nimble
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Posts posted by nimble
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I think that Objectivism does reject "categorical imperatives". Rights are contextually absolute, just as knowledge is contextually certain. The controlling principle seems to be that rights are absolute within the context of normal society (i.e. the metaphysical situations between persons that arise under ordinary circumstances). Beyond that, they are not absolute, but might nonetheless be valid depending on the specific circumstances. In both instances the usual standard of value (man's life) must be applied to determine the morally correct outcome - it happens that in the context of normal society, the resulting right is absolute - this can be verified by reduction to metaphysical primaries in every case. Both the case of the tax collector and the case of the candy bar arise within the context of normal society and so constitute immoral rights violations. (Hopefully I got that right - send me to the north woods if not!)
That sounds about right, however I do not understand how the absolute right exists if not enforced? The government in my scenario did punish the candy bar thief, but not adequately (only a 50 cent fine for a dollar candy bar). Do you suggest that the clerk take the money back by his own force? If so, isn't that somewhat like vigilantism? I was told in the anarchy versus government debate a long time ago, that rights do not exist when not adequately enforced, because they aren't absolutes like platonic forms, but merely principles asserted by rational minds, and when they aren't recognized they don't exist (thus the reason anarchy doesn't work, because PPAs don't have the obligation to be rational and assert rights, they can do whatever their customers want).
Thanks
Chris
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Thank you for your replies. Now that I am certain Objectivism rejects categorical imperatives (which is used outside of Kantian ethics as well), how would an Objectivist reply to the statement that Objectivism IS amoralism. Any philosophy that is composed entirely of hypothetical imperatives is considered amoralism, by every mainstream philosopher. For example Mill is considered an amoralist because every ought statement he would make is contextual to the greatest good for the greatest number (utilitarian).
I realize that Objectivism claims that there are OUGHTS (so does someone like Mill or Neitzche) but if they are entirely hypothetical then it isn't considered moralism by any normal standard.
Thanks
Chris
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That could well be -- I don't really get the concept, I just know that it's one of those impenetrable Kant ideas. The standard quote seems to be the highly transparent exhortation "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it would become a universal law", which I believe is a long way of saying "Do whatever you want", or, simply "Whatever".
A good example of a Kantian categorical imperative is DO NOT STEAL, because if I were to steal-assume it could be a universal law that everyone ought steal...is that good or possible? If it is not good, then the individual ought not steal, because it is bad when everyone steals.
And it seems like Inspector is saying that Objectivists reject categorical imperatives in general, because there is always an IF X circumstance in front of the moral rule.
However, then my question becomes is it permissible for in some circumstance to violate the rights of others, such as being a tax collector, or using the example I gave?
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IRS agents live comfortably and earn decent sallaries; in every sense, they are serving their own interests. They are also violating the rights of others. Therefore, it is possible to serve your own interests and violate the rights of others.
That only affirms and concretizes my example, and maybe that's what you were trying to do. Can anyone answer my question though.
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I really don't think anyone understands what is going on. I am ASKING a question, not trying to undermine Objectivism. I am not proposing any new theories, or making any critiques. I am merely asking for you to justify the stance that it is always against your self-interest to violate rights.
Whoever replied that the scenario is unrealistic because the vendor implicitly values it because there is a price on it, you are completely missing the point. Sure he may value it, but he is indifferent to me stealing it, because he won't try to fight me for a dollar. All major corporations are like this, they will not apprehend thieves for fear of lawsuits if you take the guy down and injure him.
Secondly, a categorical imperative is something you ought do in all circumstances. Imperative=ought, Categorical=all categories of circumstances.
Thirdly, self-interest IS benefits outweigh the cost. If not, please define self-interest, because as far as I am aware, that is the common usage of the term. If you are right that benefits outweighing the costs is not self-interest then you have single-handedly destroyed the theory of capitalism.
Now, if someone would answer my initial question as to why it is never, ever in my interest to violate rights, please do so.
