Trebor

Tyler, thank you for posting your analysis of the five drawings. I knew it would be interesting when you first listed them as you accessed them. My monitor died a couple of hours after my last post here, and I have only just gotten a replacement, a used one that seems okay so far. Of course, "died" tells you everything there is to know about my old monitor and what exactly went wrong. Right. By the way, I don't know why, but when I selected the "Quote" button to reply to your post, all of your text was in one long run-on "paragraph." No returns at all. Strange, but thought I would mentioned it. It's the first time it's happened. Perhaps you've changed something? (I've reformatted what I've quoted from you (above).) The reason I first mentioned these drawings and Mr. Loomis' own assessment of them was to draw an analogy to what J13 had done with respect to the works of Parrish and Capuletti and Miss Rand's quoted and respective assessments of their works, at least some of their works. J13 was asking for the impossible of me. He wanted me to tell him whether or not Miss Rand's assessments were true or false, objective or subjective. I can (and have and do) make my own assessments of those two artist's works (which are irrelevant to the issue), yet I cannot even attempt to say whether or not Miss Rand's judgement was true or false, objective or subjective. Not only do J13 and I not agree on the meaning of such terms, I simply do not have the data I would need. The meaning of concepts and phrases like "trash" and "sheer perfection of workmanship," regardless of J13's insistence, are not self-evident. So, thinking that it might clear up that issue, I scanned that page from Mr. Loomis' book, Fun with a Pencil, removed all of what Mr. Loomis said but for his assessments, and I also rearranged the five drawings, removing Mr. Loomis' numbering of them as well. I then asked J13 to do what it was he was asking me to do with respect to Miss Rand's judgement of one, at least, of Capuletti's works and some unspecified (by Miss Rand) works by Mr. Parrish. He had the images and he had Mr. Loomis' assessments (judgements), all that I had with respect to Miss Rand's assessments of Parrish and Capuletti. Could he do with what I had provide him what he was asking me to do with respect to Miss Rand's assessments of Parrish's and Capuletti's work(s)? [i had also mentioned that I viewed Miss Rand as having an "account of credibility," which I explained - not as warranting taking anything she said on faith - and compared to Mr. Loomis, who likewise has an "account of credibility" to me.] Then you posted your own basic assessments of the five drawings. You know the rest. As I said I would earlier, I will now attach another image, cropped from that same scanned page, showing the five drawings as they are seen in Mr. Loomis book, on the right hand side or margin, vertical, numbered 1 through 5, top to bottom. Now you can see which drawings Mr. Loomis was referring to in his own comments. You'll notice that Mr. Loomis' assessments differ significantly from your own, which, I think, is to be expected given that you do not know the standard of Mr. Loomis' judgements. Of course, you still don't really know the basis for Mr. Loomis' assessments with this additional image. That's in the remainder of the text on that page, and I'll post the entire scan soon, later today or in the next day or two, if I can. Even with that, with your being able to read the entirety of Mr. Loomis' text, it may not be enough to be convincing that Mr. Loomis' assessments are valid or objective, etc. All of that goes towards to point I attempted to make in my decision to post the image(s) in the first place. Anyway, for now:

Do I think that Miss Rand saw Parrish's originals before making her judgement? Think? What do you mean by "think"? Know? Believe? Speculate? Wonder? On what basis could I draw a certain conclusion or know one way or the other for certain? I can only speculate. Do I think that seeing originals was important to her? Same answer. I do not know. I would guess that it would be. And I would guess that she had the opportunity to see many original works of art in person. I understand that you doubt that she saw all of the originals of all of the artworks that she praised or condemned during her lifetime. What can I conclude from your doubt? Did she, or did she not? My guess, and it is only a guess, would be that she had seen originals by both Capuletti and Parrish. Given her high praise of Capuletti's work and her dismissal of Parrish's work as "trash," I assume that she did, but I do not know. I still do not know the basis of her judgements of the two artist's works. With respect to what she said, as you quoted, about that one work by Capuletti, I assume that she saw that work in person. Perhaps she even owned the original. Miss Rand praised Capuletti's skill in depicting the plaster expanse of the wall in that painting. That is the kind of observation and praise that would lead me to assume that she had seen that painting in person. Makeup can indeed do wonders, but there are limits. As Scott Christensen said in one of his videos, it's one thing to be ugly [which might pass relatively unnoticed in a small painting], but its another thing to be big and ugly. Well then, I do not know what Miss Rand meant by "trash," and I do not know what you mean by "trash." Nor do I know if what Miss Rand meant by "trash" is the same thing you mean by "trash." Of course you "think" she was only subjectively reacting to their respective work. It's a foregone conclusion with you. It's your subjectivism talking. What's your subjective preference? More of your subjectivism. So of course it is a foregone conclusion. As to your question of me, it's too early, assuming that I have any desire to continue this discussion with you (I do not), for me to present any claims of objective value in relation to details and proportional consistency. You and I do not even agree on the meaning of "objective" and "subjective." More or your subjectivism. And again, a foregone conclusion. What's the difference between the subjective-subjective and the subjective-objective? Who cares? But of course, if one is to make an objective judgement, then one has to leave out subjective preferences. Problem is, you and I have no common understanding of the two concepts, "objective" and "subjective." To put it another way, you keep wanting to jump past the fundamental requirement of objectively identifying and defining the two terms, "objective" and "subjective," and instead go right to using them, blindly. I see. Any person's "objective grounds on which to judge art" is but their subjective preference. More confused thinking and assertions due to your failure to objectively identify and define the terms "objective" and "subjective." The subjectively-objective. Or good photo references to copy. Chuck Close is a master of detail. You bore me, Jonathan. This "discussion" is a waste of my time.

No, what I said is not contradictory. Yes, you are confused. Worse than confused. No, you're not trying to clear up the fundamental disagreement. Generous and patient? BS. Alternating positions and backpedaling? More BS. Snarky attitude? Hey, you drew "first blood." You don't know what you're talking about. Yes, of course words have meaning. Problem is, just because someone, Miss Rand or you, uses a word, like "trash," I don't know what their meaning is. It is remarkable that a subjectivist would claim to know. Someone declares that something is "trash." That tells me very little. On the face of it, all I have is that they think it is "trash." To understand them, I would have to ask them to explain what they mean by "trash" and what is the basis for which they have judged that something is "trash." Apparently you "think" otherwise. You mean subjective-objective standard. No, Jonathan. You and I don't agree on much of anything. I'm not a mind reader. Perhaps subjectivists believe they have the ability. Wouldn't surprise me. What else, besides looking and appraising? An objective standard. I have not not read your posts. Yes, you did list several criteria, which I take to be your subjective-objective criteria. Why did Miss Rand judge Parrish's work to be "trash"? What did she mean by "trash"? And why did she judge Parrish's work to be "trash"? Same with Capuletti's work? I still do not know.

