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I love your sig. I wrote all that in a big hurry after accidentally losing a much longer and more carefully reasoned response -- insert here -- but the point I'm trying to get across is that biologically and metaphysically the fetus is a separate entity from its mother, even though it is physically connected to its mother. One isn't a part of the other, in the sense that a heart or lungs are part of the mother's body. The more general problem here is that there is more than one referent of the phrase "human being." My opponents on this thread have essesntially used this phrase to refer to an infant (or older) by imposing a requirement of physical separation from the mother in what they regard as a "human being." I have used it in the broader biological sense to refer to a viable fetus as well. Despite our many disagreements, I think we can all agree that the correct definition of "human being" is outcome determinative to who is right on the abortion issue, because we all agree that once the fetus becomes an actual human being, it has rights. I think that their usage is too narrow, and they think that my usage is too broad -- but logically, if we are talking about the same referent, it has to be one or the other. Is physical separation essential to being a human being, or is it merely one of the stages of life that a pre-existinghuman being goes through? That's the issue.

I had prepared a long response to this post, and just as I was about to finish it I accidentally deleted it. I don't want to spend another hour or two attempting to recreate what I wrote. Besides, I need to leave here for a few hours. So let me give you the short version instead (I'll elaborate if and when requested later today): 1. I disagree with everything you said in the first paragraph. Moreover, it is personally offensive. I have already explained myself in an earlier post. I don't think I insulted anyone, and I know I didn't intend to insult anyone. Period. 2. I strongly disagree with your mischaracterizations of the previous posts, all of which speak for themselves on who said or argued what to whom at various points in the thread. 3. I strongly object to your statement at the end that you "hope" that I will stop refusing to respond rationally to my opponents -- this is like asking me when I will stop beating my wife. I have been totally rational in this discussion, and my posts, again, speak for themselves. 4. I take very strong exception to the patronizing tone of your post. I have been studying and thinking about Objectivism and Aristotelian philosophy longer than you have been walking the planet. So don't patronize me. 5. I disagree with the explicit or implicit double standard that you guys seem to be applying. If anyone deserves a warning here, it is Stephen and RadCap -- not me. At a minimum, instead of prejudging the dispute, try evaluating the evidence fully, objectively, and impartially. Then please either apologize to me for jumping to a totally unwarranted conclusion. Either that, or give me the courtesy of an explanation of sufficient detail that I can respond and defend myself. 6. The overall tone of your posts leaves me even more concerned that you, as an adminstrator, are incapable of judging this dispute objectively and impartially. Plus, I don't respond well to intimidation, especially when it is based on baseless claims. 7. On the merits, I'm not totally sold on viability as the starting point, but it does seem to be the biological milestone at which, in Leonard Peikoff's words, the potential becomes the actual. It is certainly the point by which even Ayn Rand admitted that the abortion question becomes arguable. The fetus is a separate entity even though connected to the mother in the same sense that a caboose is a separate entity even though it is connected to a train, or you are a separate entity from your daugher even when you hold her hand while crossing the street.

My disagreement was with your accusations that I had made any logical fallacies, not with the notion that straw man attacks are "not rational." Incidentally, this response is itself an example context-dropping, which is a type of logical fallacy according to Objectivism.

Obviously I disagree. This is going nowhere.

I didn't say what you are quoting -- you know, the part just above the part where you accuse me of attacking a straw man.

Please rephrase your question in some form other than "when will you stop beating your wife" and I'll do my best to answer it. What specific ideas do you want me to respond to?

Neither.

The person you mentioned is absolutely correct. I have re-assessed a great many things since four or five years ago when I think what you are referring to actually happened back on HPO. I really regret some of the things I said, and of course I hope that others do, too.

It does exist inside the womb. It isn't a question of existence versus non-existence, but existence in one place versus existence in another place.

Well, don't do that. If I see a good argument here, or think of a new one myself, or come to think that I have made a mistake, I'll let you know. I promise.

