Seeker

You're making this way too difficult. Keep in mind, Objectivism holds that free will is axiomatic, available to any act of introspection. Let's also remember that this is not a matter of physics, but a matter of philosophy that we are discussing (and a self-evident one at that). All you have to do is notice that nothing (neither externalities nor inner antecedent factors) impinge upon your freedom to focus or unfocus your mind at any given moment. You need only note the spontaneous character of the decision to arrive at the needed insight. Having validated that your will is free, you have validated the axiomatic concept of free will as an attribute of your consciousness, which you are free to focus on matters of physics or whatever else, which cannot invade the context and disturb the validity of the axiom here elaborated.

In my opinion which I hold to be consistent with Objectivism (and I certainly hope that those are the correct prefacing words), it is not correct to say that a person's identity at the moment he chooses does not wholly determine his action; rather, his identity is in a key respect not wholly pre-determined by antecedent factors. In other words, at the moment at which you choose, you supply the final ingredient in your own identity that determines the outcome. Whether you choose to call this ingredient an "emergent property" or something else is up to you, the point is that up until the moment you chose, you could have chosen differently. This observation, validated by introspection, is an instance of the principle that an entity acts according to its nature. Of course there is some additional legwork involved in observing and conceptualizing to determine what natures different kinds of entities have, but that hardly renders the principle itself vacuous. Rather it points the way to the work you have to do to obtain the knowledge you seek about how particular entities will act - it says "get off your buns and figure it out, don't expect philosophy to hand you an automatic answer", which is a pretty useful idea, I think.

That your will is free can be validated simply by noticing that when you choose to vary your level of mental focus, what you choose in that instant is not necessitated by any antecedent mental factors. Furthermore your ability to know that stands at the very root of self-knowledge and is axiomatic - you must accept the validity of introspection to make any claims about your mind, including claims denying that you have free will. Your argument is self-refuting.

It seems odd to me that nowhere in your original post do you anywhere mention what the mission of Starbucks is. That is ultimately where the efficient shift manager is coming from - they want an efficiently run store which entails proper closings. So forget about who can delegate, as the efficient manager said, you need to speak up - and the reason why you ought to speak up is that, if, as you ought to have done, you have approached the situation from the standpoint of trade based on mutual advantage, then you can see how helping to run the store efficiently is in your own rational self-interest. Sometimes you have to work around an incompetent manager so that your real customers (those with whom you are engaged in trade) can get their part of the bargain. Forget about complaining about your unpaid hours, you either accept that as part of the mutually advantageous (overall) trade or not. If you think they lied to you about working conditions, then take that into consideration and leave if you must. Other than that I think that you should do what it takes to make the store run efficiently, and take justifiable pride in doing so.

Hmmm, I assume that you're not saying that humor, and by extension value, is subjective - rather, that the choice of focus and emphasis depends upon relevance, which is contextual. But that is true of any work of fiction or non-fiction, not an attribute of humor per se. The best humor, just as the best fiction or non-fiction, deals with the widest abstractions that affect all men. So it isn't really dependent on your group, is it? Also, just because humor is an effective way to deliver a serious, rational message (that X behavior is wrong) doesn't mean that that's it's only valid purpose - there is also the value, in joyful pleasure, that thinking and laughing brings. Obvious jokes don't work - there has to be some mental processing involved to reach a sudden insight, and that intellectual playfulness, that demand for rationality, and the emotional response of laughter, gives humor value. I think it depends on how you define "humor". Certainly those things are not worthy of ridicule, but if you want to widen the abstraction to also include whatever happens to be mildly amusing or entertaining, or just plain random, then yeah, I guess you could say those things are funny. Personally I wouldn't, and I don't really find those examples funny at all. On the other hand, joy is joy at existing - so anything that affirms your existence can be a source of laughter. I suppose that if the baby or kitten are in some way an existence-affirming thing for you, then laughing as an expression of joy makes sense.

Well, plus, there's plenty of oil in the ground. So you sort of have to imagine this doomsday scenario unfolding with all of that oil still there, underscoring the folly of the whole premise. What I like however is the honesty with which the author depicts his ideal future. Not all leftists are so open and pointed about it.

Great topic. Humor, by its very nature, depicts human vice and folly, and therefore depends upon ethics. A rock isn't funny; a person goofing up because of his freely chosen evasions is. Humor is what's wrong, which depends upon knowing right and wrong. What I think Objectivism would object to would be finding humor in the good as opposed to the bad, which is to say, presenting the good as bad and vice-versa, but that mistake would be no worse with humor than without, e.g. plain altruism - the essence of the error is not in the humor but in the underlying reversal of ethics that finding humor in virtue represents. That, I think, is what Objectivism would object to in regards to humor, not humor itself. It's no accident that great comedies are intimately concerned with questions of ethics. For example, South Park is well-known for dealing with ethical questions. Why? Because depicting unethical behavior is the richest source of humor there is. Far from being nihilistic, humor depends upon knowledge of right and wrong. Without that context, nothing would be funny. In my view, humor is psychologically necessary and beneficial. When faced with outright irrationality, for instance, sometimes there is simply no response other than to laugh at it.

