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nakt

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  1. nakt

    Your mind and you

    An interesting post and one that I think does a better job of highlighting how the law of identity actually applies to determinism. Fine, humans are human. Granted. And only humans can observe nature. If I may, I’ll try to formalize this line of reasoning (or at least what I believe to be your line of reasoning!): 1) Humans have senses and cognition – this is what it is to be human. 2) They use these faculties to infer the laws of nature. 3) The laws of nature cannot be used to deny humans’ existence. I think there’s a flaw here. It’s true to say that denying the existence of observational faculties would be a stolen premise, but I think you can change the argument and show how we can still use science to deny free will. A stolen premise works (or, rather, fails) by using the conclusion to deny a necessary premise. For instance, we cannot deny our existence because a necessary precondition of denying is existence. But I’m saying that existence does not hinge upon free will. Objects exist as well. And we can construct a view of the universe that has everything in it, that is fully consistent with itself, but doesn’t have beings with free will. Given that free will requires us to presume enitities that exist both within and without of the causal nature of the universe, doesn’t hard determinism provide a better “story?” Everything works the same; everything appears the same, but people are objects and possess no freedom to choose because they are affected by the same laws as everything else. Now, I know Rand says that only living objects “exist,” but this seems to be based on a different definition of “exist.”
  2. nakt

    Your mind and you

    I'll admit that it has little practical use. Even if I'm right - again, I stress that the positions advocated in a philosophical debate are not necessarily those advocated by the debater in real life - then we cannot do much about it. While holding people accountable for actions they cannot control would be wrong, I think wrongness and rightness hinge on definitions of "person" that include free will. It wouldn't be wrong or right in such a world - it would just be the movements of particles and energy. This is one of Kant's arguments against determinism - we can't know if we truly have free will, so we might as well follow the moral law. And again, you're observations of your free will are no proof of its existance. Philosophers across time have argued for the existance of God from their idea of God, but this is no objective proof of his existance. And before you say "Well, everyone sees free will," remember that the empiricists (David Hume in particular) did not see such a concept in the world. But yes, childlike would describe the depth of your arguments at this point. I don't see how the argument is "masturbatory," either. iIf that's the case, then this whole site is, as well. I don't think this discussion is just to give me some sort of pleasure, it is to engage others in healthy argument. That you are getting so bent out of shape about a simple debate speaks wonders. Given that the argument over determinsim is an argument over what we cherish most in ourselves, I think it is very important. I doubt many people will have a direct effect on their lives from this discussion (and I certainly hope they have better sense than to adopt some form of nihlist fatalism), but how many people have had their lives significantly affected by Rawls or Descartes or Kant? And those philosophers are considered some of the most important in western philosophy. I'd say that the lives of ordinary people have only been truly affected by four philosophers: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Marx. Kant has arguably had an affect on the way governments handle nation building after wars, as well as being the inspiration for the "Democratic Peace Theory of Today." But that doesn't mean every other philosopher's works are worthless - it just means that many have neither enough adherants or practical political use to have an everyday affect on society. And remember that many issues in hard science have little practical use. That Large Hadrion Collider that will be started up in June will likely never directly affect my life. Quantum physics, while interesting, is only worthy because it is a search for truth. What is more worthy? Should we throw away all knowledge deemed "self-masturbatory" and "useless." What a horrible world! And how anti-life-affirming, too. The nature of man is to seek truth. Would you deny him this as well?
  3. nakt