Let me ask you a question here about your hypothetical. At what point in the pregnancy is the woman taking the medicine, and for what purpose? Generally, I don't think that any issue regarding rights even comes into play until the point at which the fetus becomes viable (if not later). At this point, the mother has rights, the fetus arguably has rights, and the mother has, by allowing the pregnancy to proceed up to this point (we are talking approximately six months into the pregnancy, i.e near the end of the second trimester) without getting an abortion, assumed parental obligations -- the same parental obligations that govern relationships between parents and their children after they are born. Even here, there is an exception: the mother should have an absolute right to get even a late-term abortion to save her own life.

Okay... Here is where you lose me. Biologically, the viable fetus is human just before birth; e.g., it has human DNA, human organs, a human brain, etc. and can exist as a human outside the womb. You lose me here, too. Most important, the fetus is certainly physically attached to the woman's body, but it is not a part of her body, but, biologically, a separate living entity, with its own separate skin, brain, blood, organs, bones, DNA, etc. [Note: Again, I am talking only about a viable fetus -- I am not suggesting that prior to this time, the fetus is anything other than a potential human being even if it is a separate living entity.] Now, I will agree that physical independence is essential to distinguishing a fetus from an infant. However, I still think, as Ayn Rand suggested, that "one can argue about the later stages of a pregnancy." When it comes to the earlier stages, I totally agree with what she wrote.

I would say that what differentiates an Objectivist from others is a person's understanding and acceptance of Rand's theory of concepts as set forth in ITOE, which leads directly to the view of objectivity set forth in Chapter 4 of OPAR. In my opinion, Ayn Rand was essentially hinting this conclusion in her June 20, 1958 journay entry (see Journals of Ayn Rand at page 699-700).

Exactly. As Rand herself said, "One may argue about the later stages of a pregnancy, but the essential issue concerns only the first three months."

So I have been repeatedly told. These are assertions, not arguments. No. It has been repeatedly asserted, but not shown. This argument is, in fact, a textbook example of circular reasoning and, more specifically, the type of circular reasoning that involves phrasing the argument so that the premise and conclusion say the same thing in two slightly different ways (i.e. saying that only born human beings have rights because only physically independent human beings have rights). Virtually every standard textbook on logic covers this variation of circular reasoning.

I agree that birth is an obvious and clear point at which to draw a line. But so is viability. So is conception. So is the age at which the infant says its first word. We need objective criteria for where to draw the line -- not to do the equivalent of playing pin the tail on the donkey. I believe that Leonard Peikoff correctly drew the line at the point at which a potential human being becomes an actual human being. But the question then becomes exactly when this happens. He answered "birth," but I'm not so sure he is correct. More specifically, what is the logical validation of the argument that it occurs at birth, and not, say, at viability. Merely stating that the answer is birth because at this point the infant is no longer physically attached to the mother is to argue in circles -- birth is the process of becoming physically independent of the mother. Right. If a viable fetus is an actual human being, we are talking about two human beings with rights, not just one. The question then becomes not whether the fetus has rights, but the different question of what are its rights as against the rights of the mother. Some do, but not everyone. For example, a very bright non-religious Objectivist, Diana Hseih, recently wrote the following in her blog "Noodlefood" on March 11, 2004 : "For various reasons related to the autonomy of rights-bearers, I regard natural viability as the proper standard for abortion rights in ordinary circumstances. So on my view, should a woman have the right to allow her fully viable fetus die when it could be so easily saved? I don't know, but I suspect not. Legal parental obligations perhaps begin when that viability point is passed -- or whenever the woman commits to carry the fetus to term." Her position is certainly a minority position among Objectivists, but in my opinion it is a defensible one -- and, as far as I can tell so far, more easily defensible than many of the contrary arguments I've seen here. I think this is correct -- but it works both ways. The distinctions themselves are obvious. Their relevance to when we first have rights is not.

An equally interesting poll question would be what book do you go back and re-read most often for clarification on various philosophical points. For me it's a toss-up between OPAR (especially Chapter 4) and ITOE, with Galt's speech a distant third -- a reflection of the fact that my primary philosophical interest has for years been in epistemology rather than ethics or politics.

I agree that the fetus is within a woman's body and even physically connected to her body, but it doesn't follow that therefore the fetus is part of the woman (in the same sense that, say, her heart or toenails are part of the woman) as opposed to being a separate biological entity with its own DNA, heart, brain, etc., although physically connected to the woman. You are essentially trying to prove that human beings have rights only at birth by defining a human being as a newborn infant. Surely you see how circular this argument is, no?

