Plasmatic
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Posts posted by Plasmatic
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I see some subtle nuances still being missed-equivocated on in this thread. I will try to formulate them explicitly here soon.
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2 hours ago, StrictlyLogical said:
Careful, I don't think Bissell is actually trying to "prove" free will, let alone prove it based only on the special sciences.
I have to disagree. His statement clearly says what his view of the facts is "based on". Besides he is a Kellyist, who believe top down correction of philosophy in principle.
Edit:
The very difference between proof and validation is predicated on the validated facts being self evident. Clearly the special science facts he points to are not a species of the self evident kind.
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Don said:.
13 hours ago, DonAthos said:Having excused the mind from volition, one is forced to wonder what Bissell believes this implies for "free will" generally... He writes of this implication:
Does this sound like Bissell is excusing the mind from volition?
QuoteThus, upon the currently available psychological, biological and physical evidence, it would seem that man's free will, his capacity to direct his actions as an organism (especially his conscious actions), is a fact. It certainly cannot be dismissed so easily as some are willing and anxious to do. Most importantly, in this context, man's freedom of will is thoroughly compatible with the Dual-Aspect theory of mind. It is not the mind, nor the will, which chooses man's actions. These are merely man's capacity to act mentally and to chcose those actions. The cause of man's actions, according to the Dual-Aspect theory, is man, as a minded, willing organism
I object to his trying to prove free will from the special sciences but he clearly is not rejecting volition. "Man as a minded willing organism"....
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4 hours ago, MisterSwig said:9 hours ago, Plasmatic said:
Regarding Efron's paper: "Biology without consciousness"
No one here has argued for eliminating consciousness by reducing it to biology. No one....
I know. Because you're trying to reduce it to physics. I'm done correcting your evasions for the time being.
Lol! I just wanted to point out this little gem of context dropping which led to swig's accusation of evasion. If Efron's paper was titled "Physics without Consciousness" I would have said, " No one here has eliminated consciousness by reducing it to physics".
Swig clearly demonstrates the inability to think that a reduction of consciousness to the physical can be anything other than an elimination of consciousness.
Yes, consciousness is instatiated in physical causation AND it exist in a qualitatively first person experience. That is not an elimination of consciousness any more than saying an animal must posses a physical stomach in order to perform digestion.
To say there is no separate metaphysical stuff called consciousness is not to eliminate it!
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Yes indeed. Swig's last response consisted entirely of strawmen. It is clear from his last response that he has not comprehended the actual statements of pretty much anyone in this thread. Rather then address what people actually have said in this thread, he has gone on to insult people with accusations of evasion and make strawman comments about things they have not said. He is one of these Objectivist who thought they knew something about Objectivism but never actually tried to compare this isolated idea to the whole of the Objectivist literature.
To to speak of Rand using the word soul or spiritual and then draw the conclusion that what she meant was similar in some ridiculous way to descartes's view of the soul and substance dualism is preposterous.
Those Objectivist like Craig Biddle who think that consciousness in Objectivism is somehow "non-physical" and that the idea that consciousness is physical is "reductionist" in the only since they know of, which is materialist who eliminate consciousness reductively, will have to deal with statements made by Dr. Peikoff made in front of Ms. Rand in the 76 lectures, like this:
Quote"Q. In precisely what way are mind and body combined to produce man?
Should science have been seeking an answer to this question for which no good answer can now be given. Or can you give a satisfactory metaphysical answer?A "I do not ask such a question. I do not know what is unclear about the relation of mind and body or consciousness and the body. Consciousness is a faculty that we possess under certain conditions. What makes the questioner believe that there is anything to learn about how it is related to the body? Maybe at omniscience all there is to say is that we have a brain and a nervous system and under certain conditions we have the faculty of consciousness. Just as when you have a physical eye and an optical nerve -you have a working apparatus - you have the capacity to see as a result. Now the assumption here is that there has to be some kind of metaphysical glue of an unidentified kind that sticks together mind and body which of course comes from Descartes and completely false premises. I have no knowledge that there is any such thing and that there is therefore any unanswered question."
Edit: Here is another relevant Q and A:
QuoteQuestion: Is one's consciousness an entity?
My answer would be there are contexts in which you can refer to it as such. It is something. And we speak of consciousness as performing certain processes. But in this primary sense no strictly consciousness is not an entity. It is an attribute of an entity. It is a faculty possessed by certain living organisms. The entity is the living organism, man."
