Betsy

Word usage has a certain degree of optionality and this is not a problem as long as a person defines his terms, particularly when he can be misunderstood, and uses his terms consistently without equivocation. For instance, Ayn Rand used the term "certainty" in both the C1 and C2 senses. She also used the word "value" to stand for anything a person seeks to gain and/or keep (whether it was good or bad) in some contexts, and used the same word to mean only rational, proper values in other contexts. Since she always made clear what she meant, I don't have a problem with that.

When judging people, the principle is "innocent until proven guilty." The person who makes negative assertions about another person bears the burden of proof. If he does not present the evidence necessary to prove his assertion, his assertion is properly dismissed as arbitrary. "Suggesting" a "resemblance" to something dangerous does not prove that it is dangerous. That needs to be proved and not just asserted. Yes, but since I agree that Dr. Peikoff's C2 definition of certainty is valid, why is my view "dangerous?" I agree that the theory-practice dichotomy is dangerous, but since I do not believe that "theoretical certainty is all we can really have" and do hold that inductively derived causal inferences can fall under the C1 category, what does the theory-practice dichotomy have to do with my views? I can distinguish my views from the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, the theory-practice dichotomy, and skepticism. You are asserting they are the same, but you have the burden of proof here, so please prove it. I'm afraid not. It may be "nitpicking" but you have the burden of proof and you have to be much more specific than that. How would you like to be up on murder charges with a District Attorney who argues, "You'll find all the evidence you need to convict Noumenalself at the scene of the crime. The prosecution rests."

No, that would be an ad hominem. Poisoning the Well is a sub-class of ad hominem. The paragraph in question was your very first paragraph (here) and you presented it "pre-emptively" -- i.e., before presenting my arguments and your counter arguments. It certainly contained "adverse information" ("Betsy's view [...] is completely wrong [...] philosophically dangerous [...] almost indistinguishable from mainstream philosophical ideas [...] inconsistent with the Objectivist view [...] refuted countless times in the Objectivist literature ..."), before any justification for those negative assessments was presented. Why? What made it Poisoning the Well was that you attached it before you ever even presented my position. What made it worse was that you never really justified some of your charges and others were based on a strawman and not on my actual position at all, but I will deal with that in my next post. Sounds good to me.

No I don't and, I know what I believe better than anyone else. "Certainty" doesn't have an intrinsic meaning. It is a word that stands for one, and in this case, more than one, concept. A "proper" definition is one that identifies, by means of an essential genus and differentia, the referents of the concepts in reality. What I identified as C1 and C2 are not definitions, proper or otherwise. They are two concepts that are both denoted by the word "certainty." What then do you make of Ayn Rand's statements when she speaks of "degrees of certainty" for things which are possible or probable? Is she using the word "certainty" improperly? It is perfectly legitimate to have more than one concept with the same referents. Would you argue that "We already have a concept to cover rational animals ("man") so we don't need another concept ("human being") to do the work twice over?" All referents of the concept I call C1 are also referents of the concept C2, but not the other way around in the same way that all referents of the concept "man" are also referents of the concept "animal." C1 is a narrower concept and there is a good reason to distinguish C1s from other C2s just as there is a good reason to distinguish man from other animals. I think we both agree that a "certain" conclusion is one for which there is conclusive evidence. But, often depending on the context, there may be different entity-appropriate standards of proof used to determine when a conclusion is conclusive. There is nothing wrong, and it is often useful, to make a distinction between conclusive arguments on the basis of the nature of the evidence and the standards of proof used to establish that the conclusion is true. The most important fundamental similarity is that a C1 -- an axiom, sense perception, or a valid, proper causal explanation -- can never be overturned by later evidence, while other conclusive arguments might be. I know we agree that this is true of axioms and the validity of the senses, but it is true of complex causal identifications as well. What kind of evidence would it take to overturn Ayn Rand's conclusion that "It is only the concept of life that makes the concept of value possible?" It is based on the causal relationship between the essential nature of living things and the essential nature of "value" as such. That is true as well, but all it means is that we can subdivide C1 further into C1a and C1b.

It has nothing to do with the truth or the falsity of the argument. The Fallacy of Poisoning the Well consists of beginning an argument by saying negative personal things about one's intellectual opponent in order to cast doubt on their arguments. See the fuller discussion of that fallacy included in my post or Google "poisoning the well" for other explanations and examples. My position -- and I believe it Ayn Rand's as well -- is that all knowledge, certain or not, conclusive or not, is contextual. I know. It was an honest question and I want to give you a helpful answer. If what I wrote wasn't clear, feel free to ask more questions.