At the outset, I'm not trying to insult anyone, and I apologize if I did. I'm just trying to understand what the argument actually is. To answer your question, the details I had in mind are that the fetus doesn't go from zygote to infant in one step. It goes through a continuous development and reaches several biological milestones along the way. For purposes of this discussion, one of the most important such milestones is viability, i.e. the point at which the fetus is sufficiently far enough along in its development to survive outside the womb. At this stage, it seems to me that, at a bare minimum, a strong argument can be made that what was a potential human being has become an actual human being. This argument gets only stronger as the now viable fetus continues its development and gets closer to the day of its birth. Also, even though it is physically connected to its mother, biologically it is a separate living entity. Thus, it isn't so obvious to me that the "potential is not an actual" argument supports the conclusion that rights begin at birth, and not at an earlier point (but no earlier than viability). Incidentally, I recall Ayn Rand saying somewhere that the later stages of pregnancy are at least "arguable." Well, I guess I'm arguing.

As framed, the argument is crytal clear. The problem is that it is also circular, and begs the question of why physical independence is more fundamental or essential to having rights than, say, viability. So, what facts of reality actually lead to the result that physical independence is more essential or fundamental than viability? Can someone actually list these facts here in numerical or bullet point so that we are all talking about the same thing?

[stephen_speicher,May 7 2004, 05:03 PM] I fully understand Rand's and Peikoff's arguments regarding the facts that give rise to the concept of "rights." I have also read -- many times -- everything they have to say about the abortion issue. I'm trying, but I am not understanding how these arguments either apply to or justify the conclusion that rights do not arise at some point prior to birth. To put my question in OPAR terms, what exactly is the reduction or proof of the conclusion that rights do not begin at any time prior to birth? For example, how do I explain to a non-Objectivist who opposes abortion for non-religious reasons that the fetus has no rights, say, a week or two before birth? I don't see the reduction. Maybe I'm blind, but then again maybe there is nothing to see.

The problems I see here is that the first point is circular, and the second point begs the question of why physical separation is the essential fact that gives rise to rights, i.e. why the newborn has rights at the moment of birth, but not in the minutes or hours prior to birth. Come to think of it, the second argument is circular as well (birth is physical separation from the mother).

I agree with this point. However, I don't see why birth is essential to being a conceptual being. Certainly everyone here understands that at a certain point in a pregnancy, a fetus becomes "viable," i.e. surviving as a human being outside the womb. By this time, it is certainly a "conceptual being." As for the "interaction" factor, birth changes the form of a baby's interaction with others, but not the fact of its existence. A fetus certainly "interacts" with its mother. In fact, the interaction begins long before the fetus develops a brain and becomes a concpetual being. In sum, I don't see why the form of the interaction alone should make any essential difference. Maybe some other factor does, but not this one. If "interaction between conceptual beings" is the test for rights, then it seems that rights begin when the fetus becomes viable. However, if rights actually don't begin until birth, then something else is required. What is it?

Well, a newborn infant who cannot even yet integrate sensations into percepts has no means of knowing that rights exist, yet both Rand and Peikoff have said that a human being has rights at birth. For that matter, the newborn is as dependent on others as a fetus is on its mother, but, again, the Objectivist view is that the newborn infant has rights. Thus, as a matter of simple logic, rights cannot be a matter of knowing that they exist or not being totally dependent on others. So your argument isn't nearly as clear to me as it seems to be to you.

The phrase "conceptual interaction" is totally confusing to me, except that I certainly agree that rights arise in part because we are rational beings and we interact with other human beings. But it's much more than that. For example, to say that someone has rights means that others cannot initiate force against him without also violating his rights. The following quote from Ayn Rand sums up nicely what I have in mind here: "The concept of 'rights' pertains only to action -- specifically, freedom of action. It means freedom from physical compulsion, coercion or interference by other men." Anyway, the problem I'm struggling with here is that a newborn infant doesn't "conceptually interact" with anyone, either. His brain isn't yet integrating sensations into percepts, much less percepts into concepts. So how do you differentiate the newborn infant from what that infant was a few hours before he was born? The only difference I'm seeing here is his physical location, not what he essentially is.