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Acount Overdrawn

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Everything posted by Acount Overdrawn

  1. Basically: says you. I've had no problem understanding the primacy of existence, and reason's derivative role of identifying existence. It is consciousness that conforms to existence, it isn't a primary. Nor does it need to be primary to rationally understand it. In fact, I posit the exact opposite. The role and function of the mind would not be rationally intelligible if it were in some sense "primary."
  2. I don't think Rand was a dualist. While she recognized material and spiritual existents, she never suggested (to my knowledge) that these are the only forms of existence possible; she didn't legislate what things can exist in reality.
  3. Personally, I never liked April Fools. Ever. I bet friendships and marriages have ended over the inane pranks that people pull on this "holiday." (Obviously, I've been the butt of many a prank.)
  4. Simple: he broke the law. He engaged in vigilantism, and thereby broke the law: he is now a criminal. What you're proposing in fact appears to be the opposite of the effect of hate crimes. The government has no business lessening the punishment of a crime--or worse, throwing out punishment entirely--simply because the man was acting on ideas that he and the government regard as "right." Just as with hate crimes, the government has no business serving a greater punishment upon a man for acting on "bad ideas." It is not ideas that the government should judge, but actions. Rather than uphold objectivity, what mrocktor ideas on this leads to are the worst types of subjectivity capable of governments: the role of arbiter over what ideas are acceptable or not. If a man engages in vigilantism, then he must also accept the consequences of his actions, i.e. the full context, which might include a certain number of years in prison. And in this sense his act of vigilantism is irrational, insofar as his decision to act criminally can have negative effects on his life in the years to come. A proper government and objective legal system should not simply sit back and allow this man to carry out his version of "justice." Not only should he be restrained, he should be charged for criminal offenses, among them the crime of obstruction of justice.
  5. Welcome to the forum. Do you remember which criticism? I like to keep a record of the sorry attempts at criticism of Objectivism that surface every few months. Y'know, for funzies (watch Scrubs if you don't know this term). For some advice, I would say stay away from criticisms for now, and instead try to learn what Objectivism is. Of course, you should be determining whether Objectivism makes sense to you, and whether you agree with its principles or not. The point is that criticisms often imply that the reader already has some level of familiarity with the subject being criticized, and until you know the philosophy, it would be impossible for you to separate the trash from worthy criticisms (though I honestly have not seen one of the latter). And if you want something clarified, or a criticism looked over, I'm sure the members here would be more than happy to help out.
  6. I just want to put my two cents in on this, to see if I can offer clarity. When Don, and presumably Ayn Rand, say that retaliation is morally imperative for a man, they do not mean in the context of society. The context seems to be a group of men who loosely deal with each other or some type of commune. In a society, where a man lives among others, the retaliatory use of force is not morally imperative, in the sense that he must be the one to use it; in respect for others and the willingness to live peacefully, he should let the government handle the situation. So here, I agree with DavidOdden in that it is not morally imperative for an individual to act as a vigilante, but only in the context of society, where he can live peacefully and delegate his right to retaliatory force. I'll go into more detail, if that's unclear.
  7. Well, I suggest you start over with your thinking, as I did. Going off of your understanding of what I'm talking about, of course what I'm saying is hard to grasp. No, and please don't interpret me in the future: take what I'm saying at face value. I say that consciousness is "natural" because it is a fact that I am conscious in various moments of my life, such as right now while I'm typing this message. It's a fact that I can observe by becoming self-conscious, through introspection. My ability to look at this laptop I'm typing on is another fact that I can observe, making it self-evident that I possess a consciousness. The existence of something predates a scientist forming a law to explain it: case-in-point, Sir Newton and his observations about gravity leading to his law of gravitation. Gravity was natural, but until Newton no one could formulate what was going on with that kind of force. On who's authority? Why don't you define "supernatural," and I'll give you my definition of "supernatural," and then we'll try once more to work this out. My position is that consciousness, memories, concepts, thoughts, etc. have certain characteristics which matter (physical things) does not; therefore, we won't be able to form physical laws to explain what they are and how they operate (to do so necessitates that they have physical characteristics, such as spatial location). There is, as of yet, no law which explains concepts, but you use then in your responses. You've implied that supernatural things don't exist, and concepts seem to fit into the category you've created of "things not understandable based on physical laws = supernatural." So do you deny that you have and use concepts, including those in your posts? And if not, on what basis? It certainly could not be on a scientific basis, as I've indicated. I certainly can make such a distinction; it's because I don't accept the reasons you've given for saying there's no distinction. [i'm about to discuss an idea that Objectivism doesn't accept or deny, to my knowledge; consider it as my own thinking] My position on free will is that it depends on matter; for