Seeker

Okay, I take your point. But how then does the concept of metaphysical possibility apply in the context of the following? Betsy opines that there is a possibility of doubt when Dr. Peikoff says, in the context of explaining what certainty is, that there is no longer any grounds for doubt, and justifies it on the basis of metaphysical potential. This vividly shows the confusion that results from her "two certainty" concept. For there to be metaphysical potential implies that not all facts needed to meet the standard of proof are known, and thus she is right to raise the spectre of doubt, but wrong to say that this constitutes any form of "certainty". Edit - I suppose I should add, if it is not already blazingly apparent, that I am reading Betsy's statements as having philosophical significance, i.e. I read her "possibility of doubt" as "possibility of rational doubt". I can see in hindsight that that may have been a mistake, but then you have to ask yourself why Betsy is injecting the arbitrary into the discussion. After all, she's the one claiming that we can't know someone else's character. I certainly hope her argument doesn't boil down to the excuse that she was referring to arbitrary doubt the whole time.

I am thoroughly confused now. You offer an acorn as an example of metaphysical possibility, but claim that metaphysical possibility applies only to the future choices of volitional beings. I am compelled therefore to ask: which Objectivist concept of volition applies to acorns? It must be the one that wasn't discussed in OPAR.

I don't know if the foregoing contradiction was unintentional or if the latter post was intended to amend the former. If so, I don't know what the former was supposed to mean in regards to "possibility of doubt", particularly since the explanation devolved into a discussion of metaphysical possibility versus epistemological possibility, with the former being used to escape from the evidentiary requirements of the latter (would that then refer to "metaphysical doubt"? What is such a thing?) I am completely lost at this point. I don't know what use is served, in discussing the possiblity of doubt, to say there is no evidence, but metaphysical possibility covers that case, but requires evidence. I guess Betsy's point is that metaphycial possibility, while not grounds for doubt, is grounds for doubt. If you have enough evidence to remove the assertion from the realm of the arbitrary, but not conclusive evidence, then you ought to have doubt. I agree that doubt is a consequence, but it is co-extensive, and the point is that you are wrong to use "certain" when doubt remains.

I think that this distinction is thoroughly opposed to Objectivist epistemology. Nowhere in OPAR is such a distinction raised. For an assertion to be metaphysically possible means that it is epistemologically possible. What Betsy is urging is that there exists a standard of omniscience by which to judge metaphysical possibility. Otherwise, all she is doing is saying the same thing two different ways, i.e. for the nature of an entity to allow for and not contradict something being true means exactly that we have some evidence for it being true and no evidence that it is false, and that the evidence we have is not conclusive. Either way, the distinction is invalid.

"Possible", in Objectivist epistemology, demands evidence, i.e. grounds. Perhaps you could explain what you mean by "possibility" in this context and how it differs from the Objectivist concept of possible, although I'm a bit worried you'll say that there are two kinds of possibility (one requiring evidence and one not, which, I guess we could say, is not equally possible or constitute the same possibility), and we'll need a new thread to hash that out.

As you can see from the portion of Dr. Peikoff's explanation that you chose to omit, freedom from doubt is indeed implied by the concept of certainty: (emphasis added) Your concept of certainty permits doubt, so it is not surprising that you would argue that a lack of doubt is not essential to the concept of certainty. You are, of course, wrong, as the quotation above conclusively demonstrates. Once again: You cannot have your doubt and certainty too.

The answer is no, because it is possible to test whether someone actually knows what he claims to know. For example, if someone claims to know how to fly an airplane, all he has to do to prove it is get into one and fly it to a particular destination and back. At that point I will be certain that he knows how to fly an airplane, just as I am certain that I, myself, lack that knowledge and would crash straight into the ground. Sometimes a person's knowledge may not be sufficiently in evidence or testable, and there are many complexities in the area of induction about a person's state of mind that pose a challenge. But that does not make it categorically impossible, as you acknowledged in post #97.

