ultimately, I'm going to have to say I don't know what think of such a claim, as it is a metaphysical one, and metaphysics is always speculative. But more on this later. Further, I couldn't possibly believe that identity is in the thing, instead of in what we make of the thing. For your reference, identity as a word has very old etymological roots, most important for this discours being the Latin idem, which today we still know to mean 'the same'. A possible substitute for 'identity' would then be 'sameness': A thing's identity then, is the sum of it's quantity and quality of being the same (or not) as some other thing. This illuminates the fact a thing could never have an identity in itself, but only in relation to other things. This way however, each thing would still have a great many identities; it's sameness would quite fully depend on what other thing(s) you compare it to, or, its identity would depend on us, who choose which of it's identities to adhere to - and thus it follows that I should care a great deal about what other people think. But that's not the end of it. In the end, ultimately, I end up caring only about the things I think, which, by the way, are the only part of reality I ever perceive. So yes, I care about reality too. And well, not to DavidOdden in particular, about metaphysics: In my book it is a futile project. If we practice metaphysics, we're really only trying to ascertain things we can't be certain about - and then by certain I mean supported and not contradicted by arguments - and the only kinds of viable arguments I know of are logical ones and empirical ones. I think metaphysics is supported by neither, since it seeks to make claims about things that lie beyond the realms of empirism and logic; and here it is where you people and me seem to clash. I will try to clarify my point of view: I think metaphysics, if it is a search for final grounds, for objectivity, is like trying to go beyond a horizon: Once we're there, we'll only find new horizons. I just don't see a way we could ever take an objective point of view: We can't escape the totality we're part of. And if we could, we'd only find ourselves in another totality. That's an infinite regression there: We can't take an objective point of view over our subjective ones, because if did, we would need another objective point of view to make sure our first objective point of view really is objective, and so on. We can devise this infinite regression to be like a circle, so it wouldn't be some infinite regression - but then it obviously would be circular. Not the kind of objectivity objectivism (for as far as my grasp of it goes), or Aristotle, for that matter, promises. Well so much for my rant. I'm off to bed now. Jan. P.S. Objectivism's claims don't yet seem very plausible to me, but I will continue my investigation. Any help still is greatly appreciated!

