Seeker

In essence, yes. My favorite example is the biological need to eat which requires taking risks that might stand in the way of literal survival. The need to eat is immutable, hence it does not properly belong in the realm of ethics. Now, if you wish to posit a probabilistic question, i.e. given what I know, the odds are 25% that I'll die from starvation if I don't chase that rabbit, versus 75% I'll fall into the ravine if I do, then there is an ethical choice to be made, it seems to me. Sometimes knowledge is imperfect, as you suggest. Ethics does not require perfect knowledge, but only the best choice given what we know at the time. ... unless you knew you couldn't live with yourself otherwise - an extreme hypothetical to be sure, but we are here dealing with hypotheticals. Also, I am not suggesting that taking the bullet is always the correct choice. I was attempting to avoid the question only because it didn't seem to fit the topic of the thread, which is the Objectivist standard of value for man's life and whether it entails more than just a physical or biological dimension. I'll go so far as to say that if the nature of man and reality did not stand in the way of the existence-by-machine such that the question was only one of, "do I live 150 years or do I live 75?", then the machine would indeed be the correct choice. Given the probabilistic nature of most knowledge, in most instances the question isn't "is it so?" but "what is the probability that it is so?" It is practically impossible that you would know with 100% certainty that you would never again get the food you needed. Even if you estimated your odds of being rescued from captivity at 1% that's still greater than the 0% chance of your surviving if you committed suicide. In that example, suicide would not be a moral choice. But let's take the hypothetical as given: that there is a 100% chance of dying and you know it. Given that the standard is survival, you should still continue living as long as possible. Given the standard, it would be immoral to elect to not live, so long as you still had a choice in the matter. Suicide would thus be amoral: only after your deprivation of food really forced you to kill yourself would the matter be removed from the realm of ethics such that killing yourself would neither be ethical nor unethical, but simply a given.

I was speaking solely in reference to the needs that man cannot suppress. If he could suppress them, they wouldn't strictly be needs. By "need" I mean a requirement for survival. Once again, you are positing ethical questions, which presupposes choice. I on the other hand am positing aspects of man in which there is no choice, hence no ethics. The Objectivist view of psychology holds that happiness is necessary for the functioning of man's mind. Since he needs his mind to survive over the long term, an uphappy person cannot exist over the long term. The answer is respect to taking a bullet for someone is that doing so could satisfy an immutable need for self-assertion/realization - i.e. of a desire that the person protected would not be dead. In regards to the machine, of course there is a choice as to whether to hook up, but if it meant unhappiness and thus suicide, hooking up would be unethical. Ultimately we are debating the nature of man and of reality in regards to whether something is or is not open to choice - I say no, you insist yes - which is rather beside the point. Which it is doesn't alter the fundamental basis of the Objectivist ethics, i.e. the point at issue here - that when something is open to choice, there is a standard of value by which to measure it, which is survival - and that when something is not open to choice, it is beyond the realm of ethics.

So does this resolve the issue? Is everything wrapped up in a neat little package?

No, I do - but I also suggest the existence, within man's immutable nature, i.e. aspects of his being which he cannot control, of needs which require more than a life hooked up to machines. For example, once man's experiences grow to encompass more than just sitting in bed, a life of merely sitting in bed might become virtually impossible to him even though it might extend his life expectancy (I also think it necessary to challenge the idea that sitting in bed actually does, in fact, maximize one's life expectancy as one would be weak, stupid, and unable to deal with any problems that cropped up). I am referring back to the idea that ethics is required not only because of things about which man has choices, but things about which he has no choice. Ethics cannot apply to what is good or bad for man per se, but only to what is good or bad for man to the extent that he has a choice in the matter, i.e. what is ethical or unethical. I see that this does present some nettlesome questions as to man's immutable nature. If it entailed an uncontrollable will to power, for instance, Objectivism would have to admit the reality, and thus the validity, of that concept. If Hitler's madness foreclosed his actions as a matter of personal choice, then his behavior would cease to be unethical for him. It would still be bad, but it wouldn't be unethical. Similarly, man is biologically mortal, and this is bad for him, but it is not unethical because he cannot help it. This raises a lot of questions about what the unchangeable aspects of man are in reality, but it doesn't negate the basis of the Objectivist ethics.

