The_Rational_Animal

I can offer empirical evidence that organisms kill, rape, and sacrifice themselves to ensure their own reproductive success. Perhaps you are misusing terms; I did not use 'rational' in an epistemological sense, only in the sense which Rand uses the word to mean consistent with or based on or using reason. There is nothing rational about ensuring reproductive success for oneself because the lowest organisms are driven to it by instinctual means. Thornhill and Thornhill (1987, link) introduced a theory by describing the sexual behaviour of scorpionflies, in which the male may gain sex from the female either by presenting a gift of food during courtship (in which case the female submits voluntarily) or without a nuptial offering, in which case force is necessary to restrain her. Socio-biologists propose that human rape appears not as an aberration but as an alternative gene-promotion strategy that is most likely to be adopted by the 'losers' in the competitive, harem-building struggle. If the means of access to legitimate, consenting sex is not available, then a male may be faced with the choice between force or genetic extinction. If he can succeed in impregnating one or two 'stolen' women before being castrated or lynched by the 'owner' males, then his genes (and thus behavioural tendencies) will have been passed on to the next generation of males.

Each organism competes to reproduce. For the ones that do not, they die and do not pass on their genes. When you say "do with what it has biologically to survive and flourish" implies that an organism uses its reproductive capabilities for its genes to survive and flourish, not that organism itself surviving and flourishing. Just as an apple lives as a uterus for apple seeds, any organism lives as a casing for its genes, moving them from place to place until they are ready for interaction with complementary genes. The consciousness we possess is the product of a long development of evolution; the conception of rationality we derive and are so proud of is simply an enhancement of a faculty purposed as a vehicle for the purposes of copulation. I meant 'egoism' in the sense that "I must survive so that I may pass on my genes", a selfish motivation of fulfilling a biological function. I made no assertion that it is rational. Presenting objections such as these does not weaken the claim. To say that reproduction is simply an ability and not a necessity is another comparison fallacy. Organisms outside the human realm exemplify the error in your claim: reproduction is not simply "yeah, I'll do it if I feel like it" or "yeah, I'll do it once I find the right partner". It is a biological necessity, an instinct. Humans have lost the necessity thereof through time, but this is an invalid comparison. Ultimately, a human being is a rational animal. Humans defecate, sleep, and breathe as animals do, we are a product of evolution. Man may be different in many aspects from his ancestors, but this does not make Rand's theory of life being an end in itself any more valid than one's life being a means in itself.

Can we firstly agree that Ayn Rand was heavily influenced by Aristotle? But say this influence is not limited to traditional philosophy, and extends into his natural philosophy as well. Aristotle's scientific study in biology led him to believe that the life of an organism (for example, a tree) is purposed by reaching adulthood. Neither he (nor Rand) thought favorably about an alternative, that the singular mission of that tree is in reproduction, that is, reaching adulthood to reproduce. Aristotle's theories were replaced by Darwin in the 19th century. Modern biology, with great explanatory power, supports Darwin's thesis, that no biological life is interested in preserving its own life as an end in itself. Biological life treats itself as a means, to the end of reproducing. To assert that one (a human being) must treat himself as an end is contrary to nature and thus reason. And if Rand's life-to-value thesis is invalid, her entire ethical system is untenable under that heading. Instead, the human animal shall act as all animals act: preserving oneself in order to pass one's genes onto the next generation. This in itself would be egoism; rational or not is the question.

Well, Professor. It would be nice for the teacher to explain what I am doing wrong. Otherwise, how am I going to learn? Think of yourself as a very bad teacher, who gives his students a test without teaching the material... (at least I gave links, not obscure references)

Why is going against reason unethical? Why is this a moral duty and not a moral 'ought'?

Why don't you simply tell me what is so "bad" about this objection?

What are these "objective" means of survival exactly? Yes, my own self-interest signifying an 'ought'.

I did a search for the is/ought problem in this forum but could not find one... What is the Is-Ought problem? It is usually stated as the problem of whether it is possible to derive normative statements from descriptive statements; but to state the problem at its most general level, it is the problem of whether any moral statement can be literally true, and hence potentially knowable. It is the problem of whether there exist any moral facts in exactly the same sense as there exist chemical facts, historical facts, or mathematical facts. Firstly, what is the reason why one should sustain one's life. It is a matter of 'ought.' To say that you 'must' sustain your life implies a deontological imperative, one that destroys free will. Secondly, what is the rationality of keeping or abandoning reason, is it rational or irrational? With Objectivist ethics, where moral facts are apparently objective, the following syllogism is defective. It is one that represents the most basic moral reasoning of the Randian system: The adoption of value system x is necessary for the survival of any human being. You are a human being. Therefore, you should adopt value system x. The missing premise-a prescriptive premise-is that one ought to do what is necessary in order to survive. But any inclusion of that prescriptive premise just triggers the infinite regression of the is/ought dichotomy. Treatment of the problem as a hypothetical imperative would prove equally unsatisfactory: If you wish to survive, you ought to adopt value system x. You wish to survive. Therefore, you ought to adopt value system x. This syllogism is perfectly valid, but it will not serve for Rand's purposes, for its introductory conditional makes the entire ethical system subjectively dependent on the individual human will: If you do not choose to survive, there appear to he no grounds upon which the Randians can condemn your judgment morally. Objectivist ethics are, therefore, thoroughly subjective.

