HowardRoarkSpaceDetective

Thanks, I'll give that a try.

I'm not sure I understand what you mean by this.

Hey, does anyone know where I might access some of Edwin Locke's recorded lectures? He has them all listed on his website (below), but the download links are dead now. https://edwinlocke.com/recorded-lectures/ I sent him a message but wikipedia says he's 85 so who knows if he'll respond.

In thinking about religion, especially as regards its social aspects, I'm continually surprised at how often I come back to conservatism as a nearly fundamental driving force, whether in epistemology, metaphysics, or ethics. The question always remains: conservative of what? The only plausible answer that I ever see put forward, especially concerning the origins of animism, is: belief in the afterlife as revealed in dreams/hallucinations. No doubt mystical experience has its roots in a very early, all-consuming intrinisicism, notably the kind exhibited by children, but what is the origin of that intrinsicism? Is it possible that mysticism is itself a kind of epistemological conservatism? For example: My father appears to me, alive and well, and asks me to bury him. Conclusion: Look, there's my father. Granted, my father died a week ago. However, it has always been the case that, when my father appears to me alive and well, it is because, naturally, there's my father. Conclusion: I was right all along. My father is indeed dead, and there he is, alive and well. One day, I too will be dead and alive. How can this be true? Better ask my father. Furthermore, is it possible that idealism itself has its roots in a kind of cosmic sociality? For children, I think there is often an implicit identification between parents and metaphysics. I think something similar happens when idealists/intrinsicists convert to materialism/subjectivism and adopt the myth of "the myth of scarcity" -- in other words, "capitalism creates poverty". On Marxist grounds, the Myth of Scarcity occupies the same metaphysical position as Original Sin: unavoidable yet not permanent (in the Marxists' case, we rise to grace rather than fall from it). This position, of course, stinks of social determinism, but I don't see why mysticism can't be an outgrowth of what, in primitive times, was a more or less tribalistic social determinism. We were social before we were rational, and irrationalism has a self-perpetuating nature. Is it the case that happy accidents were necessary in order for man to discover reason and individuality/selfhood? Are mysticism and authoritarianism really all that different? Of course, Rand didn't take the argument this far, but I think Objectivist epistemology seems to imply it. Also, I'm curious about what you mean when you say "holding in abeyance", mostly because I don't hear that phrase often. Am I to take it to mean some kind of evasion, in this case of mortality? This would all be a good start on a possible explanation for a problem which has been plaguing me: why perfection as an epistemological starting point? The story of the Garden of Eden sounds to me to be just a metaphor for childhood. In other words, mystics - of spirit or muscle - just don't want to grow up. In other other words, childhood is the sham in their eyes. There is no such thing as security or guiltless pleasure on Earth. Not ever since Abba Father made it that way. And I think it makes sense that this approach would be so persistent. I don't know any parents (personally) who would have a good answer to the question of how to teach children that that life after childhood (ignorance) isn't essentially a matter of sacrifice and pain. Seen this way, it is no wonder that Christian ethics is so ass-backwards. The metaphysics is rotten from the core (pun not intended). Ironically, this realization played no role in my own fall from theological grace. It was the denial of free will (via Wikipedia articles) that was my "fruit". I went on to have some existentialist-style "optimism" about life choices, but it took me a long time to see how in the world man could be viewed as heroic in any sense other than Byronic. Funny enough, one could re-construe the Garden of Eden as a warning against mysticism. If the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil and the Tree of Life are taken as metaphors for beliefs in a utopian existence, which occur to one as effortlessly (and non-rationally) as eating a piece of fruit, then yes, leaving behind the peaceful modus operandi of cultivating a garden - a knowledge which is, as you say, superior - would be a fall from grace. And working to satisfy your now limitless desires would be painful indeed. It was Baconian obedience ("Nature, to be commanded...) that was the true virtue in the Garden. Perhaps Rand did misunderstand the story. Perhaps the authors of the Bible did as well. Max Muller's contention was that religion is a "disease of language" and that early mystics were more like poets than priests, using and abusing the power of metaphor. One theory I've been thinking over is that part of how religious beliefs develop (and how intrinsicism operates socially) is that ideas are communicated as metaphors and then understood as literal and that a sort of cycle is formed where beliefs are passed around between those with philosophical tendencies and those who preferred magic. Is it possible that there was rational wisdom in the Creation story that underwent this process? Surely, intrinsicism has never had a total monopoly over the mind.

