J.L. Mackie

I am sorry but I don't understand. Principles are obeyed either because they are beneficial (in which case they serve some end) or because they are ends-in-themselves i.e. one has a duty to obey them. This is a true dichotomy. Either you do X because of its consequences or you do X because you ought to do X. There is no middle ground. Either Objectivist ethics tell you to do the first thing or it tells you to do the second thing. I do not understand this statement. The above-mentioned dichotomy is either true or false. If it is true, then it follows that all principles (including those prescribed by Objectivist) are either a means to some end or ends-in-themselves. The evidence here, so far, suggests that Objectivist principles conform to the latter description. By definition, then, Objectivism entails a deontological theory of ethics. To deny this is really to say that the dichotomy is false. You are welcome to defend that position. The wikipedia article does a good job of describing when it is that a dichotomy is false: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dichotomy You must either acknowledge that it is true (and applies to any prescribed principle, including RSI), show it to be false, or remain agnostic. But - to use one of Ayn Rand's favorite phrases - "You cannot have your cake and eat it too."

I took "rational self-interest" (RSI) to mean the circumspect pursuit of contentment and prosperity. Obviously I am wrong. I have seen ample evidence that for Objectivists, there is no difference between the statements "S respects the rights of others" and "S is following his RSI". If adherence to RSI is, by definition, is the act of respecting rights - and if the act of respecting rights satisfies no goal other than the adherence to RSI - then clearly RSI is an end in itself. Objectivism is deontological. If RSI is not an end in itself, then it follows that it must satisfy some other end (e.g. prosperity). But you have specified no such end.

Do I really need to modify the hypothetical so as to remove these alternatives? How many times must I qualify the hypothetical until the actual issue is discussed? You cannot conceive of a situation in which the IRS agent has no alternatives? It doesn't take much imagination. In any case, everyone agrees that (in the unmodified hypothetical) there are alternative occupations. Suppose our man is skilled enough to be employed at a given sum. If you argue that our man should quit the agency (a risk) and pursue a job which pays about just as much (but is non-rights-violating), then you have to explain how this risk benefits him. It is not true that, in doing so, he is increasing the likelihood of dramatic political and economic change in the U.S. (which would benefit him greatly). It is true that changing jobs entails a financial risk. On what grounds is it justified (in respect to his rational self-interest)? It is not the case for the ordinary American citizen, who lives in "a land of opportunity" - where people protest their government and middle-aged men change vocations. I hope you are not under the impression that resistance is the most convenient and beneficial mode of action in other places. As a former citizen of the USSR, I can attest to the falsity of that supposition.

You are saying that he should act so that he could bring about the best possible circumstances, no matter how unlikely they are to occur. This doesn't seem very "rational" to me. It was as if you argued that everyone should invest all their money into the lotto because they would be happier and better off if they won. True enough, but most people would end up miserable in fact. Similarly, even if capitalism is in my best interests, it does not follow from this that I should "invest" in capitalism if the chances of "winning" are low. You are saying that the agent should sacrifice his well-being for the sake of an unlikely prospect. It's almost a "call to duty". If he benefits from this sacrifice, I would like to know how.

Well, I knew it was only a matter of time before someone said, "Go read x by Ayn Rand or Peikoff." These questions are being asked because the text isn't clearto us. If the text is clear to you, then you should be able to explain to the rest of us what is being stated.

If you are denying the existence of deontological ethics, I encourage you to open any modern ethics anthology.

I agree that the IRS agent would be better off in a laissez faire economy. If the agent chose to work for an oppressive government at the expense of living in a just, capitalistic, society - then he did not do what is in his best interest. However, this decision never took place. The IRS agent does not have the option of living in a just, capitalistic, society. Overwhelming evidence suggests that government taxation is in no way contingent on his desires or decisions; his abdicating the responsibilities of an IRS agent would not make it any more likely to that the US government will stop taxing him (or the rest of us). If it does not follow that not being an IRS agent leads to the best possible state of affairs (capitalism), then it does not follow that not being an IRS agent is in this man's best interest. Does following one's self-interest (according to Objectivism) mean pursuing the happiest, most comfortable, possible state of existence? If so, then one has to conclude that right-violations are sometimes a means to that end. Or - does the pursuit of self-interest (according to Objectivism) entail, by definition, "not violating the rights of others"? If this is the case, then Objectivist morality is deontological. This is the problem some of the posters here are trying to express.

IRS agents live comfortably and earn decent sallaries; in every sense, they are serving their own interests. They are also violating the rights of others. Therefore, it is possible to serve your own interests and violate the rights of others.