(In my personal opinion, I think that violating rights is okay when the costs outweigh the benefits long run, and it is up to the government and society to structure itself in a way as to adequately provide ample deterrence to rights violations so that it will never be in someones self interest to violate rights. And if the gov't fails that, like in my example by having the penalty be less than the cost of the item, then the moral obligation lies with the government not the individual).
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I'm sorry. I still don't feel like my question was adequately answered. I have seriously studied Objectivism for about 5 years now, and I am having issues again with what appears to be a categorical imperative (do not violate rights-no matter what the circumstance). That is the definition of a categorical imperative, something that ought be done in all circumstances. I do believe that people are and ought be rational egoists, but I don't see how you can make such a sweeping claim that there is no circumstance under which it is beneficial to violate rights. I know you said in the context of your entire life, but expound on that. Why would it be literally impossible to benefit from a rights violation.
Let's say we have a vendor is indifferent about whether I steal from him. And the law has a $.50 fine for stealing a candy bar, and the candy bar costs a dollar. Would it be against my self interest to steal? No, even if I am caught the social and legal penalties aren't significant enough to deter me. And psychologically, I would argue that I would be stupid and irrational not to steal the candy bar, and that would bother me psychologically to not steal it.
Chris
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I recently found myself tangling with something really difficult that I thought I had the answer to, but didn't.
I always thought that morality was completely contextual (composed of hypothetical imperatives), but then I realized I couldn't justify saying that non-aggression is always in your best interest in all circumstances or else that would be a categorical imperative. I don't know how an Objectivist would justify such a claim without resorting to the Kantian notion that what is objectively bad if everyone does it is implicitly bad if one person does it, thus it must be a categorical imperative to stay away from x action.
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Moral pluralism only states that there are multiple ways to be moral in some circumstances. It differs from relativism in that it says that there ARE moral actions that are objectively good and bad.
So you think that it might be fair to say Objectivism is morally pluralistic. I suppose I didn't have to really post this question, because now that I think about it, Objectivism definitely isn't absolutist, because it states that context matters. And it obviously isn't relativistic, and pluralism is all that is left as far as I know.
Thank you
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I'm not sure if this is covered elsewhere in this forum, I haven't been on here lately. Anyway, I was curious what the Objectivist stance on moral pluralism (NOT relativism) is.
My thoughts were that rationality is fundamental in Objectivist ethics, and that rational action is action with concern to a goal. Whatever said goal may be, once it is established to be moral, if there are multiple courses of action to get to said goal, then you'd have rational means to a moral end. Because there are two or more rational means to said moral end, is it not that both actions are good, and if so, isn't that pluralism rather than absolutism?
Thanks
Chris
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I have said this before that I didn't know where I stood, but I would play devil's advocate. Not being an expert on anarchist thought, I have no idea how to respond to this:
So I am going to concede this to you David. I have to say I agree with you here. I will let Petey try to answer that one.There are various points of law which need to have definite answers, where there seem to be multiple reasonable answers. There are various rational conditions that could be imposed on the legal search of a vehicle, which protect the rights of the accused while not letting him get away with murder. We need a definite answer as to what is legal, and we need a stable answer that doesn't change every year or two. Some specific choices seem to be arbitrary -- but they aren't. Even though we we may not know enough about man's nature and the nature of law to give a decisive defense of a particular decision, it is in the nature of the concept of objective, monopolistic law that there must be a unique answer. There is nothing at all in the concept of anarchy that supports the idea of a single set of laws that people would be subject to, and thus you can easily be subject to contradictory legal requirements.2. Uniqueness of the lawI am going to say I agree with you here as well. There does seem to be a practical problem with this. But in defense of anarchy, I would have to say the 'different States different laws' counterexample still holds. Under the territory the PPA controls there are a set of unique laws, except PPA will tend to have a smaller jurisdiction, say specific small plots of land, maybe the size of a small community or even just a house.
