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wisdomisbliss: Your first post asserted that Sciabarra is misunderstood. To support this, you linked to an article by Sciabarra. You also claim that you wrote a paper on this recently, recommended a book by Sciabarra and implied that most of us wouldn't be "morally free to read it." Then you have a paragraph that starts off with the question of whether Objectivism is open, and gradually move somehow to reasserting your praise of Sciabarra. You use the term "frozen" once or twice, implying God only knows what. You have a couple sentences at the beginning of your last paragraph that run about 150 words, neither of which I can decipher without terrible effort. In other words, your first post, aside from the link, is a slew of incoherant arguments and ugly innuendos. The article you linked to as support is absurd. It identified five aspects of the dialectical method. But how each of these aspects add up to something called "dialectics", what "dialectics" means taken as a single concept, the purpose of identifying or explicating this notion, etc., are all absent. As a quick example: The analytical integrity? Is this different from "synthetic" integrity? If all this means is "that she never loses sight of the whole", then why all the strange terminology? And the gigantic objection, to paraphrase Stephen, is: how is dialectics different from normal thinking? In other words: what is going on here? Even if all this made sense or were true, what is to be gained from it? It seems on its face like it adds nothing new and simply rewords and reorders Ayn Rand's philosophy to the point where it is, at best, useless and unreadable. I don't see that you've put forth any sort of argument or said anything meaningful at all. Sometimes you will, as I said, make assertions to the effect of what you believe, your mental state (anger, sleepiness), who you think is honest, or link to what someone else wrote. But these all come across as baldly subjective assertions. Also, your posts are full of baseless and cowardly implications, i.e. that we are cult members who are bound to a hierarchy and morally forbidden from reading unapproved texts. Don't be surprised that you aren't being well-received. I'm new to philosophy too, but I don't go around saying what things "seem" like to me, and then drawing thousands of words of conclusions. There is a level of clarity required for writing to facilitate rational thought. Your posts are far below that level. (Incidentally, I think this entire discussion is absurd. Nothing new was added after initial comments by Betsy and others to the effect of: the most important thing is to read as much Ayn Rand as you can, and then, if you're so inclined, look at what ARI is doing versus what TOC is doing.) EDIT: The point of this is to try to show that what you do in your last post, namely try to go over what you've already said, is the wrong approach. Just start over. And when you start over, take time to edit your posts, make sure they are structurally and grammatically correct, that your concepts are precise, etc. Don't be in a rush to go anywhere. It can take more than one sitting, a great deal of thought, and a tremendous amount of editing. Just because this is a forum on the internet doesn't make it so informal that you can just type straight through and click send. When you write you crystalize your thought. It should be as sharp and clear as you can possibly make it. (I have, for example, edited this post about 5 times, since I posted it, for grammar and word choice.)

Wisdomisbliss: Your posts are rambling. They have little structure and go on for well over a thousand words. Ultimately all they do is just assert: "X is good scholarship", "Y is an honest scholar", "I believe such-and-such", etc. Try to make your posts concise and at least try to support your claims. If you're tired, just post later.

There was a good and long thread on libertarianism and political parties here: http://forum.ObjectivismOnline.com/index.p...owtopic=613&hl=

It's a metaphysical problem arising from seeming incompatibilities between axioms and their corolaries. If existence is everything, then there is nothing outside of existence. But if existence is finite, then it cannot go on forever. It doesn't seem to make sense to posit a "boundary" to existence, since nothing could be "outside" of it. But it also doesn't seem to make sense to say that it goes on forever, since that would be positing an infinity.

I attended the lectures, which were quite good. He addresses many of the points you raise, and he's very well-read in Popper. As far as what I've read of Popper's, only some of the Logic of Scientific Discovery and "Falsificationism", so I'm far from an expert. I've also read Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. My opinion of Popper is that he is wrong. He fundamentally misunderstands the nature of consciousness as a "blank slate" in need of evidence and content from the world to operate. He replaces a positive (evidence) for a negative (falsification). So he gets thinking completely backwards. The fact that he is concerned with distinguishing science from pseudo-science doesn't help here. Pseudo-science is arbitrary and so there is something to the claim that it can't be falsified. But it's a non-essential characteristic of arbitrary knowledge: the essential feature is that it is not based on reality. I don't think Popper gets this. It's worth noting that KP called his approach "critical rationalism." At any rate, I think the lecture is certainly worth the money if these are issues you are interested in.

Just to clarify: LP's axioms of induction aren't basic axioms of philosophy like existence, identity, and consciousness. (They aren't even axioms of metaphysics like volition, entity, etc.) Think of them more like the axioms of geometry. They aren't first principles in general, but they are first principles for some more particular endeavor. And of course, as has been stated, there's more to do in philosophy. I assume that Dr. Ghate's point was the reason that Objectivism isn't accepted isn't because the philosophy needs to be developed more, and then people will be convinced.

