DPW

Rather than answer you at length, which I unfortunately don't have time to do, let me give you a lead to the answer. Recall that when we discussed lying about your height or about sleeping with the girl, what aspect of it constituted faking reality. In both cases, we assumed the liar was clear on the truth in his own mind. The faking involved why he was lying -- it involved the value he was trying to achieve. Now ask yourself: how is that essentially different from lying to protect yourself from force? Is such a person really faking reality? Don't worry. You're asking good questions and I'm happy to answer them. I think if you can get clear on this one aspect of Objectivism -- on the nature of principles, how they are formed, how to apply them, in what way they are contextual, etc. -- you will reach a new plateau in your grasp of the philosophy. It was an important step in my development, anyway. That said, I want to challenge your central claim here -- that "he still gained a value." Did he? Is money intrinsically valuable? Well, recall that in our other example, the guy who lied about sleeping with the girl really did gain the esteem of his friends. Why wasn't that esteem really a value? Because he didn't earn it. But, you might say, money spends just as well regardless of how you get it. That's a valid question, and I think there are two points here, one philosophical, one psychological. Philosophically, the fact that money enables you to purchase goods doesn't by itself prove anything. Remember, you can't look at something in isolation and determine that it is a net benefit to your life. In order to establish that something is a net benefit, you have to view it in the context of all your other values, goals, and needs...across the whole of your lifespan. How do we know, then, that money gained by dishonestly isn't to your interest? Because it was gained dishonestly. Because we know that dishonesty isn't to your interest. It can't be, because unreality cannot be to your interest -- because you can't remain in reality by means of unreality. The point here is that you can't argue that something is a value merely because it achieves some out-of-context end that you happen to feel benefits you. To prove that something benefits you, you have to prove that it follows from life-affirming principles. That's the only way to account for the role a given object plays in the full context of your life. But there is another point that I'd like to make, and it's this: observe that the men who seek unearned esteem from others are the same people who pursue money as an end in itself. The same motive underlies those who want esteem without its cause and money without its cause. What motive? Ayn Rand tells us: I hope that clarifies things. Don Watkins

This particular essay was written "under the watchful eye of Ayn Rand." It's from his book, "Who is Ayn Rand?" which I published in the early 1960s. As to how valuable it is, I haven't read it in a long time so can't say.

No. It's wrong only insofar as it's dishonest. Lying to a murderer, to take the classic example, is not dishonest -- it's perfectly moral. Other people are a part of reality. The question you need to ask is: Why are you lying to them? What value are you trying to gain? Is it their esteem, which they would not give to you if they knew you were really six feet tall? If so, then you are faking reality. They don't esteem you, the six foot man. Or, to make the example more realistic, take the guy who tells his buddies he slept with a girl when really she rebuffed him. Now, he knows in his mind that he didn't sleep with her (although even that's arguable -- most liars lose any clear distinction between what's real and what's not), and he knows that he doesn't deserve the "esteem" his friends are giving him. It's not real. His friends aren't showing him esteem, they are expressing their admiration for a guy who doesn't exist. But he's pretending he is that guy. In "faking reality to others" by saying he slept with the girl, he is faking reality in his own mind, by telling himself he deserves the admiration he's receiving from his friends. And that's the more general point. When you fake reality to others, you end up faking reality in your own mind.

I can't put a number to mine. In high school, I "successfully introduced" one person, who "successfully introduced" his girlfriend...but they drifted away from Objectivism after we all went off to college. On the other hand, I introduced Objectivism to my best friend at the time, and while she never became an Objectivist, many of Rand's ideas became permanently integrated with her character. My brother is now a student of Objectivism. I don't really work to spread Objectivism in my personal life anymore. The bulk of the influence I've had is through blogging. I've received somewhere between 5-10 emails over the years from people saying I turned them on to Objectivism. Now, whatever became of those people? I have no idea. I think my biggest contribution has been, not in "making converts," but in helping young Objectivists gain a better understanding of the philosophy. I think that's even more important, because that's what keeps them Objectivists -- getting their questions answered. Which I guess is a long way of saying "I don't know." Don Watkins

Faking reality means acting as if the facts were other than you know they are. Writing novels doesn't involve faking -- it involves imagining. The rest I've already covered in sufficient detail.