Thank you, Tyler, for holding off. I do not believe that Jonathan will be adding anything more with respect to my purpose in posting the image, so if you're still willing, I would be interested to see your thinking behind the choices you made. They were: 1 = A ("dress") - has great possibility 2 = C ("pipe") - has great possibility 3 = E ("buttons") - still has possibility 4 = B ("top-center") - still has possibility 5 = D ("the remaining one") - verges on those awful drawings in public places After you reply, I'll post the scan of the page, showing the drawings as numbered by Mr. Loomis as well as his comments.

I've seen photos online of several of his works, but I've never seen one in person. Likewise with Parrish's work. Have you ever seen photos of a work of art and then seen the originals, perhaps in a museum? There can be a big difference, if you have never noticed. I'm not saying that is the key here. Just noting that it is the case. Interesting that you think that anything can be made beautiful? Can the ugly be made beautiful? I mean in the same sense that it is ugly. If it's made beautiful, is it still ugly? I'm just puzzled by the idea. And I still do not know what Miss Rand meant by "trash" or why she judged Parrish's work as "trash." Nor do I know what she meant by "sheer perfection of workmanship" or why she judged Capuletti's work to be "sheer perfection of workmanship." Do you? To your aside, you seem to make a big deal about her use of "you": "You would not believe that it could be made beautiful - beautiful and inspiring by the sheer perfection of workmanship; neither did I until I saw it." I think you are reaching. Oops. Am I speaking for you? I'm sorry, Jonathan, this is irrelevant. I still, as I have pointed out many times, do not know what she meant by "trash" or "sheer perfection of workmanship," etc. Now you are being dishonest. Wow, you are projecting a lot onto me. I didn't even know that I had yet presented any of my tastes, preferences or judgements. And, more dishonesty. It parallels exactly what you have asked of me. You have the drawings which Mr. Loomis assessed, and you have his assessments: "has great possibility," "still has possibility" and "verges on those awful drawings in public places". Strange, I don't remember presenting a theory of objectivity in judging works of art. You were given Mr. Loomis' judgements, just as I was given Miss Rand's judgement. I've asked you whether or not Mr. Loomis's judgements are true, just as you asked me whether Miss Rand's were true. But I Jonathan. I did give you examples of artworks to view, and I told you what Mr. Loomis' judgements of there were. Are his judgements objective? (I believe now that I know how you would respond - below.) Yes. Those were Loomis' judgements ("has great possibility," "still has possibility" and "verges on those awful drawings in public places" not "have great possibility," "have hope" and "awful"), just as Miss Rand's were "trash" and "sheer perfection of workmanship," etc. But of course. It is all a matter of subjective preferences, after all. Well, with a few exceptions. (below) So, the reasons she preferred "bold, pure colors," clean, precise details, clarity and distinctly "discernible boundaries" were? Oh yes, it was subjective. Let's see. All preferences are subjective, in your view, so yes, to be objective in judging a work of art, we have to leave all of those out. We then focus only on the measurable aspects, like perspectvie, anatomy, color theory, proportion, composition, expression (?) and color/value modulation. Are there any other objective aspects to artworks, namely paintings given that Parrish and Capuletti were painters? All that is left, beyond those measurable aspects which you've listed, is subjective? (I think that I know your answer, but I'm certainly willing to read otherwise.) Out of curiosity, do you know anything about how Parrish actually worked in creating his paintings? Or Capuletti?

"Good" or "bad" by what standard? There are objective standards of health and illness. What if I ask you: Don't you have all of the facts to objectively determine if any given person is healthy or ill, irrespective of anyone else's opinions? You seem to equate "objective" with omniscience. Yes More nonsense. Okay, your "stress" has been noted. But then, so what? I should consider your disagreement as significant or important, but I should not consider Miss Rand's views with respect to Parrish or Capuletti? I see. I think that I've identified your fundamental error. Call it a tentative hypothesis. For conceptual knowledge to be objective, in your view, it must be self-evident, as with perception. No context, no hierarchy, just open one's eyes and one can see and know what is "trash" and what is "sheer perfection of workmanship." Little wonder then that you think that such judgements are all subjective.