The problem of copyrights being different in different places exists in the world as we know it. Sweden has almost no intellectual property rights, and all the bit-torrent sites in the world usually hold their bases there. So that when Microsoft or Apple sues them for distributing their material, they have no legal course of action to take. Unless the US is willing to put some type of sanction/declare war on Sweden on Microsoft's behalf.
The only difference between countries and this proposed anarchy is that the jurisdictions are smaller and more complicated. But there are jurisdictions. Each PPA would be defined by the property lines of the customers.
I have to say I disagree with you here. If we are to assume Objectivists are natural lawists, then we can agree that rights are derived from nature and that they are universal in that sense. But unless there is someone to protect those rights, then those rights only exist in principle, there is no material form to them. And you must remember that government does not work in a vacuum, it is composed of real people like you and me. Unless there is some willing people to enforce those rights for you, then you are rightless and I don't see an problem with that.3. Universality of rights protectionAre you proposing that we should force people into power to protect our rights?
You argue that a market is anything in which people are allowed to trade. Okay, I buy that, as long as you correctly use the term trade. Using force against a person is not a trade, it is coersion. That means that private law enforcement can not, if it is to engage solely in trade, use force. The enforcement agency can try to persuade others to obey their particular laws, perhaps they can even offer treats like toasters or 10,000 hours of free AOL online time. But they can’t use force: doing so goes beyond what is in the domain of trade.The trade takes place without force. I trade the PPA money of some sorts (or barter) in exchange for its law/protection, and once I have consented to their laws, then I they have a right to use force on me or others in their jurisdiction without violating the sanctity of the market, so to speak. They may use force, if that is what our "trade" entailed.
So I disagree with you here. There maybe pragmatic problems with even having a market for something like what I described above, but it definitely does not mean that PPAs have to abstain from all force in order to retain some "market."
*******My personal thoughts and reasons for playing devil's advocate***********
I was an anarchist for about a year, and I have been flirting with Objectivism for well over 5 years. I usually tend to agree with Objectivism and when I disagree I tend to eventually move back toward Objectivism after working problems out here.
However, there are a few things about Objectivists, not Objectivism, that bug me.
1. Petey knows very little about Objectivism and when you argue with him, you seemed to be playing little tricks on him and it wasn't fair. You (not all of you) assert things that any non-Objectivist would definitely question. And you do so without any explanation.
An analogy to this is when Christians refer to the bible in arguments against atheists. Maybe they quote a passage of real truth and make a true assertion, but the point is, you don't do reference Christian specific common-knowledge to non-Christians in debate form.
2. For being so against rationalism, I noticed that a lot of the critiques provided were definitional critiques.
3. A lot of posts would completely ignore Petey's points. I remember one instance where he posts a huge explanation of his thoughts and just happened to use the phrase "libertarian principles" instead of saying "non-agression/coercion" and he got a small reply that basically said, we don't like libertarian principles and ignored the rest of his post.
What if he would have said "Objectivist principles" instead, then maybe he would have gotten a decent response.
4. If you are allowed to critique practical problems in anarchy and use an evil PPA as an example, it is completely fair game to say that in all likelihood there won't be an Objectivist government that sticks around for any lengthy period of time longer than a generation or two, so it is fair game to use evil governments in critique of government.
***************
And I wanted to thank David for being the best of all the people I have encountered in both anarchy threads and actually helping me resolve my issues. I will concede this debate on my end and let Petey pick up where I left off.
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Thank you very much David. I will think on that, because it is a hefty post with lots of material to sift through. But this is the most useful post I have seen in 8 pages of anarchy debates. Let me think of some sort of a reply rather than write on the go.
As for Fred, I suppose your post will be summed up in anything that is in response to David, since he basically brought every main objection to a specific point.
G'Night
Chris
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I said David deserved an answer in my post if you read it. And before I went on to tackle those questions I wanted to first make my positive case for anarchy and to ask him a few questions, so I can be clear on where he and Petey left off and where I need to go with this.
