Seeker

At first blush anyway, I'm not sure I necessarily agree that giving birth to a child amounts to taking on a custodial obligation. Rather I see exercising custodial rights as the source, so that if a parent chooses to keep the child in their custody, then they have an obligation of care. This is because a promise of care inheres in the choice of being a child's caring custodian. The relationship of right to responsibility is more proximate than in the case of giving birth, though such a right reasonably belongs to the birth parents in the first instance (who naturally will want to exercise it). A failure to meet such obligations would dissolve the right, enabling other parties to take over if they so chose. As to the mass of crack whores problem, it falls under the rubric of "too bad". It's too bad that nature enables unfit or neglectful parents to have kids, but it does. Them's the breaks, but unless the unfit parents assert custody there would be no implicit promise to enforce around which to base a law demanding care. One difference with this approach would be that government couldn't enforce a law preventing child abandonment, which is too bad, but on the other hand how precisely would government enforce an obligation of care anyway given an unfit parent who simply shrugs it off? I don't see how they can, so as a practical matter we need go no further than to dissolve the custodial right at that point and allow others to take over.

You all are dancing around the salient point, which is that the police released him for him to ask the question. What in the universe did they do that for? If they wanted him out of there, they should have cuffed him and removed him immediately if he did not leave when asked. Cops ought not be ushers or moderators. They should have no right to decide which questions are relevant, or how much questioning is enough, having granted him the ability to ask questions in the first place. Also your attempted distinction between arrest, escort, and securing for safety is philosophically meaningless. Restraint by force is restraint by force, whether or not for the purposes of benevolence or altruism. At no point did it appear that others were at risk. Seeming agitated is not an offense. You better believe there are times in public debates when discussions rightly become heated, the participants agitated. It is not a crime, nor sufficient to justify restraint by force.

Agreed. I will say that Kerry plays a role in what troubles me about this, because he engages the student while the student is asking the question, but before the student can finish the female cop intervenes. There does not appear to be any civil reason at that point for her to do so. Where is the disruption at that point? The event is Kerry, right? Seems to me that if anyone was disrupting the exchange in which Kerry himself was engaged, it was the officer!

How can they arrest someone for "resisting escort"? That's weird. I think there ought to have to be some other element, like trespass or disorderly conduct, to warrant the invokation of the government's use of force (whether called "arrest" or "escort" or whatever), don't you think? As far as I know (or care), "arrest" means ANY time a cop so much as wiggles his finger and directs you to come over - since you can't choose not to obey, that's arrest - and demands specific rational justification before it occurs, and the question is, what is that justification? What law did this man violate in the first instance?

Incidentally, I happened to have been reading the Hillarycare law from 1993, and was astounded at the number of occurences of passive voice as opposed to active voice, i.e. rather than "physicians shall provide care to eligible persons" it would say "eligible persons shall be provided care", which says so much about the leftist mindset. Who is to provide the care to the eligible persons? Blank-out. The passive voice, in all its ignorant glory, is on full glowing display in the leading post here: "medical care is provided to anyone" ... were it properly written in an active voice, you would have to include the actor. Try it, and then look at it, and ask whether that could possibly be moral.

Having unchosen first and last names can be a problem - a first name being unchosen by the individual, the last name belonging to one's immediate tribal association, in effect. I can see the validity behind changing such an unchosen burden, given its significance in one's own life. It's rather like with plastic surgery when someone else argues, "but then you're changing yourself!", revealing that, to them, in their superficial and non-intellectual way, "you" are your appearance - and claiming an ownership right on you. Naming, it seems to me, has the potential to be every bit as pernicious - the desire of the tribe to control the lives of its members. If one doesn't choose that association, I see nothing wrong with making a point of declaring one's independence from it by changing one's name. Not that Ayn Rand is an authority in this specific respect, but she changed her name, much to the good. David has a good point about being perceived as weird. Your Objective values will either justify that burden for you, or they won't.

Even if he manages to avoid expulsion from the Senate, he won't have any committee chairmanships and so on -- and would have to face the voters at the next election anyway. He's bound to be gone in a matter of weeks, but watching him try to hold onto power is a sad spectacle indeed. Say, how did you manage to embed that video? It doesn't work in my posts. <object width="425" height="350"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0lvMYgIAAkk"></param><param'>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0lvMYgIAAkk"></param><param name="wmode" value="transparent"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0lvMYgIAAkk" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" wmode="transparent" width="425" height="350"></embed></object>

With Hollywood's obsession with bankable trilogies I don't know why they don't make this one. The novel comes in three parts so right away, the story is trilogy-ready.