That would require a philosophical treatise, hardly appropriate for a message board. I suggest you study the Objectivist literature on the subject, namely Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology by Ayn Rand, and Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand by Leonard Peikoff. You might also want to listen to Peikoff's lectures on the History of Philosophy and his Understanding Objectivism lectures.

I found this quote from Peikoff's "My Thirty Years With Ayn Rand." Even though it basically repeats what I've said ad nauseum, some of you may find it helpful. Peikoff begins by recounting how Ayn Rand helped him grasp the principle of honesty by having Peikoff devise a con-man scheme, which Rand went on to show would lead to escalating lies that would ultimately have to backfire. Peikoff tried to change the example slightly, but with the same result. Then he tried once more, when Rand became fed up and asked him, "Can't you think in principle?" --Quoting Peikoff-- Let me condense into a few paragraphs what she then explained to me at length. "The essence of a con-man's lie," she began, "of any such lie, no matter what the details, is the attempt to gain a value by faking certain facts of reality." She went on: "Now can't you grasp the logical consequences of that kind of policy? Since all facts of reality are interrelated, faking one of them leads the person to fake others: ultimately, he is committed to an all-out war against reality as such. But this is the kind of war no one can win. If life in reality is a man's purpose, how can he expect to achieve it while struggling at the same time to escape and defeat reality?" And she concluded: "The con-man's lies are wrong on principle. To state the principle positively: honesty is a long-range requirement of human self-preservation and is, therefore, a moral obligation." This was not merely a new ethical argument to me. It was a whole new form of thought. She was saying, in effect: you do not have to consult some supernatural authority for intellectual guidance, nor try to judge particular cases in a vacuum and on to infinity. Rather, you first abstract the essence of a series of concretes. Then you identify, by an appropriate use of lgoic, the necessary implications or result of this essence. You thereby reach a fundamental generalization, a principle, which subsumes and enables you to deal with an unlimited number of instances -- past, present, and future. The consequence, in this example, is an absolute prohibition against the con-man mentality -- a prohibition based not on God, but on perception and thought. (Voice of Reason, 340-341) --End Quote-- Don Watkins

Felix, Your question has already been answered, by Jennifer and by me: the "prudent predator" doesn't have to show that he can "get away" with his predation; he has to prove that predation is to his interest. To prove that something is to his interest, however, he has to do more than show that it helped him achieve some isolated goal or object. He has to show that the entire enterprise was a net benefit to his life. The only way to do that is with principles. Part of the difficulty here is that two different claims are being conflated: (1) That it is to a man's interest to violate moral principles when he can "get away with it", and (2) that predation is a proper moral principle. Which claim are you making? If you are claiming the second, that predation is a proper moral principle, you are obviously mistaken. A proper moral principle is an identification of a fact, yet predation flies in the face of facts. That's why you have to stress that yours is a "prudent" predator -- one who only predates when he can escape the consequences of his actions. If predation as such was prudent, the modifier would be unnecessary (Objectivists don't talk about "prudent honesty" or "prudent justice" -- honesty and justice, like all moral principles, are always prudent). And yet, for the very same reason that (2) is false, (1) is false. (1) is false because to violate proper moral principles and predate "sometimes" is to adopt predation as a principle. Quoting Peikoff: And that's the point. You can't defend violating principles, you can only argue which principles are in man's interest. You also write: You are mixing categories. You have not shown, and cannot show, that violating a principle is in a man's interest. All you have shown is that a man can violate a principle and escape disaster. Those are two different things. After all, a man can survive small pox, but that doesn't imply that he is better off than he would have been had he never contracted the disease in the first place. And violating a principle carries the same consequences as a disease. It inflicts damage on a man, first psychologically, then existentially. And the psychological damage I'm referring to is not primarily guilt -- it's pscyho-epistemological dis-integration, i.e., evasion. Is that what you uphold as to man's interest? I have to be frank: I am sick of the context-dropping that goes on in discussions of this type. I uphold principles because I refuse to drop context, and yet this precisely what the predation arguments demand: "Forget about the full context of a man's life and look only at this one little sliver. Now tell me what's wrong with this little sliver without reference to anything wider." That is not a valid question. The valid question is, how should a being who survives by his mind use his mind? Notice, however, that the mind is the one thing absent from the predator's case. He wants values divorced from reason, divorced from the means of achieving them, divorced from the context necessary to identify them. But to eat one's cake, one must buy it and bake it. A stolen cake may taste as sweet, but only until the poison kicks in. Don Watkins