Yes, I remember that you said that. That's why the discussion on the meaning of "objective" and "subjective." Without understanding those terms, those concepts, without knowing what you mean when you use them, I cannot be certain that I understand you. Look, in my own view there is a lot of subjective BS in the art world (just as there is with your own views on art), a lot of blown-up, pretentious and idiotic "crap" not only with respect to the work but also with respect to the interpretation and assessments, praise and dismissal. I think I'm right about that. You may even agree. But my statement is abstract. You have no idea if I mean the same thing that you might mean, should you agree with me, and so, in order to ensure that we are in agreement, there are terms, key terms, that we have to make certain that we are using with the same meaning. What do I mean by "blown-up," "pretentious," "idiotic 'crap," etc. The same with concepts such as "objective," about which you and I disagree about. The idea, the phrase, of "objective (factual) personal preferences" is mine, not Dr. Peikoff's. I mentioned his discussion of the distinction between FOR and OF and I asked you if you agree with the distinction. As I understood you, you do not agree with that distinction. That idea, or phrasing of an idea, "objective (factual) personal preference," (again, mine, not Dr. Peikoff's) taken out of context could easily be confusing, and perhaps I was confusing you in my using it. I don't think so, but perhaps I was, and perhaps you were therefore confused. But I think that the distinction I was making has been cleared up. My point, again, is that if someone holds a preference for something, whether their preference is objective or subjective by some other standard ("good" or "bad," "art" or "non-art," "healthy" or "non-healthy," etc.), it is an objective fact that they hold their preference. That's as far as the fact that they objectively, factually, hold a preference goes in and of itself. In itself, a preference doesn't tell you whether or not it is objective in some other sense, whether their preferences is "good" or "better" or "right" or "wrong," etc. That someone prefers vanilla ice cream over chocolate ice cream does not tell you that vanilla ice cream is "good" or "bad," with respect to their health, for instanced, etc. Assessments of "good" and "bad," (or "art" or "non-art") etc., require a standard, an objective standard, in order for them to be objective in that respect. No, I did not mean that "personal preferences" in judging art are objective rather than subjective." Nor did I mean that "personal preferences" in judging art are subjective rather than objective. Nor did I say any such thing. The only sense in which I hold that personal preferences are objective by virtue of their being preferences is, again, in the sense that they are in fact, objectively, personal preferences. They are objective in the sense that they are in fact the preferences that someone holds or has. That is what I mean by "objective (factual) personal preference." But again, in and of themselves, personal preference, though they are objectively personal preference or "objective (factual) personal preferences," (a phrase that I would not normally use, but have within a specific context of our discussion) their preferences do not indicate whether they are objective or subjective by other standards. "My point was that, no, that does not logically follow: someone's subjective judgments do not become objective using your (and Peikoff's) method. Using your method, there would be no such thing as subjectivity, because it is an objective fact that people have subjective preferences and therefore their subjective preferences would be objective." And I agree: someone's subjective judgements do not become objective using my "method" (and please, from now own, stop attributing "my method" to Dr. Peikoff). I never presented a "method" (alchemy) by which the subjective becomes the objective or by which the objective becomes the subjective. We're still talking at cross purposes because the terms "objective" and "subjective" are being used in an inconsistent manner. That's what I've been trying to clear up, in contrast to you. My point was to identify in what way one can refer to someone's personal tastes and preferences as objective and in what way one can refer to someone's personal taste and preferences as subjective. My point was not to claim that someone's personal tastes and preferences are objective, nor was my point to claim that someone's personal tastes and preferences are subject, not with respect to some standard beyond the fact that their preferences are in fact, objectively, their preferences. By themselves, personal tastes and preferences cannot be judged as being objective or subjective with respect to other standards. My point was to ensure clarity in our discussion of the terms "objective" and "subjective." Something you have failed to do. Well, they are not consistent with Miss Rand's views on the subject. I believe that I've shown how. At best they muddle the distinction between the two terms. But then, and this is why those definitions are poor, by those definitions there can be no objective thought, no objective knowledge, no objective judgements, etc. as all thought, knowledge, judgements, etc., are dependent on individual thought, not perceptible by all observers. Sure, one can be rational yet still make errors and therefore draw wrong conclusions. I did not say and do not think that the primary concern, with respect to distinguishing the objective from the subjective, is to guarantee accurate distinction between the true and the false. There's no such guarantee. Reason is not automatic, and therefore we have to use certain ideas to guide us in the proper use of reason. The concepts of objective and subjective provide such guidance. So, IF Reality is What It Is, then I, or anyone else, should be able to look at Parrish's work and determine whether or not it is "trash" without any understanding of what "trash" is in the relevant sense. And the same with Capuletti's work. Without any understanding of what "sheer perfection of workmanship" means or is in the relevant sense, anyone should be able to look at Capuletti's work and determine whether or not it exemplifies "sheer perfection of workmanship." Therefore, if anyone cannot do that, then: Reality is NOT What It Is. That is your subjectivistic payoff! Yes, I would agree that thinking for oneself is central to Objectivism. What does "seems" to you have to do with anything? I have no problem with admitting that Miss Rand was "wrong and/or subjective in a given isolated instance" IF she indeed was. Do you want me to simply take your word for it, to accept that she was "wrong and/or subjective in a given isolated instance" just because you say so? What you ask is not difficult, it's impossible. Your thinking and statements are muddled and confused. From the evidence, I'd have to say that you do not understand Miss Rand's concept of "objectivity." If there are no objective standards, then yes, I would agree, so-called "abstract art" should be treated as an epistemologically subjective matter. Nonsense. The concept "objective" is central to Objectivism, just as is the concept "subjective" central to subjectivism. "To have a subjective taste or opinion now and then is not to adopt a system of subjectivism." I can agree with that, in a qualified way. "To say that I have a subjective preference for major or minor chords, or for subtle, pastel tones or for bright, saturated ones, or for vanilla or chocolate, is not to say that all of my preferences in every aspect of life are subjective." I agree. Would you please start thinking for yourself? I do think for myself, but you have not asked me to do so. You've asked me to do the absurd. You want to to arbitrarily accept on your say-so that Miss Rand was "wrong, or that her opinion on a single subject was subjective" without my having grasped that to be the case.

Actually Tyler (and any others who might be inclined to do so) please hold off and let Jonathan13 show me how to do what he has been asking me to do with respect to Parrish's and Capuletti's works with respect to the criteria of "trash," "sheer perfection of workmanship," "crap" and "tour de force of viruoso technique," using instead these drawings from Loomis and Loomis' own assessments on his criteria of "possibility" and "awful drawings in public places." Jonathan13 has all the images needed, given they are the images Loomis himself used for his own assessments, and Jonathan13 has Loomis' own assessments and criteria, in the manner that I have Miss Rand's and his assessments or criteria of "trash," etc. He should now be able to tell me whether or not Loomis' assessments/judgements are true or not. [As well, I forgot earlier, Jonathan13, which of the drawings, A, B, C, D and E, are Loomis' 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5? Which two have "great possibility"? Which two "still has possibility"? And which one "verges on those awful drawings in public places"? And why? What are your reasons for your assessments/judgements?] I'm eager to hear what Jonathan as to say, and having others get involved could easily muddy the water. Thanks for understanding. Jonathan13, I look forward to your demonstration.

I just realized that, although the link goes to the correct podcast in the "unofficial index," it is not Episode 39 but Episode 35 for the first of the three links I provided above.

I'm uploading the image again, but I've modified it to label each of the five drawings as A, B, C, D and E in order to make it easier to communicate which of the drawings are 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in Mr. Loomis' assessments . (When I saw that you had labeled them variously as "dress," "pipe," etc., I realized that it would help were they labeled in some manner.) If I understand your guesses, Tyler, the order as Mr Loomis' presented the images would be: 1 = A ("dress") - has great possibility 2 = C ("pipe") - has great possibility 3 = E ("buttons") - still has possibility 4 = B ("top-center") - still has possibility 5 = D ("the remaining one") - verges on those awful drawings in public places Correct? Eventually, I'll post at least one more image, my scan of the entire page with the images ordered and numbered as Mr. Loomis presented them as well as his full text. I may post an intermediate image showing the drawings as presented - top to bottom on the right - and numbered by Mr. Loomis but with no additional text (not revealing Mr. Loomis' criteria for his assessments). By the way, are you willing to share your reasoning for your selections, Tyler?