The Philosophy of Objectivism
Lec 3 143:00
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12 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:
upon a first impression it would seem what Searle and Bissell point out about reality (to be distinguished from perhaps how they say it and what labels they may use) are very much in agreement... this is a pleasant (tentative) surprise.
Honestly, Ive seen several occasions were Oist seem to be restating Searle without mentioning it....
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Regarding Efron's paper: "Biology without consciousness"
No one here has argued for eliminating consciousness by reducing it to biology. No one....
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7 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:
Searle attacks a different form of peoperty dualism which is not in part influenced by Objectivism, as Bissell's IS.
Certainly. Nevertheless, the paper provides a very relevant discussion of much the same content Bissell is trying to provide an answer for.
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I think this paper is useful on John Searle's criticism on property dualism theory:
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Swig
12 hours ago, MisterSwig said:FYI - We're dealing with a bunch of reductionists. I suggest schooling yourself on the subject before re-entering the arena. There's a great, old article about it in The Objectivist anthology called "Biology Without Consciousness--And Its Consequences" by Robert Efron. I suggest taking the time to read it carefully.
For the most part Oist usually have a very limited understanding of the general discussion that exist on the topic of The Philosophy of Mind. Ms. Rand herself had a extremely limited conception of " materialism" in that she basically was only referring to what is called an "eliminative reduction". One can be a non-eliminative materialist.
If you automatically see someone say they are a materialist, or physicalist and assume that means that the mind doesnt exist, [edit: or that the mind is causaly inefficatious] then you have a problem understanding the general subject and the range of differences within this genus.
And in case you didnt know, technically the Objectivist view is a non-eliminative one but nowhere claims that the mind is non-physical.
EDIT:
Its very important that everyone learn the difference between a causal reduction and an eliminative reduction...
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Reduction is an action performed by human entities.
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5 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:
Even if that's true, it doesn't change the widely accepted understanding of mental realm as meaning that which pertains to the mind.
Since when do Objectivists believe that consciousness is a physical thing? Maybe I'm at the wrong forum.
Name any place where Rand made a claim that consciousness was non physical.
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28 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:
Ah, then we are not working with the same definitions. The mental realm simply means the mind. You can define it however you want, causal or not, physical or not. That's all part of the debate. I was assuming that, as Objectivists, we agreed that the mind exists, in some manner, and is fundamentally different from the physical. If that's wrong, then let's re-establish our baseline. I don't want my version of the realm to be assumed. I'm trying to make arguments for it.
Seriously? The majority of this thread is about two different formulations over the ontology of mind. You claim that it is a separate, if dependent, non physical "realm" that "causes" stuff to happen to things..... Everyone else is objecting to your treating consciousness as "fundamentally" "non physical" and as something that causes things on a par with primary entities, as given within Objectivism. I find it hard to believe you aren't aware that this is what others are debating.
How are you "making arguments for" something you assume others already agree with?????
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5 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:
Would you mind fleshing out this point a little, please? So I have a better idea of what you mean. Thanks.
Consciousness is metaphysically given. Concepts are man made. The directness of conscious awareness is metaphysically given. The method one uses to direct ones consciousness is man made. You want others to take your method of formulating your introspective content as if it were metaphysically given and offer their own formulations as the same.
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22 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:
But the whole point is to find a neutral ground from which I can attack the supernatural position. I'm not neutral regarding supernaturalism. I'm neutral regarding the battlefield, which is the mental realm. And the opposition doesn't have to be a supernaturalist either. He could be a materialist or determinist, or whatever other brand of thinkers want to join in the discussion.
But you are begging the question of the neutrality of the ground when the existence of a causal "realm" itself what is being argued. In this case you want your realm to be assumed as uncontested. It is your concept of this "realm" that is being argued against.
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On December 1, 2016 at 8:42 PM, MisterSwig said:
If Plasmatic is correct, then I am doing something very wrong. I don't want to be in the position of pulling a Platonic, spiritual realm out of the physical one. My intention is not to posit any sort of transcendent realm of perfect Forms. On the contrary, my goal is to describe a dependent realm of fallible, human origination. It is a realm which must be discovered through a process of introspection and rational, scientific consideration. It cannot be understood by remembering a prior life in Form Heaven.
Your position does not have to be identical to Platonism to be essentially platonic in a certain respect. The similarity is in that your "mentities" are a proposed "realm" that ideas inhabit that act on the minds of conscious actors. Amanensis and perfection are not essential to that context of similarity.