A quick note. I will be responding to everyone's posts ASAP, but I had my wisdom teeth out today and I don't want to try to write philosophy all drugged up on Oxycodone. To Felix: thanks for the kind words. As far as supplemental literature, the only thing I can suggest is OPAR, but I assume you're familiar with it. On the other hand, the second (November) issue of my magazine, Axiomatic, will have a more formal treatment of this issue, so be sure to subscribe when we go online. Don Watkins

Your answer should have been: "You should never do anything you have to 'get away with.'" Frankly, I have no idea what you think your stance is. Rather than deliver a single cogent argument, you seem to be throwing all sorts of disconnected claims out there in the hopes that one will stick. That's also indicative of empricism. Feel free to raise them, then. Don Watkins

But you were going about it in precisely the wrong way, which told me that you needed to first grasp what a principle is. In the paragraph of mine you quoted, that's what I was explaining. Only after you grasp that a principle is an inductive truth, a causal identification, can you grasp what proof of a principle consists of. Precisely, which is the purpose of principles. Once you validate a principle, that proves that a violation of the principle is destructive every time. What's giving you trouble is that you think we validate a principle by looking at "every time" and determining (somehow) the effects of the action of man's life in each of those instances. That's exactly what we can't do, and it has nothing whatever to do with Objectivism (as I've said, it represents the empiricist approach). We have to conceptualize the requirements of human survival, and to do that, we have to think in principles. So let me ask you this question: The Objectivist defense of honesty is that faking reality doesn't change the facts, and any attempt to live in reality by means of unreality must, therefore, ultimately fail. Now I want you to tell me -- are you prepared to defend the claim that life can be achieved by means of unreality? The problem is that you keep thinking, "Can't someone violate a principle and get away with it? And if he gains a value, thereby, isn't he better off?" The answer is an emphatic "No!" One does not "violate" a principle. One adopts a different principle. A criminal, for example, adopts his anti-life principle because he thinks he can "get away with it." This is what I call the anti-causal mentality. It is the mentality of a man who doesn't enact the causes necessary to achieve the effects he desires, but who spends his life evading the consequences of the causes he enacts. Notice that in defending adherence to proper moral principles, I'm not arguing, "You can get away with being honest." When you adhere to reality, there is nothing to be gotten away from: your interests are served by experiencing the full consequences of the causes you enact. This is the point I want to stress. Morality really boils down to a basic choice: adhere to reality or fight against it. (All moral principles are are identifications of what it means to adhere to reality. This is why Rand described moral principles as your "recognition of the fact that...") What do you think? Do you think your self-interest can be achieved by fighting against reality on principle? Don't fool yourself. There is no middle-ground. To adhere to reality is to adhere to reality on principle. There is no "sometimes." Now let's concretize this with an example. Suppose Erik stays late at work and is the last one to leave the office. As he is leaving he passes Tyler's desk. Sticking out of the edge of his desk drawer, Erik sees a crisp fifty-dollar bill. Erik knows for a fact there are no cameras in the office. Should he grab the fifty? Some people would make the mistake of thinking of all the ways Erik can get caught. But let's ask a more basic question: is having fifty dollars in Erik's interest? The answer isn't self-evident. As with any concrete value, whether or not the fifty dollars is to his interest depends on the role it plays in his life, and that requires that we consider how he spends it...and how he acquires it. Well, how is he to acquire it? By stealing. In order for Erik to prove that stealing the fifty dollars is to his interest, Erik must first prove that stealing -- as a principle -- is to his interest. The point is that we cannot prove that any particular action is to one's interests except by reference to a broader principle. We cannot put on blinders and judge the morality of stealing based on the "merits" of any particular case. I don't me we shouldn't...I mean we absolutely CAN'T. It's not possible. We cannot determine that it is in Erik's interest to steal in this particular case except by proving that it is in Erik's interest to steal, to steal on principle. But of course it isn't. It can't be. Stealing involves acting in contradiction to a fact: it means acting as if that fifty dollars belongs to you when it really belongs to someone else. Your welfare, in such a case, depends solely on your ability to evade and avoid the consequences of your action. But life isn't achieved by avoiding consequences, it's achieved by enacting beneficial consequences through rational action. That's why we can say with full confidence and certainty that having the fifty dollars is not to Erik's interest. It's not to his interest because stealing isn't to his interest, and stealing isn't to his interest because man's basic interest is: adhere to reality in order to live in reality. That is the Objectivist position. Don Watkins