Bold Standard: I'm not really into philosophical English. 'Reason', is that your translation of Greek logos, Latin ratio, or German Vernunft? I want to know what we're talking about. Anyway, for as far as I know, we don't live in Ancient Greece or in the Enlightenment, and their interpretations of rationality are out of date. In fact, technically speaking -you know, from a modern point of view-, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics and aesthetics are all out of date. If metaphysics and epistemology are to be the foundation of philosophy, I can't see how philosophy couldn't ever not be spucalative, and I don't think that that is what modern philosophy should be. I mean, if we allow philosophy to be speculation, then religion for example, would become perfectly viable philosophy, which I really don't think it is anymore. And well, I guess it doesn't look like I'm going to be a fervent objectivist then, but coming here, it never was my aim to be converted or something. I'm just interested, as I am in all philosophy. I want to have an opinion, so I'm trying find out what things're all about. LaszloWalrus: You are of course very right in correcting me that reason is not dogmatic. It would be more apropriate to say (wouldn't it?) that although it might be a foundation for ethics, aesthetics, etc., reason itself is either unsupported because it gives rise to an infinite regression, or is supported by something we would claim is a fallacy - but then of course it would be reason dictating us what a fallacy is, making the fallacy even more fallacious. Either way, I think that this kind of research into reason, though fascinating as some attempts may be, will never turn out to be a fruitful philosophical investigation. FeatherFall: I survived all nine works of Terry Goodkind's Sword of Truth series, does that grant me a chance at ploughing through Rand's fiction? Could you tell me what objectivism's three basic axioma's are? Oh, and, are these really self-evident, or just a point you say we shouldn't want to go beyond? And, could you explain what's wrong with contradiction? Or is that a question I shouldn't ask because it's self-evident? KendallJ: Yes, supernatural is what the original Greek metaphysics translates to, basically. And that's what my question really comes down to. How can Rand claim objectivity about something that transcends sensory percention? That's what I'd call speculation, and speculation is not something I would call objective - or very useful, for that matter. Unless her metaphysics does in no way make empirically unsupported claims, but then metaphysics just wouldn't be an appropriate term in her system, or at the very least, a very, very confusing one. And as for your question about my view on reason, being reasonable: I've said a little more about it already, but perhaps it would be helpful to consider some things Descartes says about philosophy -about science, we would say-: According to Descartes, philosophy is like a tree, with some of it's more importent branches being ethics, mechanics, and medicine. It's trunk, out of which these branches grow, is physics, and the roots of the tree, out of which the trunk grows, are metaphysics. Rand's philosophy seems to fit this pattern, sowing a metaphysical grain of seed, from which might, if tended reasonably, grow a grand philosophically aesthetic, ethical tree. But Descartes adds this little thing (which in his philosophy, he doesn't give a lot of further consideration, by the way), that ultimately the tree is judged by the fruit it produces, and that is somewhat the way I see it: The reasonable tree is not one with good roots, but one with good yield. Felix: I'm a little hesitant about further elaborating what my position is, as it still shifts now and then. Besides, I'm here to try to get a basic understanding of objectivism, not to spew my ideas on these things. But well, "there's no truth. Everything is just somebody's opinion" may suffice as half of a crude description of what my opinions are. I do not think there is a truth the way objectivism seems to define it, but I do have some kind of a conception of truth. But I would be interested in how objectivism managed to convince you? Perhaps I'm just missing some 'fundamental' point. DavidOdden: Could you explain how Rand's metaphysics differs from other kinds of metaphysics? (Where these other kinds may for convenience sake be described as the original Greek ta meta ta physika, Latin trans physicam, English supernatural, as in 'making claims not supported by empirical data'?) Again to Bold Standard: Rand seems to reject all progress made in philosophy since Kant... I was going to ask whether she is like the pinnacle of scholastic philosophy, with man instead of God as knowledge's point of emanation? For as far as I know, saying byebye to metaphysics doesn't mean saying byebye to philosophy. It 'just' means saying byebye to the philosophy of old, but it opens new ways of exciting contemporary philosophy as well - and then I don't mean logical positivism. In general: I'm really not here to try to deconstruct objectivism. If it seems I'm criticizing, that's because I want to understand. And, I'm sorry if the things I'm saying are all very standard questions and remarks. I knew completely nothing about Rand's objectivism a week or two ago. I'm just trying to grasp the material with all the means I have, and if few those be, then so be it. I find that personal interaction with people who know what they're talking about is always much better a teacher than reading books is. I really appreciate the serious replies you all are giving me! Thanks, Jan.

Yes Maarten, we have an appointment when you're back - that is, if you don't choose to stay in NY. So from reason, Rand manages to produce a metaphysics -that should be called physics, if the reason she advocates really is objective, isn't it?-, an epistemology, a form of (political / individual) ethics, and a form of aesthetics? Or vice versa, from an epistemology and a metaphysics a form of reason (excluding ethics and aesthetics for I don't see how those could ever be a foundation for reason)? I have never encountered a form of reason (or, may I say, rationality?) that wasn't at its root dogmatic. Reason is, for as far as I know, always circular, as the only justification for it being reasonable there is, comes from itself, and thus any objectivism that is deduced from, is not as objective as we would have it. However, I may just be fundamentally misinterpreting you, so I really should stop here and do some research first. But, a question about these boards: You say I won't be ready for you if I really disagree with Rand. Is that, because this is ultimately a place of celebration of objectivism? I mean, the frequent posters, are there any non- or anti-objectivists among them? Thanks, Jan.

I can hardly feel sorry for not jumping to conclusions. I think that the thing about objectivism I disagree with, or I don't understand, is its claiming objectivity. However, I would rather read some more about objectivism before entering into a discussion about this. Thanks for the links and your very brief summary! Jan.

Hi all, I don't know much about objectivism, and what I do know I do not agree with, but I figured I might as well try and find out some more. Or well, that's not entirely true: A friend of mine seems to be really into objectivism and therefore I wanted to know what it's all about. Why not ask him, you ask. Well, he's leaving for a couple of weeks of vacation tomorrow morning, and I just can't wait. So, I'm not going to read any works on objectivism as of yet, as I have plenty of other things to read. I'm hoping to gather the central points of this 'philosophy' from browsing the boards and perhaps asking a question here or there. That's all for now, but I think I will edit this post in a while to include a list with some basic info about me. Jan.