instance, Terry Schiavo's brain damage subsequently lead to her being in a persistent vegetative state, and based on her actions during that time, it could be inferred that she no longer possessed free will, along with many other functions of her brain. In other words, matter can have effects on one's consciousness. This isn't too hard to understand: imagine someone getting hit by a lead pipe, and subsequently being knocked out. Physical interactions lead to a result in a non-physical level: namely, the victim losing consciousness. But there's more to it than that. Human actions are not just involuntary reflexes. For example, my typing of these characters on the keyboard is not a series of involuntary motions which just happen to make cognitive sense to readers with adequate knowledge. I'm directing the process; I could just as easily start typing gibberish, but I'm choosing to make a point here. My other point is that the mental realm can have effects on the material realm. My conscious decisions have physical effects, such as my desire to see what's happening at this site, and my subsequent physical typing of the website's url. Neither of my points about free will require that it exist as an independent soul, as religions typically speak of. In my view, once a person dies, his free will stops existing as well; it is not independent of matter in that sense. This isn't a scientific approach at all. Newton, again for example, made observations about natural facts, and induced a law; he didn't mystically come up with his law, and then deduce the existence of gravity from it. What you're proposing is some kind of rationalism, where the existence of something is deductively concluded from a general principle the origin of which is not known. The complete opposite is the truth. One has to observe the natural fact of consciousness, and thereafter form (inductive and deductive) rules and guidelines--and even laws-- which explain consciousness and its functions. Ayn Rand's book Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology is her explanation of how our consciousnesses should forms concepts, but it refers to no natural laws in its explanation. Should this regarded as "supernatural" as well?
  8. Ah, non-emergency vigilantism. I agree with you then.
  9. I'd like to clarify something, though I still refuse to participate in this Free Will/Determinism issue (though Martian doesn't seem to think that it's an issue). Not so much now about the previous ad hominem, but that this isn't an issue that someone's going to be convinced about in a thread discussion either way. Martian and other Determinists (Hard and Soft) will have to consider this on their own time, in their own minds. Within Objectivism, the soul (spirit) is one's mind, one's consciousness--the terms are heavily related, and can be treated as more-or-less equivocal. So for us, souls are not supernatural, they do not exist on their own and they certainly don't fly off to "heaven" or such nonsense. Our type of soul, or consciousness, is capable of many unique capacities when contrasted with the abilities of all of the other animals, and this serves as evidence (though not complete) of our possession of free will (as I've said, introspection is the means to solidify the case). Though it is not determined, it is not random either, since we are capable of self-directing (Harry Binswanger has called it "cognitive self-regulating") our actions in one path or another. To sum up, the soul is our natural consciousness; it is not supernatural, as Martian has stated numerous times in his posts (I have been keeping up with the debate). And free will is the capacity of self-directing our actions, in the form of choices. Our actions are not a more complex version of the conscious actions capable to animals--ours are conscious actions of a whole different level.
  10. I understand what you've said here, but maybe my understanding of how self-defense is treated in a court of law (and why it is treated in that way) is insufficient for this discussion. I'm fine with the person who used self-defense being restrained, because the situation needs to be sorted out, but do you think he should be given criminal charges as well? And if so, which ones? I'm not sure whether I really disagree with you or not here, because I've never considered this aspect of self-defense in any depth. Any elaboration on how self-defense should be treated legally would be helpful. Thanks.
  11. Welcome! I hope you enjoy the discussions to come, and gain something out of them.
  12. I'd still like to know from DavidOdden if he would not let a man go free if his case is brought to a court of law and he is found innocent. I don't see any reason to hold him any longer, but perhaps David could elaborate. Morally, a person should act on his knowledge. But the government serves not just that person, but all citizens within a given region. No matter whether the person is acting on his knowledge, or acting on the knowledge that others hold, as soon as he uses force, he becomes a threat to everyone else, and must be restrained by the government. But there's something else I'd like to address here: You seem to be missing something about how to establish the "objective means" of determining when an act of force is retaliatory: These objective means demonstrate that there is no way for a person to supply evidence for his use of force before his act of retaliation, and certainly not during his retaliation. Determining whether an act of force was retaliatory necessitates that it has already occurred, so that others can know what force was used, and what evidence is in the particular case, etc. The person who uses force, even in retaliation, has no means of proving that his use of force was retaliatory: such a complex task is up to people like district attorneys (or higher), crime scene investigators, police officers, eye-witnesses, lawyers, judges who are all following objective rules and laws; in other words: such a task is up to a justice system, i.e. the government (with its many derivative functions and capacities). Until such a proof is established, the person must be restrained in order to protect the citizens.
