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Plasmatic

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Everything posted by Plasmatic

  1. Alex said: That thread, and our exchange in it, is on my list of things I have to spiral back to. You will note that the form of the thread title and the questions asked in the thread are not instances of "accepting uncritically", anything.
  2. Louie said: I didn't claim any of this. "Null and "nothing" refer to SK's comments in this thread and the part about object and entity refers to both of your errors. Both parts are relevant to this thread. Louie said: I didn't say atoms are irreducible. "Perceptual" irreducibility is not what is being discussed when talking about fundamental entities. And no, apples don't technically have "parts", literally speaking. I am talking about the subject if this thread, which is what you are supposed to be addressing. If you dont understand something the onus is on you to
  3. Louie said: "Not engaging" an argument is not a defining characteristic of "empiricism.... louie said: No shit... I didn't claim any such nonsense. However, all valid "abstractions" (even strings of them constituting an argument) are reducible to a perceptual base. Louie said: I did point it out, previously! I don't cater to intellectual laziness, or context dropping. You would have to integrate the fact that I said "this list suffers from the same "divergences" as SK's previous thread" and then consult the previous thread for context. That would be the intel
  4. You would have to understand the rest of the book that quote came from to understand why my post is not "trolling". Particularly what the metaphysical basis and starting point Ms. Rand lays out for the "base" of the CONCEPT existent in that very same chapter. Here is a hint, all attributes and actions are of ______...
  5. Louie said: The relation is the same for both concepts. Thats the very error My post is addressing. Louie said: It gets at what is wrong with your response, while answering. Louie said: Atoms are entities and the things that are irreducible are called fundamental entities. There is no need to misuse the concepts "null" and "nothing", or make the synonymns object and entity into seperate concepts, to identify the distinction here. What is needed is the differentiation between parts and wholes and reducible and fundamental. Null and nothing correspond to t
  6. All existents are entity dependent. There are no floating "existents" apart from entities.
  7. Ok, so I think a productive line would be to point out that this list suffers from the same "divergences" as SK's previous thread. It's concepts are arbitrary and the differentiations don't follow an objective reduction to percepts making the differences asserted rationalistic symbol manipulation. We see ontological pluralities created from what an Oist method validates as synonyms. We have no explanation how a metaphysics-ontology would aid one in doing fundamental physics without violating the general vs special methods that differentiate Philosophy from Physics and keeps bo
  8. I just discovered Field's video the other day. It is a masterful integration! I have done similar poetry myself.
  9. Tried edit my post above 4 times with no success! Kuhn's criticism of Quine on translation is subject to his own objections because we only ever have access to what people say about their "intentions" and not the intentions themselves.
  10. Concepts are integrations of particulars into a unity by the device of concrete substitution of a perceptual symbol. Even here it is possible to reduce a concept into its component parts (unless one drops the logical context of the integrating steps). Conceptual unity is not metaphysical singularity. We abstract "one" from "many". Multiplicity is axiomatic, implicit in every state of awareness. Multiplicity is metaphysically given. "I mean by "metaphysical singularity" the idea that there is only really one "whole" existent called "reality". Reality is an epistemological unity that refer
  11. Since Kuhnian irrationalism claims that different paradigm holders cannot even translate languages because they live in different "worlds", I'm left wondering what you think the current exchange has in common with Kuhn's nonsense?
  12. HM, what you are pointing at is actually the practice of the "Hypothetical-deductive" method most often taken as the default philosophy of science. Likewise, Popper refused to engage in the questioning of where a given premise or concept came from and chose to claim "we never no what we are talking about"....
  13. The above is a non-sequitur. First, one can be moral and still be wrong philosophically on a given premise because errors of knowledge and moral errors are not the same thing. America's formation was based on the moral foundation of individual rights. That does not mean they had all the correct views on what rights are and how to uphold them. Second, this whole silly notion that the possibility of attainment of a given value system is undermined because it hasn't been fully achieved before, is just ridiculous. There was a first time for every new phenomenon that has come to be and w
  14. I did a google search for a phrase I read on OO's site once and it pulled up both sites in the results.
  15. "Reality", like "existence", is a concept that economizes the referencing of all the multiplicity of bounded particulars that exist. There is no such metaphysical singularity. It should be made clear that what you say above is not the Objectivist view of metaphysics. And this follows from what?
  16. I am not rejoinding the contention here yet, but... First, Jonathan denied that there is even a qualitative difference between a special science vs a philosophical method of proof. If you are referring to the question Jonathan asked me to "prove" with "research" and "testing", it was not the special science question you mention above. "Where is the research to back up the claim that a sense of life, or any other emotional state, can be reliably integrated with a fully conscious and explicit philosophy?" Notice, this question has nothing to do with the physiological reactio
  17. That depends on who's view of Aristotle you agree with. Even Ms. Rand accepted certain things as representative of error in Aristotle that may have been mistaken. Greg Salmieri has a great paper on Aristotle and an unconventional take on his view of universals: https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxncmVnb3J5c2FsbWllcml8Z3g6MTNhZTRjZWVlZDllZWYxNQ This would make Aristotle much more Oist than Ms. Rand even thought... Also, this entry from the SEP is a good read in relation to this thread: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereolo
  18. Only the reality that is the "form" of sensory perceptual relations, the objects of which are presented via that relation. It is "fundamental", or rather "essential", to the cognitive requirements that a conceptual consciousness' identity requires.
  19. Repairman, I am even more confused now. I hope you don't think I am accusing you of saying Ms. Rand "agreed" with Marx. I only want to know if you think that she thought he meant well? Likewise were you saying Marx, Stalin and their ilk meant well?
  20. Yeah, there's got to be something against the law about that right?
  21. Just wanted to give a heads up about an apparent parody of this site (OO)called "subjectivismonline". http://forum.subjectivismonline.com
  22. Here is the promised excerpt as an example from the lecture Induction in Physics and Philosophy: He applies this premise in various ways throughout the lecture.....
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