StrictlyLogical

Plasmatic: You stated: If I understand you correctly, you are asserting that I have done the following: 1. With knowledge of the experiment I "want" to discard the perceptually gained meaning of solidity 2 I imagine a hypothetical to which solidity does not apply, point like particle 3. I foist this point like particle as proof that the concept "solidity" is not universally applicable to all existents in all contexts Does this capture your take on my words? Let me summarize what I think I actually was doing: 1. assessing what the results of the Rutherford experiment say about the nature of every day existents (mostly space, made of an arrangement of discrete entities rather than being a single extended continuous entity) 2. observing that our perceptual level intuition about solidity of every day objects (no holes, continuous) is not compatible with reality as it is (insofar as objects actually do have holes and are not continuous) 3. observing that the only basis for both the perceptual level intuition of solidity and the concept of solidity is our everyday perception of everyday objects and our interactions with them at our length and time scales. 4. identifying that given the new understanding why and how "solidity" as a property of objects arises from its constituents, it would be a mistake to attempt to impose upon those constituents themselves which cause solidity, the property of solidity because this begs the further question "what causes that kind of solidity?" 5. identifying that point like particles are consistent with the mechanisms giving rise to solidity of everyday objects at our time and length scales and need not be solid (extended, no holes, continuous) themselves. i.e. point like particles are completely consistent with a complete integration of the Rutherford experiment and our everyday interactions with reality and require no infinite regress of kinds of solidity and their mechanisms.

My wording has an ERROR. I do not mean we must abandon "ALL" day to day human perception level assumptions in ALL contexts. This would be disastrous and implies throwing out far too much. We of course must retain day to day understanding of percepts in order to deal with the world and deal with our, let me call it, "extended perceptual apparatus" which is our scientific instrumentation.

Very interesting. If you started a thread about free will I would be very interested in participating although I would have limited ability to contribute. I've done some reading on consciousness and how a nonreductive fundamental science might emerge on the subject but "free will" itself is not something I read much about. To my mind, we will have developed an understanding of consciousness and free will and thereby solved both "puzzles" only when we reach a point in time at which we could create an artificial system which we would know, because of the way we have "configured" it, that it has consciousness and free will. i.e. we could with confidence answer "how do you know that it has"/"why does it have" both consciousness and free will.

I tend to notice things... some observables of which are at the limits of my capacity for observation.. "subtle patterns in groups of people" are a type of category of observable which I am often unsure of and would like to know other people's opinions. I generally have a burning need to understand (this is intensely personal, afterall it is MY life, my knowledge, my guide to action etc), part of that need, valid or not, is wanting to understand how other people think and why... the "principle of the dean" applied widely. I agree that the general population of Objectivists are likely no better or worse a representation of those objectivists "who are qualified", than those in the nonobjectivist general public are a representation of those nonobjectivists "who are qualified". What I think I am "observing" is that Objectivists who are not qualified, seem to tend they think they know more than they do or at least that they overestimate what they can conclude from the little knowledge (specialised) that they have. A sort of epistemological overconfidence?

In this context I use "reality" to refer to existence as independent of the perceiver or thinker. So I guess I am excluding introspection. Don't get me wrong mental contents are not outside of reality but they are not to be confused with the external existents which exist in reality. The map is NOT the territory. Consciousness is a part of reality but is of course located within a tiny subset of existence whether you measure in constituents, space weight etc. I am using integration here... we know consciousness exists within the confines of the skull. Or at least the nervous system. We have not observed human consciousness, in relation to reality, matter, substance,... elsewhere. So "separation" is at least by localisation. BUT I am not saying mind and body are separable, the mind and body are not separable (other than on death... when the body continues and consciousness ceases to exist). I am also assuming for example that a potentiality for human consciousness (a baby's nervous system), IF devoid ENTIRELY of any senses, sight, hearing, touch, smell, taste, will NOT have any knowledge of reality. Whatever activity occurs in that system might in fact not EVEN amount to consciousness until it is given the chance to experience through the senses reality and develop into a consciousness. OR Take the case of a fully conscious objectivist adult. If all those senses were cut off that adult is no longer in touch with reality. He or she remembers and knows certain facts of reality, has introspection, imagination, feelings, and thoughts, and some of the facts he or she knows will not have changed, and perhaps that person could even think of something new (relying on memory) which would correspond to reality (an invention or a new principle of science) but informationally they are still severed from reality. So consciousness can also be separated in terms of information. It is in this way that I mean the senses are the only tie (this might be the word which is misleading... would "window" be better?) on reality (external reality independent of the conscious mind perceiving/conceiving it)