Actually, I believe that "Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace" is a particular term arising from English law that, like "high Crimes and Misdemeanors", has a meaning that does not necessarily comport with modern usage. It is my understanding that "Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace" has been interpreted to cover all criminal cases of every description. See, e.g. Williamson v. U.S., 207 U.S. 425 (1908). That would mean that the clause affords no protection to Senator Craig in this case.

I have a real problem with the assertion that lighting the cigarette and eating the cookie could be unintentional. Fundamentally, human beings are responsible for their actions, they aren't mindless robots, they act according to their conscious intentions and free will. It may be that the intention to smoke or eat (to satisfy cravings, let's say) is contrary to a prior intention (to quit or cut back), but it is a conscious intention nonetheless. It may be satisfying an irrational desire, but it is an intention.

By indefinitely I mean without deterioration over time, i.e ageing. You could always get hit by a bus or struck by lightening and die. So, in that context, what is the appropriate standard of proof needed to validate the claim that man can live indefinitely?

Here's a question I'd like to throw into the mix, for anyone willing to answer it. What is the appropriate standard of proof needed to validate the claim that man can live indefinitely?

Tom, how would you define "enough" in this context? By what standard?

There is one area in which life extension is a rational goal, namely ethics. If advances in biochemistry were to yield knowledge that could lead in the direction of extending man's lifespan, ethics would apply in choosing that pursuit. Once again though the key is what conclusions the evidence actually supports. If the evidence doesn't support the possibility of lifespan extension, then we must accept that fact. However, at the same time, if enough evidence supported the possibility of extending lifespans, at some point ethics would not only permit, but demand additional study; the clearer the potential for extended life, the greater the moral imperative to pursue it. At present I have no reason to think we are anywhere close to the point at which my own pursuits would be implicated. That's why I'm comfortable going about my present non-medical pursuits rather than devoting the coming decades of my life to adding centuries to it.

I think my difficulty lies in understanding the cognitive role of assumptions. To me, it could mean either "non-arbitrary assertion, based in fact" or "wish, disconnected from reality". I certainly agree with the part about building on available knowledge, provided that it points the way to further study. That, then, is what I would expect one to have firmly established in hypothesizing further.

You said, "one can assume that it's possible for humans to change this with the right technology, and work toward this." I want to know the basis in reality of such an assumption, and I don't want something general like "it is the nature of man to shape his environment" - which won't get you from here to Andromeda. That we can understand aging was not the assertion. That we can change it was. This is a particular claim, and I contend that it requires equally particular evidence.

I would require some definite evidence from the medical sciences before holding that indefinite lifespans are possible. The principle is that the particularity of the evidence must match the particularity of the claim it is intended to support. So, for instance, the fact that man learned to fly doesn't supply the specific evidence needed to hypothesize about lifespan extension. Unless such specific evidence is supplied, I would hold such claims to be arbitrary and unworthy of consideration. For example, I could assume that with the right technology, I could teleport to distant galaxies. Unfortunately, since there is no evidence that such technology might exist, working towards it would be irrational. I guess I'm holding out for some citation of something that would at least hint in some significant way that indefinite lifespans are, in fact, possible before I commit to a lifetime of working towards that end (you know, something about stem cells or DNA repair techniques or extending telomeres, which I know next to nothing about).

AFAIK, the only reason it would go against Objectivist principles is that it contradicts reality. So you merely need to ask whether or not it is man's nature to be mortal in either the conditional or terminal senses. It is certain that man's life is conditional; man is not invincible; one can, for example, be fatally injured at any time. It is also certain that man's life is terminal; aging cannot be stopped. So yes, mortality is a fact and you should accept it.

Actually no, in the OPAR example there are multiple suspects in a murder case, each of whom at least partially fulfill the standard of proof. But the principle applies in answer to the question of why further investigation is ever needed. Were it not for the possibility, however generally arrived at in light of what you know, that your preferred conclusion might actually be wrong, you most assuredly ought not be holding out for more evidence. What you describe is a different thing altogether. One obviously cannot consider a claim if one doesn't know with sufficient precision what the claim even is. But once you have detailed the claim with particularity and have garnered sufficient evidence to consider it as something non-arbitrary, a proper standard of proof derives from the reasons you have to doubt, i.e. alternative explanations. Such reasons assuredly exist, or you wouldn't be withholding your endorsement. There is not, repeat NOT, a freestanding hurdle serving as an arbitrary standard of proof that tells you when you know "enough". It is contextual and rooted in alternative explanations that form your reasons for doubt. See, e.g. my desert island scenario above. Were it otherwise, your chosen standard of proof would not apply.