I'm sorry, I decided to raise this point on the basis that somebody told me to read it, when I have, to "discover" arguments against physicalism. I am not rejecting Objectivist epistemology, only questioning whether Peikoff or Rand knew that it is possible to have a different kind of monism, one that does not reject the possibility of consciousness, one like anomalous monism. A magnetic field is a process. It may supervene upon a magnet just as a mental state supervenes upon a physical state. The magnetic field is dependent upon the magnet just as a mental state could be dependent upon a physical state. To say that magnetic fields exist independently from any causal source is mysticism. Back to the first point, not all monism is the same. A basic understanding of anomalous monism would show this. What Rand and Peikoff took to be monism is "the doctrine that all things are forms of one ultimate reality". But this is not Davidson's view. His view is a neutral monism, a dual-aspect, a third substance which is neither completely "mental" (as it is defined) or "physical" (as it is defined, by Davidson himself, a definition I should not be required to describe in full). This third substance is capable of both body and mental functions. This is the view of Benedict de Spinoza (whom Rand admired), Bertrand Russell, Alfred Ayer, William James, and, Donald Davidson. The monism of "anomalous monism" is really a misnomer and an obvious source of confusion here. In this neutral monism, there is only one. This is Wittgenstein's non-reductionism of the mind/body. My question is if this is Rand's non-reductionism of the mind/body. The question, although it requires familiarity with the topic, is not too terribly difficult. What am I reasoning or claiming here? I am asking a question. I am not asserting the truth of physicalism, I am merely showing that the definitions of monism being used here are outdated and quite frankly ridiculous, they're the ones that Rand and Peikoff used twenty to sixty years ago, and since (most) Objectivists do not make note of the mind/body discussion, I provided links to appropriate pages.

And I apologize, I mistook Capitalism Forever for noumenalself, who is the one that picked the fight.

Frankly, this question is only relevant to those who are aware of Donald Davidson's work and his theory of anomalous monism, or those who are curious enough to read about it from external sources, because I cannot explain the entire theory on these boards. It requires a bit of intellectual commitment to truly understand what he is saying and what the implications of the theory are. But Davidson explains precisely what is 'physical' and what is 'mental', and any reputable source for describing the theory will include said definitions. Think of this as an optional in-class discussion on a reading assignment that was due as homework.

I'm sorry, when did I say I care about what you think? Firstly, I'm not here to argue for physicalism, for anomalous monism, for Rand's view of the dichotomy. I posted here looking for an answer as to whether the two views are in at least some ways compatible, and if there are ways that they are not, what they are. It's you who is shifting the discussion. Secondly, don't ask me to defend physicalism to you because its obvious that no matter what I can possibly say here within normal limits, it won't convince you because you probably memorized the Objectivist Epistemology cover to cover, probably not questioning if what you're reading is intuitively reasonable. And if you have nothing more to say on the topic as indicated by the title of the thread, please go to your local university and ask any of the science faculty what physical is (if you're looking for a technical definition) and why everything must be physical.

The sciences study only science for a special reason: because science studies only that which is falsifiable and can be confirmed by rational examination. To suggest dualism without a theory of how such a mechanism would work is not falsifiable, it's a matter of asking an "if" question and not receiving an appropriate answer because it cannot be demonstrated to be false. Dualism is a place for philosophy because it is, as I say, not falsifiable. Physicalism is implied by science because the physical is all that is falsifiable. Like Rand, we cannot deny the existence of consciousness. But what we can deny is that this consciousness is a separate entity, somehow controlling the physical body which everyone inhabits. It's not that nonphysical objects cannot interact at all with physical ones. This is too broad of an ontological claim that I want to get into. It's simply in this case, with the mind and body, that they do not. I'm sure you've heard all of the arguments, I can't drum up any new proofs against the possibility of dualism, but it's simply a matter of recognizing that machines do not run on mysterious non-material forces. They are driven by energy input. "Ghosts" in the machine cannot run without energy, there is no way to transfer energy to a "ghost" if it has no material being. The only reasonable conclusion is that this "ghost" is actually an erroneous categorization of what consciousness is. No one should care about the relation of causation to energy (as the paper you cited addresses). The only care is about the necessity of energy needed to move such a "ghost", to keep it active. For example, say I stop eating. Why does my consciousness slowly deteriorate? Because my body is obviously intricately connected to my mind. My body sustains my consciousness, provides it with energy. Perhaps you would care to enlighten me on what free will is because right now, I'm not seeing your claim here as valid, that is, your conclusion doesn't follow the premises. What is the apparent defect of the "free will" which comes from physicalism and supervenience? I don't care to get into this long discussion. Almost all physicalists can agree on what is 'physical' (or more appropriately, all human beings can agree on just what is 'physical'.) But I leave some reading to you: Understanding 'Physical'.

