HaloNoble6

I think this needs a new thread.

I don't see what you have against mime shows.

I don't recall there being two l's in my name, but that's ok. I'll have a look at this thread more carefully after thanksgiving break. I want to chew on this material for a while.

I'm sorry, but in my rush to post I inadvertantly accepted the argumentation method of "validation-by-checking-with-Objectivist-position" as viable. I stand by my position that rights, which are moral principles in a social context derived by the nature of the entity in question, are not "rights to things." Perhaps it is acceptable to speak losely like that, but I prefer not to. If my position can be shown to be eroneous by reason, not by "checking with the official position," I will gladly accept it. Nonetheless, at present I view nothing wrong with my approach.

Notice the wording: "the [basic] support is his by right." That is, he has the right to the basic conditions for his survival. The paragraph where he describes the essence of parental responsibility goes above and beyond the notion of rights: it describes a parent's moral responsibility.

I thought it was the crushing of electronic devices, not unlike how a fax machine was destroyed in the movie "Office Space."

OK, but when you say "a child has the right to take all the actions required to be a child" this leaves the door wide open for abandonment. After all, the act of abandonment isn't the stopping, per se, of a child's action from being a child, is it? That is, it's not like a child wills himself to be a child and that abandonment is the stopping of this will. Notice that I never said "anyone has the right to be a child." Nor did I ever advocate "blank has the right to be blank" or "you have the right to be blank." I've said that "man, the rational animal, has the right to be man," which means, based on the metaphysics of his identity, the right to live free. I've also said "a child, an immature rational animal, has the right to be a child," which means, based on the metaphysics of his identity, the right to live as a being that can't fully empower himself to fend for himself. I presume you mean that you want to make sure that in principle one can derive rights directly from metaphysics (it wasn't clear above). Yes, this is my view. But I don't know what "confers any additional rights on them" means. "Additional" based on what set of rights, man's? My view is that while the principle of rights applies both to man and child, the application itself is quite different. And, rather than object to someone's views on children's rights by comparing them to man's rights, I think one should ask: First, what are the requirements for rights to be applicable to a certain living entity? Does a child meet these requirements? Understanding how rights are derived from metaphysics, what are a child's rights? Nowhere here am I interested in whether or not a child's rights are the same or different from a man's. Though this is interesting from a comparative point of view, and it hones one's skills in understanding the concept "rights," I don't view it as solid grounds for objecting to anyone's views on the rights of a particular entity.

Yes, the act in the case of the parent is the act of keeping the requirements for the child's survival from him. That is, just as in the credit card example, the person agreed to keep the car in exchange for paying for it, but kept it and didn't pay, so the parent agreed to keep the child in exchange for proving it with the conditions for its survival. Therefore, the parent is acting for the child's destruction. It is initiation of force. Just as with adults, however, the child has no right to something, it has a right to be a child. I want to be precise with my terminology. Rights are moral principles that consist of sanctions of actions.

Before I answer that, I think it necessary to essentialize in terms of principles the special nature of the parent-child contract. When it comes to the rights of adults, we understand that the only obligation the rights of others impose on us is a negative one. That is, we are obliged to let men be men. Since men are fully capable of using their free-will, this means let men be free. On the other hand, the right of a child to be a child imposes a positive obligation on a parent. That is, though, like with adult rights, parents are obliged to let children be children, the letting of a child be a child can't mean letting children be free. It can't possibly mean this because a child isn't fully capable of using his free-will. So the special responsibility of taking the positive actions in order to ensure that a child is a child falls on the parent, who chose to create this helpless being in the first place. Now, to the question at hand. Adults who aren't parents of said child (in this imaginary example) did not choose to bring said child into this world, so they aren't at all obligated to take all the positive, proactive actions that are required in order for said child to be a child. What of the times when adults interact with the children of others? I think this answer is highly contextual. For example, if we're talking about infants, there's no point in talking about what obligation the rights of an infant impose on non-parent adults: There aren't any applications. I mean, it's not like an infant is going to walk into your store and try to buy beer. On the other hand, suppose some nine-year-old comes to you wanting to enter into some contractual agreement with you, or tries to trade with you, what then? Well, here the notion of "let a child be a child" imposes an negative obligation on you that would not be present were this child an adult: You are obligated to not engage in contracts and trades with someone who necessarily--by their identity (not some lack of intelligence or sense of responsibility)--isn't fully capable of doing so on their own; doing so would be an attempt to violate the identity of the child. So to answer your question, I say that the rights of a child impose special positive obligations on parents by the fact that they created the little creature in the first place, and impose context-dependent negative obligations on non-parent adults.