The predictions of peak oil enthusiasts can be as funny as they are scary. In that vein I present the YouTube trailer for a novel depicting a vision of a "hopeful" post-industrial future for America. Length: 3:11 "> " type="application/x-shockwave-flash" wmode="transparent" width="425" height="355">

What's so surprising about an act of self-abnegation by an avowed leftist? Moore is simply demonstrating his self-sacrificial creed by honoring his enemy. This is how they think.

South Park is willing to make light of anything, and in the process can seem very nihilistic, but often makes a serious point in the end. In my experience, a complete inability to make light of things (as a procedural step of sorts) tends to accompany great psychological difficulties. No one would argue that seriousness doesn't have it place, that isn't the point. The point is that "making fun of" has its place too, and is essential. In terms of Objectivism, I am aware that it demands that humor be found only in the bad, not the good, and I agree (though I think that's inherent in how humor works anyway). South Park works because above all else, it understands the basic principles of humor and applies them well, and those principles are well worth considering.

True. On the other hand, the genuine troublemaker soon realizes that no one is reading his blog and shifts his efforts to more fruitful territory, posting on various moderated and unmoderated messageboards (sometimes under multiple names to enhance his influence even more). On moderated boards, a skilled troll will modulate his malicious behavior so as to have the desired negative impact while evading the ultimate consequence of banishment. On unmoderated boards it's even worse. Sure you can avoid the boards, but that solution isn't always practical or desirable.

I think it is true that the Internet generally differs in lack of consequences versus offline, and what this enables is a certain type of person to vastly magnify their influence. Some may be nihilists, others may be mentally ill, others just plain evil. Regardless, these are the toxic people who in my experience tend to amplify their voices online. As a result, it appears as though the Internet is filled with these people, but of course they are just the same people who exist in the real world. The Internet gives them a unique outlet where they can spread their misery, often unfettered by any moderation or restraint.

That is correct.

We need to reduce this back to the primary choice of whether or not to focus - the choice upon which all the others depend. The primary choice is irreducible - it cannot be explained by one's own mental contents because the choice to focus must precede any such contents (to grasp and apply the contents of one's own mind presupposes conceptual awareness). The primary choice is a first cause; it is not preceded by antecedent mental factors. Hence, the choice "could have been otherwise", and it is invalid to ask what causes it.

No, they don't.

It is essential to distinguish control from influence - your previously held knowledge, opinions and mood may influence your choice, but that influence is not controlling (this is another way of saying that you cannot "bind your future choices"). Nothing you think at time t can guarantee what your choice will be at time t+1. Your freedom to choose is always interposed, not only between external stimulus and response, but also between past and future. The same basic choice confronts you at each moment, so that you must choose whether to follow what your previously held knowledge, opinions and mood are suggesting, or not. Do you accept this distinction?

Well no, I did not intend to reduce the matter to a truism - I was simply trying to emphasize once again that it is you who chooses, at the moment at which you choose, and you could have chosen differently. I think the salient difference in our positions arises from the following: You left out the part about being free from internal prior restraint, and especially, the validity of introspection as a means of knowing. For when one argues in favor of deterministic processes of myriads of firing neurons as controlling the will, one has discarded the validity of introspection for (as must be acknowledged) such processes are invisible to introspection. As I said, free will is axiomatic as a matter of philosophy; no amount of neurological science can disprove it.

Ifat, I don't think that Objectivism holds that free will means random will. In fact it allows that your will is determined, but emphasizes that it is you who determines it. In other threads I have posited my understanding in an attempt to flesh this out - to say that the will is free you've got to have some proper contextual understanding of what it is free from. In my view, which I think is compatible with Objectivism, it is sufficient to note (by introspection) that your choice of whether or not to vary your level of focus at a given point in time is free 1. of external control (which means: nothing outside your observed mind controls it) and 2. of internal prior restraint (meaning that you cannot bind your future choices). Both of these are incontestible, provided that you accept (which I believe you have) the validity of introspection as a means of knowing one's own mind. Naturally, your choice could have been otherwise, in the sense that it would have been otherwise had you so chosen. In a philosophical context - and let us not forget that it is a matter of philosophy that we are discussing, not physics - this is sufficient to demonstrate that free will is axiomatic. Given that, the burden on contrary arguments arising from the sciences is not merely high, it is insurmountable. All of the scientific brain scans in the world will not be able to negate that philosophical free will is axiomatic no matter how comprehensive they may be.