Well, it is rational to be guided in one's metaphysical commitments by the methods of natural science. Metaphysics should not be approached in a way that is distinct from the sciences but should rather be thought of as continuous with it. The metaphysical picture of the world that one is led to by the methods of natural science is physicalism. The conclusion is that physicalism is true, or at least physicalism is the only rational conclusion from this. You're right, there are no dominant, catch-all arguments in favor of physicalism. But I mostly advocate it because I find that it is impossible for there to only be non-material entities (idealism). I also find that dualism is an impossibility. A non-material entity, such as a consciousness or a soul, cannot have causal interaction with a physical entity such as the body. There cannot be energy continuation between a non-material mind and a material body as it violates the laws of physics. Occam's Razor says that it is more likely, with the simpler explanation, that there is simply a body. Between materialism and physicalism, I choose physicalism because hard materialism goes against a belief in free will. It advocates a strict determinism, which I could argue against but being on an Objectivist forum, I don't feel such discussion is necessary. Thanks for correcting me.

To be honest, I think the agreements between Rand and Anomalous Monism are quite apparent in their premises. I believe the real issue likes in their respective laws of causality. I decided to investigate the respective meanings of 'event', 'action', and 'entity'. I see it as such: IF 'event' is an 'entity', THEN there is no contradiction IF 'event' is an 'action', THEN there is no contradiction IF 'event' is neither an 'action' nor an 'entity', THEN there is a contradiction Definitions: Event-- something that happens at a given place and time; a phenomenon located at a single point in space-time Action -- something done Entity -- something that has a distinct, separate existence look them up--source: WordNet Search Firstly, the obvious thing is that each definition begins with "something", which is some unspecified thing. According to the Objectivist, something which has a distinct existence (entity) is incompatible with "something that happens" or "something done". So thus, neither an action nor an event is an "entity". Secondly, it should be apparent that from these given definitions, action and event are equivalent and synonymous insofar as "to do" and "to happen" are both used passively. That is, something can be done, it need not do (perform) some thing itself, actively. For instance, I could say "the laundry was done", when I could have equivalently said "I did the laundry". They are the same, just as "the laundry happened" where laundry is the "action of completing the laundry". Thus, I believe there is no contradiction in both conceptions of causality because if we use the same term, either "action" or "entity", consistently in both cases, they will say the same thing.

Interesting discussion so far. I appreciate the elaboration on Rand's position. But for now, I'd simply like to point to certain consistencies between the two thinkers Davidson (the creator of anomalous monism) and Rand. Firstly, anomalous monism does not deny the existence of mental events; that is, it is not epiphenomenalism, which claims mental events are the direct result of bodily processes. Similarly, Rand (obviously) did not deny the existence of mental events, while (obviously) accepting matter as existential. Secondly, Rand said that both kinds of events have causal interaction with the whole organism (mental and physical). This position can be read about in various parts of For the New Intellectual, namely from pages 135 to 142. Anomalous monism, by "the principle of causal interaction", says that there exist both mental-to-physical as well as physical-to-mental causal interactions. Thirdly, Rand said that the mental events of consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical. Anomalous monism, by "the principle of the anomalism of the mental", says that there are no psycho-physical laws which relate the mental and the physical as just that, mental and physical. In this, anomalous monism is not your everyday reductionist physicalism; the two cannot be analyzed in terms of one another. A major problem I find in bringing these two together is in both parties' conceptions of causation. Rand knows causation to be as "an 'action' is not an entity; rather, entities act. Therefore, an action cannot be properly regarded as the fundamental cause of another action, as actions do not exist apart from the entities that produce them." On the other hand, Davidson feels that "all events are caused by and cause other events and this is the chief, defining characteristic of what an event is." Unless I am missing some vocabulary linkage here between "event" and "action", this seems to be a contradiction. Or could an "event" itself be an "entity", an these views be complementary? (see the next post) Davidson's view of properties (which is similar to Rand's) can be put in this manner: "...properties are linguistic items, are ways of describing events. According to Davidson there is nothing "in" events that makes it true that they can be described using certain predicates as opposed to others. Thus, there are no recognition-transcendent facts about events that determine how they can be described. Since properties are not ontological parts of events, it makes no sense to say that events cause other events in virtue of certain properties." The problem here is that the bolded part seems consistent with Objectivism, that properties are epistemological and not ontological. But the italicized part seems in consistent; that is, Objectivists say that properties of entities play a direct role in what actions occur and how it interacts with other things.