I'll be there as a working scholar.

In terms of cinematography and choreography, and I’m sure some other areas, the movie is a paragon of stylization in a way that few films have matched. In terms of plot and characterization, the writer and/or director fail to stylize anything. (I’m speaking of Volume 1 here.) Thus, it is boring in terms of the events and structure of the film.

I haven't seen pt. 2, but since everyone is praising it, I thought I'd offer that I didn't like pt. 1 at all. It was very stylized, but incredibly meandering. Almost nothing happens over the course of 2 hours. It was very unselective and indulgent in almost every respect. Because of Tarantino's love of time lapses, you knew the outcome of the final battle in the first scene. Nothing was dramatized. It's basically just a long series of stylized action sequences.

I have no idea why this issue interests most of you, but I suspect it is because it is related to questions of gender and romance. And since there seems to be a great deal of confusion and disagreement about these (more fundamental) topics, consider: 1. What does gender consist in? What are masculinity and femininity, biologically and psychologically? 2. What facts in reality give rise to the possibility and necessity of romantic relationships? 3. What is the difference between a morality and psychology? Does a psychological problem imply a moral problem? My advice, which I'm sure most of you won't heed, is to start thinking through these issues, by yourself or in a different thread, carefully and rationally, apart from homosexuality. This thread is, for the most part, a string of pointless assertions on a scattershot of issues that haven't been clearly related or identified. And keep in mind that introspection is of paramount importance here.

Correct. As far as I know, there is no argument for this in Marx. He simply takes over the dialectic from Hegel. Objectivism validates every aspect of its metaphysics. You should look at the already-mentioned passages of OPAR.

"On the surface so, Marxism and Objectivism have much in common. They both reject subjectivism and any form of religion, superstition and idealism." Marx accepted subjectivism in collectivist form: he thought that the nature of man was determined by the conditions that man created (the state, society). This is what he meant when he said that man was related to himself as a "species-being", that man "has no essence", etc. Though it may superficially seem like Objectivism and Marxism share a common metaphysics, they do not. Marx accepts an ultimately Hegelian, dialectic, continuously-contradicting, negating, alienating universe. His account of the universe has no notion of Aristotelian identity. In contrast, the Objectivist metaphysics turns on an Aristotelian notion of identity. The two systems are fundamentally opposed. While both systems posit some sort of "matter" or existence as primary, they have radically differing views on the nature of existence.

Actually, you can't. That's the entire point of those ambiguous-Gestalt-type things. You have to look at it as one or the other--not both at the same time.

A contradiction in thought is implied, not actual. No one can think something is and that it is not in one thought. It's impossible to actually think about a triangular circle. However, there can be inconsistent thoughts that imply a contradiction: he can be asserting something in one instance, and then denying it in the next. And then we say, "That can't be right, because there are no contradictions: what is, is what it is, not what it isn't. So at least one of your statements has to be wrong." Edit: Yes, math cognoscenti, I'm aware that triangular circles can exist in certain topologies. I don't really think that's relevant, and you can stop pointing it out.

Thanks, Daniel. I think this makes a great deal of sense. The organization alone clarified a lot for me. (I don't know why, but I have a harder time with De Anima than any other work by Aristotle except Posterior Analytics.)

Could you post here or email me your pre-essay? Because I'm getting confused again looking through De Anima.

What are you distinguishing difference from here? How could you say there is less difference? How could you differentiate between degrees of difference--without having classified differences by similarities? The more I think about it, the more sure I am that "similar" is axiomatic. Concepts are formed by abstracting away varying measurements from common characteristics. "Common" here is given--perceived. This definition is an analysis of what similarity means in a particular context to a conceptual consciousness, not a definition of similarity. You perceive similarity before you ever form a concept. Similarity, difference, and change are given in perception along with entities--which is also an axiomatic concept. If measurement-omission were a conscious process, then I think quantity and quality would have to be axioms. As it is, I'm not so sure. The subject needs more thought. I'm very inclined to say that "quantity" cannot be defined except ostensively, and that it's particular instances are simply perceived. But I'm far from wedded to the idea. I don't think there are "plenty of things" that can be only defined ostensively but that aren't axioms. Conceptualized sense experiences are the only other things besides axioms that require exclusively ostensive definitions. "Similar" is certainly not a conceptualized sense experience. EDIT: No no no. I don't mean the concept quality is built-in. It couldn't be. But we could have a mechanism for picking out particular instances of quality, as against quantity (and we could not have such a mechanism if there weren't instances in reality to pick out (differentiating myself from Kant here)). We definitely have one for picking out similarities against differences. I'm not sure about this and don't really know where to go with it, so I'd just prefer to table it for now (in regards to quality).