I'll have to wait another time to respond to other things you have said, but for now: "Why are you introducing the idea of not viewing artworks which are to be judged?" Because I do not know which works you are referring to (or that Miss Rand was referring to) with respect to Parrish and Capuletti, all of their respective works or some of them. None have been pointed out by you. And since you have dismissed Miss Rand as irrelevant (I should not want to know her reasoning for her assessments, but should be able to judge for myself whether or not she was correct) and have made the question/issue your own and have asked for (demanded) answers from me, repeatedly, I would first have to know which works you are referring to and what you mean by the various terms which you are asking me to use in forming a judgement: "trash," "sheer perfection of workmanship," and now that you've introduced them, also "crap," and "a tour de force of virtuoso technique." Given that we do not even agree on what "objective" and "subjective" mean, I don't see any point in moving beyond that issue and entertaining your various terms. I will be generous, however, and I will help you out with the Loomis drawings and his conclusions, which I referred to previously. (See the attached image.) I've scanned in the page from his book; however, I've rearranged the five drawings (I had remembered that there were four, but there are actually five) and deleted the numbers (1 through 5. I have also deleted the the text but for Mr. Loomis' concluding comments. What I've done should be no problem for you given what you think should be possible of me with respect to not only Miss Rand's assessments ("trash" and "sheer perfection of workmanship") respectively of Parrish's work and Capuletti's work, but your own criteria -- "trash," "sheer perfection of workmanship," "crap," and "tour de force of viruoso techinique" -- which you expect me to use in making a judgement about those two artists' respective works. By far, I think you have the much simpler task. Should be a breeze for you. So, tell me, which of the images are which? Look at the five images and tell me which two have "great possibilities," which two "still have hope," and which one "verges on those awful drawings in public places"? And don't cheat and look at the actual page in his book if you have access to it. I've given you sufficient information, given your own expectation of me, for you to be able to do what you ask of me with respect to Parrish's and Capuletti's work(s). Also, explain the basis, your reasoning, for your assessments. Show me how to go about doing what it is you expect of me. By the way, by "marginal drawings," Mr. Loomis was referring to the five drawings I have rearranged -- they were originally arranged vertically along the right hand side, the margin, of the page, to the right of his text. Much good luck!

Roark to Dominique when she marries Keating. From my notes from Gary Hull's lecture, "Metaphysical Value-Judgements": Throughout most of The Fountainhead, Roark understands Dominique better than she understands herself. He knows that ONE [not all; not those that gave rise to his love for her] of her metaphysical value-judgements is: Evil is important in life! Actions are motivated by values, and the more fundamental the value, as with the case of metaphysical value-judgements, then the greater the impact on how a person behaves. You can discover everything important about a person by knowing what he considers to be fundamentally important, by his metaphysical value-judgements. At the deepest level, an individual is romantically attracted to a person who has the same view of what's fundamentally important, of what is worthy of attention and consideration. That is why you can tell so much about a person's view of reality by who he sleeps with, and that is why Roark waits so long to take Dominique as his romantic partner.

You're welcome, Tony. Yes, it would make little sense to say that one has the right to self-defense and that, if needed, one can even use deadly force against someone who is acting in violation of one's rights, but...well, we have to draw the line at lying, that's just not appropriate, moral, ever, and lying to the mugger would be wrong. Mugger: "Do you have any (or more) money?" Victim: "Damn, I wish you had not asked. I cannot tell a lie. Yes, I've got more money. Is there anything else that you want to steal from me? I mean, we might as well settle this now." The issue gets a bit more difficult when it is not an "emergency context," as you put it. Dr. Peikoff addressed this issue in at a few of his podcasts: Episode 39 — December 08, 2008 (05:00): "'Could you please expand on lying? I don't understand why you say lying is okay to protect your privacy. Can't you just say "It's none of your business."?'" Episode 126 - August 23, 2010 (11:16): "'Is it morally okay for me to hide my former Christianity from friends who are still Christian so as not to hurt them and to do so even to the extent of lying about my viewpoint and participating in prayer with them?'" Episode 133 - October 11, 2010 (03:10): "'You said in OPAR that it is moral for a doctor to lie to a patient if the patient's capability to attain health diminishes if he's told the truth. So would there not exist other situations where another person's,' he's talking about and adult, 'temporary incapacity for the truth justify lying to him? Why did you give only that example?'"

I wasn't sure whether the proper word to use was "lie" or "lies." But the point is that honesty does require in some contexts that one tell a lie or lies. Honesty is being true to reality; honesty is not synonymous with always telling the truth or never lying. Part of, the significant part or factor of, the reality in the context in which the mugger, say, confronts one with a gun and demands one's money is that you do have a right to your money and the mugger does not. Lying to the mugger, telling him that you have no money or that you gave him all of the money you have on you when, say, you actually have more hidden somewhere on your person, is being honest in that you are being true to reality, all of reality, all of the relevant facts: He has no right to your money, and you are defending yourself using a lie(s) to do so. You are being honest. You are being true to reality. Otherwise, if lying is held to be synonymous with dishonesty, then in the name of honesty, of morality, one has to sacrifice one's values or even one's life when confronting the mugger or murderer, etc. Edit: clarity