Incorrect. I have neither invented nor accepted any such thing. What I have done is identified that people are using the word "certainty" to mean two different concepts and often conflating the two. That is because it is not a matter of degree but one of two different valid concepts being denoted by the same word. Why should I address the point that man has no means of acquiring knowledge other than reason when I assume that everybody here -- especially me -- agrees with that? And what would that non-rational method of cognition be that you claim I am advocating? And where do I advocate it? I think Peikoff is correct with regard to the above cited quote. It is also an example of someone validly using the word "certainty" to mean C2.

Let me try to untangle this and clarify what my view actually is. I am not saying that we can never logically validate our conclusions about other people. We often can make valid conclusive judgments given enough relevant evidence even though we don't have all the relevant evidence necessary for 100% certainty. Nor am I saying that, since we cannot read minds and directly perceive the motives of others, we should always doubt our judgments of others. That's a false alternative. We should form the best judgments we can, given the limited evidence available to us, and not doubt our judgments until or unless we have a reason to do so.

Then you ought to tell Dr. Peikoff he made a big mistake.

My statement of C1 is more essential. It states why "we can corroborate our claims through either noncontradictory identification or sound inductive reasoning" in some cases.

Now to get down to substantive issues. The sentence in red was omitted by noumenalself when he quoted me. With the sentence restored, you can see that my view is not "that there are two kinds of certainty." My actual view is that the same word -- "certainty" -- is being used to denote two different concepts. This is not necessarily true. There have been cases where all known evidence supported a conclusion as true, but later additional evidence proved it false. The original evidence is not self-contradicted. It is contradicted by later evidence. In some contexts, there is and the standard of full evidentiary support allows for the possibility of error. That is why a murderer is allowed appeals and judicial review instead of being executed as soon as the jury convicts him. Can a person make hasty generalizations based on insufficient evidence and claim certainty? Can he say "I have only seen two lions in my life and they were both females. My observations of lions are relevant evidence and I have no evidence that contradicts that. Therefore, all lions are females." Quite true. Sometimes the word "certainty" refers to the endpoint of the continuum with "degrees of certainty" used to describe possibility and probability. This is the "C2" usage. That's news to me -- and to Ayn Rand -- I agree. I think some inductive conclusions can be "certain" in the "C1" sense and have made strong arguments elsewhere showing why and when this can be so. Just which of my actual views are you claiming conflict with which of Ayn Rand's views?

I will get to the substantive points that noumenalself makes in his post in my next post, but now I would like to address the truth or falsity of his first paragraph. This is a serious negative charge being made, against me personally, in a public forum. noumenalself bears a heavy burden of proof to demonstrate the truth of his assertions. It is not my view that "there are two kinds of certainty" so this is an attack on a straw man. What I have said is that other people in the current debate are using the word "certainty" to stand for two different concepts and sometimes both at the same time. For clarity of argument, they should define their terms and use them consistently. This is poisoning the well. No argument is presented as to why what is allegedly my view is "dangerous," but it does inject a personal and negative emotional tone into the debate. This is unsupported guilt by association. noumenalself does not say which of my alleged views is indistinguishable from which mainstream philosophical ideas. There is also the implication that my alleged views should be discounted or dismissed merely because they are similar to the views of certain others and not because they are false. What evidence is offered that what is allegedly my view is "inconsistent with the Objectivist view?" In this post noumenalself only makes reference to unspecied arguments contained in "Dr. Peikoff's lecture courses" and later to uncited and unquoted material "Dr. Peikoff and Dr. Binswanger have discussed in multiple places, in particular in "The Art of Thinking" (LP) and "The Metaphysics of Consciousness" (HB)." Still later he asserts that my alleged views are wrong because "all of this is covered in various Peikoff lectures" without specifying which lectures and where. To properly prove the case that my views are "inconsistent with the Objectivist view," noumenalself has to show (1) That the views he attributes to me really are my views (2) Which specific Objectivist ideas my alleged views are inconsistent with and why (3) That my views are inconsistent with the Objectivist view -- the view of Ayn Rand -- but not necessarily the views of Dr. Peikoff or Dr. Binswanger with whom Ayn Rand was known to have had occasional disagreements. noumenalself has not met the burden of proof required to substantiate the assertions he made in his first paragraph and, until he does, his charges must be regarded as arbitrary or false -- and unjust.

Before I deal with the substantive issues raised by noumenalself, I want to address his opening paragraph. The above charge, even if true (which it isn't), constitutes the fallacy of Poisoning the Well.

I pointed to the fact that Branden deceived Ayn Rand. You raised the arbitrary possibility that Ayn Rand was a communist spy. That's the difference.

