Plasmatic

Regarding my response to your comment I excerpted previously; there is no such thing as non-rational persuasion. To persuade is to make rational arguments such that another accepts your premises as true. This should not be a controversial claim. As to the erroneous comments of Laika's I was referring to, lets see: Is it the case that "appealing to ethical absolutes" "wouldn't work with anyone"? and is it true that "trying it with a marxist serves as evidence of how little respect you have for them as people trying to reason there way through the world." If one is "trying to reason their way through the world", then why is it the case that "truth will not persuade them"?? (your "merit of fact") If self esteem can only be gained by virtuous action then how is pretending that a marxists "dedication" to the immoral cause of marxism is a source of true self worth and worthy of "respect"? Is it the case that one should treat the belief in marxism as "not a big deal" because a marxist is suffering from the psychological and emotional weight of the fact that their beliefs DO reflect on them morally and there "self" is in a state of moral debasement? Is it the case that "Marxism is primarily (but by no means exclusively) an emotional response to people's suffering"? Is the marxist view of social justice an instance of a "humane" condition"? Is it the case that the marxist myths of "out of control market forces", "anarchy of competition", "exploitation of the ruling class" and a "lack of property" are "oppressing" the Marxist into "militancy" and robbing them of individuality? Is it really "selfish" "at its core" to choose marxism because one is "grappling with legitimate personal problems" that Marx claims "they cannot change or control."? Do I need to go on?

You have any non-strawmen comments, sweetheart?

First, I don't expect you to appreciate the Oist position on dealing with people who hold evil beliefs, or even be aware of what my reasons for asking my initial question even is. Second, I have a strong interest in Marxist doctrine and study it quite a bit. Particularly the Frankfurt school and the neo-marxism within postmodernism. I think anyone who doesn't understand Marx cant possibly grasp what is happening all around us with much detail. See my playlist on the topic here: https://m.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLmJ5QMr7eqvScV0kCa7UwgMz-d0F_x6vD Read the description.... Maybe its true that you have equal value to gain by exchanging your "opinions" with a marxist on their terms but that is an affront to anyone with a moral compass.

Yet, Laika argued nothing like the above.

Why would an Oist grant this ridiculous premise? Almost nothing Laika said is remotely true. Has anyone else observing this and other recent threads been at least struggling to countenance how some have been responding to Laika? (Qualitativley, the nature of the responses)

Invalid concepts are not the same as anti-concepts. Fictional characters are not anti-concepts either.

Dude, you beat me to it. After warning them of the consequences of such barbarism, no choice but to meet this kind of situation with what terms the managers insist on bringing on themselves.

You're missing the point Mindborg. Let me put it this way. There has never been a state which has in principle separated economics from interference of the state. Black markets presuppose the state is involved in economics.

See Equal is Unfair by Don Watkins and Yaron Brook for some Oists views on this alleged problem. https://www.amazon.com/Equal-Unfair-Americas-Misguided-Inequality/dp/125008444X

For those whom capitalism is still an unknown ideal, capitalism is the complete seperation of economics and state and that has never existed. This clear, non-foggy, definition of capitalism is the basis for Rand's argument, that Laika just led himself to discover, on the difference between economic and political power.

Laika said: Laika, there are a few things anyone who takes Objectivism seriously would need to know about your context before engaging in this discussion. How old are you? Do you currently consider yourself a Communist? If so, are you saying you are doubting Communism as a philosophy as a result of your awareness of the outcomes of it in practice? You should note that just because you are getting answers from members here doesnt mean they are Objectivist and, or, are presenting Objectivism in their responses. That is why studying Rand for yourself is the best approach to any questions about Oism.

If you do improve your knowledge you will find that its impossible that you could comprehend Ryan's argument for why "It makes any general knowledge or induction unjustifiable" if you don't even understand what "It" is. For Ryan "It" (universals) are akin to what Plato call the Form. By agreeing with Ryan (knowingly, or not) you are actually claiming that in order to have knowledge we need some kind of Platonic world of ideals (entities) with bizarre abilities. Does that sound like what you want to be accepting?

Epistemolouge have you read my response in this thread? What about there being a metaphysical basis for similarity without a need for "strict Identity" makes the view of universality as epistemic problematic? There is a factual basis for similarity and it doesn't include the metaphysical nonsense of bizarre entities occupying many places at once but rather a mind grasping individual identities that have common structure/architecture while remaining physically distinct individuals.

I don't recommend a first exposure to Oism by looking into what Rand fans think about an elected official. Every year around election time many Oist seem to go bat shit crazy and say all kinds of irrational nonsense. Study Rands books to find out what you think an Objectivist view of Trump would be.