    Your mind and you

    Dude, calm down. I don't know about hubris, but I'm just debating an issue of philosophical importance. I mean, I'm not trying to convince you that you have no free will, I just find this to be an interesting argument. Most philosophical theories have to confront determinism at some point and find an answer for it. Locke and Hobbes did so by changing what is meant by "free will." Kant did so by playing with metaphysics. Others have simply thrown up their hands and walked away from the problem. I have no agenda; I just seek truth. The best way to find truth in philosophy is via discourse. I've talked to a lot of different people with a lot of different philosophical theories in my time, but I've never really found out what Objectivists have to say about these issues. And reading various authors only does so much; it's best to talk to those who adhere to a philosophy. When I say that I don't buy an argument, or that I think one is flawed, that isn't me just hating on you - I'm just trying to engage in a philosophical debate. I can't say that I'm an Objectivist, because I clearly am not one, but I'm interested in Objectivism in the same way I'm interested in Nietzche or Buddhism - as a topic to be explored and studied for sake of knowledge. Curiosity, if you will. What is more human? And I think that I've posted in a fairly coherent manner. I've brought forth a proposition for debate: that "Given what we know of the universe, we have no free will." I think there are answers, but I just want to know how an Objectivist responds to them. My posts here don't include trash like "omgz teh objectivism HAS NO ANSERWS for mah kewestions!" They are rational responses to my arguments and yours. I hope that we can all learn something from this debate. Again, I don't really hold that we have no free will. I think that humans have the power to truly initiate a causal series - to act as the prime mover of themselves. But the arguments presented here wouldn't convince me of that fact or any other. Indeed, I've had my understanding of Rand and her works slightly increased. Again, IT'S JUST A DEBATE; I DON'T REALLY FEEL THAT YOU DON'T HAVE FREE WILL. As for your arguments: What's that observation? I don't see free will, just as I don't see causation. It's something that might be inferred, but it's going to take some work. I've already shown how your introspective faculties can't be used to justify your brain's operations - your brain plays tricks on you all the time. Now, if you want to say that free will is something that, like causality, can't be proven either way, that's fine. Plenty of philosophies do this. Kant's trancendental argument is essentially that - "it doesn't matter either way and we can't prove either system, so we'll have to assume people have free will for now." That's a satisfactory argument, because hard determinism can't really be proven when it comes to the mind - body problem.
  4. nakt

    Your mind and you

    Fine. Let's assume that there are beings that can choose a course action freely, outside of any constraints on their decision making. I'll grant you that this is somehow possible. Show me that you are such a being. Show me that, given what we know of the physical universe, human action is not causally determined. That's the issue. And appalling to some axioms of what being a human is all about doesn't help; it just shifts your job a further step. This is just Descartes' proof of God all over again. "I have an idea of God, therefore it must come from something. That something is God." The illusion of free will can just be a meaningless organ of the mind - a mental appendix that has no real meaning. Just because your mind tells you something via introspection doesn't make it true of yourself. Thanks for the tautology lesson! Stop repeating Rand like a catechism and study her thoughts. That's what we're looking at. Furthermore, what he's saying isn't really a contradiction. He's saying that you do what is desired and that is, on some level, a "free choice" (in the Lockean and Hobbesian sense - your body could have done something somewhat different), but it is still causally determined by the universe and not truly free (in the Spinozan and Kantian sense). This is interesting. So, we might be subjectively free but not objectively free. Definitely a good way of looking at the problem, and possibly the source of a great deal of confusion over what we mean by free.
  5. Actually, bumming around the internet has provided me a fairly good answer from some random blog. I'll ammend my rule of "no blogs for evidence" in this case, because I think his argument is valid. Bonus: it also mentions Kant's rather odd feelings on sexuality! http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2004/08...urderer_at.html The discussion at the bottom is fairly good, too.
  6. Well, remember that certain acts are okay to perform when doing them for others. For instance, it's wrong to kill yourself, but it's morally permissible to sacrifice your life for another. Yeah. Remember that Kant's ethics are based around the use of principals and reason; common sense is something that is based more on the 'inclination' side of a person than the 'reason' side. Kant didn't think thought experiments were particularly useful in demonstrating how a principal might be wrong - only in how it might demonstrate the workings of a principal. To him, if a principal is true and guided by reason, it is true and just in all cases. Intuition and "common sense" have nothing to do with the act's rightness.
  7. You're right, you can't simply narrow it down to "this context." But I think one might be able to adopt the maxim "To protect another's life, I shall lie." The problem with lying for personal gain is the "for personal gain" part. You're respecting nobody's rationality when stealing or lying for yourself, but you are certainly respecting the victim's rationality when you lie on their behalf. Well, rationality of criminals comes up in Kant's discussion of punishment. He says that we can punish because we are essentially universalizing the criminals' maxim "I will murder/steal/kidnap/harm when it is beneficial." In other words, we are actually respecting criminals by punishing them. It's an interesting theory of punishment. Kant responds to utilitarian statements about criminals' irrationality by pointing out that if they are truly irrational they have no moral significance under the CI. We can imprison or kill them freely because they don't possess the part of persons that makes them morally significant - reason. Remember that Kant's theory rests upon the belief that reason is what separates people from rocks and animals, because it is reason that allows man to ignore his inclinations and have free will. This comes up in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. I haven't read any of Kant's work in a while, so I can't give you specific sections, but that might help. If you're interested in modern Kantian theory, take a look at Onora O'Neill. She put out several interesting defenses of Kant's moral theory. Well, attacking Kant's metaphysics is certainly the key to attacking his ethics. I think his weakest point is his establishment of the way moral statements work. To Kant, truly moral statements take the form of commandments (Do X). This is directly in opposition to relativists, as well as Objectivism. They say that moral statements are simply (If you want Y, do X). To Kant, these are merely prudential statements ("hypothetical imperatives," he calls them). I'm aware of Rand's statements on the way values work, but they don't really seem satisfactory in refuting Kant's statements. Essentially, Kant's working on a completely different plane from Rand. He's using internal reason to establish moral rules the same way we establish causal rules. These are things that can't be observed, only inferred and deducted (that's why they're Metaphysics!). Rand simply comes in and says, "Nope, values only matter to the individual." This is appealing, in the same way Hume's dismissal of Cartesian reason is, but I don't think it fully answers the problems Kant raises.
  8. First, Kant's response was something along the lines of not telling the murderer anything. He doesn't say you have to talk to the guy; you have no duty to tell him whatever he wants. You can simply tell him to go away. This, of course, doesn't help if the Nazis are asking you if Anne Franke is in your attic. But most modern Kantian theorists state that you would be allowed to lie in this situation - either because you would expect everyone else in you circumstances to do so or because the murderer is not rational / not going to treat you or his victim with respect. Generally, Kant's moral theory can be boiled down to "respect people as the rational agents that they are." When someone doesn't do that, we don't have to treat them as rational beings worthy of respect. If you want to attack Kant's ethics, there are a lot of thought experiments out there that do a much better job. No, you can't simply say "cheating is my duty," because "duty" means something very special to Kant. Duty is what arises from the CI, not just what you feel that you have a duty to do. Similarly, his "good will" comes from acting from the moral law, not simply liking helping people. Which particular thoughts of his are "leaps of logic?" I'll give you that he advances a very strange notion of why an action is just or unjust, but Kant is nothing if not internally consistent. His moral theory is dense and perhaps overly-technical, but I wouldn't say that it makes no sense.
  9. nakt

