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There are like 10 threads in that post. I'll try to make a start, though. The definition of property... I think the first dictionary definition I came across is right: "something owned." So, what kinds of things does one own? The primary things are the products of one's effort, but you can also own gifts, products you've traded for products of your own effort, etc. In regards to the comment about unclaimed property, keep in mind that nothing is an actual value until someone applies effort to make it a value. (I think you understand this.) I think you can call all of nature a "potential value", but it seems confused somehow to call anything "unclaimed property." "Potential property" might be more accurate, but there are some things in nature, i.e., other people, that can be a value to you but cannot be your property.

Well, what facts are relevant here? I can think of two that are crucial. 1. An infant or young child cannot survive on his own. 2. The infant has no choice in being brought into the world; that choice is his parents--more specifically his mother's. My tentative thoughts are that the choice to give birth to a child is an implicit contract with certain obligations. But I'd like to hear other thoughts on facts relevant to this issue before I commit myself.

Okay. Here goes. My understanding is that Rutgers is the place to be for metaphysics and epistemology. The problem is that they don't call it that in modern philosophy--it's philosophy of language, philosophy of linguistics, philosophy of mind and language, etc. However, I also understand that, generally speaking, there has been renewed interest in theories of concepts. I'm wondering how much, if at all, this interest in concepts has penetrated into Rutgers. I want to study epistemology in grad school, but I'm very afraid of spending all my time parsing symbolic logic. Also I'm wondering about their Philosophy of Physics, which is also very reknowned. I'm curious as to how much they work with the physicists there, and how much they work with the other epistemologists. Really, any general thoughts on or knowledge of the program would be appreciated. It's very difficult to get impressions of grad programs.

Hey Matt, Are you a grad or undergrad student at Rutgers? I'm applying there for graduate school, and you might be able to answer some questions for me.

There are some excellent score composers out there that should not be discounted, such as Thomas Newman. Of course none of them approach a Richard Halley level of genius, but keep in mind that all aspects of the film version of AS would suffer from similar problems.

Or order his profound lectures on induction, which will be available from the Ayn Rand Bookstore this fall.

JS Mill was subjected to corporal punishment in his education. He was also indoctrinated, in the literal sense of the word, with Utilitarianism. Not a fair comparison.

Thanks for clarifying. I think I'm more or less on the same page as you (Daniel) now. The four core subjects are both sufficient and necessary. It was helpful for me to note that both the learning and the teaching would be made more difficult by adding non-academic classes. Both cases are subsumed under the same principle: going beyond the delimited nature of academics in an academic instution is disregarding the nature of that institution, and will perforce lead to Bad Things. I learned next to nothing in school. When I thought about what it would have taken to learn just the academic subjects properly, it was almost beyond my comprehension. I still don't have a remotely good grounding in any of those subjects! It would have had to take more mental work than (my) college. Throwing in something like a foreign language early on as part of school would be ridiculous.

I am completely ignorant about philosophy of education. But I do find this thread very interesting. I just have a clarifying question. Daniel wrote: Is this because the subjects could then not be covered in depth? What if you just made the school day or the school year longer? Is there something inherently destructive in principle with including, say, a foreign language in the curriculum? My best guess is that including non-academic courses would be destructive to a school in the same way that it would be destructive for a restaurant to run a news wire. I.e., that a school's nature delimits it, and that to add unneeded appendages makes the whole thing less effective. Is this correct? If so, could you clarify this beyond the half-integration of my analogy? (I don't disagree with this; I'm just trying to understand it. I think what Daniel is saying makes a lot of sense, though I want to integrate/reduce it more before I commit myself.)

I don't know if this will get you as excited as it does me, but I'm planning on doing work in metaphysics. As for AR articles devoted to metaphysics, there is, of course, large parts of Galt's speech, and also the invaluable "The Metaphysical Versus the Manmade" reprinted in PWNI. I refer to this last a lot. Although this isn't much compared to her writings in other areas, she does constantly invoke metaphysics in said other writings. Every time she talks about cheating reality being cheating identity, or cheating the fact of consciousness, etc., she's integrating wide epistemological, ethical and political abstractions with basic axioms. I always look out for these sentences and paragraphs--it is usually very productive to analyze and "mine" them. But yeah, there's a lot of exciting stuff waiting to be done in metaphysics. Isn't it great?

Can you elaborate on his position?

Okay, I see. I was just trying to clarify things, I didn't mean to imply that you were denying the things I said. As for faculty, I actually didn't have a solid definition for that word, which this helped to clarify.

Yes, these last four lines are an accurate appraisal of my position. Consciousness is the faculty of awareness. We are aware by means of consciousness. I'm curious some of the other stuff though: "Existent" can be used to designate anything that exists, including entities, relationships, attributes, and non-physical things. So of course consciousness is an existent (with identity, no less). It's just not an entity in the primary metaphysical sense of the term entity. I don't know if I would call consciousness a capacity (though means is okay). I much prefer faculty. Anyway, the existent conciousness is this capacity, not the "existent which gives rise" to it. The existent which gives rise to it, broadly, is man. Of course not. I would call them them organs of sight, or the visual perceptual system. I'm not denying there are physical existents which give rise to the capacity for consciousness. I'm denying that they are called the mind. "Mind" refers to the cognitive aspect of consciousness. I don't think there's anything wrong with coming up for a concept to refer to the physical or neural "underpinnings" of consciousness, as long as we keep the proper philosophical context in mind. Usually thats "brain" or "nervous system" or (my favorite) "man", not "mind."

The term "mind" is not synonymous with consciousness. It is used generally to refer to the part of your consciousness that thinks. It is used in the Objectivist literature more specifically: it denotes the volitional, conceptual aspect of consciousness. (As opposed to feeling, which is automated by the subconscious.) The mind is an aspect of consciousness, and not an entity. The sense in which RadCap is using it is very unconventional. Ayn Rand certainly does not use mind and brain interchangably. When she uses it in her novels it is either to emphasize the fact that man's mind is inseparable from his body, or to emphasize a false view of the mind (i.e., the mind as automatically functioning). This latter is the most common. I'm sure its possible to find quotes that are the exception to this pattern, but it is the general pattern. In any case, mind is not synonymous with nervous system--mind is... well... mental. EDIT: Also, Tom Rexton said: "After all, it is through the nervous sytem that man perceives reality, feels emotions, coordinates the movements of his muscles, thinks about practically anthying, remembers past events, sleeps, dreams, etc... All 'actions of consciousness' are performed by the nervous system." This is not true. The nervous system does not think. Consciousness does that--more specifically, the mind does.