While standard of proof can simply mean a place on the evidentiary continuum in some contexts, it clearly means something different in this context. The standard of proof is the distinguishing facts that need to be proven, for instance, that the suspect is the only person who had motive, opportunity, and means (OPAR ch. 5, p. 179). Thank you for acknowledging that in at least some cases, we can indeed infer mens rea with certainty (not degrees of certainty, not possible or probable or very highly probable, but certainty, such that no doubt remains, the fact-standard of proof has been fully met, there is no higher to go on the evidential continuuum and more evidence won't make us any more certain, not even if we could read minds). Which is to say, you aren't certain unless you meet your standard of proof. If the evidence fails to show that Mr. X had the requisite intent in the context of a murder trial, then he isn't convicted of murder even if he very highly probably is the culprit. That is one reason why I think it is so important to not misuse the word "certainty" to mean "very highly probable". You don't want to cause the sort of confusion that could result in Mr. X being mistakenly sent to the gallows.

To be clear, what you have is the fact that there are two alternatives, only one of which is true. The doubt comes in because you don't know the essential fact needed to fulfill the standard of proof by telling you which one it is. The lack of knowing essential distinguishing fact(s) in the context of fulfilling a standard of proof is the grounds for doubt. To say that 100% of the evidence points in a single direction means that the total of the available evidence leaves no room for doubt, i.e. fulfills the standard of proof. So for example, if you have two murder suspects both of whom had motive and means, but only one of which had opportunity, 100% of the evidence points in a single direction - but that doesn't mean you don't still have the evidence that the other suspect had motive and means. That evidence is still there, and it still points towards the conclusion. What happens is that the conclusion in evidence is refined with each step.

Well then, doubting your girlfriend's honesty all day long is perfectly appropriate. I had taken your example to mean that her honesty was already known and thus my arbitrary doubts were groundless. But thank you for clarifying your example. Still, whatever reasons you have to doubt serve to guide your efforts to gather the evidence you need, so I am not sure where the disagreement lies in regards to that. My main point is that once you know something (i.e. are certain of it), you cannot know it more with greater evidence.

I take that to be asserting that I am claiming that doubts are arbitrary. That is false. All alternative hypotheses must have at least some evidence to support them or we wouldn't be considering them in the first place. If you did have a reason to doubt your girlfriend's honesty, then instead of sitting around you would be investigating to discover evidence of what the facts of reality are so as to rule out one of the alternatives (that she is honest, or that she is dishonest), so that you could then know (i.e. be certain of) which hypothesis is correct.

Here is a question I have for Betsy. What gaps are there in knowing someone's intent?

The evidentiary continuum is fundamentally about achieving certainty (in the cognitive, not emotional sense). Your doubts are the road map that tell you what evidence you need to gather. Do you agree with David's explanation that the continuum is closed-ended, i.e. a matter of proportion?

Why? What conclusions entail mindreading?

You will never be able to contrast "beyond all doubt" from "beyond a reasonable doubt" as a matter of basic epistemology. Your attempted distinction is wholly improper, as I explained in my previous post; no valid claim ever falls into the latter category as you have described it. If it is merely highly probable, then there is reason to doubt. At this point I expect that you will fall back on the position that "highly probable" refers to your standard of proof, while "no reason to doubt" is relative to that standard, i.e. "the conclusion certainly and conclusively, with no reason to doubt, meets the standard of being highly probable". To which I can logically add: "thus doubt remains". Which is to say, once the semantic games are ended and the sentence completed logically, there is doubt. And the question is what the reason is for that doubt. Even now you still have failed to provide a reason for your doubt. What we are left with is your insistence that we lack the ability to validly, conclusively, and without doubt, draw conclusions about the character of others. This is the heart of the matter, so I suggest that we focus squarely on that. I think a logical way to proceed with your argument would be to suggest that the inductive principles by which we can judge others' characters limit us to conclusions that are, let us say "modest" (as opposed to something from the evidentiary scale), and then proceed to describe with particularity what the limitations are on the sorts of conclusions that we can validly infer.

No, Betsy, your position is that others are claiming things that they are not claiming. Barring error, no one rationally makes any claims beyond the evidence that they have. Thus, such claims can never be wrong, because all claims are contextual. All rational claims are made with respect to the known evidence, which means that they are as invincible to disproof as your "absolute certainty" is. Otherwise, the claim was improperly framed and claimed more than the evidence warranted, i.e. was in error -- but was so all along, and this could have been known all along. You have treated erroneous claims that can be later disproven as valid, i.e. "as good as it gets". That is a serious mistake.

