knast

Peikoff does not engage in abduction in OPAR. Abduction is a method of reasoning based on the false premise, that pragmatists accept, that when you are going to _explain_ something (not prove something or know something with certainty), then there are virtually an unlimited number of possible theories that can explain. This premise is false because it assumes that the arbitrary is valid, i.e., to make up explanations and hypotheses without any proof or reason. In fact, Peikoff's entire example in OPAR was in part about why this premise is false and why you must reject it, the arbitrary, to be able to reach rational, contextual certainty. The fact that he used the example of a crime, which is common when explaining abduction, is totally non-essential. Abduction is, as pragmatism is, based on the idea that we cannot really know reality or truth. Abduction does not give you the true explanation, because there is no such thing according to pragmatism. There is, thus, only the "best explanation". But what determines what constitute the best explanation? Not the facts, not reality. The pragmatists accept a number of criteria because they "work" in the pragmatic sense of the word. That is, they achieve some goal or satisfy some feelings. Peirce thought, for example, that one such criteria is the alleged consensus among scientists, i.e., not the facts of reality but the opinions of some people. See the insane debate about climate change as an example of how this criteria have caused havoc. But every other criteria the pragmatists accept is ultimately justified on the idea that they "work," pragmatically, not necessarily because there is a rational ground for them. Let me quote from The Philosopher's Toolkit. A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods by Julian Baggini and Peter S Fosl: I told you this in the chatroom, but maybe you did not pay attention or something. Anyhow, the conclusion is: Peikoff does not engage in abduction in OPAR and abduction is not a rational method. It is a method based on pragmatism.

"Why is it we, not as Objectivists but as analyzers of ideas, are not merely critical of the ideas espoused by any given philosopher but also of the moral worth of that philosopher?" In fundamental terms the reason you should judge ideas _and_ their creators, i.e., the philosophers, have been given by Leonard Peikoff in his essay "Fact and Value". (The alternative is a disintegration between facts and values, the moral and the practical, theory and reality, etc.) "Let's take Bertrand Russell as an example, just because he's someone I've been increasingly interested in. He had some very bad philosophic positions, that I consider to be completely inconsistent with reality. However, as a person I find him to be very admirable." This is a contradiction in your reasoning. You are morally compartmentalizing Russell. You make an unjustified distinction between Russell as a person and as a philosopher. Russell the person is one man, who could be admired, and Russell the philosopher is another man, who could be despised. But in reality, there is no contradiction. There is only one Russell and he should be judged as such. Which means you should judge him, among other things, on his explicit ideas. This is, by the way, the very same moral compartmentalizing that allow some people rationalize when they say, without blushing: "How can you be categorical about Adolf Hitler? Was he not nice to his friends? His wife? The children of his friends? Was he not nice to his dogs? Sure, as a dictator I loath him. But as a person, he was a pretty nice guy! And boy, could he throw a great party! Don't get me wrong. That whole dictator thing was... not good. No doubt about it. I am just saying that I would not mind having him as my neighbor. As a person, that is..." This is, of course, ridiculous and I say it is just as ridiculous to morally compartmentalize philosophers. "I ask, because as Objectivists we take the moral worth of a person to be based on the application of rationality, consistently, in one's life and thoughts I don. "Is it that, if someone disagrees as to just what reason and rationality are, they are acting immorally?" No, it depends on their reasons, their arguments, and the context. I say that philosophers in general have fewer excuses than anybody else for saying the things they say, precisely because it is their job to think thoroughly about these issues. And many think for years, even decades. And all they have to show for it is what is now known as the depraved philosophy of Immanuel Kant. And speaking from years of studying philosophy, I find it ludicrous to say that philosophers "are always willing to accept what reality is". In fact, I could not help myself laughing when I read that, because it is so obviously not true. In fact, from my own personal experience, of all the different groups of people I have dealt with, philosophers have probably been the LEAST interested in what "reality is", with the possible exception of devoutly religious people.

No, not really. Not as long as they do not publicly denounce and/or refute their philosophical views. Because as long as they hold their ideas to be true, and make _any_ attempt to spread them, then their false ideas will have destructive consequences. And they are morally responsible for it and should be judge. So it does not matter whether they are total hypocrites in their own personal lives, i.e., whether or not they, as the rationalists they usually are, totally compartmentalize their lives, leaving their evil, irrational philosophies at the academy and in their personal lives goes about as if their ideas mean nothing to them. That does not, morally, exonerate them.