The problem is that while we can specify some of the (possible) effects of a given action on man's life, we can not specify them all, since every action has effects - direct and indirect - that redound across man's life. Even if we could, we would be so overwhelmed that we would have no means of evaluating all those effects. So the question becomes, how can we determine what effects an action will have on a man's life if we have to take into account such an enormous context? My point, the Objectivist point, is that the only way it's possible is with moral principles. Let me be clear on this: once you validate a moral principle, you can thereafter say that any act that violates that principle is contrary to your interest because it violates the principle. You don't have to specify the particular harms that will result. The question is: how do we validate moral principles? I indicated that in my post. We do it inductively, by observing instances and identifying the principle that explains those instances. Dishonesty, for example, we can see is the attempt to gain a value by faking reality. But faking reality doesn't change the facts, and since no course of action opposed to reality can help you live in reality, you can't gain values through dishonesty. I was right when I said you were falling into empricism. To you, that's not a solid proof. That's not because it isn't, it's because you haven't grasped what proof of a moral principle consists of.

I hope so, although I studied your posts rather carefully, so I have to admit I'm doubtful. On the contrary -- empirical examples are quite fine. Examples are the raw data from which we form a principle, and they are the means of concretizing our principles (i.e., ensuring they are tied to reality). But examples aren't arguments. The argument is the principle. Now, as to why robbing a bank is wrong, you will forgive me for not making this point explicit in this thread, as I have done so in several others, as well as on my blog... Robbing a bank is wrong because it violates life-based moral principles. That's what it means to say something is wrong. Don Watkins

