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Ward44

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Posts posted by Ward44

  1. Permit me to point out that this is now a somewhat different argument from where you started. You previously stated,

    "Actually, the inference that other humans are "conscious" is a _sub_-conscious, pre-conceptual, _implicit_ knowledge which infants grasp from observing the behavior of parents (or their equivalent). The axioms are _implicit_ knowledge from infancy."

    And I pointed out that while one's own consciousness is axiomatic, the issue is whether or not a chain of reasoning and experience is required to attribute a similarity in consciousness to another. If so this would mean it is not an axiom that was implicit knowledge in this case, but an inference -- a somewhat sophisticated one  -- based upon experience and a chain of reasoning

    No, my starting point, as you quote, is that an infant has some implicit knowledge (AR recognized this) which is _prior to_ any subsequent cognitive, i.e., epistemological, development. This _requires_ some cognitive processing, which given the infant's rudimentary level, means an implicit knowledge. The axioms of Objectivism _must_ be present at the primary, initial level of cognition because they identify reality and make possible any continued growth of cognitive abilities. You can't grow epistemologically from infancy if you haven't grasped and retained (as implicit principle or knowledge) the axioms -- one of which involves consciousness, both in oneself and in others by _subconscious inference_ (as opposed to explicit, conscious inference).

    My point, which you remain unconvinced of (and I'm willing to accept that, and still regard you as rational, objective and a friend) is that an infant _by explict evidence in it's behavior_ is aware of the fact that another's -- his parent's -- consciousness exists -- and has certain actionable, i.e., manipulable, aspects.

    Obviously, he cannot yet conceptualize the facts involved; but that doesn't preclude his ability to implicitly grasp the fact that "she, and/or he, is aware of me, of what I am doing, of what I want..etc," based on his own prior recognition of "I am conscious; that (the rest of inaminate reality around me) is not."

  2. Our own consciousness is directly accessible to us via introspection, but we need to observe the actions and identify the nature of another,

    I assume an infant does "observe the actions and [sub-consciously] identify the nature of another". Otherwise, you can only explain their behavior as a simple awareness of cause-and-effect: they act in a speciifc way (cause) -- and their parents act in a specific way (effect). They recognize the concretes, and learn to use them to satisfy their needs, which is the only way they have at their primitive level to function and survive.

    So, infants would be implicitly aware of the axiom of identity, and the principle of causality -- without having any implicit awareness of consciousness in their parents.

    Fair enough. That's a possibility. Child psychological experiments demonstrate an infant's awareness of identity and causality.

    But I have trouble accepting that an infant could be implicitly aware of identity and causality without _some_, however rudimentary, awareness, some, however primitive, inference, that his parents have _consciousness_, i.e., an awareness similar to his.

    and connect that nature to ourselves via a process of reasoning, in order to recognize that another possesses a consciousness whose nature is the same as our own.

    Just the give-and-take emotional reactions between parent and child would give the infant an _implicit knowledge_ of a similar consciousness to his own ("connect that nature to [himself]"). No _explicit_ chain of reasoning would be needed at this level of development. How much implicit knowledge, other than axiomatic, the infant may have -- and at what levels during his cognitive development -- is still open for argumentation and scientific experimentation, but his behavior, his actions and reactions, point, in my estimation, to _evidence_ of more awareness of another's consciousness than previously considered.

  3. I think that begs the question. Implicit knowledge subsumes more than just the axioms,

    Absolutely. My point was only that the axioms are implicit from infancy:"...in every state

    of awareness, from the first sensation...(AR, ITOE)"

    and the issue remains whether or not a chain of reasoning is required to attribute what may be axiomatic to you -- your own state of consciousness -- to another.

    Stephen, I think you may be confusing two different issues here.

    You're right about a chain of reasoning required to attribute any _specific_ state of consciousness in another as equivalent to my content (or, for that matter, all of the steps in any specific operation or process of consciousness), but that's a seperate issue from attributing equivalence to certain general states of consciousness, without which any explanation of consciousness is impossible.