I actually think we agree on this point. As you might remember, I also wrote: "One can say that some optional values are better than others, but only in regard to your own very personal context and the only one who can truly judge would be you. For instance, while there is no reason to say that architecture is objectively better or worse than medicine, the fact that the latter bores you to death, is a good reason for you not to pursue a career in medicine." True, one have to integrate the concretes of your own life with that ultimate value which is your life, which mean that you have to consider your personal context. But I do not see why what means that there are not optional, non-fundamental normative principles of the type that I mentioned. I have no idea how you got the impression that I would be of another opinion. Of course optional values have to be integrated with your ultimate value, i.e., your life. All I am saying is that many things are all pro-life, but since your life is not mine and since we have different interests and personalities, what kind of job will be of interest and value to you may not be of any interest and value to me. To say that both are legitimate, morally speaking, only means that you have no objective reason to say that truck driving is a bad job. Maybe it is not your thing, but that does not follow that truck-drivers are bad people. In other words, I think we have agreed all the time. Maybe I was unclear? Although I did my utmost to be clear on this point. Let me paraphrase my point: the principles apply to all, but the application demand that you think about your own personal context, with everything that entails. To disregard your own personal context when you apply a principle, would be an expression of intrinsicism and would have disastrous results. But having said that, I cannot see how it follows from this that there cannot be any non-moral, normative principles. I.e., non-fundamental, optional normative principles of the type I have described in my posts.

Oh no, that is not at all what I was talking about! The types of principles I am talking about have an objective basis in reality, they are not just a convention based on convenience. (Though I do not deny that some of the principles I am refering to _might_ be regarded as conventions.) Take certain rules of architecture, they are about how you build a house that will actually stand and not fall apart. It is, actually, an application of laws of physics. The COMPLETE OPPOSITE of the type of "conventions" you are talking about.

I think there is a difference between moral principles and their application in your own life and, on the other hand, non-moral normative principles. Consider the virtue of productivity. It entails that you should pursue some career, some productive work. But it does not say what type of career you should pursue, that is entirely up to you to decide. As long as it is consonant with the requirements of your survival as a rational being, "it's all good". There are thus many legitimate optional values. (One can say that some optional values are better than others, but only in regard to your own very personal context and the only one who can truly judge would be you. For instance, while there is no reason to say that architecture is objectively better or worse than medicine, the fact that the latter bores you to death, is a good reason for you not to pursue a career in medicine.) How do non-moral normative principles differ from moral principles? I can see at least two differences. 1. Moral principles are fundamental, while non-moral normative principles are non-fundamental. 2. Moral principles are not optional, if you want to live. Non-moral normative principles, on the other hand, are optional. Compare the normative principles within architecture with the principle of productivity. The latter applies to all men (virtually) all the time, while the former only applies to those who are concerned with building houses. It seems to me that when you say that every "norm" per se is a moral one, then you are saying that this is a concern every moral person should care about, while in fact it is optional. Non-moral normative principles are thus not only non-fundamental, they are also optional. Now, while moral principles are not "optional", when you apply them that usually means that you apply them on optional values. Morality does not have a say on _exactly_ what you should pursue here, not as long as the options are legitimate from a moral point of view. And once you adopt a certain optional value, such as your specific career, then that implies a certain set of non-moral normative principles, such as the principles of architecture or medicine. Of course, once you have chosen a career and recognized the principles it entails, then it would be immoral to evade that knowledge. But what determines this? The moral principle of honesty. But notice that this principle applies to _all_ knowledge, not just knowledge of how to build a house or treat a patient, because it is _fundamental_. Therefore I see a basis for a distinction between moral principles and non-moral normative principles.

I am sorry David, but I do not know whether I agree or disagree, simply because I do not understand what you are saying or how it is related to what I said. Please elaborate or clarify yourself.