I agree with pretty much everything you are saying. You stated: "For something to "truly" be random is for it to be causeless (because there's supposedly no reason for any one outcome, instead of another) which ultimately defies the law of identity. Truly random particles would behave illogically." Agree: the particular result of a "truly" random outcome or choice must be causeless (at least insofar as the randomness goes). Any outcome that is causeless "ultimately defies the law of identity". This conclusion I am not sure I agree with... although the logical part of my brain says I should agree with it. The problem is that if I do, free will may be threatened. Here is my reasoning which I borrow from an argument about free will and determinism put forth by a friend (he advocates that free will exists and choices are first causes in reality): 1. A person is an entity in reality. (non mysticism) 2. A person has consciousness and volition (denial of determinism) and although made up of ultimately constituent elements of reality (denial of mysticism) is not determined by the ultimate constituents of reality (material) making up the person.(assertion of nonmaterialism) 3. All entities A in reality are such that A is A and A acts in accordance with A's nature, hence a person is that person and will act in accordance with that person's nature. 4. Volition and denial of determinism implies not only that a person not be determined by the constituent elements of reality making up that person, not be determined by external existents, but also (in order to assert that the person always "could have chosen otherwise") that a person's choice not be determined completely based upon the particular nature of the person at the time of the choice (the exact same person after all is not compelled to make only one choice because they could have chosen otherwise), 5. Freewill requires therefore that the person's choices, although perhaps limited, are ultimately not determined by anything, i.e. volitional actions/choices are first causes. 6. By definition first causes, are not determined, and are therefore in one sense causeless (as between the at least two choices the person could have chosen "otherwise"). Looking at this defence of free will I see the same conflict with the law of identity. The same kind of problem you identify with random outcomes from a single state. Something A, changes state or form in accordance with it's nature to a set of outcomes/choices which are not caused (determined) by the nature of the something A at the time the change occurred. The range of possible choices may be determined by the nature of A but the specific (random) outcome is not. If I am to accept the idea an entity such as a human can be a first cause or make a truly causeless choice, then why in principle can't an electron undergo a causeless outcome out of a set of possibilities?

Thanks Eiuol for getting what I was trying to say. The kinds of limitations I am alluding to are not conceptual, I generally assume we have no limit to abstraction (although there may be a limit to how many things we can have in our mind at any one time). There are many ways in which we are limited... one that comes to mind is visualization which I think is a big part of how we think, and this is limited by our internal visualizing apparatus which deals easily with one and two dimensions, reasonably well with three (because we live in it), but for example, if we need to visualize four or more dimensional data, without some sort of specialized training, we need to take a cross section (three dimensional cross section so to speak) in order to "see" a bit of the whole thing.... Immediate and autonomous pattern recognition also is something which is limited by our cognitive capacity... we are much better than more primitive animals.. but we have limits. Again due to our ability to abstract and with use of mathematics and such we can solve these sorts of complex problems which we cannot instantaneously and automatically process just by looking at them. I am not a psychologist so the above is speculation...