    Remember the analytical philosopher's standard arguments (e.g., Quine's "Gavagai" from "Word and Object") about not being able to attribute _anything_ to another's consciousness because consciousness is all "personal"? They based their theories of linguistic interpretation upon this idea.

    In other words, what's axiomatic to my consciousness is axiomatic to any and every consciousness. The principles are the same for all; no matter the specific concretes of content and/or process.

    Since I know you know all this, I'm not sure exactly how to interpret your criticism!

    p.s.. I think you need to work some more on that quoting process.  :D

    How's this? :)

    ELS

  4. [re-formatted 1/09/05 06:54 PM post with jedymastyr quotes:]

    Actually, the inference that other humans are "conscious" is a _sub_-conscious, pre-conceptual, _implicit_ knowledge which infants grasp from observing the behavior of parents (or their equivalent). The axioms are _implicit_ knowledge from infancy.

    There certainly is! Inferring the nature of the consciousness in other animals is a task for comparative psychology. All we can do is observe an animal's behavior and infer

    from that what it _might_ or might not be aware of. To be more certain, requires experimentation geared to eliminating some possibilities and reinforcing others.

    After enough evidence is gathered (see the OPAR chapter regarding "certainty"), you can then infer something which might be valid.

    Just for example, if you feed squirrels peanuts, you'll observe there are _individual_differences in their responses; some search out the food more quickly and effectively than others; but they all (in a given group) seem not to "see" the food, but rather "smell" it's existence and location. Yet they apparently can navigate tree branches by sight fairly well. Do their consciousness' have seperate _modes_ of operation for the different actions in regard to the different objects involved?

    This is assumed (as far as I know) correctly from the lack of any identifiable equivalents to animal perceptual organs. The logical inference is that any _perception_ of reality has to come from some physiological organ _similar to_ an animal's organ of perception. If any plant had an _awareness_ (even at a very primitive level) of that-which-is-outside-itself, it would have to have consciousness of two facts: that-which-is-outside-itself -- and itself. So far, only animals have this awareness.

    ELS

  5. ...It requires more than just the axioms to deduce that other humans are conscious,...

    Actually, the inference that other humans are "conscious" is a _sub_-conscious, pre-conceptual, _implicit_ knowledge which infants grasp from observing the behavior of parents (or their equivalent). The axioms are _implicit_ knowledge from infancy.

    How, by this sort of logic, could we possibly know that bears hibernate?  I mean, after all, since humans don't hibernate and these types of things are introspective, there would really be no way of knowing.  The fact is, though, that there is a lot of evidence outside of introspection that goes into making these assertions.

    There certainly is! Inferring the nature of the consciousness in other animals is a task for comparative psychology. All we can do is observe an animal's behavior and infer

    from that what it _might_ or might not be aware of. To be more certain, requires  experimentation geared to eliminating some possibilities and reinforcing others.

    After enough evidence is gathered (see the OPAR chapter regarding "certainty"), you can then infer something which might be valid.

    Just for example, if you feed squirrels peanuts, you'll observe there are _individual_differences in their responses; some search out the food more quickly and effectively than others; but they all (in a given group) seem not to "see" the food, but rather "smell" it's existence and location. Yet they apparently can navigate tree branches by sight fairly well. Do their consciousness' have seperate _modes_ of operation for the different actions in regard to the different objects involved?

    Plants react around the hormonal level, and don't have sense _organs_ like animals do.  They have no means of _perception_, only a reaction at a more molecular or cellular level.

    This is assumed (as far as I know) correctly from the lack of any identifiable equivalents to animal perceptual organs. The logical inference is that any _perception_ of reality has to come from some physiological organ _similar to_ an animal's organ of perception. If any plant had an _awareness_ (even at a very primitive level) of that-which-is-outside-itself, it would have to have consciousness of two facts: that-which-is-outside-itself -- and itself. So far, only animals have this awareness.

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