  13. There's a vast difference between something being incoherent, and you not agreeing with that something. For instance, your "criticism" that O-ist epistemology is incoherent partly because "it treats concepts as fixed and invariant once formed." The whole point of concepts (within Objectivism) is to subsume a vast number of facts and observations and retain these things in the form of a single mental existent--this would be impossible if the concept is not "fixed," i.e. possesses an identity. Further, this partly isn't true. The definition of a concept, for example, might change, given more knowledge which necessitates a further classification of a group of existents from other groups of existents. More importantly, why did you bother to ask us, supporters of the Objectivist epistemology, questions? Our answers, "tainted" with the inanity and arbitrariness of Objectivism's view of knowledge, should be completely incomprehensible to you. Well, fear not, I certainly won't be bothering you anymore with my nonsensical, incoherent blathering. Good day, trivas7. P.S. Perhaps in the future you should hide your disdain of a philosophy until after your questions on it have been answered.
  14. That's admittedly because I did not completely understand what mrocktor's scenario was (whether it was genuine self-defense where one's life is immediately threatened, or a vigilante action after-the-fact). I have very little knowledge concerning how legal procedures go. I guess what I'm not understanding here is what happens to a person who uses force (in his mind, it's retaliatory, but has yet to be proved to others), is arrested and tried in a court, and found innocent? Is he not then free to go? I will state that I'm against what mrocktor is proposing, precisely because any private use of force is unlawful--all such uses would have to be tried by the government.
  15. Since Olex (and perhaps others) have not or could not see the essay "Epistemological Anarchy," I will now post it. Note that I just received Don Watkins' permission to do so:
  16. This is what you have to banish from your mind. In an individual's context, once he's gone through the proper cognitive steps, he can consider a claim as proved--he's only dealing with his own mind. In this context, such objectivity in his own mind is primary. But in a social context, when he has to deal with other people's minds and is trying to peacefully co-exist with them, objectivity implies new demands, as Watkins pointed out. Isn't there something rationalistic going on in this issue you have? Let me try to identify it, so that I'm not dismissing your points without justification. From the conclusion that a person can have certainty about a crime being committed against him, you seem to be deducing that this person's certainty is sufficient to retaliate in a social context as well--but this is false. This is why we have security cameras, the numerous legal procedures, and the many other aspects of crime prevention and prosecution--because men are not omniscient, and neither are we easily convinced by hearing "one side of the story." This "huge issue" isn't being evaded: it has been acknowledged, but deemed irrelevant in a social context. In a social context, because you are dealing with people who do not have instant access to your mind and reasoning, it is not enough to determine in your mind that your act of force was retaliatory; everyone else (especially the government) needs to know the facts, and be able to judge them with their own minds. To answer your question "Enough for what?" : The person using force is living with other people in a society. His use of force may be retaliatory, but that fact is not enough for other people to know that it was retaliatory. To know whether or not they should continue to deal with him (and whether or not the government should imprison him for a crime) he must prove that his use of force was, in fact, retaliatory. The point is that any private use of force is not legitimate, i.e., lawful. You're only showing why Watkins is right here. Why do we arrest and try the man in the first place?--Because an act of retaliation is not distinguishable from an act of aggression. This is why the man has to prove his case after the fact: to show that indeed his use of force was retaliatory in nature and not aggression. Until proven to be otherwise, all private acts of force are to be considered to be acts of aggression. If he can prove his case in a court of law, then I have no objections to letting him go free.
  17. Welcome to the forum. With philosophy, particularly Objectivism, the emphasis is on induction, not deduction (from the Objectivist standpoint, so is mathematics, but that's a separate issue). From the axioms, you couldn't reach that principle using deductive logic. In fact, the argument for acting morally in the first place (which precedes the related principle about happiness being morality's purpose) involves an inductive argument, in addition to observations made about the choice to live or not (see Tara Smith's book Viable Values). Your friend needs to understand what "reason" and "rational" really are. Further, induction isn't a "necessary evil" (you seem to be implying this with your comment about the "necessity of induction") that should be quickly done in the beginning of the philosophy, so that the rationalistic (deductive) castles can finally be built from aforementioned inductions. Induction is of vast and profound significance within Objectivism, to an extent that I haven't yet grasped completely--maybe I will do so whenever I listen to "Objectivism through Induction.". So if you truly want to understand the "systematic construction" of Objectivism, you need to recognize the importance of induction in the human means of cognition in general, and in Objectivism in particular.