What about the concept of reasonable foresight? Let's take a simple example like lighting a cigarette. The assertion is that I intended to light the cigarette, the evidence is that I had the cigarette in my mouth and a lighter which I used to light it, before puffing away. Can we agree that we can know with 100% certainty that my intent was to light the cigarette? What about eating a cookie? The assertion is that I intended to eat the cookie, the evidence is that I opened the bag of cookies, grabbed one, popped it in my mouth, chewed and swallowed it. Can we agree that we can know with 100% certainty that my intent was to eat the cookie?

My preceding post explains why inconclusiveness of evidence and doubt are necessarily co-extensive. Given two known non-arbitrary alternatives, to have doubt you merely need a lack of conclusive evidence for one in particular. Since doubt and inconclusiveness of evidence are co-extensive, a claim that grounds for doubt no longer exist is a positive claim about having conclusive evidence. Thus, defining certainty as freedom from doubt is more than just one dictionary definition; in this context, it describes the essence of the concept.

I believe that this description contradicts OPAR, which finds the basis for doubt in the fact that the supporting evidence has not yet reached the standard of proof. See, e.g., p. 178-179 ("...these data have not yet reached the standard of proof. Because they have not, there are still objective grounds to remain in doubt about the final verdict. ... these grounds, to repeat, are defined by reference to the standard of proof ..." - and when the standard of proof is fulfilled, "... there is nothing to suggest even the possibility of another interpretation. There are, therefore, no longer any grounds for doubt.") As presented in OPAR, when evidence does not reach the standard of proof there is grounds for doubt. I would respectfully suggest that you are overlooking the fact that in merely entertaining the assertion to build evidence to reach a standard of proof, that there must be an alternative that you are considering. A standard of proof does not exist in a vacuum; there is always some alternative. For example, in a murder case, even if you have identified only one suspect, you cannot conclude guilt without reaching the standard of proof, but the alternative is an unidentified person (setting aside a desert island scenario where Smith is stabbed in the back and the only person there besides you is Jones - in such a scenario, the very fact that no one else is around forecloses any alternative, and you wouldn't need to inquire into whether Jones had motive, means, and opportunity to be certain that he did it). The standard of proof helps guide us to the correct conclusion in the face of alternatives in a given context. That alternatives are known to exist is the grounds for doubt, so you should never say "it is not certain, but it is possibly true, and I have no reason to doubt it".

Experiments Show Shuttle Gouge Unlikely to Be Danger I found this interesting in light of our recent discussions on certainty. Since their simulations show the gouge is unlikely to pose a danger to the shuttle on re-entry, should they patch it anyway just to be safe? Or would that be entertaining unreasonable doubt?

By the way, lest any doubt remain as to what OPAR says on this point, I refer you to Chapter 5, p. 178: This passage is discussing conclusions that are probable. It says very plainly that, with such conclusions, the evidence is inconclusive and has not reached the standard of proof. What Betsy does is change the standard of proof to something that is itself merely highly probable so that the conclusion can be called certain. I contend that to do so is contrary to Objectivism, which treats probable and certain as mutually exclusive concepts in this context: (emphasis added) One can admire the ingenuity of Betsy's attempt. It takes some creativity to see standard of proof as a variable into which to plug another concept of "certainty" so as to ostensibly agree with Dr. Peikoff while completely eviscerating the concept he describes. It also takes chutzpah. But it is doomed to fail, because, as we can see here, it inescapably contradicts the explanation given in OPAR. Betsy's only hope is that Dr. Peikoff is wrong about what Ayn Rand thought of epistemology - but that would require a great deal of evidence, none of which has been provided thus far.

Then the conclusion is not certain and we shouldn't be calling it "certain". What Betsy wants to do is to say that evidence need only meet a "highly probable" standard of proof to say that a conclusion is "certain". I disagree. I argued that "highly probable" implies that doubt remains, and pointed to Dr. Peikoff's statement that when a conclusion is certain, there are no longer any grounds for doubt, to which Betsy replied that a lack of grounds for doubt does not foreclose a possibility of doubt. In other words, she is trying hard to make her idea of "highly probable" doubtful certainty fit inside OPAR's description of certainty, but you can see the absurdities that result. So let me be crystal clear: "highly probable" implies that grounds for doubt remains - and thus, the concept of "highly probable" certainty that Betsy urges upon us is contrary to Objectivism as given in OPAR.