For the record, let me state my emphatic disagreement with hunterrose, not simply in specifics, but with his fundamental approach. In his approach, moral principles are essentially rules of thumb. "This is unpredictable, so don't do it." That has nothing to do with the Objectivist approach. On the Objectivist approach, moral principles (like all principles) identify a causal relationship, in this case, a causal relationship between a given action and man's life. Consider just one principle: honesty. Does Ayn Rand argue that lying would be great if you could get away with it, but since you never know when you can get away with it, you shouldn't do it? Does she merely observe a lot of concrete cases of dishonesty, noting that in most cases, the dishonesty led to negative consequences, so therefore one should never be dishonest? Absolutely not. What Rand did was identify the essential nature of dishonesty and recognize that such a policy is inherently opposed to man's life. Quoting Galt's speech: "Honesty is the recognition of the fact that the unreal is unreal and can have no value, that neither love nor fame nor cash is a value if gained by fraud" (FNI 129). Hunterrose's approach is mired in empricism. Just like scientific empiricism, which says that to make a valid induction we would have to observe all the relevant phenomena, hunterrose's moral empricism says that to conclude that violating moral principles is always contrary to one's interest, we would have to be able to observe all such instances and all their consequences. The only reason to act on principle, according to hunterrose, is because we can't know when we would be "get away with" and thereby benefit from an immoral act, and since we generally don't benefit from such acts, not acting immorally is a good policy. Mrocktor shares this empricist approach but is more consistent. He observes that life is full of risks, and that driving a car or getting surgery or getting married are no less risky (in a certain sense) than robbing the occassional bank. If all those things lead to values so long as you don't fall victim to risk, then Mrocktor is right -- there is no egoistic reason to be principled. But empiricism is wrong. What man needs is a conceptual methodology...an objective methodology. Such a methodology, as Rand showed us, enables us to identify the essential nature of an action, and thereby determine its relationship to human life. We can thereafter know with full confidence and certainty that there is nothing to be gained by deviating from life-based moral principles. Those things one "gains" by violating moral principles are not in fact values, anymore than Galt's motor was a value in the hands of the looters. Don Watkins

This is the core issue. Mrocktor and all those who make the argument he is making take it as given that a certain class of objects is valuable to man, and then ask why it matters how you gain those objects. That is not a given. It is not obvious that having a million dollars is to your interest. That must be proved. The question is, how do you prove something is to your interest? How do you prove that something is, in the full context of your entire lifespan, a benefit? The only way to do it is conceptually. Apart from moral principles it is impossible to establish that a given object is to your interest. Let me stress this. We need moral principles, not because we can't compute the odds of "getting caught" when violating them. We need moral principles because nothing is a value intrinsically -- it depends on the role it plays in our life. The only way to identify the role a given end will play is by means of principles. Don Watkins

Risk is inherent in life, but there is an essential difference between accepting an increased risk in order to pursue a higher value, and pursuing destruction. Moral principles don't identify risky courses of action -- they identify courses of action opposed to man's life. Can you get away with violating a principle? Sure, in the sense that immediate destruction need not follow the violation of a rational principle, but absolutely not in the sense that you will be better off than had you adhered to such principles. Why is this? Because actually there is no such thing as "violating" a principle. To violate a principle is really to adopt a different (anti-life) principle. That leaves you with two options: either stop, make amends, and re-establish the rational principle, or continue acting on the anti-life principle. Long term, that HAS to be self-destructive. Just as it is senseless to say you gained a dollar if you had to sacrifice a thousand to get it, so it makes no sense to call anything gained through an immoral means a value -- you've sacrificed too much to get it. Even when we accept more risk in order to pursue a greater value, we don't do so on the "I hope I can get away with it" premise. We do so on the premise that we would rather accept the possible negative consequences than settle for whatever the alternative course of action had to offer. For example, suppose I'm trying to decide whether to be a cop or a lawyer. If I choose to be a cop, it's not on the premise that I think (or hope) I can beat the odds. It's that I would rather die as a cop than live as a lawyer. This has nothing to do whatever with a man who wants to escape the consequences of the causes he enacts, which is what the mentality of a thug consists of. By the way, I am treating these issues in depth in the first issue of my forthcoming magazine, Axiomatic, which will be available October first at: http://www.axiomaticmagazine.com Don Watkins

Yeah, I didn't notice those, which is why I tried to erase my comment. I just couldn't believe he was actually serious -- it seemed like a spoof of what tolerationists pretend our position to be.

We are dealing with a troll, folks.

Yes, thank you for clarifying. The fact that nothing is in principle unknowable means that there is nothing which -- by its nature -- man's means of knowledge is incapable of grasping.