Harrison: your comments look interesting but I am focused on an exchange with Plasmatic right now. Please forgive me if I address them later. Plasmatic: You stated: "The impossible in it is the idea that meaning can be transferred to higher level concepts while denying their source and context in perception. That induction or deduction somehow allow us to bypass the foundation of perception to ALL HUMAN knowledge" This is the very misunderstanding I thought you may have had. I will be clear: 1 induction or deduction CANNOT bypass the foundation of knowledge which at its base is perception... the only link to reality. I am not a rationalist, and as an objectivist reject all forms of mysticism, religion, Platonism, communism, primacy of consciousness...etc. Induction and deduction ... are my tools I use to make sense of my perceptions, conceptually in an integrated, noncontradictory fashion. 2 I do not deny that perception and our perceptual apparatus are fundamental to obtaining information from reality. They are fundamental, in fact they are the ONLY tie a consciousness has to reality no many how many or few (blind deaf.. etc.) or how weakly that consciousness is able to get input from reality, that input IS all it has (inner self-knowledge, intuition, "remembering" platonic forms... are NOT sources of knowledge of existents.. these are introspective musings, delusions, and imaginings only). These two things I state above ARE my philosophy. The question arises: what have I said that could have been misconstrued to mean the exact opposite? I think perhaps it may be due to my identifying (attempting?) concepts not commonly referred to, or perhaps I have referred to something known in special circles according to some specific jargon which I have not used. What is the hypothetically flawed objectivist (and by no means do I mean every objectivist) doing which I identify as a mistake? Certainly, relying on perceptual input is NOT a mistake. The pencil appearing bent in a glass of water is in no way "wrong" it is the way the light refracts through the water, enters the eye and is processed by the visual cortex. The possible problem which can arise is the prescientific instantaneous judgement that the pencil must itself be bent. It is in this sense only that I refer to "common sense intuitions" which can be erroneous if the whole of knowledge, experiments, analysis etc, is not integrated with the process of assessing the appearance of the pencil. As an objectivist, maximal integration is my voluntarily chosen "duty" (not the best word but you get my meaning) In a sense the error I am thinking of is focusing too much on or giving too much weight to common-sense "feelings" and intuitions humans (including unwary objectivists) have, which interferes with proper cognition. Feelings and intuition cannot form a basis of knowledge... this is precisely my point. E.g. We all know from specialized knowledge of the science of physics that atoms, nuclei and their surrounding electrons, exist and form all forms of everyday solid, gaseous, and liquid matter. I know of no objectivist who rejects the concept of atoms, but we should recognise that there is an accomplishment involved in the acceptance of this fact. We have had to forego the application of concepts such as solidity and "continuity of entity" as applicable to our interaction with "a ball of steel" and "a rock" at our time and length scales, when dealing with electrons, nuclei and atoms. This is not trivial. I note we used our rationality and our perceptual faculty to imagine, construct, conduct an experiment and analyse the results to arrive at this state of counterintuitive knowledge. Perhaps it is only my intuition, but when I imagine things, entities in reality, something which is solid and continuous tends to appear in my mind: not something mostly empty, made of pointlike (if not actual point) particles interacting in a manner which gives rise to an arrangement which is static and yet utterly discontinuous and full of space. [[[As an aside: when writing this, my common-sense intuition is screaming "point particle... nothing is a point.. a point has no length, no area, no volume such a thing is impossible because ... all things have volume are solid and are continuous...." I note this is circular and unsupported, then I have an infinite regression type argument with myself INVENTING spherical particles which are solid...for which there is no evidence whatsoever that they exist... soon I realise my intuition is simply not applicable and is simply not based on any data relevant to that which I am trying to apply it]]] This intuition (solidity and continuity) about the way the universe is, does work at the level of everyday objects we interact with and operationally makes perfect sense and in that sense is true. I cannot pass my hand through a block of steel, and I can (on a macroscopic scale) divide it to my heart's content. This is useful knowledge and solidity is valid. The concept of solidity, however, is simply inapplicable to electrons and nuclei which make up all solid matter. These things give rise to solidity but they do not themselves possess it. To me this is an accomplishment in abstract conceptual thinking, knowledge of atoms as they are requires rationality and careful experimentation. This does not involve the denial of the perceptual faculty but does in some sense require close examination and vigilance with respect to "intuitive common sense" so as not to permit it to lead us astray. My open question was whether certain prescientific, non specialized knowledge or experience based "common sense intuitions" may influence judgements about science in the absence of the full body of knowledge which should be integrated to make a decision about it. This kind of mistake may not in fact be a phenomenon attributable to Objectivists in general... my sample is very small. I hope this resolves the misunderstanding of my meaning. SL

Plasmatic: You've barraged me with a whole new set of "assertions" which I would rather defer response to until we have addressed the first set of assertions, the basis on which you rely to make, I am still trying to figure out. Perhaps this discussion will benefit from a little focus. Of: 1. "You are talking nonsense above and do not understand what your words above actually mean in light of it." 2. "What you describe above is impossible!" 3. "you dont know that logic is the formalization of MEANING" I suggest we deal with 2, primarily because it is more "oriented toward reality" than the purported content of anyone's mind. I ask you to address directly: A ) To WHAT are you referring when you say "What you described above." B ) What portion (or totality) of that "what is described above" is impossible C ) Precisely WHY IS that "what is described" impossible. Respectfully, SL

Thank you for joining the discussion Plasmatic!! If you could provide more detail (referencing what I actually said) I would be able and would like to respond to: 1. "You are talking nonsense above and do not understand what your words above actually mean in light of it." 2. "What you describe above is impossible!" 3. "you dont know that logic is the formalization of MEANING" I have looked again at my comments and cannot see how these 3. conclusions can be based solely on my comments i.e. without introducing other new premises or speculation about what I have tried to say. I will assume you are very intelligent and rational and that this is some sort of miscommunication which can be fixed by exchange of information and keeping unsupported logical "leaps" to a minimum. I look forward to your considered reply. SL

