Trebor

A nice tribute to Mr. Lewis: "Remembering John Lewis" by Alex Epstein - January 4, 2012

Yes, I say that it is possible. I have spent some time writing a good deal more, but for now I've decided to keep my response simple, and to say, as I did, simply, yes, it's possible to find some key principles of Aristotelianism to be right while finding other principles of Aristotelianism to be wrong. Instead of saying more on that than what I've already said, I thought I would post the following, which may be helpful (I wish that all of my old notes were in digital, typed form, but what a chore it would be). I'm certainly not an expert on Aristotle, but I'm going to post, selectively, for the sake of brevity, from my old notes on Dr. Peikoff's History of Philosophy course (any errors are my own, but I think my notes are consistent with what Dr. Peikoff had to say): Aristotle (b. 384 BC) was as much and more of a genius as Plato, as original and as capable of abstraction and systematic organization. Aristotle's philosophy however differs profoundly with Plato's in that it is fundamentally true. As such, he set the base for all subsequent achievements of man. Western history has been a dualism between Platonic and Aristotelian influences. At 18 Aristotle entered Plato's Academy and spent the next 20 years in study under Plato. During this time he was a thorough Platonist. Only gradually did he question Plato's views and then construct his own philosophy, diametrically opposed to Plato, a philosophy for life on Earth. Metaphysics: There is one Reality - it's here, objective, absolute, independent of consciousness, anti-supernatural, non-Sophist and non-Platonist. Universals are not as Plato thought, not things - only particular things exist. Universals are characteristics common and distinctive and essential to a kind of particular. By selective awareness (abstraction) we can separate elements in thought which cannot be separated in reality, in fact. Plato's error was reification, making things out of abstractions, confusing particulars with abstractions. (Universals are the base and the object of conceptual thought; however, only particulars exist. Individuality is an irreducible element of reality.) Aristotle held that universals differed from particulars, yet existed within, intrinsic to, particulars. Every particular has uniqueness and characteristics similar to other things (universals). The fundamental constituents of existence are entities. Qualities and actions presuppose entities or things. Aristotle, by implication, is the author of the Primacy of Existence. Reality comes first; it is independent of consciousness, which has no power to alter it. Though Aristotle retained contradictory, Platonic elements, he did, however, discover reality. Epistemology: At birth we are tabula rasa. Knowledge rests ultimately upon the evidence of the senses. There are no innate ideas. (Empiricism, as the term is correctly used, not as it is currently used.) Any contradiction between theory and fact requires one to recheck one premises. Facts are true, the evidence of the senses cannot be questioned. From the senses we grasp common denominators, characteristics common or dissimilar in things. Concepts do not exist in advance (as Plato held), but rather are grasped by abstraction from particulars. Man uses his sensory capacity and his memory along with his abstract ability to identify universals. There are universals and particulars, form and matter, structure and stuff, the common and the unique. All that exists are particulars (matter) with characteristics common to other things (universals). (Objectivism doesn't agree with Aristotle's intrinsic view of universals. Aristotle held that essences were innate, not contextual.) Problem of Change There's no contradiction in the existence of change. Matter remains but the form changes. A changing world is intelligible; it presupposes the Law of Identity. Actuality determines Potentiality - what is determines what can be. Not just anything is possible. Four factors or causes of change: 1. Material Cause - stuff or matter 2. Formal Cause - new form, identity 3. Efficient Cause - agent of transformation, source of action 4. Final Cause - purpose The Laws of Proof (Logic) cannot be proved, just as blue cannot be proved. Grasping blue is self-evident. The evidence is there; it doesn't require proof. Aristotle is a teleologist. He held that all change involved a final or purposeful cause. Why? He was primarily a biologist (Plato was a mathematician), and he derived metaphysical generalizations from his study of living things. He observed the growing acorn and noted that it appears to act toward a final goal (it's "actuality"), an inherent end, its full form. Everything has a purpose, a goal, to reach its form. (Formal Cause - the new reality - is the Final Cause - the purpose - viewed from a different perspective.) Aristotle never freed himself from Plato; he never fully actualized his Reason and Earth orientation. And Christianity cashed in on this. Ethics: Neither mystic or skeptic, neither commandments or mystically revealed from a supernatural realm. Naturalistic, this worldly and objective (not whim worshiping). However, ethics was not an exact science. (He did not know how to implement his general approach.) In science, you begin with facts. What are the facts at the base of ethics? What people actually value. Which people? The noble. Observing the nobel, we generalize, omit any inconsistencies, and add a metaphysical framework to codify our results. No formal ethics. Instead, we have how wise and nobel men behave, and if you don't see it, you haven't been well brought up. Values are hierarchal. There must be an end in itself, an ultimate goal which will serve as the standard, and it must be self-evident. It must recognize man's nature (the inherent is not a moral issue). There is no original sin. Man by his nature has emotions, is fallible, has a body and is capable of desires, and such characteristics are neutral ethically. At birth, man is morally neither good nor bad (passions are neutral); your actions determine your moral virtue. The forms which one gives to one's life, passions, emotions, etc. determine moral stature. The ultimate goal is happiness or Eudaimonia - successful living, inner and outer on all levels, rich, prosperous, unimpeded life. Everything has a distinctive nature with distinctive potentialities. The good life is to act as reality and one's nature requires. Potentiality strives towards actuality. What is man's distinctive (unique) potentiality? A life of reason, which leads to happiness. Virtue - excellence of function. The virtues of practical reason (versus theoretical reason or contemplation in pursuit of knowledge for it's own sake): to guide or regulate emotions, desires, goals, actions, etc. Aristotle held that emotions are independent of reason and also believed that they could be controlled by reason. Any desire can be too much, too little, or the Golden Mean. Virtuous behavior is always the Golden Mean. Pride is the crowning virtue, a virtue of the Ideal Man. Virtue is an issue of degrees, of not going to extremes. Most men have to work and do not have time for contemplative reasoning. Their thought must remain practical (practical reasoning). Ethics, therefore, is for a relative few. How does one know the mean? It will be known if one is well brought up and one takes all contributory factors into account. (Aristotle did not originate the mean standard; he systematized the early Greek idea of moderation.) Virtues: 1. Theoretical Reason - seeks knowledge as an end in itself, not as a means. (Before the Industrial Age, it was impossible to grasp the relationship of such knowledge to life.) The highest virtue is to lead a contemplative life, thereby approaching as nearly as possible Aristotle's Prime Mover (Pure consciousness - an evident inheritance from Plato). 2. Egoism - each man is an end in himself; properly, he should be concerned with his own welfare and happiness. The true egoist is the man of reason, not the whim-worshipping brute, because reason leads to happiness. Politics: The least interesting aspect of his philosophy. He was not a revolutionary, but more of a documenter. He viewed what existed and offered improvements. (Plato was a revolutionary innovator.) He advocated a government of laws, not men. He is the father of the idea of a constitution. However, he was not a major individualist; he was an implicit (Golden Mean) "middle of the roader." He was against Plato's communism, not as an ideal, but as impractical and too likely to end up as a tyranny. The important issue to Aristotle was: who should rule? What group? His answer: the Middle Class or "Polity." He was opposed to rule of the rich, the experts or the masses. Plato objected to "mine" and "thine." Aristotle however held that these words are inherent in human nature, and a community attitude would best be served by allowing men to have property and freedom. (A social usefulness standard to which Objectivism objects.) As to slavery, he held that slaves are a natural phenomenon, born capable of understanding directions, but not knowledge. (The Greeks never grasped that all men are metaphysically equal, the same kind of being. Rather, they held that some are superior, some are inferior.) Aristotle's Achievements: 1. He laid down the basis of scientific epistemology in the face of the Sophists and Platonists. 2. In ethics, he was this worldly and he held that the ultimate goal is happiness, that Pride is the greatest virtue, and that reason is man's fundamental characteristic, with its use as his means of successful living.