Because there is such a thing as subjectivity. However, given your definitions: Although I had hoped that you would make your meanings clear, by providing definitions, your definitions, as you have stated them, have left me confused as to just what you mean by "objective" and "subjective." Therefore it is difficult, if not impossible, still, for me to understand you when you use those terms. Given your definitions, I have to ask whether you think that there is any such thing as objective thought, knowledge or interpretation at all (all of which are actions of or the product of consciousness), if "objective," in your view, by your definition, is "independent of individual thought," "perceptible by all observers," or "dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations"? There is no knowledge (conscious or mental grasp of reality, perceptually or conceptually) or interpretation (conscious or mental grasp of the meaning of something) that is "independent of individual thought" or "perceptible by all other observers," yet according to you, by your definition, for knowledge to be objective it must be "independent of individual thought" and "perceptible by all other observers." The primary concern, with respect to distinguishing the objective from the subjective, is to distinguish the true from the false. Existence exists, reality is what it is, and the task of consciousness is to identify what exists, for our efforts to identify reality to correspond to existence, an issue that only arises on the conceptual level, our non-automatic faculty of consciousness, the level in which we can be right or wrong in our efforts to identify the facts. I assume that it is your view that it is at least possible for someone to express or deal with "facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations," but given your definitions I am not certain of even that. If "objective" means "independent of individual thought" and/or "perceptible by all observers," this aspect of your definition of "objective" seems irrelevant. Even if I am capable of dealing with "facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations," my dealing with facts or conditions is not "independent of individual thought" (it's my consciousness that is dealing with the facts or conditions, and my consciousness is personal) and my dealing with "facts or conditions" is not "perceptible by all observers." If there is no possibility of objective thought, knowledge or interpretation, in your own view, given your definition, then of course it is no stretch for you to say that you have never seen any "fully objective" interpretations of art by Objectivists as a "fully objective" or even an "objective" interpretation of art (or of anything else) is not possible. If the objective is impossible, in your view, then I assume that all thought, knowledge and interpretation, etc. (all actions of consciousness, which is an individual capacity) is "subjective," in your view. But such a view is a self-contradictory. Your definition of "subjective" doesn't help to clarify the confusion unless I am correct in assuming that you think that there is no possibility of objective knowledge. You define "subjective" as "relating to experience or knowledge as conditioned by personal mental characteristics or states; modified or affected by personal views, experience, or background." All experience or knowledge is "conditioned by personal mental characteristics or states," "modified or affected by personal views, experience, or background." So, again, if, in your view, "objective" knowledge is not possible, then it is no stretch for you to say that you have never seen any "fully objective" interpretations of art by Objectivists. But then, of course, no "fully objective" or even "objective" interpretation is possible as an "objective" fact, which is the self-contradiction. Anyway, perhaps you see why I find your definitions confusing. Perhaps you do think that objective knowledge is possible, but again, from your definitions (as you provided), I am not certain. Perhaps you ask this due to your definitions (of "objective" and "subjective"), but no, if it is an objective fact (true) that you like certain abstract paintings, then it is an objective fact that you do indeed like them. However, the objective fact that you (or anyone else) like (or dislikes) them is not the standard of objective interpretation, of esthetic judgement. Again, if you like certain works of music, then it is an objective fact that you like them - it is true that you like them, and (with respect to the distinction between FOR and OF which I mentioned) the fact that you like them is true FOR everyone else. If anyone else states knowingly that you like the works that you like, then they have stated a truth, they have identified an objective fact of reality, that you like certain works of music. Although, however, your tastes in music are an objective fact, neither your tastes nor anyone else's taste are an "objectively valid criterion of esthetic judgement...," as Miss Rand put it. "Art and Cognition," The Romantic Manifesto, 55 If it is an objective fact that someone has a subjective (arbitrary) interpretation or preference, then it is an objective fact that they have a subjective interpretation or preference, yes. However, it makes no sense to then jump to the conclusion that their subjective interpretation or preference is an objective interpretation or preference. Two different issues. One could say, for example and perhaps clarifying my point, that, in such a case, it is an objective fact that the person holds a subjective interpretation or preference, but the fact that they hold a subjective interpretation or preference means that their (subjective) interpretation or preference is not objective. Or, in other words, it is a fact, objectively, that they hold a non-objective, subjective, interpretation or preference. [my bold] True, one's preference for vanilla over chocolate is not true of OF all men (some prefer chocolate over vanilla), but it is true FOR all men (that one's preference for vanilla over chocolate is a fact). One's preference is a fact of reality, an objective fact of reality. The true (truth) is a correct identification of reality, an identification that corresponds to reality. Anyone who identifies the fact that one's preference is for vanilla over chocolate, if one's preference is for vanilla over chocolate, has identified the fact correctly. They have identified an objective fact of reality. Their identification is objective; it is true. It seems that (consistent with your own definitions of "objective" and "subjective"), using a preference for vanilla (ice cream) over chocolate (ice cream) as a paradigm, you have asserted that all preferences are "subjective" because, you say, it is not possible to know or prove what aspect of our experiences of anything are contributed by the thing we experience and what aspects of our experiences are contributed by our consciousness. But what exactly are you asking for in insisting on knowing what aspect of our experiences of anything are contributed by that which we experience and what aspects of our experiences are contributed by our consciousness in order to make an "objective" determination of a preference? If, as it seems, you do hold that all preferences are "subjective," then that is consistent with your definition of "objective" as "independent of individual thought; perceptible by all observers; expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations." "Objective" preferences are not possible by your definition. As well, incorrectly, you state that a preference for vanilla over chocolate is subjective by Miss Rand's criteria because of what she said about music (below). If someone likes something (say, they like vanilla ice cream and prefer it over chocolate ice cream, or they like (some) abstract painting(s) versus other abstract painting(s) or (some) representational painting(s) versus other representational painting(s), etc.), then it is a simple, objective fact that they do indeed like that which they like. Would you claim that they do not like what they in fact like? But what someone likes (or not) is not sufficient to determine if what they like is "better" (or "worse"). "Better" (or "worse") requires a standard beyond or different from "like." "Like" is not a valid standard for "better" (nor for (fully) objective interpretations in art). What a person likes (or prefers) may or may not be "better," but regardless it is an (fully) objective fact that they do like it. As best I can tell, you are throwing out the distinction between pleasure and pain on the perceptual level (feelings of pleasure or pain) and on the conceptual level (pleasurable or painful emotions). Assuming that the reason that someone prefers vanilla ice cream over chocolate ice cream is the taste experience of vanilla over chocolate (which seems obvious given that there are no other variables between two ice creams but their flavors, in general), then the pleasure they get from the taste of vanilla as opposed to the taste of chocolate (or the taste of sewage or anything else they dislike for that matter) is sufficient cause in itself for their preference. "Yum" is cause enough, objectively, to identify their preference in taste. "Yum! I like this." There is no getting beneath that, and there is no need to do so, not with respect to their identifying their preference or like on the perceptual level. There's no need to understand it beyond that in order to objectively identify their preference because their evaluation is on the basis of direct perception of pleasure. Perhaps they may one day be able to analyze their experience in terms of what aspect is contributed by the vanilla ice cream and what aspect is contributed by their perceptual capacity (consciousness), but it is not needed in order to conclude that they objectively prefers vanilla ice cream over chocolate ice cream. It is a self-evident identification; the evidence for the identification is directly available to them in tasting (perceiving) the vanilla ice cream (and the chocolate ice cream, etc.). However not every assessment of preferences (values) is made on the basis of perceptual level experience of pleasure or pain. The whole realm of conceptual cognition requires more than the perceptual self-evident. On the conceptual level we are not automatically correct in our efforts to identify reality, and, because we are fallible on the conceptual level, all conceptual products require validation, some means of confirming that they are consistent with reality. Here is Miss Rand's own statement on "Objectivity" (Lexicon): "Objectivity is both a metaphysical and an epistemological concept. It pertains to the relationship of consciousness to existence. Metaphysically, it is the recognition of the fact that reality exists independent of any perceiver’s consciousness. Epistemologically, it is the recognition of the fact that a perceiver’s (man’s) consciousness must acquire knowledge of reality by certain means (reason) in accordance with certain rules (logic). This means that although reality is immutable and, in any given context, only one answer is true, the truth is not automatically available to a human consciousness and can be obtained only by a certain mental process which is required of every man who seeks knowledge—that there is no substitute for this process, no escape from the responsibility for it, no shortcuts, no special revelations to privileged observers—and that there can be no such thing as a final “authority” in matters pertaining to human knowledge. Metaphysically, the only authority is reality; epistemologically—one’s own mind. The first is the ultimate arbiter of the second." "Who Is the Final Authority in Ethics?" The Objectivist Newsletter, Feb. 1965, 7 [bold mine] Miss Rand did not state that tastes in music must be treated as a subjective matter metaphysically, but epistemologically, and only until a conceptual vocabulary is discovered and defined with respect to music. Your statement, as to the Objectivist view on "subjectivity," that it is: "subconscious, automatic and/or emotional response in which a person's judgment is not entirely inherent in the object being considered, but which has aspects which are contributed by his own consciousness," is not accurate. A subjective claim is an arbitrary claim. Although one may hold subjective views subconsciously, being subconscious is not a condition of "subjectivity." I do not know what you mean by an "automatic and/or emotional response in which a person's judgment is not entirely inherent in the object being considered." No judgements about anything are inherent in the object being considered (judged). Judgements are actions of consciousness in relation to objects being considered; judgements are "in one's mind" and in relation to the objects being judged. (As to the Objectivist view on "Subjectivity," see below.) Music (Lexicon): "The formulation of a common vocabulary of music . . . would require: a translation of the musical experience, the inner experience, into conceptual terms; an explanation of why certain sounds strike us a certain way; a definition of the axioms of musical perception, from which the appropriate esthetic principles could be derived, which would serve as a base for the objective validation of esthetic judgments . . . . ["In listening to music, a man cannot tell clearly, neither to himself nor to others -- and, therefore, cannot prove -- which aspects of his experience are inherent in the music and which are contributed by his own consciousness"][The quote you provided previously, in sequence.] Until a conceptual vocabulary is discovered and defined, no objectively valid criterion of esthetic judgment is possible in the field of music..." "Art and Cognition," The Romantic Manifesto, 55 And: "Until a conceptual vocabulary is discovered and defined" is not Miss Rand's confession that it is on principle impossible to discover and define the required conceptual vocabulary. ... "Until it is brought to the stage of conceptualization, we have to treat musical tastes or preferences as a subjective matter--not in the metaphysical sense, but in the epistemological sense; i.e., not in the sense that these preferences are, in fact, causeless and arbitrary, but in the sense that we do not know their causes. No one, therefore, can claim the objective superiority of his choices over the choices of others. Where no objective proof is available, it's every man for himself--and only for himself." [From which it seems that you have concluded that all of the arts are a matter of similar subjectivity, epistemological if not metaphysical.)" "Art and Cognition," The Romantic Manifesto, 55-56 As to the Objectivist view on "Subjectivity": "Subjectivism" (Lexicon): In Metaphysics and Epistemology Subjectivism is the belief that reality is not a firm absolute, but a fluid, plastic, indeterminate realm which can be altered, in whole or in part, by the consciousness of the perceiver—i.e., by his feelings, wishes or whims. It is the doctrine which holds that man—an entity of a specific nature, dealing with a universe of a specific nature—can, somehow, live, act and achieve his goals apart from and/or in contradiction to the facts of reality, i.e., apart from and/or in contradiction to his own nature and the nature of the universe. (This is the “mixed,” moderate or middle-of-the-road version of subjectivism. Pure or “extreme” subjectivism does not recognize the concept of identity, i.e., the fact that man or the universe or anything possesses a specific nature.) "Who Is the Final Authority in Ethics?" The Objectivist Newsletter, Feb. 1965, 7 The subjective means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional. "Art and Moral Treason," The Romantic Manifesto, 150 Of course her reasons are relevant. Without any supporting reasons from Miss Rand, I cannot say whether or not her statements are true. Without viewing the four stick figure-ish drawings I mentioned previously, in the Loomis book, and without reading his comments about them, can you tell me, are his assessments or interpretations of them true or not? Are you just trying to be insulting? I have all the needed facts to be able to grasp that 2+2=17 is wrong. I cannot, again, without knowledge of Miss Rand's reasons (you say that she gave no arguments in support) for her statements, form any judgement as to her statements with respect to Parrish's work or Capuletti's work. I have already told you that I do not agree (or disagree) with her - I said that I am baffled by her statements. Does "baffled" imply agreement or disagreement to you? It is not possible for me to agree or disagree with her without knowing why (the reason(s)) she said what she said. And, given the ongoing confusion as to what you mean by "objective" and "subjective," I think that it is inadvisable to get into a discussion with you about the meaning of "trash" or "sheer perfection of workmanship," for now. Edit: Clarity