Sorry, I got kicked out of the forum before I could finish my answer ... Is happiness part of "life" or a result of living, or "fulfilment of "life""? Happiness results from a correct understanding of what one's life requires coupled with the achievement of the same. Thus, it is a part of "life" and a result of living and "fulfillment of "life"". In Objectivist terms, "unhappy life" is an oxymoron.

See below ... The standard of value includes only those aspects of an organism which its survival entails. What is the essential versus the non-essential? The definition of life, i.e. "a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action" reduces the answer to those aspects necessary for that process to continue. Objectivism states that man needs his mind in order to survive. If he didn't - if his mind were superflouous, like his appendix - then its survival would no longer be entailed within man's standard of value. But in reality, man's mind is necessary for his survival in the long run, even if not in the immediate range of the moment. So the question is what does the survival of man's mind require? What are its specific needs psychologically, spiritually, and so on? That is the connection between "something fancy" and "survival". That is why Roark needed to build the Stoddard Temple and not a shack. We need not explore the immutable features of man's psyche in every detail to see how this understanding fits within Rand's basis for ethics. "Man's life" is man's process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. That process requires his mind. His mind requires happiness.

The standard of value for Hitler was his long-range survival, to which the people he murdered could have contributed in a rational society had they been allowed to live. Had Hitler been acting rationally, he would not have not murdered them because doing so ultimately reduced his own life in every aspect to which human beings contribute by the free exchange of values. Those who initiate the use of force to gain value in the short term ultimately lose value.

On the issue of reproduction, I take it that according to Objectivism, having children is only good to the extent that it further's one's own life. To the extent that man is biologically (and in a sense psychologically) "wired" to reproduce (i.e. has no choice in the matter), this is akin to the need to eat - and just as we would not say that an organism's physical need to take risks to acquire food contradicts its standard of value, i.e. its physical existence, similarly we would not say that taking risks to reproduce implies a contradiction. On the other hand, to the extent that having children is elective (psychologically, to the extent that one does not need to have children), doing so would be good only to the extent that it furthered one's own survival in some other non-elective way, such as the offspring producing goods and services that one needs. Values are necessary not only because there are some things about which alternatives exist, but also because there are some things about which alternatives do not exist. When we speak of a living being's nature, we are referring to this latter aspect of reality. Thus, to live according to one's nature means to live according to reality which is given: there is no other reality to choose. That is not a contradiction.

I think you misunderstood my notation. By AB I mean the conjunction "A AND B", the logical negation of which is the disjunction "not A OR not B" - meaning that if man were to lose either his body or his mind, he would cease to live as man (because man's method of survival entails both mind and body). You seem to have presented it as a conjunction "A AND not B", which is a logical error.

If X is the living entity in question, going from a standard of value 'A' (where X = "living organism") to a standard of value 'AB' (where X = "man") is not a switch in regards to the abstract way in which the "standard of value" is defined, namely "X's life". What is being switched is the X to which it refers (the concept "man" instead of "living organism"), but that is not a "switch" in regards to the definition of "standard of value" ... I'm not seeing the switch. Where is the switch?

To answer your other questions: not all aspects of an organism's survival are included in its standard of value, but only those it requires to undertake its process of self-sustaining and self-generated action (i.e. it's life). This is not merely physical in the case of man but also includes his mind. It does not, for example, include his appendix. In the case of a lion, the only non-physical attribute required for it to sustain its life (that I am aware of - again, not my field of expertise) is its survival instinct. So that's what L would be, A being its body, and the lion's standard of value would be the survival of AL.