On December 1, 2016 at 8:42 PM, MisterSwig said:Perhaps I can best answer Plasmatic by attempting to clarify what I mean by a concept as a mental entity. Which is this: a concept is a concrete thing in our mind that, due to its complex mental nature, we cannot retain without the aid of a perceptual, representational symbol, such as a word or picture. I believe my view here is basically consistent with Rand, who explained: "So the word is not the concept, but the word is the auditory or visual symbol which stands for a concept. And a concept is a mental entity; it cannot be perceived perceptually. That's the role played by words." (ITOE, p. 1
The word is not the concept AND a concept is not a mental entity until symbols are substituted for the concretes the concept is a device for referring to.
I object again to your literal use of "concrete" to categorize concepts. More on this below.
On December 1, 2016 at 8:42 PM, MisterSwig said:It's a very particular distinction, and there are seemingly conflicting passages regarding it in ITOE: "Words transform concepts into (mental) entities." (p. 11) And in OPAR: "A concept without a word is at best an ephemeral resolve; a word without a concept is noise." (p. 79) People, including myself, often blur the line between a concept and the symbol representing it. So, to be more precise, when I claim to perceive a concept introspectively, I mean that I'm aware of the symbol representing the concept, similar to how I'm aware of it extrospectively. Only, in the mental realm, I'm silently imagining the symbolic word or picture, instead of seeing them with my eyes or hearing the word with my ears.
So you are saying that the mental imagery of introspection, with the aid of language is "concrete" because it is apprehended directly by consciousness. I say to use this sense of "concrete" to make a metaphysical argument for another ontological "realm" is a context dropping formulation. It is a formulation uncontrained by proper hierarchy where the metaphysical is separated from the man made so as to keep causal order clear. Yes, Rand made infuriatingly careless statements in the appendix but that is because she was not publishing her statement as edited finalities, speaking extemporeaneously as it were. Your position that the cases therein are more authoritative despit all that and despite the larger body of Oist literature giving context to these imprecise instances is a mistake.
On December 1, 2016 at 8:42 PM, MisterSwig said:Plasmatic insists that: "There is no such thing as a mental concrete. You fundamentally misunderstand the role of words/language as providing concepts with concreteness." But this too misses the subtle distinction that words don't actually provide concepts with concreteness. Remember that we are talking about concretes in relation to abstractions. Abstractions don't exist. But concretes do. And a concept exists in the mind of man, not as an abstraction, but as a real mental integration. It is a mental thing. Words, therefore, are only perceptual concretes symbolizing the mental concretes (concepts).
This is a great example of ignoring the larger context of the Oist literature. Abstraction is part of the conceptualization process which creates mental integrations. You can find tons of statements in the literature to demonstrate that Rand agreed. Particularly the context of the statement "abstractions as such do not exist". "We substitute a concrete for the unlimited, open ended number of concretes which the new concrete subsumes." A concept gets its concreteness from language.
On December 1, 2016 at 8:42 PM, MisterSwig said:But even if I'm wrong, and it is the word that ultimately makes a concept an entity, the concept's nature would still be that of a mental concrete, according to Rand. "Prof. D: Now every entity, mental and otherwise, is a concrete existent. AR: That's right." (ITOE, p. 171) So why should we haggle over this terminology, when we could be considering each other's introspective evidence and conclusions about it?
The word is the concrete that makes the concept into a mental entity. You want to drop the context of the specific use of symbols/language AS concretes to perform the substitution. You want others to communicate with the Mystics criteria of "experience" as a testimony based argument and forego the constraints of objective hierarchy. Existence has causal primacy and not consciousness. Your whole method is askew.
On December 1, 2016 at 8:42 PM, MisterSwig said:I suspect that Plasmatic and I are working off two different interpretations of what Rand had to say in ITOE. It seems that some of what she wrote about words and concepts in the original work, particularly chapters 2 and 3, needed to be reformulated and clarified in the Appendix. I favor the workshop material, since it came later in Rand's life, and I suggest reading the section titled, "The Role of Words." (p. 163) Though I fear this will be a point of contention between Objectivists for some time to come.
As long as people don't try to look at statements from the Appendix in relation to all else that the literature contains, this type of contention will persist. Particularly if they take extemporeaneous comments that were not edited by the author as primary.
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On December 1, 2016 at 8:42 PM, MisterSwig said:
, I consider his most important position to be that "if volitional causation is not physical, then it's literally unreal." For, if this is true, then mental (non-physical, immaterial) causation is simply impossible, rendering any further discussion pointless.