sNerd, I've been thinking about this, and I think that a question [well an answer to a question] might help to resolve our disagreement. Miss Rand, when asked to summarize her philosophy while standing on one foot put it as: Metaphysics: Objective Reality Epistemology: Reason Ethics: Self-interest Politics: Capitalism Or: "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." "You can't eat your cake and have it, too." "Man is an end in himself." "Give me liberty or give me death." You mentioned Aristotelianism as a philosophy. Can you summaries his philosophy, his integrated system of philosophy, in a similar manner to what Miss Rand did with Objectivism? (Basically, I contend that he did not have an integrated system of philosophy, but perhaps you don't agree.)

Okay. This is where we disagree. I agree that all of reality is related (it is a non-contradictory whole), but I do not agree that this issue (that a philosophic system stands or falls as a whole) only applies to Objectivism because it is true. It applies to any philosophy. Again, that's where we disagree. However: Yes, some of his ideas are true. For instance, he is correct about reason being our means of knowledge (opposed to mysticism) and that there is only reality (as opposed to some supernatural realm, such as Plato's "World of Forms"). Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that you answered your own question. Aristotelianism falls as a philosophic system even though we may not reject every one of his philosophical ideas, such as, again, reason and reality. Are you then saying that, even though Aristotelianism falls as a philosophic system, that it "stands or falls as a whole," something you say only applies in the case of a true philosophy, then Aristotelianism is a true philosophy and that Objectivism also is a true philosophy? Yes, Objectivism is an integrated whole, a philosophy, but so are other philosophies. The difference is that Objectivism is integrated to reality, not misintegrated, not merely internally consistent (Rationalism).

If I understand you, you're making that point that theirs a hierarchy of relationships among the principles of Objectivism, that some (metaphysics and epistemology) are fundamental and that others (ethics and politics and esthetics) are derivatives, that it's a one-way street of dependency, that of course if one accepts the Objectivist metaphysics and epistemology, one will be led by logic to accept its ethics and politics and, presumably, its esthetics. But then, how about the other way around? If the implications are proven false, doesn't that leave the fundamentals intact? So... What would it mean to discover a "chink in the proof of the virtue of Selfishness vs. Altruism"? If we discovered that selfishness was not a virtue, how could that impact issues from metaphysics and epistemology? Well, what one would have to discover is that man's nature is not such that selfishness is a virtue. If selfishness is not a virtue, then there's something about man and reality (and the epistemology that supported the idea that selfishness was a virtue) that is not in accord with the Objectivist metaphysics and epistemology. Is that too abstract? If selfishness is not a virtue, then man should not be the beneficiary of his own actions, his life is not fundamentally dependent upon his own independent thinking and actions, but perhaps instead on subordinating himself to the group and the group's representatives who will do his thinking for him. "In other words, we cannot argue for Objectivism's Ethics and Politics if we reject Objectivist Metaphysics and Epistemplogy. We would have to try a whole different approach." I agree. "However, cannot we argue for Objectivism's Metaphysics and Epistemology without first proving its Ethics and Politics." Yes, we can argue for the Objectivist metaphysics and epistemology without first proving its ethics and politics. But ethics and politics is the motivation for the study of metaphysics and epistemology. We're concerned with living, how to live well and be happy. Therefore we need to know where we are, what kind of being we are, and how we know what we know or claim to know. Point is: why is anyone at all interested in metaphysics and epistemology? If we could live just fine with only ethics and politics, with no need for metaphysics and epistemology, then I suppose that we would. But we would not be the beings we are. We wouldn't even need ethics and politics. But we are what we are, and there are vying ethical and political views, in conflict with one another. What's the solution? Fight it out? Or identify the metaphysics and epistemology, the proper metaphysics and epistemology so that we can decide on the proper ethics and politics. 'If so, then don't those two more fundamental branches "stand on their own".' I guess I'm not sure what "stand on their own" means. Those two branches have definite implications for the rest of the philosophy (or any philosophy), and likewise, any ethics or politics that depends on metaphysics and epistemology (all ethical and political views do stand on some fundamental philosophy - metaphysics and epistemology) have definite implications for the fundamentals of philosophy. It's mutual in[ter]dependence. There's a hierarchy, the fundamentals give rise to the derivatives, but the derivatives imply the fundamentals. 'Indeed, even between Politics and Ethics, doesn't the Ethics stand up to any assault against the Politics?"' I don't see how it can, but perhaps I don't understand you. Let's say that capitalism is proven to be ill-suited for man's survival. What does that mean? Well, it would mean that freedom is not a fundamental requirement for man's life, that rights really aren't rights after all. If freedom is not a fundamental requirement, then thinking is not either. After all, the need for freedom is due to our being individuals and the fact that thinking is an individual act and necessity. But if the necessity for independent thinking is out, then man's role should be that of an obedient follower. Of who? Whoever tells him to follow whoever. Who is the individual to question? We praise the Founding Fathers of America even though they accepted the institution of slavery. Why? Because the fundamental ideas they did accept were the very ideas that ultimately got rid of slavery. Fundamental ideas are the last to go in acceptance. If there's a conflict between fundamental ideas and derivative ideas (like individual rights and the acceptance of slavery), something has to give. The fundamental are more important, in a sense. But say that in America slavery wasn't rejected. The implication and need would be to ultimately reject the fundamental idea, individual rights. I believe that Miss Rand made the same point about Aristotle. If I remember correctly, Dr. Peikoff, at one point, early on in his association with Miss Rand, having read Aristotle, couldn't understand her high praise for the man. It was his fundamental ideas, not his errors in thinking about issue relating to his fundamental ideas, his inconsistencies or contradictions, that ultimately gave rise to the Enlightenment and America, etc., and that's why she admired him (as opposed to Plato with his original blueprint for a totalitarian state as required by his view of man's nature). Fundamental ideas and their derivatives stand or fall together, interrelatedly. It may be that the fundamental ideas withstand more attacks (by way of derivative ideas under attack), in a sense, but when push comes to shove, when there's a conflict or contradiction between fundamental ideas and derivative ideas (which would rest on a conflicting fundamental idea), then one or the other, in order to resolve the conflict, the contradiction, has to go. If the derivatives are held firmly to, then the fundamental ideas have to go, although it is probably more common for the derivatives to go in order to retain the fundamentals.

