Seeker

What conclusion that doesn't rely upon axiom, sense perception, or a valid, proper causal explanation has a valid role in man's cognition? So far you have cited conclusions involving mens rea, but isn't it true that there are inductive principles by which to validly and with causal explanations, infer such conclusions? Again I think this all comes down to some unspecified, unwarranted doubt you have that is (for you) precluding certainty by a rational standard, hence we are told that we must make do with certainty by an irrational standard.

After reviewing post #82 and post #98 in the other thread, it is clear that Betsy is invoking different standards of proof that, when reached, constitute certainty (that those standards of proof have been met). C2 is Peikoff certainty from OPAR chapter 5. C1 is a special instance of C2 in which the standard of proof is "absolute" such that it is impossible to be proven wrong later. Because of this, it is highly unlikely that Betsy will acknowledge a disagreement with OPAR ch. 5 (other than her preference that "certainty" refer only to certainty in which the standard of proof is "absolute"). What we have then, according to Betsy's approach, is certainty that a conclusion has been validated "absolutely", or certainty that a conclusion has been validated "beyond a reasonable doubt". So I can see now how she is using the OPAR concept of certainty by plugging in different standards of proof, but then the question simply turns from "degrees of certainty" to standards of proof, and the same objections apply - that there is no distinction between the standards, that all knowledge is contextual, etc.

Betsy, please let me ask this. What, in your view, is the difference between the certainty you advocate and the certainty that Dr. Peikoff advocates in OPAR Ch. 5? Because there is clearly a difference. I think that when Dr. Peikoff says certain, he doesn't mean "highly probable" - he means certain - and you do not agree with that. I am trying to get at the linchpin of the disagreement. It seems to boil down to the fact that we cannot read minds, so we cannot know men's motives (what causes people to do things) and that the lack of that causal connection is (for you) a barrier to (contextual) certainty about men's motives. Is that correct?

You cannot have your doubt and certainty too. It simply makes no sense to say that our conclusions about others can be certain because they can be highly probable but not certain. As to mindreading, here is what you said: Again, you say that we cannot be certain. So why bother keeping up the ridiculous claim that we can achieve "certainty", just not 100% certainty? Why not just say what you mean: that such conclusions can be highly probable but not certain?

Except for the fact that Betsy's C2 entails doubt, i.e. non-certainty (specifically, as to another person's mental state, because we cannot read minds), while her C1 does not. As far as I know, others' mental states are the only example she provides where conclusive inferences cannot be made). You may be right that C1=C2 once such doubts are dispelled, but then the issue is that, in Betsy's view, such doubts cannot be dispelled because we are not mindreaders. That's the difference. What got us here was the mistaken allowance that Betsy's C2 is a form of certainty. It isn't. If one cannot resolve her doubts regarding others' mind states, then it is completely improper to allow, as Betsy does, that the criminal law's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard constitutes a valid form of certainty. I think she should just say what she means: in her view, the criminal law's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard allows reasonable doubts, i.e. uncertainty, because men cannot read minds. Then this entire mess could have been avoided. To put it another way, debating what "certain" means (as though it is not perfectly obvious) is serving to obscure the real disagreement and put it farther from resolution. I have expressed my view of the core issues here.

As I see it, there are two essential issues here that need to be resolved. 1. Free will means that man must choose among alternatives, but it is not evidence of choosing a particular alternative. For example, the fact that someone must choose to be honest or dishonest is not evidence of their choosing to be dishonest. Therefore, Betsy's position, that having free will creates doubt about a person's honesty, is incorrect. 2. Because man is not omniscient, his certainty is contextual within his present knowledge. Therefore, it is possible to be certain yet wrong. Therefore, Betsy's position, that man must account for unknown reasons to think that he might be wrong to establish a contextless certainty, is incorrect (but note the relation to #1 - if Betsy's position is actually that certainty is contextual but that free will is a known reason to think that one might be wrong about another person, then that is incorrect for the reasons stated in #1).