In a book I'm reading on Charles de Brosses (enlightenment-era thinker, coined fetish in the anthropological context as regards the origins of religious belief), he is described, in part, this way: "Finally, influenced, by materialist tendencies, he investigates how concrete circumstances, the limits of technology, and bodily capacities condition human nature and thought." My first instinct was to oppose this approach to research, but on further thought, I'm not sure I know what I'm talking about here. I'm thinking in particular of Piekoff's quoting of Rand when she said that she believed she wouldn't have been able to formulate the philosophy of Objectivism prior to the industrial revolution. I believe the reason was that the industrial revolution produced such a degree of cultural and material diversity that it gave her the opportunity to collect a vast amount of data about human nature. I also have a vague memory of something being said by either Rand or Piekoff about the fact that primitive humans could not be blamed for their beliefs given the state of human knowledge early in the history of mankind. This makes sense since reason had to develop gradually as humans evolved from monkeys. Now, all that said, would de Brosses's approach to thinking about early religious thought be, in fact, correct? If so, at what point in history does it stop being true that man's environment places limits on his capacity for objectivity (or am I equivocating objectivity with philosophy? or reason?). In other words, how do we evaluate the philosophical judgments of people in different eras of human history? Is part of the reason that Kant is, according to Rand, the most evil the fact that he lived as recently as he did? Does the proliferation of certain truths change the standards for one's grasp of correct philosophy?

Fair enough. I was listening to Douglas Murray yesterday talk about how Muslim/Arab countries have such an awful track record in building civilizations, which is true, but unfortunately you can't make that argument to an Islamic fundamentalist. Their conception of "civilized" is different, depending on how true they are to Allah. American leftists, however, have to make the argument that Israel is rigging the game since, at least to an extent, their definition of "civilized" resembles that of most westerners (technological progress). That said, I think it was the last sentence of Tylor's quote that got me in that it reminded me of Rand's conviction that human excellence is the natural state of man - a very radical idea, at least to me, and one that, whether he meant to or not, Tylor expressed very eloquently.

@Boydstun Actually, I bought Tylor in order to get more context for Bellah, which you recommended in a past post. I also went ahead and read Clifford Geertz’s essay, which Bellah takes as a starting point. I really appreciated his theory that religion is more or less ethics and metaphysics mutually reinforcing one another through emotion.

I’m reading Edward Burnett Tylor’s Primitive Culture and the first chapter - introducing evidence for his theory that civilizations typically evolve from lower states to more advanced ones, rather than degrade from an initial “divine” state - finishes with this bit: “We may fancy ourselves looking on Civilization, as in personal figure she traverses the world; we see her lingering or resting by the way, and often deviating into paths that bring her toiling back to where she had passed by long ago; but, direct or devious, her path lies forward, and if now and then she tries a few backward steps, her walk soon falls into a helpless stumbling. It is not according to her nature, her feet were not made to plant uncertain steps behind her, for both in her forward view and in her onward gait she is of truly human type.” Thought that was nicely put.

So the structure is that each student sees a different teacher each hour and that each teacher sees a different student each hour. We're given an itinerary that takes about an hour to complete and switches between activities every ten or so minutes. It was only after 80 hours of training that I realized that, with the exception of the rotating pairings of teacher and student, a student will complete the exact same itinerary 3-5 times per day depending on how long they're there. When I asked about this, I was told that the idea is that the hour begins with easier material and ends with harder material in order to reinforce the connection between lower and higher level skills. That made sense to me at the time but now I realize they'd be much better off, at the very least, making that progression slowly over the course of an entire day. I would say that the program is designed specifically to address areas of weakness, so in that sense you're correct. The only individuation is in regard to which skills they haven't yet mastered. There's a lot of emphasis on getting them to be able to read "at grade level", and evaluations are meant to determine "mental ages", so to speak. In that regard, there's something very "no child left behind" about it. I'll have to make a post about the actual instructional methodology so that I can get some assessments on it from objectivists.

Glad to see a leftist confronting cognitive dissonance. My hope is that some of them can see the overlap between the implications of their own vitriol and the playing out of Hamas' inhumanity. Seeing their ideological opponents shot down in cold blood has to be a wake up call. Either they're on the wrong side or they never had the balls to own their convictions.