No, I haven't. Or, I don't think in your terms. I don't see where the confusion is. A parent brings a volition-possessing entity into the world with special requirements given by its identity. As such, the parent has the moral and legal responsibility to treat this volition-possessing entity according to its identity. What that requires, is consequential. That the child has a special identity and that a parent is obliged to act accordingly is more important. Once this is understood, what those special requirements are follow from the identity of the child. What isn't clear about this? Again, I'm interested in principles. These are: A child's identity is different than a man's. A child, like a man, is a volition-possessing living entity. As such, the principle of rights applies to children. The application of the concept rights must be different for a child, because it is a different kind of volition-possessing living entity. Parents, by willingly carrying out the actions required for creating a child, bear the special responsibility of ensuring the child is not forced to live contra his identity.

As I said, I don't ascribe to the "right to (blank)" viewpoint. A child has a right to be a child, and a child is a helpless living entity at one point, an immature rational animal at other points. The answer lies in the identity of a child, which is different at different points of developement.

Because they willingly brought the child into their home. Just as an adult who willingly stays in a free society is obligated to respect the rights of others, so a parent who willingly brings a child into their home is obligated to respect its rights.

My premesis do not amount to the right to support. Rights are moral principles, they are statements of the freedom to act to live in accordance with one's identity--rights aren't "rights to objects". That is, there ain't no right to a meal ticket. A child is a volitional being of a specific identity, and when a parent chooses to bring him into his home, they agree to treat the child in accordance with its identity. This is the foundation of all rights, whether for adults or children: the obligation of treating others in accordance with their identity, that is, the obligation of not attempting to violate identity. How does one attempt to violate the identity of an adult? By the use of force. Why does this constitute an attempt to violate his identity? Because man has free-will. Therefore, rights are moral principles, they are statements acknowledging the freedom to be man qua man. They aren't rights to things, or entities as such. Children, being a form of the animal "man," must also be legally protected from attempts at violating their identity. Why? Because whether they are fully capable of using it or not, they have free-will. So someone asked "how does one attempt to violate the identity of a child?" Easy. A child cannot engage in self-sustained action to completely care for itself, so a parent who attempts to have their child do so is attempting to violate the identity of the child. What happens? Well, suppose the parent puts the child in a room and walks away, leaving him for days on end, thinking the child will get up and feed itself, bathe itself, etc. What will happen? Clearly the child dies. I think what is confusing all the "children have the same rights as adults" crowd is that you can't envision idleness as the initiation of force. That is, you are mentally blocked by the idea that a parent idly leaving their child to fend for itself doesn't constitute "force." "I mean, c'mon," you say, "the parent isn't doing anything to the child." But it only takes a feeble mental effort to see that it does constitute the use of force: the parent is forcing the child to try to act against its identity. By the same "this doesn't constitute force" argument, people who default on contracts aren't initiating force. Suppose you sign up for a credit card, and you charge a car on it, and then remain idle and choose not to pay your financer. "Where's the force there?," you could easily say. Call it a social contract, call it whatever you want, but when you decide to live in a free society, you accept the principle of rights. Similarly, when you choose to take in a child, a free-will-possessing animal, you agree to treat it according to its identity. But anyway, back to the reason I was responding. My view is not that a child has a right to anything. My view is that a child has a right to be a child qua child.

What is it with the obsession with "the line?" Why does knowing "the line" help with determining whether a child has rights?! Can someone please tell me how "the line" is at all relevant?