Good question. I see it as two different issues: 1. Objectivism as a philosophical whole of interrelated principles, and 2. the (of Objectivism) principles considered separately (which, in a sense, is how we go about learning Objectivism and coming to accept, or reject, it). Every statement anyone makes implies some epistemology, some theory of knowledge whether implicit or explicit. So, say that you believe that there's life after death, that you've accepted a principle of Christianity. But then you think about knowledge and come to conclude that reason is our only means of knowledge (you accept one principle of Objectivism, without yet accepting Objectivism in total). Well then, if you take that principle where it logically goes, you then have to reject the Christian metaphysics, the idea that there's a supernatural realm and a life after death, etc., which depended on the Christian epistemological view. You've then accepted another principle of Objectivism, that reality, this world, and reality only exists. Cash in on your metaphysics (including man's nature) and your epistemology, and you get the Objectivist ethics and politics, etc. as a system of interrelated principles, each relating to or implying the others. "How would you answer the criticism that says that if one principle is rendered wrong, then only principles derived from that are thereby rendered wrong?" By pointing out that not only principles derived from it are rendered wrong, but also all principles that relate to it are wrong [and that Objectivism, as a philosophical system, collapses]. If Objectivism is wrong in its epistemology, if concepts are not objective, all the rest is moot as relates to that issue. [Etc.]

That's an important point. There's a flip side to this issue as well. Ultimately, Objectivism, as a whole, stands or falls as a totality. From Dr. Peikoff's 1985 lecture, "Philosophy of Education," during the last (sixth) lecture, a Q&A session: Q: In your disclaimer at the beginning of your first lecture you said that Ayn Rand has not reviewed all of what you would present, and also reminded us of your fallibility. Do you mean to imply that she was infallible? A: No. But some people think so, so I was putting them on notice, that if they think she is, they surely don't think I am. No, she was not infallible. Nobody is infallible. Q: Did I mean to imply that Objectivism is, as she defined it, right or wrong? A: What do you think about that question? Is Objectivism as she defined it right or wrong? Absolutely! Objectivism is the name of her philosophy, so if you think it's right or wrong, it's exactly what she said it was. If you have a different philosophy, you call it "gloopism" or whatever you want, and then that's your philosophy, right or wrong. Now the thing that this questioner fails to grasp is that a philosophy is not an eclectic congerie of ideas. It is not like four ideas on reality and six ideas on knowledge and three on ethics and eight or nine on politics, and, you know, you could be right on A3 but not B4 and C7. That is not a philosophy. From what we've already said just about integration, you should know that a proper philosophy is one totality, and it's an issue of basic principles and their consequences. So it's either all right or it's all wrong, if it's an integrated system. And therefore, depending one your viewpoint, either Objectivism is all right or it's all wrong, but either way it is what she defined it as, one consistent whole. Q: I view you and others as having the duty (let's say you don't mean that in the strong sense) of adding to and if necessary correcting the existing ideas of Objectivism. Do you agree? A; Well, I agree that anybody interested in it who is a professional philosopher and so on - that's his field - should, if he can - it would be nice to come up with something more than just reiterating what was already stated. Sure. But nobody has the duty to discover something new. You can't have a duty to discover the new. It's the same reason why you can't teach how to discover the new. You either do it or you don't. Now, what about, do we have a duty in correcting the existing ideas? If anything is wrong anywhere, anybody who is interested in the truth should correct it. Does that mean that I concede that maybe there is an essential principle of Objectivism that is wrong? No, because by my understanding for the reason I just told you, it's one totality. So if any one principle is wrong, the whole thing is collapsed. In which case it doesn't make any sense to correct it. You then should start with Hegel or Marx or whoever you can find and do what you can within that framework. Q: Can you say anything... A: The problem is, you see, that people that ask these questions don't distinguish a principle from a concrete application and invariably have in mind, "If I disagree about a woman president, shouldn't I correct Objectivism?" That is not Objectivist. Someday we'll have to have a whole course on "What is a principle?," and that will clarify these questions, cause there is really some things that are important, but it doesn't mean they are principles. ---- It's true, Objectivism is not to be accepted on faith, but it stands or falls as a whole. And of course, the same applies to religions. As to a course on what a principle is, Dr. Peikoff did give a speech on the subject, "Why Should One Act on Principle?," which, for any who do not know about it, can be listened to on one's "Registered User Page" at the Ayn Rand Institute's web site. (Registration is free.) The lecture is about one hour long, and there's a second audio, about 30 minutes long, of the Q&A session following that lecture. (If you're already registered, the link, "Registered User Page" is on the upper left of the ARI home page. If you're not already registered, once you do register, you'll automatically be taken to your "Registered User Page.") *** Mod's note: Some discussion regarding Objectivism standing or falling as a whole has been split into a separate topic. - sN ***