I'm looking for advice from anyone here who has insight into the intricacies of childhood development/learning disabilities. I recently started a new job in which I'm teaching basic reading skills to children of various ages (typically around 7-9 and usually diagnosed with dyslexia and/or ADHD), and it's presenting some challenges that I'm not prepared for. Basically, the program employs a proprietary methodology that emphasizes mental imaging in order to strengthen both phonetic and comprehension skills (the implications of the objectivist epistemology may be interesting and a topic for a future post), and I was trained during my first few weeks for everything involved in the program with the exception of managing troublesome behavior, a task which has turned out to require about half of my energy during any one session. Apparently, our particular center is popular with children who have significant cognitive disabilities (autism most often but sometimes schizophrenia or anxiety), and - in case you haven't heard - they are truly a pain in the ass. I often have to repeat questions three or four times before I can get a student to acknowledge that I'm speaking at all, and they often give totally nonsensical answers, like telling me that the word "portion" begins with "i" (when this happens, it's about a 50/50 split between intentional defiance and utter lack of attention). And for the most part, these are not the "child stuck in an adult's body" types. They're very smart and sometimes passionate and can potentially blend in with other kids their age - the "oh, he has autism? that explains so much" types - so there are times when their behavior can be considered outright malicious. Now, I understand that autism is no joke. I had plenty of autism/ADHD symptoms growing up, and a common element in my childhood memories is the feeling that being mentally present was excruciatingly difficult. That said, I think most symptoms of ADHD and autism can be chalked up to a lack of motivation. It's hard for me to see these students as "unable" to focus rather than "unwilling", and I have to stop myself from saying things like, "Why aren't you trying?" or, "Hey, I hate this just as much as you do." To make matters worse, the company heavily emphasizes "positive thinking". If a student makes a mistake, you always respond by first praising them for what they did right and then mildly suggesting what they might have done wrong. And the more they refuse to cooperate, the more praise you give them. Furthermore, a "magical learning moment" should be awarded every session (i.e., every hour). I'm frankly not sure what that entails because it's too similar to "star cards" and "magic stones", which they can also "earn". The magic stones are especially weird since most instructors typically drop them into a little metal pail that makes loud clinking noises as the kids follow directions. Very Pavlovian. I'm a little skeptical about awarding prizes for good work as it is. I know that children are naturally short-sighted, but I don't like the idea of saying, in essence, "Please stop yelling at me and kicking me in the shins. Now, if you read these five words for me, you can have an ice cream." On top of all this, the kids basically demand "brain breaks" every ten or so minutes, and if you don't comply, no further work will be done. Anyways, their parents are paying customers and supposedly the program really does wonders for kids who struggle to read, so I can't say the company is inherently vicious. But I'm torn over the fact that I can't bring myself to coddle these children. At the same time, I sympathize because for many of these kids, the program is their last chance for academic success and, whatever the reason, tough love only seems to exacerbate their symptoms. I imagine the fundamental issue here is pessimism about learning and probably life in general and that any criticism is very likely to obliterate their morale (or so I'm told). They never say "I can't do it" or anything like that so I have to assume that they're way past that stage and that their sole concern at this point is to do anything they can to derail their lessons. I'm hoping someone here has experience with this kind of dilemma. I'm not sure how to walk the line between empathy and dishonesty here.

I've actually had a very hard time, in my thinking about primitive religion, understanding how mankind didn't begin as materialist. Part of that is my own history as a materialist; from that perspective, positing deities comes off as very sophisticated (which it would certainly be, if done in bad faith). But I also think that religions have incredible staying power as far as survival goes. Especially when you consider the way intrinsicism justifies emotionalism so well, it turns out to be a very powerful intellectual parasite. And since religion is so closely tied to family and education, its power as a cognitive context is unquestionable. One thing leads to another and you end up with pantheons, child sacrifice, and theologians who can sustain cognitive dissonance despite the most damning of contradictions. Piekoff theorized in his work on induction that children inferred causality from their own volition. He basically said that he wasn't confident enough to die on that hill, and neither am I - I don't see why induction alone is insufficient, although maybe volition just gives us a hint. Either way, I can't think of a more appropriate explanation for the origins of cosmic telology/agency.

How do you mean?

@Boydstun @necrovore I'm tempted to assert that it's harmless/advisable to systematically doubt any truth claim while it is under consideration, at least in the sense of saying, regarding something credible, "But is that true?" However, my next temptation, personally, would be to look for instances that contradict said truth claim, and I know LP has warned against this kind of thinking in his discussions of empiricism. His reason for saying so has never been transparent for me, though (and I can't remember it now). I guess 'doubt' needs defining. If it means 'disbelief', I see how that could go wrong. However, if it means 'agnosticism for the time being with the intention of unambiguously confirming or rejecting eventually', then I can't imagine how someone could not systematically 'doubt' even basic axioms or self-evidencies. I'm interested in these quotes because Dewey's "attitude of suspended conclusion" is an almost perfect description of what seems to me to be what is essential for rationality despite the fact that I've never heard an Objectivist put it in those terms. I think I mentioned in a recent post how Dagny, the way she's described in the first several chapter of AS, seems to suspend certain thought processes and emotions until a more convenient time, and it appeals to me as being the bridge between volition and logic - namely the choice to second-guess one's immediate reactions to a given fact in spite of any powerful emotions.