Agreed: Although, a normally developed male (mentally, i.e. emotionally and cognitively) in his 30s will likely have different very values, experiences, knowledge, and goals from a "normally" developed female in her late teens/early 20s. Unless the woman is exceptionally experienced, accomplished, and mature emotionally and cognitively etc. OR unless the man is exceptionally UNDER developed there generally will not be the conditions for what objectivists define as a state of love ever occurring between the two or even one for the other. If one were to speculate one could say that, probabilistically speaking, "real" romantic love (according to objectivism) is likely not actually being experienced by the man (irrespective of whether or not this would or even could be reciprocated by the female).

I agree with the previous two answers. Well said both of you. One additional item I would like to raise is the implicit context within which Sartre's statements should likely be viewed. Before Rand (and correct me if I am wrong), "Ethics" and "Morality", "Good" and "Evil" were concepts which had the status of existents, "out there" in reality, having an independent existence from Man or any man's mind, whether existing in the supernatural (religious), platonic (realm of forms), or otherwise mystical realm(consciousness of a collective). As such these were holus bolus Mystical in nature, whether edicts, duties, imperatives, commandments, they simply WERE, and "should" be discovered and followed. As a philosopher considering Ethics and morality, you either believed in them (and embraced them or rejected them) or disbelieved in them i.e. repudiated their existence entirely, and there was no alternative. Either mystical moral truths EXIST (out there) or they moral truths (of any kind) do not exist AT ALL (complete subjectivism). A person like Sartre (and I am guessing as to motives) speaking of "Ethics" as subjective is primarily denying the existence of mystical moral truths etc. that require mysticism, BUT going too far because he saw no alternative. In some sense when he says you can't say what is "better" is correct, if "better" (morally speaking) is defined as having meaning only in the context of a mystical realm. He falls back on a subjective standard for "better" - i.e. short range "what you feel like" subjective whims, because at least that IS real. I think Objectivist Ethics and morality is difficult for non-Objectivists to understand because it does not really fall within what the normally mystical definitions of Ethics and Morality are based upon. In some sense many of the problems, ruminations, conundrums of ethical and moral philosophy, which inherently are based on these mystical concepts, are simply not addressed by Objectivism which rejects mysticism (and rightly so). It is ironic that Objectivism solves the "problems" of Ethics and morality by providing an alternative to the common conceptualizations of Ethics and morality. In some sense it does not solve the previously erroneously posed problems other than by pointing out they are ill-posed questions whose premises are based on non-existents.

DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA for NPD Includes five or more of the following characteristics: 1. Is grandiose in evaluation of self without demonstrating superior achievements 2. Concentrates on fantasies of great success, influence, intelligence, beauty or perfect love 3. Believes in own "specialness" and expects to associate with high prestiage people or institutions 4. Demands to be overly admired 5. Feels entitled to special treatment and to have demands acceded to 6. Exploits others to achieve own ends 7. Lacks empathy for others 8. Frequently envious of others or assumes others are envious of him or her 9. Is arrogant in attitudes and behavior ..................... In assessing an "every-man" of the Objectivist population against the diagnostic criteria we get the following: 1. This is diametrically opposite to Objectivist philosophy (in particular "without demonstrating" achievements) 2. This also is diametrically opposite to Objectivist philosophy as any form of "fantasy" is what Objectivism rejects. 3. This is not in accord with Objectivist philosophy since "specialness" per se is vague and what objectivists value is not associated with people or institutions (others) or the supposed "prestige" attributed thereto. 4. This is diametrically opposite to Objectivist philosophy, "demands to be overly admired" is the principle of a second hander or someone who wants to fake reality (plus admiration of others is not a "cardinal" value of objectivist philosophy) 5. This is also not in accord with Objectivist philosophy, again "entitlement" "special treatment" and "demands acceded to" are not values to Objectivists 6. This is diametrically opposed to Objectivist philosophy: the trader principle, rejection of the use of force, and assertion men are ends in themselves are opposite to exploitation (in its true non-altruistic meaning) 7. Most objectivists I know are particularly intelligent, passionate, and very capable of feelings for others... as such "lack of empathy" is far from a characterization of an Objectivist 8. Once again, opposite from Objectivist philosophy: envy is a petty and irrational emotion based on arbitrary wishes and entitlement to something without exercising the requisite causes... not an objectivist trait. 9. Arrogant is defined by Oxford Dictionary as: having or revealing an exaggerated sense of one’s own importance or abilities. Firstly, Objectivism is against "exaggeration". Secondly if "importance" is attributed to some role in a society or group, Objectivists desire no such role, it forming no part of an Objectivist's self esteem. It would appear that not only do Objectivists not possess any of the requisite indicators of NPD (and 5 are required) but in fact possess the exact opposite of what is required of a person to medically/scientifically be called narcissistic.