    Your mind and you

    Wow, good responses! Okay, it does seem to me that I make thousands of choices every day. But in a truly deterministic universe, I could not have made any other choice. Ultimately, Objectivism needs to either: 1) Deny determinism as whole (a response seemingly denied by empirical observation) 2) Deny determinism's effects on free will. I think 2 is probably the better bet, but I don't know how an Objectivist might construct such an argument. Like I said, even if you group all of your body in with your "self," accepting that the chemicals and neurons that determine your emotions and thoughts are "you," this doesn't help free will. Those volitions were still determined by the outside state of the Universe. Granted. I'm just saying this applies to everyone. Objectivism, Kantianism, Virtue - these theories of the self and right action fly out the window. Well, bumblebess might not behave according to the known laws of physics as we currently understand them, but that doesn't mean that they are somehow magic. They obviously fly, yeah, but that doesn't mean they're exempt from the laws of nature. Similarly, we don't fully understand how our brains work, but this doesn't mean that our brains are somehow outside the physical laws of the universe. No, it's simply a large, complex collection of atoms. As is everything (well, except energy - that's made up of energy!). You and I are matter; there's no evidence for anything else in us (and Objectivism would deny the presence of a soul or similar entity). Matter behaves according to the laws of nature, ergo we do as well. Given that every effect has a cause, the state of the universe now was determined by the state of the universe in the past. Why would humans be exempt from this? My consciousness would simply be an illusion. Even if I am in some real sense "conscious," that consciousness has no meaning because it won't give me free will. Look, I think there are answers, and I think I have free will. But the answers lie in things that, from what I understand of it, Objectivism denies. Obviously, having a soul outside the physical universe would provide an answer (though would also give issues of its own). I think the sort of difference between an object as a formal concept and as a physical object, similar to what Aquinas and Kant said, might provide some answer. But Objectivism denies the first and doesn't seem to provide much ground for the second. I'll consider determinism accounted for if you show one of two things: 1) A difference between the "thing in itself" and the "physical accidents." You would also have to show that the thing in itself would not be determined by the physical universe. 2) Some sort of thought example where somebody could truly make a choice in a deterministic universe.
  10. nakt