"Reduce to" = "can be explained in terms of"

My interest in Ayn Rand brought me to considering her views on the mind/body dichotomy. Of course I know she rejected the distinction altogether and called the human being a single, integrated entity, yet was still what can be appropriately called a dualist. She made the the assertions that (a) conscious organisms have both mental attributes and physical attributes, and ( both kinds of attributes may participate in determining the causal powers of the conscious organism. She then left the interaction mechanisms of mind and body to the sciences of psychology and neurobiology. But this last part, according to my standards, does not address the problem. I am a physicalist, but recognize Rand as not a physicalist, simply because she recognized a difference between mind and matter. I think that a physicalist interpretation of her 'primacy of existence' would not be well-founded. Anomalous monism, something I'm quite familiar with, can best be summarized as this: (a) mental events are identical with physical events and ( that the mental is anomalous; that is, under their mental descriptions these mental events are not regulated by strict physical laws (see Anomalous Monism for additional information). My question is whether or not Ayn Rand believed that the mental is not reducible to the physical (a key tenet of anomalous monism as a non-reduction form of physicalism) and whether the theory of anomalous monism would be consistent with her views of the mind and body, and offers an acceptable thesis that she "left to the sciences". Although Rand was a "dualist" and anomalous monism is monistic, I believe the two concepts can be reconciled in this case. Reference: here

Did I mention that no two Aristotelian scholars agree... on anything? I don't claim to be one, but I know a reputable peripatetic who agrees with the semantical interpretation. The view you presented from the philosophy encyclopedia may be the majority view; but as democracy teaches us, the majority view is not necessarily the correct one.

Essences are properties ascribed to universals: qualities that describe entities which are consistent enough throughout the universe to be collected under a single title. Aristotle saw essences as semantical, or pertaining to meaning (I should have been more clear). Aristotle's view of the essences, or universals, was largely that they come from abstraction. For example, say an alien comes to Earth to watch "the (intelligent) creatures of Earth", but has never before seen one. He forms his concept of the universal of human being by abstracting many instances he observes in his experience, interacting with and living amongst "the creatures of Earth". He comes to identity, or mentally extract, a shared feature by all human beings from each instance he comes across, one that need not be physically apparent, and probably necessarily so. He ignores the small differences between each example and recognizes the common essence they share: humanness. This characteristic is an essence because a human being can be so without being "human-like". "Human-like" is then a definition; a semantically significant bit of language, extracted by an abstraction. Ayn Rand, however, correlates "human-like" to some objectively existential feature, such as intelligence or reason, something ontologically existent, while Aristotle's may be an abstract concept, derived from experience nonetheless.

I could say that the nominalists are right: classification of entities is epistemological; that is, properties are purely conceived by those that conceive them as a means of organizing reality into something that is comprehensible. There is no ontological difference between the objects of reality because if there were no minds, no distinction could be drawn, especially between immaterial objects (concepts) and material objects (existents). Classifying two things in the same category (the "ball" category) based on shared characteristics, according to the nominalist approach, is then an error. My question then becomes, what keeps the nominalists from being correct?

Alright. I adopted Objectivism some years ago as an all-around world view when I became interested in philosophy and metaphysics. Unfortunately, I never had to make use of this forum, but now I do need help. I find that the Objectivist problem of essences to be quite substantial. The nature of the problem is this: Aristotle interpreted essences of objects (the property or properties an object must have if it is to be what it is) as merely a matter of language and definition. But Rand, perhaps mistakingly, interprets essences of objects as ontological, or existing in objective reality, independent of language. If Rand had no basis for this assessment and it is merely an assumption, the entire Objectivist philosophy could topple down with the support of its Axiom of Identity, which states that "a thing is what it is", which must necessarily be ontological. I tried to ignore this problem before but it has come up with a debate on Descartes' Cogito. Someone made this assertion: "The essential feature of thought is not ontological, but epistemological: it is the only activity that can clearly deduce my existence." I need support to give a counterargument that this assessment is false, that essences are in fact ontological. I guess what I ask for is support for Rand's interpretation of essences, which I can use to counter this claim and redeem my full belief in Objectivism. Thanks in advance.