I think "culpability" in the context of Objectivism does not rise to become a platonic existent "out there", certainly "moral culpability" is nothing like its Religious, Platonic or Kantian counterparts, and hence from an operational point of view (personally how do you extend your sense of "justice") you as an Objectivist would likely treat a "predestined" acting thing (human like robot?,, or perhaps a human itself) in the same way you would treat the non-predestined thing, which/who acts in similar ways. Steer clear of the thing which thinks (processes) X and does Y based on it. and reward or befriend, or trade with one who thinks K and does J.

BTW, apparently there have been experiments devised and conducted for which DeBroglie Bohm and Standard QM have different predicted physical outcomes. Apparently the results of the experiment were consistent with standard QM predictions and inconsistent with DeBroglie Bohm theory. http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0206196 I would guess this is only the first of perhaps a number of experiments to be devised and carried out, but right now its SQM 1, DBB zero.

Here is one facility specifically for detecting solar neutrinos: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudbury_Neutrino_Observatory Hidden variables... I note you did not say "local". I think what we need, in order to break beyond current QM (which is primarily descriptive), is to infuse it with substance, but not just substance which is consistent with current physics, but the development of theories which predict measurable effects that are distinguishable from the descriptive model of QM. I.e. it must be more than mere interpretation. This may be in the form of a nonlocal hidden variable theory but it must be one whose substance is non zero. What I am getting at is this: "QM proper" is the descriptive part, the part which is incredibly powerful and correctly reflects reality, call it DQM. The part of physics which objectivists are uncomfortable with are various interpretations of QM or call then IQM1, IQM2, etc. I would suggest that simply replacing DQM + IQM1 with DQM + IQM2 for example changes nothing except the "image" we have in our minds. As long as we know IQMx is only a representation for our benefit, i.e. actually says nothing about phenomena, outcomes, experimental results, nothing about concrete reality, it really is just a "pill" we take to make QM digestible. It is in the end, a wholly irrelevant part of the science to which it is attached (like a parasite). Only new physics which offer substance but with CONSEQUENCES (i.e. testable predictions) can change the face of QM. Something fundamental would need to be discovered. Luckily, many physicists are looking into fundamentals, much of the work is related to entanglement, bell's inequality, quantum computation, causality, measurement, uncertainty, etc. Be optimistic. We already have an incredibly accurate descriptive and predictive view of reality, it wont be long before we will confirm which "interpretations" are meaningful.

As general observation: There are difficulties with the language surrounding "morality", such as "right" and "wrong" which, when used in an underdetermined manner imply meanings which have been accepted in the general population as against the specific "flavor" these concepts have been used and are to be understood in the context of Objectivism or by Objectivists. The danger is that in the general population there is a belief in a "mystical" or at least "platonic" morality. This morality has edicts and duties, prohibitions and unavoidable prescriptions, which purportedly "exist" externally to any human mind... i.e. is OUT THERE written on the universe, in the stars, in the mind of a God, or in a realm of perfect forms. Something or other IS JUST WRONG,... or IS JUST RIGHT. Objectivists do not think in terms of these imaginary external existents, but instead deal with a voluntarily adopted guide to action, principles of right action, contexts,..etc.. The IS-OUGHT gap, Rand clearly saw was not a gap, as the only relevant/real OUGHTs MUST and DO have their origin in reality and from Man's wish to live life qua man. The truth of it is there is a gap, it's a "Mystical Ought" versus "Reality based Ought" gap, a gap between those who FEEL there is a mystical moral code they MUST follow, and those who see that to live life to the fullest certain actions are "correct" and therefore "should" be taken. Just a point I wanted to raise... really it is just a reminder which may not be needed for all.