Sorry, if you think I mean all Objectivists make circular arguments. I don't think that by definition Objectivist=circular arguer haha.
I was just a bit frustrated with the replies Petey got.
By the way Fred, I don't mean for you to think I'm degrading you in any way, I just didn't want this argument to boil down to the way Rand had defined things. It must be obvious that any anarchist doesn't concede that law=government or else we wouldn't even be arguing right now, so I thought that it was pointless to just give me a definition as a refutation of all that has been said here.
We can debate the definition if you like, but I believe this whole argument will boil down to how law is in theory (meta-ethical) and how law is in practice.
Thanks
Chris
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Before I submit my positive claim for anarchy, let me ask this question of everyone. In order to have a moral law enforcing agency it must meet these requirements, correct?
1. The laws must be objective and know to all those who fall in its jurisdiction.
2. The laws must protect man's natural rights.
3. There must be some third party settler of disputes in any given case that happens under the jurisdiction of the agency.
4. That settler of disputes has to be able to enforce its decision to the best of its ability.
And to clear up one last thing, let me ask--Objectivists are Natural law theorists meta-ethically, correct? And they are Positive law theorists when it comes to government application of laws, correct?
I think we get some confused messages when I get people saying men create laws (positive law) and then the next person will say that laws are derived from nature (natural law). But if the two above questions are true then I think that will settle our miscommunication.
Thanks
Chris
Tragically incorrect. The massive acceptance of altruism-collectivism by the governed led it completely away from Objectivis principles.A proper Objectivist government can keep a nation free as long as a majority of the population understand rights. Considering that currently in America the people who reject altruism-collectivism number less than 10%, I'd say the system is proven to work fantastically well.
mrocktor
So you are saying that the only way government will work is with a majority of Objectivists in the society? I'm not trying to antagonize, but I don't see how this is any less utopian than anarchy.
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I'm not sure about Petey Rimple and if he gave up on this, but if it is okay with everyone I would like to take his place in his absence, and I'll hand the debate back to him when he returns.
I really hope we aren't going to argue semantics, and base everything on the way you define them. Law is a system of enforced rules, I concede that. But I do not believe that by definition law assumes one all powerful government to enforce it. The simplest counterexample is the fact that multiple agencies (countries) exist now that enforce different laws in different areas, just as would exist under our theoretical anarchy, which is under scrutiny.This is a stolen concept. Law presupposes a gov't which enforces it. (Without enforcement there is no law)."Market anarchism" is a contradiction in terms. If you have anarchism, you can't have a market. A market presupposes the existence of law which presupposes the existence of gov't. Some entity has to enforce the rules of the market.Again you fall back on the definitions you came up with, and again I am going to not allow you to make assertions that weren't debated on in here. A market is anything in which people are allowed to trade. Trade exists with or without governments, thus so do markets. And I covered above how law doesn't presuppose one sole government.
Of course. That's the very definition of anarchy. It is the absence of law and therefore the rule of gangs.Again you fall back on definitions rather than looking to reality. If you assert that anarchy equals gangs by definition there really isn't much of a debate here. Just a bunch of Objectivists making circular arguments because you have already defined it in a manner in which you can't possibly lose your point.
Now if we can lay off having a purely definitional debate, I will make a positive claim for anarchy and then I will try to address David's questions.
*****PLEASE NOTE****** I am in limbo right now as to my beliefs on anarchy, but I would like to continue this debate for my own personal sake. These views are partially in the spirit of playing devil's advocate, and in the spirit of exploring Ojbectivist thought.
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I am not going to reply in a debate form, however I would like to point out that the Objectivists here have switched back and forth on whether this is a descriptive debate or a normative debate.
I notice you point out practical questions of anarchy and then infer that anarchy is somehow morally unsound. But when practical problems are pointed out about states on Petey's side, you reply this is a normative debate, so refering to real mistakes that real governments make and continue to make, won't help Petey. But somehow mistakes that his theoretical anarchist society makes, somehow disprove him...it doesn't make sense and I think it is low to treat him that way, since he doesn't even understand the little ins-and-outs of Objectivism. And you are playing debate games with him.