Your equivocating on "range" as well as missing the point as relates to Oist epistemology and the base of mathematics. 1+1=2 regardless of what qualitative differences the entities you are counting possess because we omit all measurements except quantity. That is, the one thing one cannot omit is the fundamental concept entity. Entity=1 and that is the information that is absolute and universal to every moment of perceptual awareness. Just as there is no range of existing there is no being more or less an entity. Metaphysically "to be, is to be an entity" (76 lectures). Thats why concepts rely on concrete symbols to exist. This relates to the topic because while the analytic synthetic dichotomy is in error there is definately something factual they were trying to explain. (Peikoff recounts his struggle to answer many questions posed by the dichotomy in one lecture. How he dealt with those questions is something I think everyone should be aware of) Buddha, McCaskey tries to deal with those "Exceptionless and universal statements" here: http://www.johnmccaskey.com/analytic-statements/

What is the range of answers to 1+1 ? Why is quantity the one thing one must assume while measuring magnitudes? From Mathematics is About the World:

I think people here need to learn why Rand called it "omitting measurements" and not "omitting quantities"....why Rand called perception the arithmetic of knowledge and concepts the algebra.... There is absolutely nothing approximate about 1+1=2 and the metaphysical "base" of that undeniable fact is given in perception.....

I have little time to deal with the many things I dissagree with in the recent posts but just wanted to point something out quickly: I dont know why your claims about Kant are so far off sometimes but this is demonstrably false. Kant believed in the "synthetic apriori". Also, Rand actually believed that one can know what properties belong to "things in themselves" through the special sciences....

I wasn't making a claim about origins of JTB but about Gettier's claims about JTB. I assume you are referring to "The basic concepts involved in Gettier's JTB are:" I assume that knowledge of what Gettier said about JTB is sufficient to know what I was referring to. The basic concepts involved in Gettier's claims about JTB are: Better?

The basic concepts involved in Gettier's JTB are: 1). Justification 2).Truth 3). Belief 4). Knowledge The debate here basically centers around how to define these concepts and the hierarchal relation of them to one another. All the Gettier examples given basically are ways to attempt to do the above. The added contentions are around what Oist epistemology says about the above 4 concepts and hierarchal relations. Finding out if we mean the same thing is usually done by simply stating your definition of a given concept. In this case the concept knowledge. Definition: Knowledge is the recognition/identification of the facts of reality. Do you agree with this definition?

I still don't quite follow. But let's leave "motivation" aside for the moment, if possible. I'd like to get the basics squared away first. And if we can agree on the basics, then maybe I can more easily understand your point about motivation. All right. So let's start here: I have a belief that Bin Laden was responsible for 9/11. This belief that I have is either 1) knowledge or 2) not knowledge. This depends on whether or not it is true that Bin Laden was responsible for 9/11. Thus far, am I correct? If so, I guess my initial questions are: 1) Is it possible for me to determine whether my belief is knowledge or not knowledge? 2) If it is possible for me to do this, how exactly would I go about it in this case? You are thus far correct. 1). Yes, by reducing your beliefs via a valid epistemology back to the perceptual. A theory about unperceived causes is a special case of knowing that gets much more complicated and involves a whole theory of induction. Not what I would really call "the basics" of what constitutes knowledge. 2). Is asking for me to lay out an entire epistemology. (Theory of knowledge)

This does no work for you. I don't agree with Grames' claims so that doesn't help you make sense to me. And this explains the relevance of your "promise" statement how? What does not being able to promise, or guarantee truth have to do with claiming that a false belief constitutes knowledge? Im certain what you are saying is false.

The belief that Osama Bin Laden was responsible for 9/11 is only knowledge if it is true/ a fact that Bin laden was responsible for 9/11. (Whether or not I think your belief is true and therefore constitutes knowledge is irrelevant to the question of whether untrue beliefs are knowledge generally. ) I was trying to tell you that there are other reasons why one could hold that false beliefs are not knowledge other than the reasons you imputed in your analysis of the motivations of those who hold this.

If you can make the statement "one can't promise that knowledge is true" and then read the statement after its pointed out and still not get that you have separated knowledge from truth then you have a reading comprehension problem I don't know how to help you with. On the other issue: If one said "I promise A is A", what does that add to the question of whether or not one is justified in believing A is A because momma said so? (or if that belief constitutes knowledge in that context) edit: the question "does knowledge entail correspondence to fact" is answered by knowing how to form the concept knowledge. The claim that false beliefs are knowledge obliterates the difference between true beliefs and false ones.

How is it that you do not realize you are reiterating previous statements of yours that prove that you separate truth from knowledge? I read it and it is nonsensical. You are referring to beliefs, not knowledge. edit: "I mean promise as in promising you aren't in error, not as in being certain." What could you possibly mean by this such that it makes the statement any less nonsensical as it relates to your previous sentence?