Thank you. As my next answer ventures beyond the scope of my expertise, it is apt to not be genius, but I will do my best. Man is defined as a rational animal. From this I would say that A is man's body and B is his rational mind. Thus "man's life" is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action where "self" refers to AB. As to your question about whether this is self-contradictory, in respect to man the question becomes an empirical one of understanding the nature, features, and characteristics of man's rational mind to see whether such a contradiction exists. For example, one aspect of man's mind is psychological. "The Psychology of Pleasure", VoS p. 71 (paperback) states that "pleasure, for man, is not a luxury, but a profound psychological need" and goes on to examine this aspect of man's mind. This is saying: experiencing psychological pleasure is a virtue because it is essential to man's psyche such that his rational mind cannot survive without it. There is no contradiction between this aspect of man's mind and his physical survival, if man chooses his values correctly. So far I do not see a contradiction between A and B that would mean that two ultimate values existed. For man, there is but one: the survival of AB, i.e. man's survival qua man.

KendallJ is correct. The definition of a sub-concept does not contradict the definition of its super-concept by adding attributes which distinguish it from other sub-concepts of the super-concept. Man is a living organism with physical characteristics, but he also has (among other features) psychological characteristics that not every organism does. In order to survive as man, he must survive in his psychological as well as his physical aspects. To simplify, let's look at only the physical and psychological aspects of man. Say that A = "physical survival/existence" and B = "psychological survival/existence", and define the concepts thusly: Organism = ( survival: A ) | | (sub-conceptual relation) | Man = ( survival: AB ) The definition of survival for man includes A and thus, does not contradict the definition of organism which also includes A. By contrast, let us suppose that another aspect of survival, C, was included in the definition of organism as follows: Organism = ( survival: AC ) | | (sub-conceptual relation) | Man = ( survival: AB ) That would be a contradiction; in that case, you would be correct that "man" no longer belonged to the concept "organism". But this is not what Rand does. When she speaks of "survival" in the physical sense for all living organisms, she is describing A. She then turns to the more specific concept of man and adds B. This does not create a contradiction. Man must still face the question of existence or non-existence, just as any living organism. For the organism that means A, for man it means AB. But the same root (i.e. starting point for Objectivism) fundamentally applies: it is the alternative of existence vs. non-existence necessitating goals and values. It is not correct to interpret the definition of organism to encompass "A only", i.e. A and nothing but A. This is not what Rand says: she never says that physical survival is the only type of survival of each organism, but rather the one that all living organisms have in common, leaving open the possibility (as in the case of man) other aspects of existence than physical. Also, although it is true that man requires his mind to survive physically, it is not true that that is the link that man's mind has to man's standard of value. Man is body and mind. His standard of value is therefore the existence/survival of both aspects, i.e. his survival qua man.

By the way, lest I be misunderstood, Rand herself explains how to understand what she is saying in the very same article. See "The Objectivist Ethics", VoS p. 21 (paperback): "A concept [is] an abstraction that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a specific kind." The word "organism" denotes just such an abstraction. What she says about a living organism's standard of value is true at that level of abstraction. What she says about man's standard of value is true at that level of abstraction. The two do not contradict each other, but one is more specific because it deals with a more specific level of abstraction.

Except that life is not the same for all organisms. You seem to have focused on the abstraction Rand generated to describe all life without recognizing that such abstraction does not exist except in particular concrete instances, each of which has its own specialized requirements. In computer science terms (sorry but this is my field so I understand it better this way) the class "living organism" is an abstract superclass of all concrete subclasses that belong to it such as "human", "lion", etc. There can be no instances of "living organism" as such, but only by instantiation of one of the subclasses. Rand is describing in general terms that apply to all organisms what life is, but that generalization always accompanies the existence of a concrete instance of a more particular class to which attach specific requirements. There is no contradiction because nothing exists only as a living organism abstractly, but always as a living organism of a particular type. So for a lion, the standard of value is "life qua lion" because that is the concrete instance of the abstract concept of "life qua living organism" (which never exists independently). Does this help at all?

I can't find the exact quotations that support the premise that Rand ever said that survival entails physical existence excluding such aspects as psychological in the case of man. Where specifically does Rand make that claim? Is the idea rooted in the fact that all existents exist physically? The human psyche can, in fact, be described in physical terms - a collection of neurons organized in a particular physical pattern, for example - so could that be the connection you seek?