You make it seem like "choosing not to abort" is some instantaneous moment, some flip of a switch--some inconsequential decision. Do you think that choosing to live in this society constitutes an obligation on your part to respect the rights of others? Did you ever sign a contract for that? Oh wait, is that what you sign up for when they take your baby foot prints at birth? I can't make you see it, it's self-evident. Just as choosing to live here requires that you respect the rights of others, choosing to carry the fetus to full term requires that you respect its rights by caring for it, unless you legally relinquish that responsibility. I don't see what's so hard about the matter. Insidentally, what is your motivation for believing that parents are not morally and legally obligated to care for their children? Would you feel fine abandoning a child of yours? Or, picture this. Suppose a loved one, say your wife or future wife or whatever, lapsed into a comma, one for which the doctors told you there's a 50/50 chance for her to come out of. Suppose then that you chose to bring her home and care for her yourself. Does it make a difference that she isn't presently capable of free-will? Does she loose her rights by falling into a comma? If so, would it be moral and legal for you to do as you wish with her, including ending her life? Choices have consequences. Choosing to live here means you are obligated to respect the rights of others, and choosing to carry a fetus to full term means you are obligated to care for it. What is so god damn difficult about this.

And when does anyone "explicitly" sign on to the idea of "respecting the rights of others?" Do you also object to that "implicit" contract?

That's a good point, and the root of why it's experienced as a dichotomy is because emotions go unexamined.

I've written on this topic, please see this.

Actually, this discussion is pointless: hardly no abortions are carried out in the third trimester, far less at the end of it. I mean, who would want to go through the incredibly taxing process of carrying a fetus to full term only to abort it? Think about it, damn it! Anyway, this ain't the abortion thread. The question is whether children have rights; stick to it.

The long, arduous process of carrying a child to full term constitutes a legal commitment to the care of the child. It's not like having a child can be accidental or something that "just hits you." The choice to have child, a living entity with a specific identity, constitutes your commitment, morally and legally, to not attempt violate its identity.

Every time a mother takes an action that is for her fetus is a point at which she decides to make her fetus into a child; the sum of all these actions leads to the maturation of the fetus and is based on the motivation: "I want my fetus to come to full term." Figuring out at what point a fetus is full term, or a "child," depends on how one defines "full term" or "child." Is identifying this point of much significance? No, because so long as the fetus or child or whatever is in its mother's stomach, it is part of her mother's body and can be done with as she pleases. I could speak like you and say "there is no specific point at which we consciously choose to have a sperm go into an egg, since this is actually a process that isn't specifically willed, at the detailed microscopic level, by consciousness." But this is pointless. People choose to get pregnant or not, and they choose to carry a pregnancy to full term or not. That these choices aren't "willed" at the microscopic level is of not importance whatsoever. So, in conclusion, there most certainly is conscious input in both becoming pregnant or not, and carrying a pregnancy to full term or not.

Alright, this is tiring, and is off topic, but I can't let this fly. A fetus would certainly turn into a child without conscious input? This ranks as one of the most ingorant statements I've ever heard. So, it doesn't matter whether the mother carrying the fetus stops feeding herself, stops eating, stops breathing, kills herself--the fetus will still develop into a child? I'm tired of this random pontification, what are the essentials of this discussion and can we please stick to them?

Huh? What precisely isn't the Objectivist position? And who are you speaking to? Perhaps you can be more direct.

Kills All Known John Kerry - Dead. Only John Kerry Can Prevent Forest Fires. Sweet as the Moment When the Howard Dean Went "Pop" I Think, Therefore Howard Dean. Feel The Raw Naked George Bush Of The Road. Make It A George Bush Night. You're in Good Hands with Ralph Nader. Ralph Nader Tested, Mother Approved.

"Can't Do It In Real Life? Do It On Felipe." "Got Felipe?" "Now with 50% more Felipe!" "He Who Thinks Felipe Drinks Felipe." "Stop. Go. Felipe." "Felipe - Australian for Beer." "I Bet He Drinks Felipe." "Absolut Felipe." Apparently I'm quite the drink.