Why is it so hard to think of non-moral normative principles or norms? Morality is a code of values and principles to guide your life in general, so what, then, about normative principles within a specialized field of action? They could be considered non-moral, at least in the sense that a moral man does not have to think about them, if he is not into that field. For instance, take normative principles of how to make a speech or build a house. If you are not into speeches, or building houses, then _morally_ speaking, there is no reason for you to care about these normative principles. _Moral_ principles apply to all men (virtually) all the time, while non-moral normative principles are only applicable to some men, some of the time, namely if and when they are engaged in a specific type of action that is not, morally, obligatory for all. Such as holding a speech or building a house. Of course, a rational morality suggests that if you are engaged in a specific type of action then you should consider and apply the proper normative principles or standards, to successfully achieve your (moral) goals. As to your question about method, I suggest you simply look at reality and see if you can find any facts giving rise to the notion of non-moral norms. In other words, engage in a process of reduction and/or induction. Remember that the standard of truth and objectivity is _never_ the "intuitions," i.e., feelings, of most average philosophers. The standard is _reality_.

Exactly. But Kant makes it clear, on so many occasions, that happines is not to be expected for the moral man, that it is just absurd to claim that he is in any shape or form pro-happiness. He is obviously anti-happiness. Here is another quote from Kant: http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/metaphys-of-morals.txt Not only is your duty in conflict with your happiness, it is also in conflict with your life. Here is a classical example from Critique of Practical Reason: http://www.e-text.org/text/Kant%20Immanuel...al%20Reason.pdf Apparently, the moral man should be willing to sacrifice his own life. (It looks like Kant, with this example, is the father of all so-called "lifeboat" examples.) But in another situation, one should also, according ot Kant, sacrifice the innocent lives of others. Not for your own gain. Not for anybody's gain. But as an end in itself. In his famous article "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives" Kant explicitly says that you should not lie in order to protect people from getting murdered. That means, in reality, that you should let innocent people die, for no reason at all - simply because it is your "sacred" duty. http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/cavalier/80130/part1/sect4/lie.html

I know. I did not say anything else. I just made it clear that according to Kant there is a clear conflict between your duty and your happiness and that duty will make you feel pain. And this clearly implies, in view of the total context, that the only way to know for sure whether somebody is acting from duty is if he is suffering. I have not read Kant in German, I meant only that I have not relied on any second-hand sources to come to my conclusions regarding Kant. As to honesty, I was refering to anybody who claims that Ayn Rand and Leonard Peikoff made up and attacked a "straw man" of Kant. Does that include you? Yes, if you have made such a claim.

I think we have to make a distinction between: things we think about, in general, and when we think about what we want to do or have to do. I think the latter is distractive and sucks mental energy. I think David Allen is right about this. I do not know if it is as distracting to just think in general. Further, even if one chooses not make such a distinction, then I do not see how that affects the truth of what I am saying. If I am right, then it only means that it is also distracting to be thinking about a lot of different things all the time. That is true. That is why one should write down what one is thinking about, that is why many people have an "intellectual diary." Ayn Rand had one and I too have one and I suspect that many other people who think a lot have one too. I write down my thoughts, my conclusions, my issues and how I try to solve them on paper. Sometimes I leave my problems and progress on paper, sometimes I continue thinking about it when I am "out and about". That is why I write down good ideas, such as this one, when I am out and need to focus on something else, such as my work at hand.