If you are going to allow details about anarchy to be subject to scrutiny, then examples of real governments should be allowed in the argument as well.
As for anarchy only working under a Utopian society, it seems as if an Objectivist government is Utopian as well. Out of how many thousands of years of government have we even seen one that respects rights? None. Even our own government started with noble roots and was heading in the right direction, yet the very nature of government led it completely away from Objectivist principles.
I would argue that an Objectivist government can not exist for any extended period of time before collapsing back into some statist country or pseudo-welfare state.
Thanks
Chris
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I'm just going to let you know that PeteyRimple won't be back from vacation until Monday, and I am pretty sure this debate forum is for 1vs1's. So, there need not be 5 replies from different people to one of his posts before he even responds. If someone really wants to get at this debate, I'm sure I could carry his side of the debate for fun's sake on AIM (onelungedwonder) or in a different forum that wasn't dedicated to formal debate.
Thanks
Chris
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Thanks for the replies.
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My friend writes for academic magazines as a summer job and he was tasked to write an essay about normative ethics, so he came to me to discuss some ideas and it lead into a larger debate about ethics in general. Basically he has a problem with normative ethics because there is no natural law (like gravity) that imposes them on you, like with the case of gravity you literally cannot break the law, physics always wins. But with something like a moral law, there is no such physical evidence to support that it exists. So how are ethics normative?
When we moved to the second scenario that ethics are created and are somewhat mutually a contractual thing among humans, he asked how would you pick a standard to create the ethics by and by picking a standard aren't you somewhat implying that the standard is somehow normative and must be a standard? How can you do that?
Then there is a theory of relative morals, where it is basically 'do what you want and its right.' In that case there are rights and wrongs but not a cohesive one, and basically we agreed that it was a crap concept.
Lastly, we thought that maybe morals simply don't exist but for some reason we create them anyway, just to suit our aggregated wants (safety in society, etc) and that there is no reason why you ought follow them, just that we do in general. We didn't like this one, but we didn't rule it out.
After that we talked more about objectively created ethics and he said that even if you choose a standard of life to base the ethics on, why ought you value your life? And then I rephrased the question and asked if he was asking 'why ought i live?' and he said that was a fine way to rephrase it. Then I said I am not sure of the meaning of life yet, if you find that out let me know. And that's where we left off.
If anyone has any thing they could add to help clear up our dilemma, I would be glad to hear it.
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The smile was a simplistic example to illustrate the point. Nozick doesn't actually mean smiles are the end all trait to have, in fact I was the one who came up with the smiles bit.
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Sorry I cannot provide a link, I am pretty sure he keeps his stuff under tight copyright protection (although he is dead now). I can tell you the book it came from though. It is called Life Examined or Examined Life I think, it is one of those two. He goes on to make a business analogy.
If love is a trading of values then like any business transaction businesses seek the best deal (most value). Once they establish some sort of relationship with the other businesses they trade with, they tend to deal more and more with that business rather than others. Eventually each business gets to know what the other wants so that they start specializing for their business partner. And once they become so specialized to their partner, a merger seems like the only suitable action (marriage).
I kind of liked that analogy, but arguments from analogy almost never hold, so it's just a means to think about the subject.
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I have been familiar with Rand's manner of looking at love, and then I got into Robert Nozick and I like his version much better. I always wondered what kept people from moving to an objectively better person when that person came into your life, using Rand's way of thinking. For instance, why get married when you know that most likely the person you are with is not the best person in the world, and if you meet that best person why not love them more than your spouse and get a divorce to be with them?
With Nozick's idea of love, he describes love as being a state in which your personal well being is tied directly to their personal well being. When your loved one is hurt, so are you, and when your loved one is doing well, so are you. Nozick tries to explain that attraction comes from holding similar values and appreciating that which makes up the other, but in the long run you don't "upgrade" because love changes you in a sense.