Sometimes honesty requires that one lie.

Yes, I understand that you were, in #73, responding to the "people disagree" argument. If pigs could fly, they would, and they would thereby gain all of the advantages of being able to fly. Therefore pigs can fly? Or, even if they haven't yet, it is possible that they can? Or, at least, if we can imagine them flying, then it is possible that they can? Yes, "in most of post #73 [you] have taken for granted exactly that ["that there could be such thing as defense services on the free market"]. That is begging the question. No, you did not resolved the issue of the stolen concepts that you are depending on in #41. I did not concede what you conveniently seem to think that I conceded when I agreed with you that governments and markets evolve together - as opposed to some chicken or egg dilemma. True, it is not the case that there first has to be a government that fully and consistently recognizes and protects rights and then and only then can a market come into existence. And it's not true that first there must exist a market, fully free (somehow), so that there is a means to provide for a government. Again, they evolve (and decline) together. They are mutually dependent. Some rights have to be at least implicitly recognized and protected to have a government (not a ruling gang) or a market in anything. If, and to the extent that there is no government that recognizes and protects individual rights, then there is not a market, nor can there be, to that extent - a market is a sphere of voluntary trade, and a market can only exist because its voluntary nature is protected. If rights are not recognized, respected and protected, there there is no market within that sphere. But that doesn't mean that there are no spheres where rights are recognized and protected, even implicitly, and within which therefore there are (or can be) markets, and therefore the means to support a government. We have a mixed economy. The point should be obvious. There is (still) a market for abortion services in this country. A few decades ago, there was not. Your address of the issue of '"constitutionalism" and its applicability to a market legal system in #73 (5th paragraph)' is one of the concepts you are stealing. "Constitutionalism" - constitutional government - can exist without government because, well, it just can, it's desirable, it's possible, we can imagine it? If you are going to argue for and give support for a "market" of "protection services," then you have to stop stealing concepts (markets, laws, law codes, countries, etc.) that only have meaning in the context of government, and you have to stop begging the question. "Have to" logically. The onus in on you. Your arguments will be DOA, but you have the right, and the logical obligation, to present them, something you've not yet done. Flesh it out (as Paul Birch did, even if his efforts do not satisfy you) just what you are arguing for, but, again, without stealing concepts and begging the question. Prove, attempt to prove, that you're not arguing for an arbitrary construct by grounding it in reality. You cannot do so, but at least it your effort would be a proper attempt as opposed to cashing in on concepts you have already rejected the basis for and on begging the question. Sure, and I provided a concrete example of a "market" for aggression services. "Division of labor" is stolen from the concept of market which presupposes a government that enables there to exist a market. "It is no different with a single monopolist government." If pigs could fly...therefore they do fly. "Police officers," "[law] investigators," "soldiers," "judges," and "jurists," "etc." - all stolen to conveniently apply to a context in which they do not and cannot apply. Sure, you can use the same words, but they would refer to completely different things: non-governmental, non-market players in something you might call a "society," or "country," etc, "voluntarily trading with others." All would exist in a "market" for "protection services" because...well because if we but try, we can imagine it? "Imagining" offers you no argument. Disney could create a very imaginative cartoon with flying pigs (or elephants). So? It proves only that we can create things in our imagination that cannot exist in reality. "Its desirability" assumes its "workability" - which presumably means its consistency with the principle of rights - and its "workability" presupposes reality. If one holds the facts of reality in mind, then its not even possible to imagine that someone could run off the edge of a canyon, stay suspended in mid-air for moments in defiance of gravity, fall hundreds or thousands of feet, smash into the canyon bottom, pancake flat, but then get up, dust themselves off and take chase again after the Road Runner, but Disney makes it happen in cartoons using imagination with Wile E. Coyote. It's cute; it's fun; it's imagination. But it is proof of nothing. No, I am really saying, '"there can be no such thing" as in it [is] an "arbitrary construct"." Within a market (which requires government to exist) there can exist an exchange or market for defense services, such as private security services, etc, which do currently exist. But such services, just as do individuals when they resort to using force in self-defense, have to function within the law, are governed by law, by the government. I don't know why you keep using "democracy" as though I (or others here) have suggested that it's the proper form of government. America was founded as a constitutional republic, not a democracy. There's no objective requirement that everyone, or even most, people think that something should be or should not be lawful. One is not required to convince a thief that he has no right to what he is stealing. One meets his initiated force with force in order to protect rights. If you think that those who say that what you're advocating, so-called "anarcho-capitalism" are just short-sighted fools unwilling to open their eyes to the possibility of a "market in defense services," then what do you expect them to do? Take it on your word that such is possible, dismissing the contradictions, the arbitrary assertions? We all should accept the arbitrary as possible until and unless we can disprove it? I think that a better analogy (as opposed to advocates of monarchy denying the possibility of a "workable" democracy) would be people saying that flight is not possible. Some did not agree that flight was impossible, for good reasons, and proved that flight was indeed possible. Like it or not, the onus is on you. You will have to stop begging the question and stealing concepts and demonstrate that what you think to be possible is actually possible. Yes, you're right that Birch supports the establishment of a state church is irrelevant. And "several libertarians have already replied to his articles" is not an argument. I pointed to Birch's articles because I saw that he at least attempted to flesh-out just what a "market" of "protection services" might be like, and I thought he did a rather good job and that it would help those involved in this discussion, if they were interested in reading them. (I've read David Friedman's book, The Machinery of Freedom, but many years ago and do not remember much of anything from it.) Like it or not, you are stuck with the fact that there can be no market without government to protect rights. It is not that the problem is different interpretations of justice; it's a problem of different enforcement of different interpretations of justice. The problems with government are not the result of a lack of competition (of enforcement of different interpretations of justice), but a result of bad philosophy - just as the establishment of the United States of America was the result of good philosophical ideas. Politics depends on Ethics which depends on Metaphysics and Epistemology. There's no getting around that, and so the solution to the problems with government lies in philosophy, not in a "market for competing defense services." And so we continue to go in circles.

Because, deep down, in spite of her malevolent universe sense of life, Dominique wanted the good to win and she wanted Roark; she lusted after him. And of course Roark wanted her. [No intention to speak for bluecherry.] [Dominique did not hate the good for being the good; she hated evil and believed that the good had no chance. She wanted to deprive the evil of the good which it fed on and destroyed.]

No, you may claim that you have assumed the onus, but you have not. And your much vaunted post, #73, does nothing towards that end. In #73, as elsewhere, you point out certain arguments against so-called anarcho-capitalism, such as those that flow from the fact that people disagree - the "people disagree" argument - which is inherent in the human condition and which therefore exists in a "single monopoly government" and would as well exist in a "market-based legal system," but each system has a means of dealing with the conflicts and ensuring justice. [my bold] All of which begs the question, that there is such a thing as a "market-based legal system." But of course, if we grant that a "market-based legal system" can in fact deliver the "good," that it can deliver on the need for the protection of individual rights, then yes, we have to ask if it is not the better way of doing so, compared with a "single monopoly government," as a competitive market does in contrast with any other monopoly and for the same reason: competition in a free market. [my bold] Again, more question begging. Asking why a "market-based legal order" can't do what a proper government can do is not an affirmation that it can. So, question begging (assuming that a "market-based legal order" is possible and can deliver the goods) and stolen concepts - concepts that take their meaning within the context of a "single monopoly government" arbitrarily applied to the context of an arbitrary construct, a "market-based legal order." I had never heard of him before, but Paul Birch, who I recently discovered via a Google search) has some essays online that at least attempt to flesh-out what an "anarcho-capitalist" system could be like. He also points out some of what he thinks are the fatal flaws: "A Fatal Instability in Anarcho-Capitalism?" "Is Anarcho-Capitalism Possible?" "Anarcho-Capitalism Dissolves into City States"

Well done, bluecherry. If one can understand what bluecherry has explained, then one will understand why the micro-focus on details, losing sight of the whole, will never help to understand the "rape." Dominique vs Roark, a clash of metaphysical value-judgements, one side held in error and not truly, fully or consistently embraced.

Tyler, I have been working on a reply to your lengthy reply to my earlier post, but I'm going to put if off for now (it's late), and maybe reply to it tomorrow on in the next few days. Maybe. I first read The Fountainhead in 1976. Over the years, I have heard or read that people actually thought that Roark raped Dominique, but never until this discussion has it seemed that anyone could actually, seriously think so. I did not think so when I first read the book, nor have I ever since. So it baffles me to find that anyone actually does. It's like we've read two different books. I think that you are micro-focusing on details and losing sight of the context, of the whole, but I'm not sure that I can really convince you that Roark did not rape Dominique, not in the sense of wronging her. Yes, he took her by force. He did not ask her permission. Whose word does one have to have on that if not Dominique's? But if you think that Dominique's mind was destroyed by Roark's force and that she then suffered from prolonged Stockholm Syndrome, I'm at a lost as to how I could convince you otherwise. Still, if I have more to say, I'll do so. "She knew that she would not take a bath. She knew that she wanted to keep the feeling of his body, the traces of his body on hers, knowing also what such a desire implied. She fell on her knees, clasping the edge of the bathtub. She could not make herself crawl over that edge. Her hands slipped, she lay still on the floor. The tiles were hard and cold under her body. She lay there till morning."