Let me just repeat what I know and what I do not know. I know that the subconsciousness makes some integrations and I know that there is such a thing as automatized knowledge. So I know that I have automatized syntax, a vocabulary, and many, many, many, many other things. The only question is: what is the evidence for any _subconscious_ automatizations? According to Ayn Rand, Harry Binswanger, and my own observations, the automatizations I have are the result of my conscious thinking, my conscious work of connecting and integrating, including much repetitions. The fact that all of my automatizations are _placed_ in the subconscious do not prove that it was created by my subconscious. (Not even the fact that they are activated by my subconscious once they are there is evidence for that conclusion.) The fact that I have some automatized knowledge which I do not remember how I got are not either proof that they were created by my subconsciousness. Notice how you can know a lot of things, things you have read about, but you do not remember where or when you read about it? That does not prove that your subconsciousness did the reading for you. It has been suggested that emotions are proof of subconscious automatizations. I am inclined to accept that, but I do not think that that would qualify as evidence for subconscious automatization of _conceptual_ knowledge, which is what I was looking for, not value-estimates or basic emotional generalizations. Some might say that this is no big deal. True, but since I have come such a long in my work to inductively validate Objectivism, I thought it would be a shame if I just gave up on this point. I have a suggestion though. It occured to me when I thought about something David Allen (the author of Getting Things Done) said. He said that the reason we should write down everything we think about, everything we want to do or have to do, is because that way we free our mind from it. If put it on a piece of paper, then we do not have to think about it all the time. (For the complete argument see his book or Google on it.) This made me think of computers. I think Allen is right. And I think this indicates that our mind works like a computer in the sense that we have many "processes" going on simultaneously. They do not stop, just because you are not currently consciously focused on them. Instead they continue in "the background", i.e., in your subconscious. Our mind, it seems, are engaged in what computer people call "multithreading". And if this is true, then I guess that what can happen is that you start consciously to integrate something, then when you start another task, you do not stop that process, you just put it in "the background," i.e., in the subconscious. (This is, I think, similar to what Ayn Rand meant by giving your subconscious a "standing order".) Sometimes, maybe most of the time, your subconsiousness finish the job, just like when you start a process on your computer, you let it finish in the background, while you are busy doing something else, e.g., writing something in Word. If this analogy is true and appropriate, then many, maybe most of all our integrations and automatized knowledge, have been created, at least in part, by our subconscious. The reason to suspect that is the case, is because we start many more processes like this than we can consciously work with at any given moment. (Remember "the Crow.") Also, look at how we are using our computers. We have many more applications active than we can use at any given moment. Any suggestions?

Thanks for all the suggestions. I will have to integrate it. If I have some "revelation", after my subconsciousness have done its work, then I will report it!

Let us provide som further context for the bizarre suggestion that Kant was in any relevant sense "pro-happiness". Because, in fact, when Kant says that it is our duty to pursue happiness, then that is actually, within the larger context, proof of how depraved Kant's moral philosophy is. After all, what he is saying is that if you do not pursue your happiness INDIRECTLY, then you will not be eager to do your duty. Why would one not be eager to do one's duty? Because it is in conflict with one's happiness. In The Groundwork of the Metaphyhics of Morals, Kant makes it very clear that your duty is in conflict with your happiness: "Against all the commands of duty which reason represents to man as so deserving of respect, he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in his wants and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness. Now reason issues its commands unyieldingly, without promising anything to the inclinations, and, as it were, with disregard and contempt for these claims, which are so impetuous, and at the same time so plausible, and which will not allow themselves to be suppressed by any command. Hence there arises a natural dialectic, i.e., a disposition, to argue against these strict laws of duty and to question their validity, or at least their purity and strictness; and, if possible, to make them more accordant with our wishes and inclinations, that is to say, to corrupt them at their very source, and entirely to destroy their worth- a thing which even common practical reason cannot ultimately call good." (http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/metaphys-of-morals.txt) Kant also makes it clear on more than one occation that you can never know for sure if you are acting from duty or merely in accordance with duty. Kant writes: "In fact, it is absolutely impossible to make out by experience with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action, however right in itself, rested simply on moral grounds and on the conception of duty. Sometimes it happens that with the sharpest self-examination we can find nothing beside the moral principle of duty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or that action and to so great a sacrifice; yet we cannot from this infer with certainty that it was not really some secret impulse of self-love, under the false appearance of duty, that was the actual determining cause of the will. We like them to flatter ourselves by falsely taking credit for a more noble motive; whereas in fact we can never, even by the strictest examination, get completely behind the secret springs of action; since, when the question is of moral worth, it is not with the actions which we see that we are concerned, but with those inward principles of them which we do not see." And: "... I am willing to admit out of love of humanity that even most of our actions are correct, but if we look closer at them we everywhere come upon the dear self which is always prominent, and it is this they have in view and not the strict command of duty which would often require self-denial. Without being an enemy of virtue, a cool observer, one that does not mistake the wish for good, however lively, for its reality, may sometimes doubt whether true virtue is actually found anywhere in the world, and this especially as years increase and the judgement is partly made wiser by experience and partly, also, more acute in observation..." Consequently he also writes: "It is much harder to make this distinction when the action accords with duty and the subject has besides a direct inclination to it. For example, it is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not over charge an inexperienced purchaser; and wherever there is much commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge... Men are thus honestly served; but this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it; it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he might besides have a direct inclination in favour of the buyers, so that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage to one over another. Accordingly the action was done neither from duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish view." The only way you can be sure you are acting from duty is through your own suffering. In The Critique of Practical Reason Kant writes: "...the moral law as a motive is only negative, and this motive can be known a priori to be such. For all inclination and every sensible impulse is founded on feeling, and the negative effect produced on feeling (by the check on the inclinations) is itself feeling; consequently, we can see a priori that the moral law, as a determining principle of the will, must by thwarting all our inclinations produce a feeling which may be called pain..." (http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext04/ikcpr10.txt) Rand and Peikoff have not created a "straw man". They knew what they were talking about. I know because I have read and study Kant in original for years. Every single claim by them have been verified by reading Kant. And I know that everybody, who are honest, and who spend some time to study Kant, in original, will come to the same conclusion.