MisterSwig, It doesn't make sense, because the evidentiary continuum is fundamentally about resolving doubt. Once all doubt is resolved, you are at the end and can go no farther.

Thomas, I must once again disagree. I understand what you are saying in regards to a growing context of knowledge. I agree that which each discovery there is more evidence in support of the conclusion. But more evidence does not mean more certainty, and this is not a trivial problem. To be more certain later implies being less certain earlier - and since certainty is freedom from doubt, being less certain earlier means being more doubtful earlier. There is no way out of that problem other than to abandon your inappropriate use of the word "certainty" in this context.

"Strength of case" and "degree of certainty" make sense relative to the evidentiary continuum - possible, probable, and certain. But Betsy has sought to justify her use of "certain" on that evidentiary scale, by varying the standard of proof either to go beyond axiom, sense perception, or a valid, proper causal explanation, or permitting unspecified, unwarranted doubt. I can accept Rand's label for the evidentiary continuum - it's not a problem provided that everyone understands that "degrees of certainty" is an indivisible expression naming that continuum, because it doesn't affect what certainty is: the terminus wherein no doubt remains. I can also accept certainty as a feeling that, like any feeling, can be stronger or weaker depending on the circumstances. But those expressions are not relevant here. What ARE relevant are the mistaken ideas that there is a valid role in human cognition for conclusions that are not based upon axiom, sense perception, or a valid, proper causal explanation; that we ought to have unspecified, insurmountable doubts when making inferences about other's motives; and that certainty, once achieved, can be made more certain still. None of those ideas are valid; none correspond to reality; all must be rejected.

Maybe the database adopted her view of certainty.

One thing I wish to add about Thomas' remarks is that his explanation of "more certain" constitutes a kind of intellectual fudging. He says that there isn't any doubt about the conclusion, but introduces a new concept: strength of one's case. But all that does conceptually is undermine certainty once again by introducing a new kind of inequality which is PRECISELY what certainty is NOT all about. What does it mean to have a weaker case in the context of certainty? If it does not mean having doubts then it means nothing at all. Certainty is a precious intellectual concept. We must not destroy it through usages that undermine it.

Would you please cite the page in OPAR (or anywhere in Objectivist literature) where it says that (a conclusion)* can go from possible to probable to certain to even more certain? Somehow I must have overlooked it. How can you go from having zero doubt to having less than zero doubt? *Edit - we are here referring to conclusions, I think, not emotional states

There is only one way out that I can see and that is to: 1. Acknowledge that the conclusion is certain within the meaning of OPAR ch. 5 2. Confirm that the conclusion is based upon axiom, sense perception, or a valid, proper causal explanation. 3. Set a standard of proof of that admits of reasonable doubt, e.g. "very highly probable". So what this would say, in effect, is: "The conclusion that Mr. X is guilty conclusively and certainly meets the standard of being very highly probable, though doubts remain." Notwithstanding that rather bizarre construction, and setting aside that "very highly probable" is not what the criminal law actually provides, this still fails to explain what objective doubts exist (to Betsy). Hence my remarks about unspecified, unwarranted doubt. I am truly at a loss to explain that.

But a conclusion is not conclusive if it is merely probable (in the framework of OPAR ch. 5). At that stage, there are still objective grounds to remain in doubt. To make it conclusive it must be certain (again, in the framework of OPAR ch. 5). Your solution was to vary the standard of proof so that the conclusion does not rely upon axiom, sense perception, or a valid, proper causal explanation. How such a conclusion can have a valid role in man's cognition remains an unanswered question.

If he provides no relevant evidence then his assertion is properly dismissed as arbitrary, as with any unsupported assertion - when judging people or with anything else. However, "innocent until proven guilty", as effective as it may be in its insistence upon non-arbitrary assertions and meeting a burden of proof, is not evidence warranting doubts about guilt in a particular framework of evidence. Thus your reply does not answer my point that there are inductive principles by which to validly and with causal explanations, validly infer a conclusion of guilt such that no doubts remain, and does nothing to explain the basis of your insurmountable doubts - you know, the ones that force you to adopt an irrational standard of proof when judging others.