I was referring to some of the usages in replies #146, #149, and #150. My position is that it is a misuse of the word "certainty" to contrast it against greater or lesser versions of itself - such as "this conclusion is certain, but not as certain as that conclusion" ... I consider such statements to be of the "all animals are equal but some are more equal than others" variety. Certainty means one thing - if something is not certain, then one should not say that it is. What makes this so odd is the number of times Betsy claims to embrace a single standard of certainty, then (sometimes in the very same post) embrace certainty-in-degrees, notwithstanding the utter confusion that such usage necessarily engenders, especially when the problem could be so easily avoided by simply dropping the qualifiers (i.e. just say it: since one cannot read minds, one is not certain ...) etc.

I am almost at the end of my rope pointing this out, but will say it again: certainty does not come in relative shades of grey. If you do not know something with equal certainty, then you do not know it with certainty, period. If you are not as sure of a conclusion, then you are not sure of it. It begs credulity to allow that certainty (epistemologically speaking) means one thing only (i.e. freedom from doubt), yet still allow comparisons in terms of degrees like that. At this point I don't know what else to say. Correct me if I am wrong? Note that I am treating these statements as claims relating to cognition, because of phrases like "know with equal certainty", and not emotion, which were it to be admitted to this discussion would be subuseful anyway. But if that is anyone's intention, it would help to clarify it by saying "feel as certain", "feel as sure", etc. so that we know that that is the intention.

As far as I can tell, the distinction between "C1" and "C2" is best explained by the following exchange: Hence all that business about mindreading - that supposedly being the necessary (but impossible) step to logically validate and achieve certainty, hence certainty is impossible concerning entities having free will. No matter the evidence, according to Betsy's view, doubts necessarily remain because the step needed to logically validate the conclusion cannot be done. That was the concrete example that led to the generalizations about "C1" and "C2". Edit - Note that the usage of "beyond a reasonable doubt" here doesn't really mean beyond a reasonable doubt, it's referring to a standard of proof in criminal cases that (in Betsy's view) actually allows reasonable doubts precisely because certainty (as to motive) cannot be obtained.

Bear in mind that certainty is also a feeling, and to that extent one may feel more strongly certain with greater evidence. But that is not a cognitive evaluation, and is not the same as saying that a conclusion becomes more certain with greater evidence, which it cannot. A conclusion that is already free of doubt cannot become more free of doubt with greater evidence. However, I am not able at present to inspect the essay you cite, so I cannot say whether that was Rand's view, and offer it as a possible alternative only in that context.

Well then, in that case it's no evidentiary support for doubts as to someone's character, is it? Free will means that someone must choose, but it doesn't evidence a choice of a particular alternative, and that is what one would need to have rational doubt. Free will is no barrier to having certainty about someone's character.

Do you think that having free will constitutes evidence that someone will be dishonest?

Certainty is a single concept meaning freedom from doubt. There are different ways to arrive at certainty, depending on the nature of the proposition. A conclusion is either certain or it isn't. There are no degrees of certainty, any more than there are degrees of arbitrariness, or degrees of impossibility. To split certainty into greater and lesser certainty does real violence to the concept "certainty" and to human cognition. The only way there can be two different kinds of certainty is for one to include doubt while the other remains doubtless. Certainty is not a shade of grey to be contrasted with other shades of certainty; it is solid white, with no variations.

The answer is no. I really wish we would stop saying "the difference between certainty A versus certainty B" when what we mean is "certain versus not certain". Certainty is not a shade of grey to be contrasted with other shades of certainty; it is solid white, with no variations. Please - certainty is too important an epistemological concept to misuse in this way. Certainty is contextual. If we must compare, let's compare knowledge contexts, or compare the types of conclusions about which one may be certain in those contexts. Let's not muddy the waters by introducing certainty in multiple hues. If you are not certain of someone's character, then you are not certain of it and should not be using that word.

It might also be that the moon is made of green cheese. But we have dispensed with arbitrary claims, or so I thought. Certainty means one thing only. If it isn't "the same certainty", then it is not certain and that word should not be used. Since certainty means freedom from doubt, this statement is self-contradictory.

