HappyDays

I don’t see how this responses to the arguments presented by the two dimensional semantics people, saying what you believe is useless to me unless you explain why you believe it. Do you actually have a rebuttal to the arguments by Kripke, Chalmers etc. or are you just going to say “well my philosophy says XYZ”

This doesn’t address the two dimensional semantics people I brought up’s argument that you can distinguish between possible (existent in some conceivable world, such as the light reflecting from water being red) and necessary (existent in all possible worlds by virtue of being included under a proper name, a Kripkean causal referent if you will)

As I understand, objectivism believes claims without evidence are not to be regarded as possible. Does the work on possibility through distinguishing propositions which are true in all possible worlds by definition (eg water is H2O) vs possible/contingent truths (eg water is blue or water is red) which include many claims without empirical validation (such as water possibly being red in the future) as the claims made about properties aren’t essential to the concept or proper name (this goes into two dimensional semantics and the main people associated with it are David Chalmers, Hilary Putnam, Saul Kripke etc. although similar ideas of the same concept or proper name (referent) having distinct possible senses goes back to Gottlob Frege as well as the latter Ludwig Wittgenstein in his theory of language games)

Waiting for a reply

The differences are that A) Charles Taylor unlike ayn rand rejects individualist concepts of identity and subject formation that neglect communitarianism, B: rejects naturalism and is a Catholic who’s critical of secularism C) epistemically (based off of hermeneutics, hegelianism and what seems to be pragmatism) rejects formalist logic in favor of holistic, sociocultural based analysis

I’m curious how objectivists would respond to the philosophy of Charles Taylor (PLEASE actually answer the question instead of “to the extent he agrees with objectivism, that’s the extent objectivists agree with him”, I don’t care what objectivists believe, I care why they believe what they do) so please actually respond to the parts of his philosophy which you disagree with

I’m curious what an objectivist perspective on the philosophy of Roman Ingarden is, please Boydstun don’t do a non response “response”

I’m curious what objectivists make of the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, I have seen some people on this forum praise Gadamer who was an influence on Paul Ricoeur but I’m curious what y’all make of him and his hermeneutic Christian phenomenology

While I disagree with Laruelle/Zizek (if you would like to know my perspective on ideology, I broadly although not completely agree with Peterson, Ricoeur and Gadamer on it) you didn’t seem to respond to the argument that all metaphysical and philosophical models rely on axioms which necessarily precede ideology, and therefor one could argue can’t be evaluated philosophically

I’m curious how the objectivists here would respond to the philosopher François Laruelle’s criticism that ideology distorts our understanding and perception of reality by separating it into metaphysical binaries, his criticisms of ideology seem similar to Slavoj Žižek’s criticisms, but if you’d like to read more about him to respond here’s an article: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/François_Laruelle

I’m curious how objectivists would respond to Kant’s criticism of certainty of perception because it could be that time and space are intuitions of perception

I’m posing this question to the more philosophically educated objectivists of this forum, how would you respond his philosophy?

Is psychoanalysis compatible with objectivism’s epistemology, metaphysics and conceptualization of human nature? I ask because the group Psychoanalysts Like Carl Jung, Julia Kristeva, Jacques Lacan, Sigmund Freud, James Hollis etc. seem to contradict the objectivist view of Tabula rasa human consciousness.

Objectivists of this community, what is objectivism’s response to the argument for the existence of god presented by Leibniz in the argument from contingency

Most theologians believe God’s omnipotence is such that he can do whatever is logically possible, so doing something which would limit his own internal power (like making a rock he can’t lift) is logically impossible and not what god can do, however god as an omnipotent entity can do anything which is not logically impossible (such as creating a rock of any level of heaviness). This isn’t contradictory. As for the law of identity, it only means things act in accordance with their nature, of which, god’s nature is clearly defined with the various omni attributes, that nature being limited or quantitative is not part of the law of identity, both Plato and Leibniz who formulated it were theists and they didn’t put any arbitrary clause in it like that