Well, I am primarily looking for conceptual knowledge that have been automatized, not motions, i.e., not things that primarily involve your implicit "muscle memory". I grant you that it is a good example of automatized knowledge, but not conceptual knowledge. I also grant you that it is probably a good example of something we learned subconsciously, in the sense that we did not know exactly what we wanted to achieve or do while we were doing it. Now when I think about it, I guess many other things could be an example. For instance, learning to speak and everything that entailed. I can see how that was at least partly subconsciously and involved at least some automatization of conceptual knowledge. But the examples I can think of are of things that we learned when we were children, but I have a hard time finding examples of things we learned and automatized subconsciously when we are adults. I will have to think some more about this.

That is what I did in order to validate the claim that my subconscious do any integration whatsoever. But what I am looking for are automatizations that I cannot remember I did anything consciously to achieve, not just any integration my subconsciousness have performed. That is what I have failed to find. Whatever automatized knowledge I have, I can, as of yet, remember that I have made an conscious effort to integrate it with the rest of my knowledge.

I have a question, which presupposes a good understanding of Objectivist epistemology. So if you have not read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology and/or listened on various lectures on the nature of reduction and induction, such as Objectivism Through Induction, then please do not bother. This is the background. I have inductively validated the following propositions: There is a subconsciousness. (As proved by the fact that most of the things we know, are we not consciously aware of at any given moment.) Our subconsciousness makes some integrations. (E.g., You think about a problem, but you get stuck and so you "give up" for the day and go to sleep. Then, the next day it all comes together in your head, with total clarity, and you scream: "Eureka!" - even though you have not put any more _conscious_ thought on the problem.) There is such a thing as automatized knowledge. (E.g., our vocabulary and a basic grasp of syntax; otherwise we would not be able to talk, read or even think. All of this knowledge comes to me automatically, i.e., without any conscious effort.) However, Ayn Rand also claims that our subconsciousness is the faculty that automatize our knowledge by integrating it. Here is the relevant quote: "The subconscious is an integrating mechanism. Man’s conscious mind observes and establishes connections among his experiences; the subconscious integrates the connections and makes them become automatic." http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/psycho-epistemology.html Now, my question is simply this: What do I have to look for in order to validate this claim inductively? I have tried hard to figure it out on my own, but I have failed. I think my problem here is that while I know that my subconscious is doing some integrating and thus some automatization, I also know that my consciousness is doing some integrating and thus also, I presume, some automatization. So why, then, emphasize the role of the subconscious? For all I know, all or most of my automatizations might be the result of my conscious efforts to integrate my knowledge. Any suggestions?

Does Dr Peikoff explain how this relates to earlier his statement in OTI, that the law of cause and effect is induced, and his later statement, in this course, that it is not? Or is he only saying that the self-evident perceptual/axiomatic experience of causality is _later_ integrated with A is A and can then, as a result, be _explicitly_ viewed as a corollary to the law of identity?

Here is a suggestion: write your notes as usual and then only quote him (extensively) once or twice, if you do not know how to present a very important point in a short and concise way.

Hey Grames, when can we expect more notes? I am so eager to see where this is going.

Grames, I am very thankful for your notes. They are great! But I have one question concerning this: "Application of first level concepts is self-evident." When you/Peikoff say that the application is "self-evident", what does that actually mean? Is this another way of saying that the application of first level concepts is automatized? Furthermore, once a complex conceptual framework is established, is then the application of this framework "self-evident" in the sense that it is automatized? I, for instance, do not have to tell myself, over and over again, when I read about a new statist scheme, that it will have bad consequences. I know it will and, given the total of my knowledge, I regard it as "self-evident". (I also react automatically emotionally because I immediately grasp the implication of what I am reading.) Of course, I am fully aware of the fact that without this knowledge it is not "self-evident" at all, why I am not suprised that other people do not necessarily draw the same conclusion from reading the same article as I do.