    Your mind and you

    Well, yeah. What I'm saying is that Objectivism simply can't account for a truly deterministic world. Since determinism is, for all intents and purposes, demonstrated both philosophically and scientifically, I think we need to do some major work here. Determinism, it seems, provides a better explanation for the way everything works than vague notions of "self" and "consciousness" independent of outside physical forces. It seems, given what we know, that "I" don't really have a choice in what I do at all. In which case virtually all philosophies predicated on some form of free will are kind of screwed. How can any philosophy be meaningfully "life affirming" if there is no real subject for the "life" being affirmed? But on a purely ontological level, how can an object exist except as a collection of its component parts? I'll grant that showing some form of real substance independent of a physical objects' composition would provide an answer to some problems presented, but I don't see the evidence for such a statement.
  11. Actually, you're pretty off on this one. It's a common misconception that the categorical imperative restricts actions because "bad things will happen." That would be inherently consequentialist and, therefore, anti-Kantian. What the CI requires is for the individual to formulate a maxim. Something like "When it is beneficial to do so, I shall lie." Kant says this can't be rationally willed, because not everyone can lie. Lying requires others to tell the truth at least sometimes, otherwise lying won't work. Now, that's the basis of the first formulation of the CI. The second is a little less arcane. Instead of being about universalizing of wills and maxims, it just states "Always act so that you never treat another solely as a means." So I can't lie because I will treat another person solely as a means. Again, Kantianism rejects consequences as justification for ethics. The bridge between metaphysics and ethics lies in Kant's views of the nature of man, as well. He sees the rational will as having infinite value. The person, he says, is "beyond price." Actions are just or unjust based on the rational will behind them (the maxim). Thus, the maxim must be capable of always being adopted (being consistent with the way moral statements are made, ie "Do X.") and must not violate the sanctity of another's will. That thought experiment, famously enough, was proposed by several of Kant's contemporaries. Essentially, they proposed that you are confronted with someone running from a murderer, who then hides in your house (with your consent, of course). The murderer comes knocking and asks where his victim is. It would seem that the CI would demand that we tell him the truth, or at the very least not lie. Kant gives a rather stupid answer that is, overall, pretty inconsistent with his previous statements (By the time this was proposed formally to him, he was getting on in years and fairly senile). But I think the answer lies in Kant's right to punish. He says that when a criminal commits a crime against us, we have a duty to punish them in proportion to their crime. We can do this primarily because we are treating them according to their own will (hurt people!). We have a right to ask, "Why do you ask me this?" If he lies (and we are fairly certain he is lying), we can freely lie to him back as punishment. If he tells the truth, we can simply refuse to tell him where his victim is. Furthermore, we can freely lie to him because of his own violation of the CI.
  12. nakt

    Your mind and you

    Hey everybody, this is my first post. I'm primarily interested in metaphysical matters in philosophy, but I also like ethics. One of the more fascinating topics, I think, in philosophy is the nature of the self and free will. I'm only casually acquainted with Rand's views on this, so maybe ya'll might be able to help me out here. I think determinism poses some interesting consequences for virtually all of philosophy, but particularly for theorists who put all there eggs in the free will basket (Rand, Kant, etc.) Free will is ultimately an illusion brought on by the way our brain works. The truth is that all your actions, intentions, and volitions are subject to deterministic rules. Your thoughts are biologically and physically determined by forces beyond your control. Your "self" is something determined by these same forces. You have no control over your thoughts or actions because "you" don't exist. "You" (and "I") are simply collections of molecules chemically and physically determined in the same way a rock is. This isn't pretty, but take comfort in the fact that you have no choice in whether you accept it or not. Now, you might say that everything in your brain is your "self," thereby avoiding some issues. But this is also flawed. You respond to events not because you "decide" to, but because your brain is set up in a certain way and presented with imagery. You didn't decide how your brain is set up, and you certainly didn't cause the current state of the universe. I think that this is a particular problem for Rand, given her statements on "man being his own cause" and such. Do you think that determinism is compatible with Objectivism? If so, how do you respond to the above objections? / I know, there's another thread on the page about Free Will. But that was mostly about clearing up an Objectivist's views on the nature of free will and causality, not really confronting determinism.
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