Let me restate. Although we always endeavor to describe the universe in a way which can intuitively understand, it may be that some phenomena of the actual universe are not in the set of "human intuition compatible" concrete's (although understandable with abstraction/conceptualization), and hence imposing on that universe the requirement that all phenomena "should be" such that it is "human intuition compatible" may be nonsensical... indeed "human centric"... (earth at the center of the universe again...). We must understand reality as it is with what capacity we can, so it is in some sense "on our terms" and with our limitations we describe the universe, but the universe is the final judge of itself so to speak. We evolved very specifically at a length scale, at a time scale, at an energy scale, and our "intuition" is very attuned to understand the way objects in the universe at these scales behave. This is the perceptual "common sense". Evolution works. So do the formative years of infancy etc. Our minds luckily are also conceptual and logical and to the extent we can perform experiments and draw conclusions/abstractions and perform further experiments etc. no phenomenon in the universe, intuitive or not, is beyond our "understanding" or "description" or "use" to make predictions about observations and repeat experiments etc., i.e. master reality, even if it is beyond our "common sense intuition". Thing's as ephemeral? and fleeting as Neutrinos have been actually measured. It is a triumph of the human mind that we have described so fundamentally the workings of the universe despite our natural (common sense) mental short-sightedness.

bioengine: You state explicitly and I agree, that no real thing can be in a state which is "indeterminate and could be anything or nothing". No scientific theory or QM state actually embraces a physical entity which is "indeterminate" in that it could be "anything or nothing". e.g. A = probability1*anything + probability2*nothing is not a description of a quantum mechanical state according to modern science. At most an entity is described by a quantum state as an "indeterminate" mixture of some known states, the mixture (defined by probability and phase) is specific. e.g. for spin A = probability1*up + probability2*down (I have dispensed with phase for ease of interpretation). Every hypothetical physical QM state A has probability1 or probability2 determined, and the sum of probabilities sums to 1 for every hypothetical QM state. As such the state of spin for A is specific, it is defined, and the probabilities of all possible measurements is unity. This characterization of states is not something scientists imagined, theorized or pushed for prior to observation, it is a consequence of experiments and much frustration. Furthermore the position that the state only defines the probabilities of what will be measured also is not something scientists wanted. This is a compromise which costs the scientist dearly. The very nature of reality forces us to stop at merely describing the state on the basis of the probability of measuring outcomes. Through further experiment we have not been able to crack nature to a degree such that we can know what these states "really are" in a way we can describe them coherently. In fact it is an open question whether or not it is meaningful to impose upon the universe explanations for all possible phenomena which we can intuitively understand. Our intuition is extremely limited by our nature, evolution, our experience etc. After trying to invent scenarios to make sense of the experimental results (which have been attempted many times) conservative and prudent minds have chosen merely to stick with the "description" of reality which quantum mechanics provides. So far this description (albeit probabilistic) is completely correct in its match with reality as we observe it. I think the best example to go into is the Stern-Gerlach experiment. It is simple and elegant. I will present that on another day.

My outlook on Objectivist attitudes toward modern science/physics is somewhat buoyed by your answer. It is reassuring 3 and 5 seem acceptable. But I do recall some famous objectivists denying 5. You state "things can't exist in an indeterminate state". What do you mean by "indeterminate state"? You give an example of an entity which changes from a cow to a hippopotamus to a flea. All of which seem to be determined states in a temporal sequence. I know cows don't do this but I don't think there is a philosophical reason why Neutrinos can't do this... and I think experiments have been performed to show that they do. The neutrino fluctuates from one kind of neutrino to another... Turning to this now, we know that all entities are themselves and behave according to their natures. So either the entity (itself at time t) transforms into a different entity (which is itself at time t+1), or we take to be the "real" entity, the thing which has "attributes" describing/typifying the state of the entity at time t and which evolve into the "attributes" describing/typifying the state of the entity at time t+1, In any case the law of identity is not violated. Perhaps something else is meant by "indeterminate state"? Whatever state that is, I would like to understand how an indeterminate state necessarily is inconsistent with the law of identity. It would be a state which is indeterminate (perhaps bounded in possibilities) as against a state which was determined (restricted strictly to a single possibility i.e. a certainty). I can state this state A is indeterminate and is the state A as against state B... Are we conflating the identity of a thing and the identification of the limits of its nature? I would submit that any hypothetical entity which is itself obeys the law of identity as long as it is not .. not itself, irrespective of its hypothetical nature. The law of identity is VERY strict but VERY broad. Moreover, I do not think any hypothetical entity could be defined which violates the law of identity without it being ab initio conceptually incomprehensible/incoherent. In fact the class of such hypotheticals would belong to a very specific set: the set of things which are not themselves... which is the null set... Still curious...

