rkamasam

Ayn Rand mentions in the chapter "cognitive role of concepts" that "the descriptive complexity of a given group of existents, the frequency of their use, and the requirements of cognition (of further study) are the main reasons for the formation of new concepts. Of these reasons, the requirements of cognition are the paramount one." This implies that the requirements of cognition make it necessary for us to form new concepts. In this context I wanted to understand the "requirements of cognition."

Just want to know in explicit terms, what the requirements of the cognition are? Went through the chapter "cognitive role of concepts" in IOE, but couldn't quite grasp what the requirements of cognition are.

In ITOE, Ayn Rand actually makes a distinction between concept formation, and induction. She says that concept formation is "essentially" a process of induction. She does not say that they are the same. If a principle is arrived at by the process of induction, then it follows that a concept and principle are different. Going through the threads, I realise there are many aspects to the issue of the difference between "concept formation" and "principle formation."

I remember Ayn Rand explaining in ITOE how one arrives at the concept of "justice." What she was emphasising there was the process of concept formation. Elsewhere in "objectivist" literature I remember "justice" being referred to as a "principle." I want to understand for myself whether one arrives at "justice" through the process of concept formation or through the process of induction. In otherwords is "induction" an aspect of concept formation? (personally I don't think so). Ayn Rand explained in ITOE that every word of language is a concept barring the "proper nouns," which I took to mean that every cognition is arrived at on the basis of concept formation. Can someone point to me where in the objectivist literature I can find an anatomy of "principle."

Is there a clear cut distinction between a "concept" and a "principle?" Are they two distinct forms of cognition, and if so how is concept formation different from the formation of a principle?

I am basing it on the distinction that "moral values" are a sub-set of "values." Moral values are principles and are a guide to action. In otherwords, moral values are the standards by which we judge our individual choices and actions in any given context as moral and immoral. They help us to reduce a vast range of choices and actions under a single concept/principle. Where as the concept "value" includes all values, moral or otherwise (material and spirutual etc..). Hope this makes sense.

I think "virtue" refers to the action undertaken/required in the context of "moral values" and goal refers to the action in the context of all values.

Is n't virtue the action required to achieve a value??

Is there a clear distinction between "goals" and "values?" Are they two distinct concepts with two different sets of referents, or are they two different perspectives on the same facts. Throughout objectivist ethics one gets the view that these two concepts are used interchangeably.

I understand the issue now. I made the mistake of assming that the truth and falsehood only applied to the facts without evaluation, instead of recognizing that evaluation (something as for or against man's life) is implicit in recognition of the fact: i.e in recognizing a fact as corresponding to reality or contradicting is also the evaluation that it is good or evil.

In the essay "fact and value" Peikoff states that: "Every proper value-judgment is the identification of a fact: a given object or action advances man's life (it is good): or it threatens man's life (it is bad or an evil). The good, therefore, is a species of the true; it is a form of recognizing reality. The evil is a species of the false; it is a form of contradicting reality. Or: values are a type of facts; they are facts considered in relation to the choice to live." I am struggling to grasp the relationship between the true and the good. How can one possibly infer the statement: "the good, therefore, is a species of the true", from its preceding statement in the above quote. Because, if the fact that an object or action can be harmful or threatening to man's life is "true," then the evaluation of the fact (as bad or evil) cannot possibly make it a species of the "true." Similarly, if the recognition of the fact that an action or object could threaten (bad or evil) man's life is "true," then doesn't that make "evil" a species of the true?? I am sure, peikoff didn't intend the conclusions I reached, but I am missing something here.