As far as I know, former Saturday Night Live star Julia Sweeney isn't an Objectivist, and I don't know what her thoughts about Ayn Rand are, but she deserves at least two cheers for her monologue "Letting Go Of God" in which she chronicles her journey "from Cathlolic girl to atheist woman". A few things stood out as I listened to it, first, she uncovers the philosophical roots of her inquiry, in effectively embracing objective reality and an evidence-based epistemology; and she demonstrates the courage of her convictions in a cultural climate that is hostile to atheism. Her skewering of religion and the way she peeled back the layers of her former beliefs one by one were an entertaining and inspiring listen. As a fan of Julia's SNL career and her previous monologue "God Said Ha!" I was delighted with "Letting Go of God" and recommend it to all.

That's terrible even beyond the usual sort. I didn't know a thing about Forfeiture Law until just now. Here is a backgrounder on Forfeiture: http://www.law.cornell.edu/background/forfeiture/

I guess I would have to ask why causing the condition of the vulnerable baby creates the obligation for ensuring that it's taken care of. Until that is answered, we are merely begging the question. Let's say I'm the mother - I know I caused the baby to exist, I know it's vulnerable, I know it needs me. Now point to where this means I'm obligated to care for it. You can wrap it however you like, ultimately you are simply asserting that which remains to be proven, namely that the fact of causing the child's vulnerability amounts to an obligation to mitigate that vulnerability. I remain unconvinced that obligation works so easily. I could just as easily say that since I caused the baby's vulnerability, I am obliged to watch it starve to death on account of that vulnerability. I think you have to make an affirmative statement about man's nature, i.e. that it is right for a baby to be cared for by the person who created it, hence it has a right to be cared for by its mother. It isn't hard. I would accept that.

I certainly agree that the mother puts the baby in a position of dependency on her by creating him. I am not certain that this answers my question of why she thereby incurs an obligation to provide care. I guess we could analogize to providing care to those forcibly taken into custody, i.e. prisoners, but that analogy suffers from an equivocation on the meaning of "put" - is having a baby really a use of force in the proper sense? - and we are right back to square one. It seems to me that when you are talking about creating another human being, that this is sui generis and we can't readily apply principles taken from outside of that context. If I were to offer an example of a mother who at the moment of birth abandoned her infant, could we say that this is simply wrong because it's not how man lives? And reason from that?

I agree completely with the general concept of obligation, however, my question is whether having children is, in fact, a concretization of such principle. In particular I am taking aim at the notion of the infant's right to care. We seem to presuppose that such right exists, then try to answer the question of who is obligated to provide it. Naturally, I consider the question of a "right to care" without the caregiver's consent to be territory worthy of careful examination. The idea that infants have a right to be cared for by their parents feels natural, but I want to avoid rationalizations. Are we couching this in terms of objective harm to the child resulting from its dependency when care is withdrawn? If so, then the issue is the child's dependency regardless of consent. So a stranger who found a baby lying by the side of road, or the nurse to whom the baby was left when the indigent mother split the scene at the hospital, are obligated because the infant depends upon them, and when they withdraw care, it engenders harm. Well, if that reasoning doesn't work, and I don't think it does, then the child's dependency and ensuing harm doesn't work as an argument and we are back at square one. Why does the parent's decision to carry a baby to term incur a consenting obligation to a "right to care" afterwards? Off the top of my head I would say, no one. But see my answer above. I just want to see the connection between the decision to conceive (or not abort previability, I guess) and the contract-like obligation to provide care post-birth.

IF they decide to keep it, yes. But what if they don't? The responsbility is to choose one or the other, but to be responsible for making a choice doesn't entail being obligated to choose a particular thing. That, of course, is the crux of the argument: is the birth parent obligated to provide care by virtue of having given birth, and if so, why is that a fact?

Caffeine is a drug, and I'll bet a dollar to a doughtnut that most of us here are hooked on it. The benefit is that it sharpens the mind, but it also manipulates the dopamine (pleasure) response so in that sense distorts our feelings about reality making everything seem peachy. Your humdrum life in that cubicle, devoid of social relationships and working weekends to get the software code written, doesn't seem so bad when the company supplies free pots of Starbucks coffee continually, but on the other hand maybe those extra dollars you're eanring will eventually enable you to quit your job and find something more satisfying, though you may never find it easy to quit your caffeine habit. Anyway, whether it's a net gain or loss to you, is something you have to judge for yourself, and so it goes with all drugs.