I think it's not, because certainty is a single concept meaning freedom from doubt. There are different ways to arrive at certainty, depending on the nature of the proposition. It may even be necessary to distinguish them sometimes. That does not mean that the word "certainty" denotes multiple concepts. That's like saying there are two different kinds of cars: cars purchased on credit, and cars bought with cash. It really has nothing to do with what a car is. Nor does the way in which certainty is established have anything to do with what certainty is.

To embellish that last point: certainty refers to a single concept. What differs is the nature of the proposition. I am certain that I am myself, axiomatically. I am also certain that day will follow night, because all of the evidence points in that direction. Those are not two different kinds of certainty though. To bifurcate certainty into greater axiomatic and lesser non-axiomatic certainty does real violence to the concept "certainty" and to human cognition by introducing unwarranted doubt. Why? Because that consequence follows from the bifurcation. The only way there can be two different kinds of certainty is for one to include doubt while the other remains doubtless. Otherwise, the bifurcation is meaningless. This is a basic epistemological issue. If the only truths of which we permit ourselves to be certain are axiomatic, then we will never be free of groundless, arbitrary doubt. But if we can be certain (as we must) of propositions having full evidentiary support, then there can be only one concept of certainty. It's either-or. There is no in-between.

It seems that what you are really doing is distinguishing conclusions that are axiomatic versus those that require proof. That's fine. A is A is axiomatic. Why not just say so? That doesn't make it any more proven, because one cannot prove an axiom. Yes, you are certain of it. You are also certain of propositions that have been sufficiently established in a given context. Certainty is binary. A conclusion is either certain or it isn't. There are no degrees of certainty, any more than there are degrees of arbitrariness, or degrees of impossibility.

But there are two different meanings within this reference also. If someone is using "100% certainty" as a meaning for the word "certainty", then to that person "100% certainty" must mean "100% 100% certainty" just as "absolute certainty" must mean "absolute absolute certainty". The qualifiers are redundant and unhelpful if the same person uses "certainty" and "100% certainty" interchangeably. Therefore, I am still unsure of what you think "certain" means, or why you would say something like "100% certainty" rather than just "certainty", given your definition. So yeah, it's a problem all right.

Apparently, "Christian Neo-Objectivism" begins with nonsense and ends with evasion and a stolen term, with a dollop of victimhood on top. Next topic: the philosophy of "Unreal Neo-Reality" - is it true if we wish for it hard enough? Discuss.

I think Ifat's usage of "choice" essentially means selection in a context - as in, a deterministic robot would be "choosing" when making a selection in the context of a police lineup even if it always pointed to the first man in the lineup. It is quite right and proper to correct the usage though. There's more to do. We have shown that our will is free from external interference, and must now show that our will is free from internal prior restraint. So let's do that. Choose to decrease and increase your level of focus. Do you notice any prior conditions or decisions interfering with your choice, or is the choice of your own accord at the instant you make it? Is it predictable or unpredictable? Freely chosen or dependent on past internal conditions acting upon your mind over which you have no control in infinite regress? My answer is that between past and future I am free at every instant to decide my level of focus of my own accord, without knowing or being able to control ahead of time what my choice will be at a given instant, i.e. it is freely chosen. What answer does your inspection reveal?

Choose to vary your level of focus. Do you notice any external interference, or is the choice of your own accord?

Naturally they cannot be proved, but what you can do is show that they are axioms. To wit - Yes, precisely. I wasn't going for anything more complicated than that.

If you mean, how do we know that our will is free? The answer is introspection. Given that knowledge, the evidentiary burden lies on the proponent of determinism to demonstrate that the basic choice to focus is determined solely by physical brain activity such that our will is not free, which as far as I know has not been done - leaving us, in the context of our presently known facts, with the knowledge that our will is free.

I can understand applying that reasoning to someone who denies that existence exists, but in the case of someone who accepts the Primacy of Existence, the Law of Identity, the Axiom of Consciousness, and the Law of Causality, yet differs on the subject of free will only I suggest that some additional effort may be warranted. In particular, the solution may be to clarify terms, or, as may be the case here, in presenting the concept in a particular way that facilitates a new insight.