Thank you for posting the link. And a few paragraphs before that one, just after the "rape":

Tyler, the lion-lioness metaphor was just that, a metaphor, and perhaps not very fitting, for the reason that you point out: lions are non-rational animals, humans are rational animals. I offered that metaphor in contrast to the metaphor offered by FeatherFall, I believe, or his question of me as to whether I viewed Dominique's striking Roark across his face with the branch as like a dandy slapping someone as an invitation to a duel. I had actual thought of the strike as comparable to an invitation to a duel, not by a dandy, but by a worthy challenger, but perhaps I misunderstand what a dandy is. So I offered the alternative metaphor. I did not (do not) see Dominique as weak or cowardly or taking advantage of some code that said that she could slash Roark across the face without Roark striking back, counting on her vulnerability as a license to strike with impunity. [Had the lioness really not wanted the lion, then she would have fought him until he gave up. I say that to perhaps show the sense in which I used the metaphor. She slashed him, wounded him, but did not make him go away. Dominique did not have Roark fired when she suggested that she could and when he offered to call the superintendent for her.] Let me ask: What if, after Dominique slashed Roark across his face with that branch, Roark had grabbed the reins of her horse (although Dominique wanted to flee) and then yanked her off, Dominique falling hard to the ground, getting scratched and bruised? Would that be an unprovoked assault by Roark? Would her injuries be his fault? Older movies often had scenes in which a woman would slap a man, even expressing her anger or hatred for him, and he would then grab her and forcefully kiss her. At first the woman would resist, but then she would "melt" and surrender to his kiss and embrace. Of course, being movies of that time period - when people never actually had sex, it seemed - that would be that. An assault by the man? You have pointed out that Dominique was frightened or terrified during the rape and that she resisted. Please then explain why she hated Roark (I do not accept that she did not really hate Roark or that she mistakenly hated him. She hated him.) and was frightened and terrified of him long before the "rape" and that she resisted him. Why was Dominique, who had had many men come on to her before, suddenly repulsed by another young man making a pass at her. She had always been indifferent (or amused) by those passes. Why the sudden repulsion? When two boxers get into a boxing ring, they have agreed to a physical battle and potential (likely and even perhaps serious physica) injuries. If one of them gets hurt, has he been assaulted? Could it be that Dominique, by slashing Roark the face, invited a physical struggle with Roark, a physical struggle which in that context meant that should he take the challenge then his victory would be her?

Not only "law codes" without government(s), but "countries" without governments as well. And even "constitutions" without governments. (What I see is stolen concepts and question begging, using concepts (like "laws," "countries," "constitutiones") divorced from their cognitive base, and assuming the thing that is in question: the plausibility of "competing protection agencies" absent any government.) 2046 has been putting the onus on others to prove that "anarcho-capitalism" is not an arbitrary construct, but the onus is properly his. Has there ever been anything approximating what he thinks should be "competing protection agencies" with no government? I look forward to seeing his efforts in defending his ideal, in the vein of replying to DonAthos's questions, for starters.

Entertaining to whom? (And I'm not asking that just because you decided to kill off our dear Trebor.) "[F]reedom around the world has [been] successfully destroyed, and there has arisen the modern democratic nation-state." What? The modern democratic nation-state already exists, including "politicians to satisfy the demands of voters with bad philosophy(s)" and they are "put in office for a price (a vote) to beat, rob and kill people." It's nonsense to talk of some state of affairs as having "arisen" when it already exists. Further, the "democratic mob votes Adolph Smithler into office and gives him unlimited power, so he sends Trebor to a concentration camp" since he, the hero of your touching story, Trebor, supported "democracy and helped to contribute to the situation"? I'm sorry. I knew Trebor. Trebor was a good friend of mine, and you're no Trebor!. Trebor never supported democracy. By "helped to contribute to the situation," I can only wonder what you might mean. However, there was a man, a man with no name, a man who, in the dying days of the republic spent his time and effort arguing for a "free market of competing protection services." He would argue and argue and argue and insist that the discussion should progress. "Progress," of course, simply meant that others should finally accept that he was right. And others did, in time, come to accept that he was right. Great numbers of others. He spoke of liberty, and of a path for hope and change. "2046 will be our year!" "2046, 2046, 2046!" the crowds would shout. "2046" was in everyone's thoughts - even lovers had come to shout "2046, 2046, 2046!," in a crescendo in the throws of their passion. Never learning his actual name, the people began to call him "2046." "2046 will lead us to freedom!" The rest of the story is now history. "2046" did lead the world in a great battle. "Smash the State!" the people cried. "We want competing protection services!" And smash the state(s) they did. Everywhere the world over. That was now many, many years ago. Mankind has made a great leap backwards, and those once common shrines to "2046" are long gone now, turned to dust with the dreams of "competing protection agencies." It wasn't meant as an argument. To have these competing "governments" or "protection agencies" or whatever else you (or others) might call them, you have to get rid of monopolistic governments. Since governments are legal institutions with a monopoly on the use of force within a geographical area, then, in order to have these "competing protection agencies," you have to get rid of (destroy) government(s). ("The Enemy Is Always the State" by Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.) From what you've said, I think we're in agreement about that. It seems silly to call your "competing protection agencies" governments given that governments are in fact institutions with a monopoly on the use of force in a given geographical area, and something you are against. Why confuse things by calling "competing protection agencies" governments? So, it's governments versus "competing protection agencies." They're mutually exclusive, by even your own terms. However, are you or your personal "protection agency" going to ban other "producers of defense" who disagree with what you think to be objective rules and procedures (and even rights) from going into competition with you and your "protection agency" and then require consumers of security to come exclusively to you or your protection agency for this "commodity"? "Outlaw protectors"? What in the world is an "outlaw protector"? A "protection agency" that doesn't bow to your "protection agency's" laws? By what right does your "protection agency" have the right to create laws that govern non-consumers of your "commodity"? "Initiate aggression"? By what standard or more correctly, whose standard? Yours or that of your "protection agency"? And speaking of free competition of "protection agencies," why can't any individual just be his own "protection agency"? Is your protection agency going to require that all individuals pay some "protection agency" for protection? The key to this whole discussion is the implicit belief that it is not actually philosophy that determines the state of affairs of the world, but politics. And so the focus is on some political strategy or model that somehow sets up the best incentives for the protection of individual rights. It's the old libertarian view that philosophy is irrelevant, that "liberty" is axiomatic (or self-evident to anyone who thinks), that everyone, or most everyone, wants liberty. But of course they do if "liberty" simply means freedom from force. Everyone recoils from force. "Initiated force"? Again, by what standard? Christianity? Islam? Communism? Nazism? Fascism? Socialism? Etc., etc., etc. Miss Rand is right however, it is philosophy that has gotten us into this mess, and it is only philosophy that will get us out of it. For you, or others, this might be of some help: "Seminar: Philosophy and the Evolution of the Mixed Economy" - a 30 minutes video presentation by Dr. Stephen Hicks (with a flowchart).