Plasmatic

Kaladin, I didn't see that you had responded until recently. Kaladin said: The comment about Dr. Peikoff's position on economics is related to the Oist conception of value, more specifically evaluation. Somewhere in the induction in Physics and Philosophy lectures Dr. Peikoff mentions Ms. Rand's view of the role of "teleological measurements" in economics. His point was that all of the sciences that pertain to the interplay between the metaphysical and the man-made (consciousness) are dealing with teleological measurements (as opposed to, say, physics). Kaladin said: The differences between the senses of objective and subjective become important here. Remember that the Oist ethics are normative and therefore involve evaluation: One "must choose" goals and values. The choice of values is conditioned on volitional, active effort. Remember Ms. Rand's comments in Atlas Shrugged: The conditional nature of reason requires one to mark clearly the metaphysically given from the man-made. If your model of economics does not counsel one to consider the legitimately subjective sense of an individuals volitional evaluation of their own value hierarchy, then how will you deal with a market that involves irrational evaluations? Ethics tells us what one ought to value but that is an "If-then" conditional. If one chooses to live then they must choose to constrain their values by recognizing metaphysically given facts, facts that are not open to evaluation and therefore not the province of teleological measurements. It is a metaphysically given fact that any given market contains volitional agents that act irrationally. The legitimately meaningful sense of subjective applies to these evaluations. It is however an objective fact that these agents preferences are subject to their own self-made evaluations. It is my own subjective (or personal if you rather) preference that I prefer blondes but it is an objective fact that I do have this preference. Any investor interested in an objective evaluation of their rational, life serving options, better recognize that IF the market they are evaluating contains volitional agents who have conditional evaluations of their own, they must THEN consider these metaphysically given facts. Be careful not to make the fallacy of the frozen abstraction regarding economic theory. A market contains man-made preferences and that is a metaphysically given fact. That a rational investor evaluates the evaluations of other market agents as irrational and unobjective does not mitigate the damage to the objective investors values that will follow from acting as though these irrational agents are not present in said market.

Concerning the premise that the point of stressing the primary nature of entities in causality is restricted somehow to actions causing action, one can hear Dr. Peikoff stress explicitly in the 1976 lecture on Causality and entities as primary, to "please note that this is true of action as well as the rest" of the so called "categories". Lecture 2 approx 68 min

Grames said: There is nothing for the principle to work against because attributes and relationships are nothing more than the entities which instantiate these "categories". Any separation of attributes or relations is an act of abstraction. Edit: Grames said: But the Oist principle of causality does require one to and Kaladin is asking about the Oist position. Edit: I am skeptical of the term "causal derivative" depending on what is meant. (Causal primary vs epistemic primary, etc.)

Grames said: Kaladin wanted to know the Oist position on the OP which is that only entities exist as primaries and that only entities are causal primaries. Clearly many answers here are motivated by inverted hierarchy. (A desire to reconcile Oist metaphysics with current popular theories in physics) I wonder how many responders besides Stephen hold this premise explicitly? Or "To be is to be an entity with a specific nature or identity".

Buddha: Complete nonsense. This is a description of subjectivism. You have no idea what your saying. An Objective defense of rights relates ones actions to mind independent facts not "because I said so". How rediculous. Buddha said: More nonsense. The Objectivist view of rights is that they are Objective. Meaning they are not created by mans mind or will. Nature, for Oist is a synonym of existence. Governments are formed to "secure" the identity derived fact of mans nature as a living creature with certain requirements. Just think, "I have a right to health care, because I said so"! Absolute nonsense.

Does your theory of value take in to account the fact that objectivity is volitional and that very many folks have unobjective values? Are you familiar with Dr. Peikoff's position on the difference between economics and the rest of the sciences? How does your theory countenance the different senses of subjective and objective? For example, Metaphysical objectivity vs epistemic objectivity. Edit: thought this anser by Yaron would be worth listening to in relation to the OP. http://www.peikoff.com/2014/03/17/to-yb-what-is-your-view-on-austrian-economics/

Another one of those passive aggressive unsupported assertions about the insufficiency of Oism. "I believe" that anyone who claims such nonsense doesn't possess sufficient knowledge of philosophy to understand that causality is a general philosophical subject and physics has nothing to say about it. The very claim is a logical contradiction. Why do you go off on these attempts at historical narration in everyones threads when the story has no relevance?