Okay, I think we're in agreement. As to any preference, the question to ask is, why? Why do I prefer this over that. If the "reason" (cause) is simply on the level of pleasure and pain, then there's nothing else to say. I don't like having a headache because it's painful, and so I prefer not to have them. Pleasure and pain are self-evident evaluations. As far as they go, pleasure is good, pain is bad. That is determined by reality, by our nature and the nature of all that we interact with. Any other kind of preference (a selection of one thing over another), which has some conceptual component (evaluation), given that we are not automatically right on the conceptual level of evaluation (or identification), are open to challenge, in need of validation beyond "I like" or "I don't like." The validation of pleasure and pain is self-evident. The validation for other values requires reasoning.

I've posted this before, but given this topic and my having mention Norman Rockwell's approach to painting, I thought I'd post it again: The Idea--Backbone of Story-Telling Pictures In a picture which tells a story, the idea itself probably is the most important element of the entire illustration. Certainly if the idea is not good and if it does not interest and intrigue people, any other good qualities which the picture may possess will be lost because they will not be seen. It is an utter waste of effort to paint a beautiful, story-telling picture unless it is based on a good central idea — one which can be readily understood. I will now explain just how I develop a magazine cover idea. Whether you follow my method or not is up to you. I suggest that you try it at the start. Later you will probably develop a method of your own. In all my years as an illustrator, sudden inspiration has never been the source of a single idea. I have had to "beat my brains out" for each one. And each time I go through the same preliminaries. I know of no painless process for giving birth to a picture idea. When I must produce one, I retire to a quiet room with a supply of cheap paper and sharp pencils. My brain is going to take a beating — and knows it. First, I invariably draw a lamp post. I have found that I must start somewhere and if I did not start with the lamp post or something else, I would spend the day looking at the blank paper. So I start with hope and prayer — and a lamp post. Next I draw a drunken sailor clinging to my lamp post. Now I have an object and a person. Then I give my brain a little exercise. Through association of ideas, I am reminded that sailors must do their own mending, so I put that down. That reminds me of a mother sewing up Junior's trousers with Junior in them, and I draw that. At last I am on my way, but where I will end I never know. I keep hoping and praying for a knockout idea. And I keep on making sketches. Usually the first session gets me nowhere. Most authors, composers, playwrights and other creative people seem to have the same experience. Somehow you must condition your brain to think creatively. So I generally end this first session of two hours or more completely discouraged. I feel that I never will develop another idea as long as I live. Then, perhaps next day, I go at it again. By this time my poor brain seems to be beaten into shape to develop ideas. I keep making sketches which no one but me could understand. I throw them down beside me as I work but I do not discard them. Often, by going over these sketches later, one of them will suggest something which escaped me at the time but which may be the very germ of the idea I am seeking. One thing I know. When I do get a really good idea — the idea — I will have no doubt about it. When that time comes bells ring and lights flash! Then I get all excited. I do not want to try other ideas. I want to try out this one on my wife, my neighbors and — if they like it — I want to get to work on this one — the bell ringer. How I Make A Picture by Norman Rockwell p. 28; Chp 1. "Getting the Picture Idea"

Yes, bad ideas and bad philosophy have bad consequences. As Miss Rand said, it is philosophy that has gotten us into this state, and it's only philosophy that will get us out of it. As to the "hell," Roark faced great opposition. I do not see him as suffering in the face of it, which is what was so very alluring about him when I first read The Fountainhead. It's that thing about pain only going down so far. The difference between Roark and Dominique was that Dominique viewed evil as important, more important than the good, more potent.

No, I don't think it's a mistake to address the importance of civility in discussions. I think that it's important. Hostile discussions are not typically very enjoyable, and I mostly want to just get away from them. The important issue gets lost in the fray. Certainly understandable. I like Mr. Parrish's work as well, and so, given what I think of Miss Rand, I am and have been puzzled and intrigued by her remark about his work. I understand and agree. Yes, certainly it's a possibility. If I understand correctly, her reply was in a Q&A session after some talk. It was in public. So, given the context and given the type of thinker she was, it just doesn't strike me as likely that she just rashly threw out an unconsidered judgement. My bet would be that she had considered his work, formed her judgement (on some basis unknown to me), and so it was an easy response for her to make. Although it's been some time since I've read it, I have a book on Maxfield Parrish, and it goes into his methods and process of creating his paintings. From memory, again, I believe that even though both Mr. Parrish and Norman Rockwell (among others, including Andrew Loomis) made use of photography in their work, Mr. Parrish was more of a "slave" to photography compared to Mr. Rockwell and Mr. Loomis. So, in speculating, I wonder if that has anything to do which Miss Rand's assessment of Mr. Parrish's work. (Given what she had to say about photography as an art form.) My understanding is that Chuck Close, for example, uses photographs to create his large, highly detailed paintings. He creates a grid on the photo and a grid on his large canvas (generically, I'm not certain what he actually paints on), and then, grid-square by grid-square, he copies each grid. When he's done, the photograph has been enlarged to a tremendous size. That is a different process than what Mr. Rockwell would use with respect to photographs. He would use them, but he would take liberties (guided by his idea for the painting). He would "hire" local townspeople to model for him and he would direct them to get into the pose and the character he was after, and he would take great numbers of photographs. Ultimately, he would create a full-sized charcoal drawing of his planned painting, using the photos as references, taking what he wanted or needed from them, and then he would do several small color studies in paint (not detailed paintings; he was just working out the color composition), and then, with all his problems solved (composition, values, color, etc.), he would paint his pictures. He started with an idea for a painting. Photography was a tool which he used, but again, he wasn't a "slave" to it. I got to spend a day in Paris at the Louvre many years ago. While there, I noticed that there were several artists with easels set up in front of this or that painting (I believe that the museum actual provides easels for artists who are interested in painting there), and they were working diligently to copy, literally, the paintings. I certainly don't see anything wrong with such study, but I remember thinking, what has that to do with the actual painting that they were copying? Copying is a different process than creating. In a sense, copy is mindless - with respect to certain problems in painting, in creating a painting. It is somewhat like transcribing a photograph. So, I just speculate along such lines with respect to Miss Rand's remark (assessment) on Mr. Parrish's work. I'd love to know her reasoning, but I don't know if it will ever be known. What Miss Rand did have was her own theory on art (plus, I think that it's obvious, that she was a great artist herself; she understood art), and I figure that by that standard she concluded that Mr. Parrish's work wasn't good art. Yes, her use of "trash" is rather insignificant if she was just saying, "I don't like it." The assumption (which I think is warranted) is that she meant that his work was not good art. Yes, I think we are in basic agreement on this issue. And as Miss Rand said (Esthetic Judgment): "Since art is a philosophical composite, it is not a contradiction to say: “This is a great work of art, but I don’t like it,” provided one defines the exact meaning of that statement: the first part refers to a purely esthetic appraisal, the second to a deeper philosophical level which includes more than esthetic values." "Art and Sense of Life," The Romantic Manifesto, 42 Ah, yes, "Wendy." My mistake. You may be verbose, Tyler, but your writing is typically thoughtful and clear. Yes, I agree. I enjoyed Miss McElroy's discussion. I understand your desire to separate this thread from the other, but as to art, if you don't mind giving a simple answer, relevant to this topic, which of the two better dramatizes the actual part of story? No need to get involved in it, but since I knew of the two clips (on YouTube), I thought it would be interesting to see the difference. Yes, Miss Rand forgot to mention Dominique's teddy bear, plus just how attractive she really is.