The link is man's nature. The article "The Psychology of Pleasure" (VoS paperback p. 71) states that "pleasure is not a luxury, but a profound psychological need". Thus, man does not survive in his psychological aspect (and thus, survive qua man) without pleasure. There are five areas "that allow man to experience the enjoyment of life: productive work, human relationships, recreation, art, sex." (p. 72). For man, a process of self-generated action that failed to provide pleasure would not be self-sustaining in that man would not survive psychologically. That's the connection.

I can understand why reading "The Objectivist Ethics" might lead one to conclude that by "survival" Rand meant merely physical survival - most of the article is spent denouncing the collectivist mindset which leads, literally, to physical death, and framed as such it is easy to mistake the argument for something far too limited in scope. Fortunately she does make clear that man's survival means his entire survival - the survival not just of his body, but of his mind, and of all aspects of his existence open to his choice. A far better explanation of Rand's view of man's essential nature can be found in The Romantic Manifesto. I quote the following from "Art and Sense of Life" (p. 36, Signet edition): "An artist (as, for instance, the sculptors of Ancient Greece) who presents man as a God-like figure is aware of the fact that men may be crippled or diseased or helpless; but regards these conditions as accidental, and irrelevant to the essential nature of man - and he presents a figure embodying strength, beauty, intelligence, self-confidence, as man's proper, natural state." (emphasis added). This shorthand could fairly be used to describe the Ideal Man of Rand's novels. The point I wish to make is that Rand's view of man's nature goes well beyond his physical survival, or even the maintenance of a passionless reasoning capacity. The heroes portrayed in her novels are passionate and filled with radiant joy. "This," she seems to say, "is man's essential nature." There is a great deal of truth there that begins to delve into the concept of man's nature in a way that goes beyond physical survival. Once again, it is a fuller understanding of that nature that is required, if we are to arrive at an understanding of what "the good" entails. I don't wish to make it sound trite or easy. I know it isn't - I simply want to suggest that what is needed, more than an argument over whether or not "survival" means mere subsistence, is a thorough investigation into the aspects of man's nature as the link between what those seeking the clarity of the Objectivist philosophy need and what much of Rand's work actually supplies.

Your assertion is simply incorrect. I did quote her - from the bottom of page 26, Signet paperback edition. Look it up. She says "such is the meaning of the definition: that which is required for man's survival qua man. It does not mean a momentary or merely physical survival. ... Man's survival qua man means the terms, methods, conditions, and goals required for the survival of a rational being through the whole of his lifespan - in all those aspects of existence which are open to his choice." Read the last sentence carefully. It says "survival ... in all those aspects of existence which are open to his choice". Not "through" -- "in". Thus, Rand is saying that there is survival in many aspects of existence: there is physical survival, there is intellectual survival, there is psychological survival, and so on. Not merely physical survival. My point is that these aspects derive from man's nature, so to know what "the good" is, you must understand that nature so as to correctly choose the terms, methods, conditions, and goals required for survival in each. Yes?

I disagree as to your interpretation. Rand made clear in "The Objectivist Ethics" that survival means not merely physical survival, but "the terms, methods, conditions, and goals required for the survival of a rational being through the whole of his lifespan - in all those aspects of existence which are open to his choice." Since the range of man's choices extends well beyond choosing "the state of not being dead", that is not what Rand meant by survival. The issue remains one of determining the nature of man. For example, if an aspect of man's nature is to create things of beauty, then his survival in that aspect requires certain terms, methods, conditions, and goals. You're welcome.

Let me take a stab at this. I don't see a fundamental contradiction, just a disagreement as to definitions. Let's say that "man's life", properly understood, entails happiness and pleasure among other things arising out of his nature. So far I see no contradiction, just a need to better delineate the nature of man to answer questions regarding the life proper to him and thus determine what is good for him. It would be irrational for you to choose to live like a dog, because you are not a dog. It's not your identity. Your identity objectively determines what "the good" is for you, and you ought to observe it. Once you know what is good, you know what is bad. As to suicide, the answer would ultimately depend once again on your identity as a living human. This is a fair matter for debate I think - to me, man's nature is to maximize objective values such as beauty, and since suicide amounts to a zeroing of values, it is contrary to man's nature except in extraordinary cases for individuals whose condition completely forecloses all achievement - but those are obviously rare exceptions.