I haven't listened to HB's Psychoepistemology courses. But after some thought, I think that subconscious content can be introspected with varying degrees of difficulty by using various techniques. Subconscious processes and mechanisms are more complicated. They can't just be brought into consciousness; they have to be inferred. Is this what you meant? I don't think the fact that similarity is analyzable disqualifies it as an axiom. As you've been saying, what we're really analyzing is the subconscious mechanism by which our brain picks out similarities. That doesn't change the fact that we _perceive_ similarities--are directly aware of them in consciousness. This is where my analogy really applies: what we are learning in physics and physiology about the physical reality of color increases our knowledge, but doesn't change our perceptual experience. I've been tossing around the idea that "quantity" and possibly "quality" were axioms, but now I'm not so sure. They clearly have to be built-in to our brains in some way, since in perceiving similarity we distinguish between quantities (to be omitted) and qualities. But just because they are part of a subconscious mechanism doesn't mean they are axioms. I'm still at least leaning towards "quantity" being an axiom, just because I can't think of any way to conceivably define it except ostensively. y_f: How would you abstract away differences if you didn't perceive a similarity? A similarity has to be in awareness before abstracting, or else you wouldn't be able to start. In your example, two dogs are similar both before and after you abstract away the difference in color. After you abstract color and the other relevant measurements, then you have a concept for dog. But even before that, you perceive both similarities and differences.

I don't think Aristotle is clear on this point. One of the things that confused me most about De Anima is following the description of the common sense through the account of phantasia. (I used Sachs' translation, and I don't read Greek.) Sorry to just make an assertation. I don't have my book with me. I'll find references sometime in the next few days to support this.

"Similar" (and "different") are definitely axioms. They aren't fundamental axiom like the Big Three, but they are axioms. It's like "change." All of these are fundamental, inherent in perception, etc. I don't think see how this implies that observing similarities doesn't require work (intrinsicism). (I don't mean that you perceive an entity called "similar." But you don't perceive an entity called "identity" either.) I think you might be under the impression that I'm reifying similarity. I'm not; it's certainly a relationship--but it's axiomatic. I'll think about the subconscious stuff for later this weekend.

Right. This actually makes a lot fall into place for me. There's a lot more to be said here, but here's a preliminary thought: The color analogy (despite its obvious limitations) applies in another way: concepts of color sensation are axiomatic, and so is "similarity" how it is generally meant. But it is possible to analyze both concepts further, not in terms of their perceived base, but in terms of what they consist in. You'll never get "beneath" color sensations, but that doesn't mean that you can't figure out what they are: wavelengths of light. Likewise, you'll never get "beneath" similarity, but that doesn't mean you can't say what it is: an algebraic abstraction of measurements.

kgvl wrote, "GVS asked what steps I would take to make government 'better' ... I stated the obvious first steps in a previous posting where I said that initial steps to 'repeal the 16th Amendment and reaffirm the individual rights [including property rights] already once affirmed in our country's Constitution would be a tremendous start." This isn't a "step." It's a massive legislative change that would be absolutely impossible to implement in the near future. The question is, given the state of our culture, how do you plan on doing this? You obviously can't just enact sweeping changes like that as a "start." Those changes will come about as consequences of philosophical changes--which the LP is antithetical to. There are much deeper ideological steps that have to be taken to to bring Objectivism into the "real world."

This is interesting. So what is given in perception is similarities (and differences). What that, in fact, means is: omitted measurements of common characteristics. A very rough analogy would be: color is given in perception, and science tells us what color actually consists of is varying wavelengths of light. But that doesn't change the fact that all we perceive is color, just as what we perceive is similarities. Is that in the right ballpark?

Is concept-formation a subconscious process??

Let me begin by saying that I think AR's theory of measurement omission in concept-formation is correct. Sometimes it is difficult to figure out how measurement omission applies to a particular concept, but it is always possible in the end, and once you figure it out you can see that that is, in fact, how the concept is organized. My problem is specifically in regard to the possibility of introspectively observing your mind omitting the measurements during the formation of a concept. I absolutely cannot do it. The best I can do is watch myself grasping similarities against differences. As far as what particular quantities are being omitted from what qualities, I have to sit down and figure it out later. As I said, sometimes it's quite difficult. It also seems like a somewhat rationalistic process, at least the way I do it. It doesn’t involve much, if any introspection. It’s more just sitting down and thinking about what would "work" in this situation, what previous concepts it would depend on and what measurements those omit, and so on. Since concept-formation is a volitional process, I'm inclined to think that it should be possible. But it all seems to happen so fast. One moment I'm noticing some similarity, the next moment I have a concept. I feel like having active, first-hand experience in omitting measurements would be helpful. I'm also baffled why the process seems to be so automated, even though I know it requires mental effort. The way I try to observe the process is by reading up on scientific and mathematical concepts that I'm unfamiliar with. Perhaps this isn't the best way of going about it, but I'm not sure what else to do. I don't think I'm an unusually poor introspector, but I don't know where to start here. Any thoughts/advice would be welcome.