I agree. Coincidentally and related to this, Dr. Peikoff was asked, in his most recent podcast, Episode 197 — January 2, 2012: 04:50: "'I have noticed that whenever Ayn Rand and others, such as you and Yaron Brook, are interviewed or debated, they always know what to answer almost instantly. I may know the answer, but I would be completely unsure how to express myself, and I may have to think. How do you get to such a level where one can answer questions like that?'"

During the Q&A period following lecture 2 in Dr. Peikoff's lecture series, "The Philosophy of Objectivism," he was asked about cigarette smoking and cancer, is it philosophically anti-life and immoral to smoke? Again, from my notes: Statistics are not forms of proof, of establishing causality, of identifying the nature of the entity which acts as the causal agent. To show that an effect is inherent (death and cigarette smoking), you have to show that entity X acts upon entity Y which acts upon entity Z which causes death. A correlation is not necessarily causal. In a particular case, if a doctor gives you reasons based upon evidence, facts about you, that they are harming you, act accordingly. (Dr. Peikoff rejects the compliment that he has "kicked the habit.") Smoking is not philosophically bad.

"Concrete bound" is not "a fancy name for short term." Concrete-bound is a reference to Pragmatism. (Lexicon) "To give you an example: if a building were threatened with collapse and you declared that the crumbling foundation has to be rebuilt, a pragmatist would answer that your solution is too abstract, extreme, unprovable, and that immediate priority must be given to the need of putting ornaments on the balcony railings, because it would make the tenants feel better. "There was a time when a man would not utter arguments of this sort, for fear of being rightly considered a fool. Today, Pragmatism has not merely given him permission to do it and liberated him from the necessity of thought, but has elevated his mental default into an intellectual virtue, has given him the right to dismiss thinkers (or construction engineers) as naive, and has endowed him with that typically modern quality: the arrogance of the concrete-bound, who takes pride in not seeing the forest fire, or the forest, or the trees, while he is studying one inch of bark on a rotted tree stump." "How to Read (and Not to Write)," The Ayn Rand Letter, l, 26, 5

Why do you prefer heat from a fireplace as opposed to heat from a furnace? With respect to a fireplace versus a furnace, what standard are you referring to? In what sense is your preference objective? The actual sensation? What's the sensation of outdoors? What's the sensation of a gym? I do not understand what you are asking, and so I can't say I agree. Yes, your personal preference for vanilla is objective in the sense that it is a fact that you prefer it (it is true for you and true for anyone else that you prefer vanilla), but that is as far as it goes. You can not infer, from the fact that you prefer vanilla ice cream over apricot ice cream, that your preference for vanilla means that vanilla is better in some other sense, such as for your health for example. Given what I think you've said, I think that you're making too much of the fact that I say that all personal preferences, whether they are objective or subjective or neither, are objective in the sense that they are in fact preferences. My point, in that respect, was in reference to the distinction between FOR and OF, not as a means of declaring that all preferences are objective in any other sense. I think that, outside of this discussion (and even further along in this discussion for the most part) it is only confusing to refer to preferences as objective in any other sense than that they are objectively valid in contrast with their being subjective or arbitrary. I wanted to clear up any confusion about the distinction between FOR and OF, but it's starting to seem that I did not do so. If you're drawing the conclusion that any preference that anyone holds is objective (in any other sense than that it is a fact that they hold it), then preferences for representational art, romantic or naturalistic, are just as objective as are preferences for non-representational or abstract art.