I'm new as well, and this is also a central question I have. As I see it, the difficulty arises due to an incomplete, incorrect, or circular definition of "Man's Life". We can safely say what it is not: it is not mere subsistence. Rather, it is existence as "man qua man", or life according to man's nature: a life proper to man. This is unobjectionable as a starting point, but what's needed is a good deal of fleshing out via inquiry into the complete and precise nature of man. On an individual level, this would require a lot of self-study and introspection to come to a useful understanding. It is not an easy task.

It certainly wouldn't be because God spoke to me. It would be because I found something joyous and tremendously life-affirming about tasting broccoli. My emotions would signal that, and my introspection would seek to explain it objectively. Perhaps (to use this example) there is something about the art of tasting broccoli that makes it an act of courage for me and a beautiful statement of defiance against death and unhappiness. In my view, the objective evaluation is a life-maximizing function, where life is not a stagnant physical existence, but a directed effort that spreads orderly patterns of beauty to the greatest extent possible. Objective reasoning validates whether the specific dream we have chosen to pursue among the many open to us best fulfills that purpose. Am I right or wrong?

Okay, I read the ITOE appendix dealing with introspection. I think the upshot is to be honest, to think carefully about what you find in examining your own ideas and emotions, and to start with the base concepts and work up from there. The purpose is to come to an honest accounting of who you are with which to make decisions concerning which values and goals you ought to pursue. Now here lies some difficulty, because what we are proven to be very good at and what we are interested in pursuing are not necessarily the same thing always. Talent can go largely untapped until it's discovered and an effort made to develop it. The mind is not a fixed thing. It can be developed. Given a healthy brain, new patterns of neurons and connections can be formed. We learn and develop new skills. What seems impossible to us may, in fact, be possible. It seems to me that high aspirations for growth are essential to flourishing. While I would not choose a value that I know to be unattainable, neither should I sell myself short by shying away from something that interests me and that I feel strongly about pursuing simply because I haven't yet become great at it, or because its attainment may be improbable. There is a marvelous scene towards the end of The Fountainhead where Peter Keating goes to Howard Roark with some architectural drawings he produced and asks "is there any (hope)?" Roark replies, "it's too late" and feels pity. That passage has always troubled me. Maybe Keating was never that talented to begin with, but on the other hand who was Roark to tell him to give up on his dream? If Keating did possess some talent and made a big enough effort to correct his years of decay, and developed within himself the burning desire of Roark, would it not be possible for him to achieve some measure of greatness himself? Is time really so lethal? To put it another way, given that we aren't certain about our own capabilities at a given point in time, is it irrational to give ourselves the benefit of the doubt, so long as some evidence exists that success is possible? Isn't a burning passion crucial to overcoming such obstacles in any event? I suggest that we are each capable of less than we wish, but more than we know. Given a passionate interest in something, ought we not pursue it so long as some evidence exists that success is possible? If a professional broccoli-taster were the thing I desperately wanted to be more than anything, why let the hTAS2R38 gene stand in my way?

Here is the difficulty I have. I can accept that I ought to choose values and goals according to my nature, but I am not sure what that means objectively. It can't mean my mind: that can be whatever reason compels it to be according to reality. It can't be my "sense of life", because that can be reprogrammed to reflect reality and is not intrinsically reliable. It can't be my body (excluding such goals as my body couldn't fulfill, like super-athleticism). It couldn't be my brain (excluding such goals as would exceed its neurological limits, like being the next Einstein). It might be my need for action generally, as in Neitzche's "will to power", but that's a general concept unsuitable for creating a distinct hierarchy of values and selecting specific goals. Beyond the requirements for survival, there are infinite choices but no objectively reliable means of selecting any of them. Part of the problem, I think, is that Rand never explained why her heroes chose the specific courses they did. We never knew why it was right for Dagny to be the railroad executive and John Galt the physicist, and not vice versa. It seems to me that the only way is to resort to their subjective preferences or the happenstance of their lives, which seems arbitrary and unsuitable for an Objectivist, doesn't it?