Here is another great article on the destructive consequences of the welfare state by Andrew Bernstein. It is entitled The Welfare State Versus Values and the Mind. I think Dr Bernstein's analysis is much better, why we do not need to sanction such horrible, immoral anarchists such as Per Bylund. (I know who he is, I have talked to him before. He is no good.)

I would put the burden of proof on her. Most people do not think (rational) selfishness is moral, but they can easily understand WHY people want act in their own self-interest. The reason is pretty obvious to most people: their life and happiness demand it. While they do not regard it as moral they do regard it as practical, to the extent they want to live and be happy. Most people want to live and be happy. (Unfortunately, this give rise to the moral-practical dichotomy. But that is an issue for another day.) So at least implicitly, everybody knows why (rational) selfishness "makes sense", even if they do not feel that they can morally justify it. After all, most people understand why people generally want a good job that pays well, or a good education, or have sex, or a nice house, or a nice car, or a hobby, or play video games, watch movies and listen to music, i.e., entertainment. In fact, I would argue that most people would be baffled if you asked them: "Why is this good? Why is it good to pursue sex, money, housing or education? So what if it makes you happy? So what if it makes you enjoy life?" No, the real question is and have always been: "WHY on earth, should we sacrifice ourselves? Why? Is there any rationally justifiable reason for it, at all?" So ask her questions such as: "Why should we give up our happiness - for the sake of others? Why should we sacrifice ourselves - for the sake of others? Why should we spend our days in misery - for the sake of others? Why? Why? Why? Give me just one good reason, one rational and logical reason." I would not be suprised if it turns out that most of her reasons will be illogical. (See Craig Biddle's article "Altruism: The Morality of Logical Fallacies".) If you ever get her to question altruism, then make sure she understand the the essence of the alternative, that is of rational selfishness. How? Get her to read The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged. If she is not willing to do that right away, then you should at least explain to her that a rational egoist lives by the guidance of his reason - not his whims; he thinks and acts long-term - not short-sighted; he regard honesty, justice and integrity as virtues; he do not believe that the happiness of one man demands any sacrifice - he believes that life and happiness demands a trade of values. Thereby you clearly indicate that a rational egoist is NOT a S O B who would hurt others in their pursuit of their own happiness. This would also indicate that there is an alternative between sacrificing yourself to others and sacrificing others to yourself: pursuing your own happiness, by your own actions, without sacrificing anybody for anybody. One final advice. Concretize, concretize, concretize. Give as many examples you can come up with. If you want to be sure the examples are good, then take them from Atlas Shrugged and The Fountainhead. Think of the characters in those novels. That should make even the most abstract aspects of the discussion easy to follow. Good luck.

The Objectivist position is that the ends do NOT justify the means. The Objectivist position is that rational moral principles - based on the nature of man's life, life as the ultimate value and man's life as the standard of value - defines and sanctions the specific means for specific ends. For details on this read Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand by Leonard Peikoff or listen to his lecture "Why Should One Act on Principle?" available for free for registered users at www.AynRand.org. If you are not a registered user then you can register for free here. To say and even imply that Objectivism is in any way "anti-human life" is only ridiculous. It is only possible to come to that conclusion - or even imply it - if you leave reality all together and start with out of context, rationalistic fantazies. That is why your "thought experiment" is wrong and impossible in every essential respect. A thought experiment, if properly conducted, is only valid and relevant either as a mean of understanding something or a mean of proving something. But in this case it serves neither of these ends because you cannot understand or prove anything if it has no connection to reality whatsoever. A rational, true philosophy tells you what you should do in reality, not in an impossible fantazy. It also helps you understand reality. A rational and true philosophy do not have to live up to the impossible and unreal. A proper thought experiment is about reality: it is essentially about integration and differentiation of concretes, i.e., of things or aspects of reality. (For details on this point see Harry Binswanger's lecture Psycho-Epistemology II.) Thus, even in regard to "thought experiments," the idea that "the end justifies the means" is false.