I hope that you're not equivocating between the person who draws "first blood," as I put it previously, and the person who responds. J13 was wrong to assert that I am taking great efforts to deny reality, and it was inappropriate in the context of my "attempt to engage in [a] discussion productively." Such "discussions" do bore me and are a waste of my time. I agree that there's something of real interest in the discussion as such, just not, as far as I am concerned, in a discussion with J13. Speaking for myself, I would not say that the manner of the discussion is more important than the issue of the discussion; however, I will not participate in a discussion if certain standards of propriety are not met. Life's too short. And I would say that the reason that J13 and I were "talking right past one another" was due to a lack of clarity on the concepts of "objective" and "subjective." If we do not agree on the meanings of those two concepts, any further use of them in a discussion will only reveal that basic disagreement. I agree. My asking you to define the terms ("objective" and "subjective") may have seemed that I took issue with all else that you had said in response to J13, but that was not the case. I basically agreed with what you had said to him. I just noticed what I thought was a need to define the terms. I agree. No, it doesn't seem right to me. I agree. I certainly take Miss Rand's stating that Mr. Parrish's artwork is "trash" as a negative appraisal, but, as you say, we don't know precisely what she meant. Funny aside, assuming that it's true: I remember reading about some gallery in NYC, I believe, which was in the process of some kind of renovation. During the renovation, they temporarily moved their modern art displays out on the sidewalk. The garbage collectors, thinking that the works were trash, hauled it all away as trash. As to standard, I meant it in the sense in which Miss Rand mentioned in the quote I posted in reply to Brian. (Pleasure and Pain - Lexicon), specifically to Miss Rand's statement: "The capacity to experience pleasure or pain is innate in a man’s body; it is part of his nature, part of the kind of entity he is. He has no choice about it, and he has no choice about the standard that determines what will make him experience the physical sensation of pleasure or of pain. What is that standard?* His life*." "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, 17 Yes, I agree that there are objective standards for art. I do not know whether or not J13 agrees with that. I do not think that Miss Rand was the type of person to throw out rash, unfounded judgements, and given that she said that she considered Mr. Parrish's artwork to be "trash," I don't think she just threw out an unconsidered judgement. I just do not know what her reasoning was, and apparently, if she did not reveal it, I can not know, even if I can speculate. The pronouncement is objective in the sense that, given that they loathe the taste of chocolate, then they would loathe anything that they taste which is chocolate flavored. In that sense, by that standard alone, it would be "trash." But their loathing the taste of chocolate is not the standard for other assessments. That's why I've been making a big deal about the definitions of "objective" and "subjective" as well as attempting to distinguish between sensory-perceptual level assessments and conceptual level assessments. Personal preferences based on what? Questionable? It depends on how you interpret the person's use of "trash." (What I said above with respect to loathing the taste of chocolate and saying that a cake is "trash.") One standard is not another. (We're already in agreement on that.) The reason that I think the analogy is "bad" is that it conflates the distinction between direct awareness and appraisal and conceptual awareness and appraisal, of art in this case. I agree, if a person dislikes Hamlet due to some personal family history, their saying that "Hamlet is an awful play" reflects their personal experience, but that is not the standard for Hamlet as bad art. Unlike you, however, I would say that the person has "correctly identified the facts of reality": I've had this bad experience and this play so effectively recreates reality that it brings back to mind my bad experience. It's awful! And it is "awful" in that sense. But awful as art? This reminds me of what Windy McElroy said in her discussion of the "rape" scene in The Fountainhead ("Looking Through a Paradigm Darkly Was Dominque's rape in The Fountainhead actually rape? Why ... or why not?"), in her statement: "Equally, any woman who has been battered or raped will probably have difficulty with Rand's harshly graphic sex scenes — and understandably so. Although such women may grasp and enjoy the intellectual values being portrayed, the emotional impact of those values will be lost upon them." Or, consider these two (the second up to 1:57) dramatizations of the "rape" scene in The Fountainhead: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O7-u0w1F7qQ And: Which is the better art? By what standard? Both recreate the "rape" scene, but they're certainly not equal. Re: 3: It all depends on the meaning of "trash," the meaning in which a person is using the term. They're objective pronouncements in the sense that they identify, correctly, the person's personal preferences, but yes, I agree, such personal preferences are not an objective standard for judgements of artworks as art. He is wrong in treating "trash" as some intrinsicistic, self-evident concept. And he's wrong to think that should anyone say that Mr. Parrish is or is not "trash" then they are agreeing with or disagreeing with Miss Rand's assessment. Without knowing the basis for her assessment, it's not possible to know. Yes. Considering the source, I would say that it would be arbitrary to assume that Miss Rand's judgement may have been based solely on some irrelevant personal preference. But certainly, bring on the evidence. With respect to "boldness of color," the only way I see to determine the significance of that is by reference to a standard, specifically an objective standard of art. The question would be how does boldness of color relate to that standard? I believe that I've addressed this issue. Thank you, Tyler. I'll not be discussing anything with J13, at least for the foreseeable future. That's not to say, obviously, that I won't be continuing this discussion with you. But, to the extent that you and J13 are having a discussion, I'll not be participating.

Yes, it is an important area of disagreement, and I too think that it is central to, if not the crux of, the discussion (of whether Miss Rand's assessments or judgements -- "trash" and "sheer perfection of workmanship" -- of Mr. Parrish's and Mr. Capulettis's respective artworks (some are all) are objective (or subjective); of whether anyone can objectively make the same judgements of their works. How can one possibly say without understanding just what "objective" and "subjective" mean, without defining the terms accurately? However, to say, "I do think they're [personal preferences at the sensory level] none other than "objective," is to accept the same error as in saying that they're subjective. The subjective-objective distinction does not apply (epistemologically) to personal preferences at the sensory level. Nor does it apply on the perceptual level of awareness. "Yum!" in response to one's experience of the taste of vanilla ice cream is a direct experience and (favorable) assessment. The same is true of "Yuck!" in response to the taste of something which tastes awful. If someone enjoys the taste of vanilla ice cream, they don't ask themselves, "I like the taste of (the flavor of) vanilla ice cream, but do I really like it, am I right about that, is it true, is it objective?" The question(s) would not come up or be relevant. If I like the taste of vanilla ice cream and prefer it more than the taste of chocolate ice cream, that's an assessment on the sensory-perceptual level, not the conceptual level, of awareness. (I'm only referring the the actual taste or flavor experience, not to some other assessment: "good" in some other sense, "healthy," etc.) Sensation and perception are forms of direct awareness and even appraisal of existence, not a form of conceptual identification or appraisal of existence. Sensation and perception cannot be right or wrong, true or false, objective or subjective, etc. They are direct experiences, direct awareness and even appraisal, of existence, not conceptual identifications (or attempts at conceptual identification) which may be either right or wrong, true or false, objective or subjective. Experiences of pleasure and pain are sensory-perceptual level assessments of the things experienced, and as far as they go, they are valid, directly informing you of the good or bad of something. If I like the taste of (the flavor of) vanilla ice cream (and even prefer it over chocolate ice cream), and I then tell someone else that I do, then, given that they do not have direct awareness of my direct awareness or assessment of existence (vanilla ice cream), then they have to judge my statement as to whether it is right or wrong, true or false, objective or subjective. Am I identifying a fact or am I not is a valid concern for them, but not for me. Pleasure and Pain (Lexicon): "The capacity to experience pleasure or pain is innate in a man’s body; it is part of his nature, part of the kind of entity he is. He has no choice about it, and he has no choice about the standard that determines what will make him experience the physical sensation of pleasure or of pain. What is that standard?* His life*. "The pleasure-pain mechanism in the body of man—and in the bodies of all the living organisms that possess the faculty of consciousness—serves as an automatic guardian of the organism’s life. The physical sensation of pleasure is a signal indicating that the organism is pursuing the right course of action. The physical sensation of pain is a warning signal of danger, indicating that the organism is pursuing the wrong course of action, that something is impairing the proper function of its body, which requires action to correct it. The best illustration of this can be seen in the rare, freak cases of children who are born without the capacity to experience physical pain; such children do not survive for long; they have no means of discovering what can injure them, no warning signals, and thus a minor cut can develop into a deadly infection, or a major illness can remain undetected until it is too late to fight it." "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, 17. The issue with conceptual identification -- which may be right or wrong, true or false, objective or subjective -- is one of relating conceptual identifications to what is given in direct awareness in order to ensure that our conceptual level of awareness corresponds to reality. A curious statement. Perhaps some explanations and examples would be helpful to explain just what you mean.