  18. Please answer sNerd's question: Have you read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology? You quote the book, but if you have it, then you know, for example: -From what facts axiom are formed from. -The difference between a priori and a posteriori (Dr. Peikoff's essay elaborates on this). All concepts within Objectivism are "a posteriori" (Again, something you should know if you've read the book.) The "critics" who point out such trivial objections aren't even worth debating. Am I being "incoherent" when I say at different times for different arguments that a chair is: a unit, a concrete existent, a concrete integration of atoms, a physical object, a material thing, etc. Pointing out such a "discrepancy" might show that you don't understand, or reject, the Objectivist epistemology. In one context, the concept "chair" is a mental existent when contrasting it with a concrete existent, such as a physical chair. In another context, the concept "chair" would be a unit when considering the larger concept "furniture" or "man-made object." And in another context, the concept "chair" would be a mental integration when considering the chairs which are subsumed within the concept.
  19. By "again" I mean that this is my second request for people to look at the essay. This was the first time I mentioned mrocktor at all.
  20. You're making the same error that Roy Childs, and probably the majority of Objectivists-turned-Anarchists, did and still do. Here's the best reply I've heard to Roy Childs' dispute about force not being left to the discretion of individuals: There is no assumption about the use of force being based on "whim," as mrocktor seems to think. Indeed, a person's use of force can be completely rational and appropriate, depending on the severity of his situation, such as his life being at stake. However, since force is essentially a social issue, and humans are not telepathic, any unproved act of force must be considered as initiatory by the society at large, and treated as such. In that sense, such unproved acts are whims, because there is no proven reason for other people to believe that the act of force was justified. Again, I ask that people who agree with mrocktor's point look at Don Watkin's essay "Epistemological Anarchy," which can be found at Noodlefood.
  21. If the "source" means "the beginning," then yes, Objectivism would agree that the source of knowledge is our experience of reality, our awareness of it. But the "base" of man's knowledge, the "foundation" is the axioms. When Rand says that the base of man's knowledge is axiomatic concepts, she means "all other concepts, all axioms, propositions, and thought" (p. 55) She does not mean that explicit axiomatic concepts are the base of our experience as such, at least that is how I understand it. By forming the axioms, Miss Rand simply pointed out in conceptual terms the things we were implicitly aware of, if not explicitly in some people's cases. Philosophy is concerned with explaining to man what is fundamental about reality and man's relationship to reality--this has to be done explicitly, which means: in terms of concepts. And in Objectivism's case, since it is a body of knowledge, its basis is the axioms it starts with. There's nothing Platonic in this because the Objectivist theory of concept-formation is not Platonic. For something to be Platonic, it must have certain fundamental relationships with Plato's view on concepts--which Objectivism doesn't share in the slightest.
  22. Besides sNerd's post, the terms add a lot to man's subsequent knowledge. Here are some points off the top of my head: -The "identity" axiom leads to a broader view of causality, and specifies what it means to be "caused." -The "identity" axiom links metaphysics to epistemology by setting the basic rule for consciousness to follow: identifications must be non-contradictory. -Knowing that something has an identity allows for us to set rules appropriate for deal with that particular thing. -All proofs must terminate at the evidence of the senses, i.e., the axioms. The list could go on, I think. I would like to see your response to KendallJ, if you're willing to answer him.
  23. All of your experiences. For instance, there's nothing telling me that this laptop I'm typing on exists, except for the fact that I'm perceiving and interacting with it (hitting keys on the keyboard, etc.). Further, to validate something is to show an idea's relationship to reality. If you understand how the axioms are validated by experience, then in turn you'll understand how they are derived from experience. What do you think Objectivism derives its axioms from, if anything?
  24. "Existence, identity and consciousness are concepts in that they require identification in conceptual form. Their peculiarity lies in the fact that they are perceived or experienced directly, but grasped conceptually. They are implicit in every state of awareness..." [iTOE, p. 55] Identifying a base conceptually does not mean ruling out experience. As everyone has been saying, you should read ITOE, it's a great help. It's a good thing you asked us about this: I wonder if other people give up on Objectivism by mistaking its axioms for a priorism?
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