Louie said: Well, I dont understand why you think ITOE isn't sufficient but you can find Dr. Peikoff discussing this point in the 1976 lectures around 64 min into lecture 2. You can find Greg Salmiari discussing Ms. Rand's distinction on what a "faculty" is in relation to a conscious entities properties whereby said entity has the abilities it does cognitively in Objectivist Epistemology in Outline. You can find Dr. Peikoff discussing nearly the same things from the 1976 lectures in OPAR. This is not about merely how one talks colloquially with non technical language but about the Oist metaphysical principle of causality and the claim that it is somehow deficient or overstated ( along with the nonsensical claim that special, derivative knowledge can correct general self evident knowledge.) edit: Louie said: This does not follow at all. You are the cause of your behavior. You, as an indivisible whole, posses the faculty of volition. That a faculty is made possible by physical properties possessed by an entity does not justify the elevation of a metaphysical principle that sunders the men into separate metaphysical categories of causal agency.

Double post

For Objectivism, if its a cause, its an entity. There are no non-agent causes. The differentiation is useless.

SL said: But you are in good company! Kaladin's question is answered in spades in the appendix to ITOE. Ms. Rand's comments in the sections on primary/secondary qualities and constituent vs dispositional properties are highly relevant here. Consider especially the conversation surrounding these comments. A grain of sands potential or capacity to burn the skin of a foot exposed stroller is no less a result of an aspect of the entity than its solidity or surface texture. The cognitive isolation of the relevant attributes pertaining to temperature are held as an epistemological device performed by abstraction. The "essential" attributes isolated, the range of measurements chosen, are held in abstraction. Entities ARE their attributes exactly in the same way that "Existence IS Identity". In fact, in metaphysical, causal context, "to be, is to be an entity".

SL said: Yes, and it is to your credit that you noticed this confusion relating to fundamentals of Oist metaphysics. Do you see how this philosophical error can be a foothold for upside down-inverted premises about the hierarchal relations of philosophy to physics?

Gio said: "Read the economic writings of Bastiat (Economic Sophisms for instance). The purpose of economy is the satisfaction of the consumer, not the producer protection. Because consumer is the finality of economy and because each producer is also consumer and consumes much more than he produces. In his life, any creator copy much more things than he can create (he copies something every minute of his life). Therefore, intellectual property isn't in anybody interest." Just for contrast, this is what the Oist view is on the consumer as the "end" of production. "Consumption is the final, not the efficient, cause of production. The efficient cause is savings, which can be said to represent the opposite of consumption: they represent unconsumed goods. Consumption is the end of production, and a dead end, as far as the productive process is concerned. The worker who produces so little that he consumes everything he earns, carries his own weight economically, but contributes nothing to future production. The worker who has a modest savings account, and the millionaire who invests a fortune (and all the men in between), are those who finance the future. The man who consumes without producing is a parasite, whether he is a welfare recipient or a rich playboy." http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/consumption.html I really need to enter this debate but havent had the time to give it the needed attention. My tounge is bleeding!

Buddha said: "Rand's tweak on Aristotelian causality is that no one can "force" anything to behave in a way that is not in accordance with it's nature." Aristotle's notion of force was consistent with his law of identity. Where did Aristotle claim anything to the contrary? Buddha said: "Can you force a broken TV to work?" Yes, by grasping what caused it to break, one can enact the necessary physical conditions that satisfy a working television. [through the application of what physicist call force] That has nothing to do with violating identity. Buddha said: "If you stick a gun to another persons head and tell him to give you his wallet, and he does, does this mean that you "forced" him to give you his wallet? Or does it mean that he CHOSE to give you his wallet? [...] If Congress passes a law, do they "force" people to obey it? Do they really have that type of ontological power? Are they supernatural Gods, violating causality?" This is an equivocation on the meaning of "force" here. One who "sticks a gun to another persons head and tell him to give [him] his wallet" is threatening the use of force to coerce another into making choices they would not make without the threat of force. Likewise with a government law. It is a coercion of actions with the threat of force. The government and the robber do have the ontological power to make good on their threat.

Reidy said: Oh, I wasn't intending to argue anything like that. Only that there were very effectual cultural influences arriving with these immigrants.

There was indeed several immigrant intellectuals who came here with highly active philosophical and cultural efforts. The Frankfurt School marxist who fled Nazi Germany to settle at Columbia University to mention a major source of cultural decay.( Fromm, Horkiemer, Marcuse etc.) Also several philosophical physicist and philosophers of science, Popper, Fayerabend, Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Planck, the Positivist, etc.... Also, Russell and Wittgenstein influenced these thinkers. Another European influence. These intellectuals were not trying to "escape collectivism". They came here and agitated-implemented their own kind of collectivism.