I know that you weren't asking me what the purpose of a definition is. I had asked you to define the term "subjective" (as well as "objective"). You didn't, so I posted the quote from Mr. Branden to stress the importance of definitions. I'm not certain as to why you say that. Did you take my post to be one out of anger towards you? It certainly wasn't made in anger. As to a "quibble over terminology," I wouldn't characterize it as such. Definitions are critical. And the definitions of "subjective" and "objective" are central to this discussion about Miss Rand's judgements of Mr. Parrish's and Mr. Capuletti's respective works. Yes, I agree, the question is: by what standard? That's why I asked. Yes, I agree with your assessment of J's contention. I also agree with what you've said previously, that you would need to know just what Miss Rand meant by "trash" and why she therefore judged Mr. Parrish's work to be "trash." That's my own position as well. No argument. So far, I'm not so certain of that. A preference for the taste of vanilla over chocolate is being used as an analogy for tastes in art, especially subjective tastes in art. My point is that the preference for vanilla is not subjective and that therefore using it as an analogy confuses the issue. One would have to define the "esthetic" term "trash" objectively, then apply it objectively to any particular works. I'm at a loss with respect to the term because I don't know what Miss Rand meant by it or why she called Mr. Parrish's work "trash." I'd like to know, but it seems that is out of the question. Yes, I understand that to be his contention. I don't agree that flavor is not governed by any universal standard, and I still contend that it's a bad analogy to be using with respect to tastes in art, which may or may not be, unlike tastes with respect to sensory qualities, subjective or objective. I agree. What is the standard, the definition of "trash" with respect to artworks? That's the question. The other question, on which this discussion revolves, is whether or not Miss Rand's assessment of Parrish's works to be "trash" is subjective or objective. I think that you and I agree that it's not possible to answer that without knowing what Miss Rand meant by "trash" in that regard and why exactly she regarded Mr. Parrish's works as "trash." I have no means of answering the question: is Miss Rand's judgement true or false, right or wrong, objective or subjective? I wasn't contending that anyone is purposefully aiming to cause confusion. I was, again, just making the point that defining the term "subjective (and "objective") is critical to this discussion, that without clear and agreed upon definitions, confusion was/is bound to pervade it. Yes, and that's the analogy I take issue with. A personal preference for chocolate over vanilla is not subjective. The concept "subjective" is not relevant to such tastes, though it is relevant to "tastes" in art. I read your statement, and my reaction is, no, that makes no sense: if the assessment of artworks is based upon a personal preference like one's personal preference for chocolate over vanilla, then, given that a preference for chocolate over vanilla is not subjective, it doesn't follow that a similarly non-subjective assessment of Parrish's work would be subjective. I'm just saying that the analogy is confusing. Why do you think that a preference for chocolate over vanilla is subjective? (And see, we're back to the importance of defining the term "subjective" - not a simple quibble over terminology.) Same thing. I contend that the analogy is poor. If a preference for the taste of vanilla is subjective, what then is objective? Yes, as I understand your point, going from "I like vanilla more than chocolate" is not a basis for declaring that vanilla-based desserts are good and chocolate-based desserts are bad. Good and bad are different judgements and require a standard beyond "I like." I agree. The issue is, I agree, not one about "clear definitions," but it depends upon clear definitions. That's my only point with respect to asking for definitions of "subjective" and "objective," to make certain that everyone is speaking the same language, so to speak. Anyway, Tyler, I did not mean to side track your discussion with J13. I thought that definitions were called for, so I asked. I'll bow out and let you continue your discussion with J13.