To really explain this I need to use an example. Let's say the only criteria you care about when picking a significant other is by looking at their smile. So the initial attraction comes because they have a really good smile and/or smile a lot. Because you value the smile you love/like her more and more. Eventually you grow so attached to her that you no longer care about smiles in general (or objectively) you just like her smile. So that even if someone comes along who smiles more or has a better smile, you don't just immediately trade up to a "better model."
If this is how Rand describes love too, then by all means explain it to me. And if not, I would like to argue about the proper way to view love. I just remember Dagny "upgrading" all the time from Francisco to Hank to Galt, who she ultimately stayed with since he was the apex of what man could be.
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It's not about compromising as an end in itself. It is about compromising Objectivism because you find that is does not cover every aspect of life or is counterproductive in some aspects. That would be my argument, and then I would proceed to say where I find Objectivism lacking.
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As a once Objectivist, then libertarian, then anarchist, then who-knows what, I might be able to shed some light on this. Libertarians are anarchists if they draw their premises to their rightful conclusions. If the banning of the initiation of force is a moral absolute, then anarchy is what is morally superior. If no one may initiate the use of force and a government is a monopoly on the use of force. The monopoly requires that the government initiate force in order to hold its monopoly, thus it is immoral.
However, I have come to the conclusion that morals in government don't really hold. If I instead look at the more general 'what is best for people', then it isn't clear that anarchy is morally superior anymore. I believe anarchy can work, just as governments can work, and criminal rings can work, and how totalitarian states can work. It is all a matter of whether the majority of the public supports the system (implicitly or explicitly).
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I'll argue for a mixed philosophy, just to see the debate happen. I don't know whether a mixed philosophy is the optimal way to use Objectivism, but that is how I live, so I suppose I'll be able to conjure up some type of argument. Plus this seems fun.
For a more specific topic, I would like to address love and art in Objectivism. I find that individualism in love is very hard to work out. I started dating my current girlfriend because of her traits like ambition, intelligence, and because she reminded me of Dagny (both physically and psychologically). Now I find that trying to work things out with an uncompromisable person is so very hard and sometimes hurtful to me or her (emotionally). So maybe incorporating a more main-stream view of love is appropriate.
Secondly about art, I have painted for about 5 years now. I must say that I like painting regardless of whether I am expressing some deep philosophical view, or merely stroking canvas with a brush. So long as it looks good and others like it too, I feel like my time was well spent. If my goal is my happiness and it can be acheived through non-Objectivist means, I see this as proof that Rand's views on art may be off a bit.
Do Objectivists Believe in Categorical Imperatives?
in Ethics
Posted
Deontological ethics and categorical imperatives are explained in this caption.
"The most famous deontological theory was advanced by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. In his theory, Kant claimed that various actions are morally wrong because they are inconsistent with the status of a person as a free and rational being, and that, conversely, acts that further the status of people as free and rational beings are morally right. Therefore, Kant claimed, we all have a duty to avoid the first type of act and perform the second type of act.
Kant believed that this duty was absolute. He drew a distinction between contingent duties, which only need to be carried out under certain empirical circumstances, and categorical duties, which always need to be carried out, because they are based on a priori reasoning about the general nature of things, and thus apply no matter what the circumstances are. Kant thought of the duty to promote human freedom and rationality as the only truly categorical duty. He called this duty the categorical imperative, and described it at great length in his writings. Of the five formulations of the categorical imperative Kant developed, the three most well-known and significant are:
* Act only according to that maxim by which you can also will that it would become a universal law.
* Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.
* Act as though you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends.
Other examples of deontological theorists include the English philosopher John Locke and the modern-day philosopher John Rawls. Locke held that individual persons have rights that are part of the natural law of the world, and that actions (including the death penalty, which he advocated) can be judged as right or wrong based on whether they respect these rights."
That is a wikipedia entry which isn't always a credible source, but it might clear up a bit with us.