Is there any significant difference from this thread and the previous one? As to the object-use dichotomy being bandied with: Ms. Rand Said: "[...] after which IT would become his property"

Observe the dramatic qualitative changes in shape via nothing but a change in sound. http://youtu.be/GtiSCBXbHAg

Vik asked: No, particularly when the qualitative difference arrives at a critical quantity of motion.

Louie asked: You are probably lost on the exchange between Vik and I because of your unfamiliarity with the topic. The largest portion of the Philosophy of Science has been about the scientific realism debate and in particular over theoretical entities. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/theoretical-terms-science/ To answer your question, no I do not consider electrons non-physical. I am a realist. Concepts that refer are objective.

Louie said: It obvious that you have missed the nuanced difference between the debate Vik and I are having and the differences you and I have on your confusion about the synonyms object and entity. There is no sense ever where Ms. Rand uses object as something other than an entity. Neither your link or the discussion Vik and I are having have anything to do with that error of yours.

Vik said: It's much worse than you think Vik. I have been up and down every thing she and Dr. Peikoff have said on this topic and the whole topic is afflicted with frustrating language. In the end It's actually a very simple determination. Take Prof. K's question. He mentions her earlier statement about "perceptible entities" and then asked for clarification on whether she would "grant that there is a metaphysical status of entity apart from whether or not something is a perceptual entity?" and then gives an example of constituents that are perceptible. This pattern is constant. It shows up in Dr. Peikoff's lectures on Induction. The whole "super entity" thing as well as the confused treatment of "roll" as a first level concept. (which are all entities) Now, after years of chewing this problem I have concluded the confusion in Oist students came from the teacher. Mrs Rand herself demonstrated a strain in regards to the integration of what an entity is. "Abstractions as such do not exist" and yet "concepts are abstractions" and "concepts are mental existents". When queried about the metaphysical status of concepts as "mental entities" Ms. Rand then retracts and calls them a "mental something" because she abhorred "neologisms". But "thing" is a synonym of entity.... All of this is from not integrating consistently what an entity is. Oist academics constantly repeat that the Oist metaphysics is a highly delimited subject "Identity plus causality". Like your claim : This is a consequence of an impoverished integration of the Oist view of causality. Specifically the primary role of entities in causality. Take the quote about "ultimate constituents": "this particle...acts" ... "particle...acts"...."material object....acts"......"ultimate causes" Now the simple part: If "all actions are caused by entities" and "particles act", then_____________.? Now, you haven't show familiarity with the extended sense of "entity" mentioned in Oist publications. If the "smallest of subatomic particles" are still considered entities and an electron is a subatomic particle, then _________? Lets take Ms Rand's statements: And yet Philosophy does exactly that! Ms Rand herself in that very passage places "conditions" on what constitutes discovery and how one expresses it. "There are no actions without entities"-the law of identity and causality are constraints on both what is possible and what we say about what is possible. Particularly axiomatic concepts like entity . The important thing to grasp here is to NOT use terms that do NOT apply. And what term was misapplied by the Prof. in that exchange? The very error that is at issue here, speaking of the hidden causes as if it were actions without entities! Meaning is based on perception. We cannot divorce our conceptual chain from perception. Not even when hypothesizing about ultimate causes. That is why Ms. Rand said in the same passage that you have to "bring it back to the perceptual" We do not have some semantic criteria for theoretical objects that is somehow not tied to the perceptual because they are "abstractions from abstractions" because the referents of concepts are grasped non-propositionally by perception. The difficulty arises when we move into the "unit stage" of abstracting from entities and use symbols as concrete "mental entities" ( which have their "being" via such concrete substitution of words for the experiential content.) Now, do you know that the quantitative-qualitative issue is central to modern science trespasses on the philosophical principle of causality? Dr. Peikoff said of philosophy "it does not tell us what kinds of entities or actions are possible. It tells us only that whatever entities there are, they act in accordance with their nature, and whatever actions there are, they are performed and determined by the entity which acts." Entity = 1 = Quantity Attributes, actions , relations = Qualities More later....

Only time for this: Vic said: Seriously? Yes it does! to which she said "certainly" Bricks are perceptible but the question is about the imperceptible constituents being granted the metaphysical status of entities.

Making mountains from mole hills would be taking the word "perceptible" and then treating everything else she said about entities as though it didn't matter. ITOE said: This is why its a bad idea to not consider everything an author said about a subject. The perceptible part is just to stress the ostensible nature of first level concepts.

louie said: What does this ridiculous non sequitur have to do with what I have claimed?