Perhaps there are professional objectivist philosophers who have enough of an understanding of physics to give lectures and who are diligent and serious about investigating science in an unbiased manner... it would be unfair for me to attribute to them something I have noted generally. There are always exceptions. Since I am not playing the blame game I will not identify the sources or individuals but generally go over the types of "rejections" I have noted: 1. General relativity 2. nonlocality 3. anti-matter - total conversion of matter into energy 4. objective randomness (probability with no hidden variables) 5. quantum tunnelling and nuclear decay 6. dual nature (wave particle) of very small (low mass) particles, atoms etc. 7. QM in general I have not observed the same hostility towards knowledge and science and indeed their application in engineering and the multitude of "magical" gadgets we enjoy today from any other civilized group. Lawyers, dentists, authors, even Catholics seem more open on average to the knowledge of Physics than layperson objectivists. It is as though there is an overarching psychological phenomenon at play. I think it is tied to extending the "common sense" approach of critical thinking (which in association with logic as such is incredibly useful) to a kind of "judge things using common perception" policy, i.e. a day-to-day perceptual standard is used to judge scientific evidence. By way of illustration think of the famous Rutherford experiment: Rutherford discovered the general structure of atoms from his Gold foil experiment. He bombarded gold foil and found from the results that solid metal is mostly "empty" space, being an arrangement of nuclei which are capable of scattering particles which bombard the target, separated by expanses of space many times greater than the size of those nuclei through which particles simply pass though. Most of the mass of the gold was concentrated at these tiny places (nuclei) and these were arranged, "disconnected" and apart from each other. This clearly flies in the face of common every day experience in a number of ways but primarily strikes at the heard of the every-day concept of "solidity" itself. Imagine a fictional person at the time appealing to common "sense" (perceptions) alone: "Solid things are by definition continuously solid, they are not made of holes, they certainly are not MOSTLY empty space, clearly we can see this because objects do not pass through each other -> Logic dictates that were solid objects mostly empty space they would easily pass through each other routinely. I have never seen a steel ball pass though a table. As for this matrix of spaced apart nuclei, this is impossible. Were the nuclei themselves solid, still, solid things do not hold each other "up" without touching each other. Even if we tried to arrange newly understood magnets in an arrangement of some permanence, there is no stable matrix position and orientation which allows construction of a stable "thing". This man would have me believe that this quite solid table (speaker slams fist on the table) is actually 99% empty space? This man implies, nay is explicitly stating, that Solid things are not and indeed never have been, Solid. Such an idea is a contradiction in terms. It is nonsensical. Next he would have us believe that these Nuclei of his also are mostly space, populated by even smaller entities (or perhaps even point singularities) whizzing about tied together by mysterious "forces", and thereby have us dispense from the universe the concept of solidity ENTIRELY for none of the individual things of which things are made would take up any space at all! I will not believe that solidity is an illusion somehow arising from things which do not possess it. THIS (Slams fist again) my friends I believe in... Not the nonsense this so-called scientist has asked us to swallow." There are innumerable problems in the thinking here. I will not try to identify them all. I think anyone can grasp my point. We have a conception of solidity which is based on human perception at the level of interaction with matter (macroscopic) we are capable of. THAT conception constitutes knowledge of the way interactions at our level actually "work" and as such is not incorrect. Solid things are not "porous" in that they do not admit fluid or dust to pass through them, nor are they capable of being passed through each other. Solid things are continuously divisible into other solid things and solid things actually "take up space". It is not that objects "appear" solid, at our level of experience they ARE continuously solid and do not possess any "empty spaceiness" properties at our level of interaction with fluids or other solids. The FACT that this common sense conception of "solidity" does not hold on the microscopic (atomic) scale, nor indeed is it an attribute of any fundamental entity which makes up solid things, does not invalidate the whole of our knowledge nor even that knowledge of solid objects per se. The experiment augments our knowledge. Far from the knowledge that everything solid is made of mostly point like particles interacting over expanses of space banishing the concept of "solidity" from the universe, it informs our knowledge of the reality of solidity. It tells us WHY solid things behave the way solid things do (we actually need to add more knowledge re negative electrical charge between the nuclei to really understand, but knowledge of nuclei and empty space forms part of the total knowledge needed.). The sum of our knowledge of reality also is entirely consistent with steel balls NOT falling though tables, etc.. Acceptance and subsequent integration of knowledge gained by science here requires that we do NOT abandon reason, deductive and inductive logic, careful experimentation, but DOES require that we abandon day to day human "PERCEPTION" level assumptions about the universe, some which SEEM like "common sense". This is a fine distinction with which perhaps layperson objectivists are somewhat challenged. BTW The fictional person who spoke those words against the implications of the Rutherford experiment I equate with many objectivists in the way they treat modern science. I do not doubt that had Rand lived before Rutherford, this very type of "speech" would have been quite popular among objectivists (perhaps both laypersons and "professionals").