I specifically chose the term agnostic because I wanted to nod to Dr. Peikoff's point about epistemological agnostics:
QuoteThe agnostic viewpoint poses as fair, impartial, and balanced. See how many fallacies you can find in it. Here are a few obvious ones: First, the agnostic allows the arbitrary into the realm of human cognition. He treats arbitrary claims as ideas proper to consider, discuss, evaluate—and then he regretfully says, “I don’t know,” instead of dismissing the arbitrary out of hand. Second, the onus-of-proof issue: the agnostic demands proof of a negative in a context where there is no evidence for the positive. “It’s up to you,” he says, “to prove that the fourth moon of Jupiter did not cause your sex life and that it was not a result of your previous incarnation as the Pharaoh of Egypt.” Third, the agnostic says, “Maybe these things will one day be proved.” In other words, he asserts possibilities or hypotheses with no jot of evidential basis.
The agnostic miscalculates. He thinks he is avoiding any position that will antagonize anybody. In fact, he is taking a position which is much more irrational than that of a man who takes a definite but mistaken stand on a given issue, because the agnostic treats arbitrary claims as meriting cognitive consideration and epistemological respect. He treats the arbitrary as on a par with the rational and evidentially supported. So he is the ultimate epistemological egalitarian: he equates the groundless and the proved. As such, he is an epistemological destroyer. The agnostic thinks that he is not taking any stand at all and therefore that he is safe, secure, invulnerable to attack. The fact is that his view is one of the falsest—and most cowardly—stands there can be.
http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/agnosticism.html
To pretend to be neutral as to the validity of the supernaturalist claim by substituting a different word is a mistake. You don't think you are doing that but your position is exactly like that of supernaturalist in the respect of unjustified categorization.
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1 hour ago, MisterSwig said:
Addendum: Upon further consideration, perhaps realm is a favored concept because it doesn't identify the domain as being natural or supernatural, thus allowing both naturalists and mystics to agree upon terms while the debate rages.
And why would you want to proceed on such agnostic terms on the subject of the invalid concept of supernature?
Thorough responses incoming.
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1 hour ago, Eiuol said:
I may be confused what your sentence says, I thought you were referring to motor control as an entity or mental content. If not, my bad
Yes, you must be confused.
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1 hour ago, Eiuol said:
I'm talking about how they (mental entities) -aren't- entities and Rand -says-
And Since I have made this very point so many times here, why are you saying this to me while also saying you don't disagree?
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51 minutes ago, Eiuol said:
Quite literally, Rand directly labels them as a more metaphorical usage of the term mental entity. She used the term to note that they are distinct "somethings" (phenomena of consciousness to use Rand's description earlier of mental entities; phenomena are not concretes). She also says the term "entity" is valid in other usage - if we remember our context. Here entity is okay, if we remember these are not concretes (as you do). I think on page 158 of ITOE or near there. I don't disagree with your positions in this thread, though.
Louie, I have no idea what you want to say here. My point to Greg is about causality as a principle being about entities as the cause of action. You responded by reiterating points that I have made in this thread and then saying you don't disagree with me. But the point you are talking about "Rand directly labels them" is not the same subject as my response to Greg involves. The primaries (entities) the principle of causality pertains to are not the "metaphorical" (epistemological) kind I have had cause to admonish you on so many times in past discussions.
What are you talking about?
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On November 23, 2016 at 5:05 PM, dream_weaver said:
Philosophically, it doesn't state what the identities of the particulars are, but only that each particular acts in accordance with what its particular identity is. The nature of inanimate matter is studied by physics, the nature of animate matter is studied by biology.
Except that "they" are entities....
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This podcast is suspiciously reminiscent of this thread:
swig, are you Steve Patterson?
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39 minutes ago, MisterSwig said:
To attack the idea of mental causation, don't you need to address the introspective evidence for volition (free will) which I have presented? Do you not experience yourself willing your body to move? What do you think goes on here?
Me willing my body to move is directly experienced introspectively and that does nothing for your attached dualism to this process. I am the entity doing the causing.
Hillary Blames Putin's Personal Beef
in US Elections 2004/2008/2012/2016
Posted · Edited by Plasmatic
Nicky, because I am fascinated by the nature of the exchange on this topic (and Trump in general) amongst Oist, I'd like to ask you if you could list what some of that evidence is?
Edit: Also, do you consider the raw data from Wikileaks misinformation?