Great! That is the issue I have been arguing for when it comes to judging people. I have been arguing against those who claim they can know, with total certainty, another person's thoughts, motives, and future actions. See the posts like the ones here and here and here and here. Because I believe there are things we can be totally certain of and other things we hold to be true with varying degrees of probability, we have to make sure and define exactly what we mean when we use a work like "certainty." Otherwise, we may assume and act as if we have more knowledge than we really do. When you say you are certain about another person's honesty, do you mean an extremely high probability that he is honest or that, based on what you know, it is impossible for him to be dishonest? Do you mean to say you are certain he is honest now, or that he will remain honest in the future?

I would agree with that. I disagree with those who claim they know with 100% certainty and without any doubt whatsoever, what someone will do in the future and/or his motives for doing what he does. You can know a lot of things about others and what they will probably do, but you can't be as sure about them as you are about your own motives or about the actions of non-volitional entities.

I'm not saying that. I am saying that people are using the word "certainty" to stand for two different concepts and sometimes changing concepts in the middle of an argument. I say people should define clearly which concept of "certainty" they are using and use it consistently.

I agree. Why not? Free will means that a particular person can change his path. It does not mean, of course, that he will. No, because when considering a person's future actions, free will is a factor. To demonstrate this, ask yourself which you are more "certain," confident, or sure of: another person's past actions or his future actions? Then ask yourself why. [i have been having to repeatedly edit my postings because something strange happens. When I post two different postings, back to back, the two postings get stuck together and the formatting on both postings is messed up.]

I wasn't referring to past character but to past actions. Advocating Objectivism is an action. Exactly. My point is that we can know, with certainty, what a person has done but we cannot know, with equal certainty, why he did it. Also true, which makes another one of my points. Actions are easier to ascertain because they are out there to be seen. I either did something or I did not and someone who has seen me do it can know with total, 100% certainty that I did it. He cannot know, with equal certainty, why I did it because he can't read my mind. So what you call "certainty" with absolutely no doubt allows for the possibility of being wrong? What facts of reality account for the possibility of being wrong? Not being able to read his mind? His free will? Even if you "end up being wrong?"

I guess that depends on what you mean by "certain" and whether your use of "certainty" allows for being certain and wrong. I think that what probably happened with Ayn Rand was that she had sufficient evidence to conclude, with a high degree of probability, that Branden was a man of high moral character -- but she was wrong. Also he may have once been moral and become immoral or been slightly immoral and become much more immoral. There is evidence for that as well.

Absolutely not. Having free will means that someone can be dishonest and that's all.

That's true that I was the first person to use the term "mindreading." I did it to name, explicitly, an assumption implicit in arguments that we could be 100% certain about another person's honesty. Then I have two questions for you: 1. Can you be as certain about someone else's honesty as you can be about your own? Why or why not? 2. Can you be as certain about whether someone's statement was or was not made honestly as you can be about the fact that the statement was actually made? Why or why not? By that standard, can you be certain of things that are not true? My view is that you can have conclusive (i.e., sufficient to form a valid conclusion) evidence without having 100% certain knowledge -- NOT that you can throw all kinds of arbitrary doubts in. Other people not only can be dishonest without us knowing it, they sometimes are. As evidence, I can point to Branden deceiving Ayn Rand or anyone who ever lied to anyone and got away with it for a while. Now that is arbitrary. Where's the evidence? I agree.

As far as the past is concerned, you can. All you have to do is look at what I have been doing for the past 45 years. Not as much as I can -- and that's my point. We can be certain of what we see people do but, because we can't read minds, we cannot be equally certain as to the motives that caused them to do it. We can be certain of what people have done but, because men have free will, we cannot be equally certain about what they will do. And that my position in essentials.

Third interpretation: The certainty denoted by C1 means we have a sound causal explanation that reduces to a tautology. The certainty denoted by C2 means we have supporting evidence but we lack a sound causal explanation.

That's correct. I was describing common usage and also usage in the discussions here. Personally, I only want to use the term "certainty" to apply to something that is known to be absolutely, 100% true such that denying it would involve a contradiction. Anything less I might call "conclusive" or "highly probable" but not "certain." The problem is that I am discussing issues with people who use "certainty" in both the C1 and C2 sense and sometimes switch between the two meanings in mid-argument, so I have to make an issue of it for the sake of clarity.

Do you think that a "long-term advocate of Objectivism" like Ayn Rand, in the years prior to her break with Branden, could be certain of his character based on the available evidence? Her journal entries, included in The Passion of Ayn Rand's Critics, show otherwise.