I am pleased to announce that I’m currently developing an online magazine, Axiomatic. Since The Intellectual Activist became almost exclusively a current events publication, there has been no place for Objectivists to publish or read articles that analyze Objectivism, apply Objectivist principles to other fields of study, or help readers integrate Objectivism into daily lives. I’ve decide to create such a forum. Axiomatic is a publication for Objectivists who wish to write seriously about Objectivist topics that are inappropriate for mainstream publications, and who do not wish to write for anti-Objectivist publications. (We will also welcome authors who wish to publish anonymously in order to protect their identity – especially individuals pursuing careers in academia, a world often hostile to Objectivists.) As this project moves forward, I will keep you all informed of its progress. For people who are interested in receiving regular updates by email, please send me an email with the subject line, “Axiomatic: Reader.” To those interested in writing for us: Axiomatic is not affiliated with any other organization or publication, but it is committed to Objectivism and therefore will not publish works by enemies of Objectivism or of Ayn Rand – this includes but is not limited to libertarians, anarchists, "tolerationists," people Ayn Rand condemned or who've condemned Ayn Rand, and anyone who sanctions members of the aforementioned groups. Additionally, Axiomatic will only publish works that demonstrate a thorough, sophisticated understanding of Objectivism. Anyone may subscribe to and read Axiomatic, but in order to adhere to the highest standards of quality, we ask that those best described as “students of Objectivism” not submit anything for publication. That said, if you are interested in writing for us, send me an email with the subject line “Axiomatic: Writer,” and I will send you a copy of our submission guidelines. I am also looking for one or two advanced Objectivists who would be interested in a role either as a senior editor or as consulting editor (this latter position would involve intellectual consultation rather than copy editing), so if that interests you, let me know as well. This is a for-profit venture, so all participants will be paid for their efforts. One final note: no one is authorized to speak for Ayn Rand or Objectivism – certainly not I. Every author will speak only for himself, and although it is our policy not to publish anything that isn’t congruent with Objectivist principles, each reader will have to judge for himself whether we’ve succeeded at that task. Thank you all! Don Watkins egoist(at)gmail.com

No, reverse time-travel is impossible. When I said that nothing is unknowable, what I meant was that nothing is in principle unknowable.

For all your years as an Objectivist, you should know what a "package-deal" is, and that this is that. Objectivism is a personal philosophy -- it's Ayn Rand's personal philosophy. To call oneself an Objectivist is to have used one's own mind and one's free will to determine that Ayn Rand's philosophy is true. Are you bound to her conclusions? No. You are free to reach whatever conclusions you wish -- you just aren't free to call yourself an Objectivist if you differ with Rand on a philosophic principle.

Actually I do. I had forgotten I'd written that and would have very likely spent a significant amount of time making those same points in this thread. Thanks!

Thanks for the kind mention. I've actually been thinking about putting together something akin to an online version of Harry Binswanger's defunct "The Objectivist Forum," that would contain more serious and more philosophical works on Objectivism, kind of along the lines of what the original poster seems to be looking for. The problem is, I'm not sure if there is (a) enough interest to make it economically feasible and ( enough Objectivists willing and able to write for it. If you would be interested (and able) to write for something like that, send me an email or a PM.

This isn't the core root of the philosophy. And to the extent that Objectivism does have an official answer to this question, we all agreed on it: to claim that something is unknowable is to engage in a contradiction. That was N. Branden's response to the question when he addressed it in The Objectivist Newsletter. And what are your (non-arbitrary) grounds for saying that? Look at what you're doing. You're saying, "What if there are things that are unknowable?" We're asking, "What are your grounds for thinking so?" You say, "I don't have any grounds. But what if?" Your error, as demonstrated in the rest of your post, is to claim that anything which doesn't involve an inherent contradiction is "possible." It isn't. "Possible" means that there is some evidence for an idea. If there is no evidence for it, it is arbitrary. We can't discuss it because, apart from evidence (pro or con), nothing can be discussed. See OPAR on this point. Thank you, although I don't think it's my argument. I'm pretty sure I got it from Leonard Peikoff or Harry Binswanger, but I'm not sure.