What is the purpose of a definition? A definition, in identifying the specific meaning of a concept, isolates the facts of reality to which the concept refers and of which the concept is a mental integration. Thus, the purpose of defining one's terms is to afford oneself the inestimable benefit of knowing what one is talking about. Nathaniel Branden, The Objectivist Newsletter, January 1963 p. 3, "Intellectual Ammunition Department" Superior, by what standard? If you prefer vanilla to (over) chocolate, the taste of vanilla ice cream over the taste of chocolate ice cream, there's a "reason" (not a process of reasoning) or a cause for its tasting better or more favorable to you than chocolate, a cause for your liking that flavor or taste (vanilla) over other flavors or tastes (like chocolate). Your preference is based on direct sensory experience. It is not a choice but an experience, a favorable, pleasing or pleasant experience as compared to one that is less favorable, pleasing or pleasant. The point may not be apparent when distinguishing between the tastes of vanilla ice cream and chocolate ice cream because the difference in the tastes are relatively minor as compared with the difference between, say, the taste of vanilla ice cream and the taste of raw sewage, for example, or anything else which tastes truly awful. Such a preference (for vanilla over chocolate or raw sewage) is on the level of feelings of pleasure and pain, not pleasurable or painful emotions (which derive from our conceptual, fallible, level of awareness). "Yum!" and "Yuck!" on the sensory-perceptual level are not choices but experiences (positive and negative), and they are, when considering the taste of vanilla and chocolate or anything else, caused by the interaction between the thing tasted and your means of tasting, your sense of taste, literal taste (not taste in the extended sense, such as one's taste in art). Epistemologically, "subjective" and "objective" are concepts that are required on and dependent on the conceptual level of awareness, not on the sensory or perceptual level of awareness. They do not apply and would never arise on the sensory or perceptual level of awareness or consciousness. Our sensory experiences and our perceptions are direct awareness of and even evaluations of existence. They are not, nor can they be, true or false, right or wrong, objective or subjective. They are simply valid by virtue of their being direct awareness of existence. The subjective (epistemologically) is the arbitrary and implies the primacy of consciousness, the view that consciousness determines (as opposed to identifies) what is real. The objective (epistemologically) is that which corresponds with reality, identifications and evaluations which correspond or correctly identify and evaluate the facts of reality. The subjective-objective distinction applies on the conceptual level of awareness, the level in which we are not automatically correct in our efforts to identify and evaluate things, the level in which we are attempting to ensure that our ideas, our identifications and evaluations, do indeed correspond with reality. To conflate this important distinction by using the term "subjective" for sensory experiences or even personal preferences of any kind (which, on the conceptual level, may be either subjective or objective), is to cause only confusion. No, it does not clarify. You say: 'What I'm saying is that, if he is correct -- if Rand's preference for boldness of color is as personal to her and as non-reasoned as a taste preference for vanilla -- and if it was upon that basis (or similar) that she came to pronounce Parrish's work trash, then we may regard that pronouncement as "subjective," and I believe wrong to make. In such a case, it would be more proper to say that "I don't like" a thing, rather than "it's trash."' According to you then, if Miss Rand's preference for boldness of color is just like a preference for the taste of vanilla, then it is "subjective" because it is "as personal to her and as non-reasoned as a taste for vanilla." In other words, if her preference for boldness of color is just like something (a preference for vanilla) which is not subjective, then it is subjective. No, I do not disagree. J13 had not proven his conclusion(s). And instead of proving his assertions, he typically resorts, ultimately, to accusing and insulting those who disagree with him of blind (not thinking for themselves) adherence to Miss Rand's claims. This whole discussion remains undermined by a lack of clear definitions, leading to inevitable confusions.

Tony, is that 'rape "by engraved invitation"' or "rape by engraved invitation"? The former implies that Miss Rand meant to illustrate an actual rape that was "invited," which is a contradiction (rape is not consensual), the later implies that Miss Rand meant to illustrate something that perhaps appeared to be a rape, on some level, but was not an actual rape, because it was in fact invited or consented to.

Property rights are the rights to the use and disposal of something. To have the right to property is to have the right to use or dispose of something, which implies the right to exclude others from doing the same (else there's no sense to having such a right). It is a requirement of man's nature, of his survival, that he make use of and dispose of things. If he cannot, if others have the right to bar him from the use and disposal of things, then he has no means of survival, no right to his own life. If he doesn't, no one does. It's dog eat dog. By what means does a individual acquire the right to the use and disposal of certain things, the property rights of certain things? If no one else owns something, he acquires the right to exclusive use by virtue of making use of that something. If someone else has already established a use for that something, then an individual can acquire the property rights of that something by trading with the owner and acquiring the property rights by voluntary exchange. If instead he resorts to force and steals the other's property, then he has rejected the principle of property rights and has no grounds upon which to demand recognition of what he then claims to be his property.

[my bold] Tyler, what do you mean by "subjective"? (And by "objective" for that matter?) I don't understand what you mean by "from chocolate to vanilla," so I'll use, assuming that it is what you may have meant, "chocolate over vanilla," and ask, in what sense is a taste preference for chocolate over vanilla subjective? If "subjective" is to be used to mean personal preferences (any and all) as such, and if personal preferences can be either subjective or objective, then there are subjective-subjective preferences and subjective-objective preferences, all subjective in one sense of the term, yet either subjective or not in another sense of the term. The equivocation leads only to confusion. Given that you say that maybe you would conclude that a preference for boldness of color is equivalent to a taste preference "from chocolate to vanilla" which, again, I'm assuming to be a preference for the taste of chocolate over the taste of vanilla, and that on that basis you would deem Miss Rand's preference (for boldness of color, etc.) to be subjective, it seems that you do indeed view sensory experiences (such as the taste of vanilla or chocolate, etc.) as subjective.

I could not agree more. And realize, psychological projection is a defense mechanism. You still bore me.

I noticed that as well. You're welcome, Tyler. I wasn't certain when you would get to read my post, and I wanted to give you a chance to see the difference between your assessments and Mr. Loomis'. Given that you've already seen the post and image and have replied, I'll now post the original scan, page 52 in Andrew Loomis' Fun with a Pencil:

This was in his discussion on emotions. With emotions there are four things that must occur: Perception Identification Evaluation Emotional response. With emotions, we are typically aware of only the first and the last, of perceiving something and then having an emotional response. So it can seem as though the object perceived causes the emotion. But the other two, Identification and Evaluation, are required. They, however, are subconsciously held and automatized, and occur within an instant. That is why, were someone to be about to cut you with a knife, you would not need anything more than to see that such is what they are doing to feel life-threatening fear. Emotions depend upon our automatized, subconsciously held (retained) identifications and evaluations. In his example, several different people view a slide under a microscope, and they each have differing emotional responses. They all perceive the very same object, but their emotions vary greatly. From my old notes: Six men look at a slide under a microscope. The first is a savage fresh from the jungle. He looks and sees some eerie movements and experiences a superstitious fear. The second is an average civilized man of today, and he sees it and yawns with bored indifference. The third is a representational painter, and he sees what reminds him of the contortions of colors of a Kandinsky. He feels revulsion. Then the fourth man, Augustine, looks and decries that this is evidence of pagan science and he feels the anger of a blasphemy. Fifth, a doctor looks and is deeply saddened because he sees evidence that his good friend has a fatal disease. And last, an ivory tower researcher looks and he recognizes it as some long-sought discovery, and he feels euphoric elation. Not the same issue as subjectivism vs. intrinsicism.