I have had many conversations with objectivist friends and physicists and in fact an objectivist physics major friend. I tend to find among the objectivists, in addition to their rejection of Platonism, mysticism, supernaturalism and the like, which is ALL correct, there is a kind of crusty curmudgeonly "if it ain't something I saw on a farm it's nonsense" attitude about the physics of the incredibly small or the unimaginably big... BOTH of which are utterly UNEXPERIENCED by humans in our lifetimes or by any of our evolutionary ancestors reaching back into the beginnings of life and time itself. To me it is logical to connect everyday experience with... well, everyday experience. Our ability to reason evolved to correctly gain knowledge from reality and it works. But when it comes to imagining reality in comparison to common experience, we tend to rely too much on what we are perceptually accustomed to. Anything other than common experience must be analysed very carefully using sound inductive and deductive reasoning. There is so much evasion (yeas I used the word) regarding modern science in the objectivist community that I begin to wonder why? Why hold on to unreason, masquerading as reason, under the false pretenses of common sense being the justification? ("I'm the dude playing the dude disguised as another dude") I think we all climbed out of the falsehoods, the false dichotomies, the mystic traps of religion, Platonism, and Kant, by use of logic and our rationality which is closely tied to ... well, common sense. After seeing and feeling such amazing emancipatory powers of this tool, we are tempted to rely on our "gut" for far too many things. In the battle of "they say" and "I think" that common sense was invaluable... there were falsehoods to surmount and we as objectivists prevailed. However, In the struggle to understand the universe, dismissing what scientists say often means dismissing the only evidence (piles and piles of scientific experimental evidence and knowledge) we have, which in fact comes from reality itself. We are then left in the stone-age, or perhaps with the mind of an eight year old, babbling about the "reality" of things without a shred of and in fact IN SPITE of experimental evidence. Consigned to this oblivion of ignorance we see objectivists providing instead of useful informed explanations, mere criticisms, unreasoned rejections out of hand, and quite bluntly inane futilities which make up a large part of Objectivist "thought" on the subject of Physics in this forum. Does anyone else see this tendency as I do, or have any theories as to this phenomenon's origins? cheers DO

This is a good question bioengine. "Politics" as applicable to a society who have collectively? agreed to a set of minimum government interferences is far more difficult for me to get my head around than "morality" the guide to action whose beneficiary is the individual who has adopted the morality. A society comprising people who have voluntarily decided to remain within it is relatively uncomplicated. We have the trader principle... For those "in society" (or at least who find themselves within the geographical boundaries of a territory "occupied" by the society) who are NOT of an intellectual or mental capacity to participate voluntarily in that society are somewhat of a puzzler for me. Certainly the mentally incapable are not property, and should not be owned per se, but those who wish to take responsibility for them should be allowed to if there is clearly no other place for them (geographically) and if they consent (to the extent they can). Children are more problematic in particular because unlike mentally challenged persons who cannot and will never gain the requisite capacity to voluntarily choose for themselves, they have the potential to grow into one of the individuals of voluntary capacity of which society is made. Additionally, (and problematically) children have parents. Parents traditionally have had or felt they have had the unfettered right to "raise their" children as they see fit, including influencing what they think, what they value, what they believe, etc. In some sense parents have been given rights over their children to a degree that approaches a kind of ownership and one which DOES NOT ignore the personal desires/wishes/feelings of the parent in contrast to that of the child. At the time of a dispute between the state and parents while the individual is a child whose "rights" are really at play? I would submit it is the "parent" versus the "child". But what right does the child have... what is in the child's best interest... something which can develop into a full self-responsible individual adult with volition etc. but which is not at the time of the dispute? 1. Who knows best the state or the parents? 2. What is the nature of the child's rights at stake? I submits the answers are 1. Neither and 2. The right to be become a fully formed adult rational self-actualized adult ( or at least one with minimal psychosis, baggage, vices, irrationalities, etc.) which matures on entering adulthood. How can the rights of an adult yet to be, be protected? I think a state should respect an implied contractual obligation triggered by maintaining a child until adulthood, that parents owe to their adult child upon entering adulthood, to ensure that they care for the child to the best of their ability and in the yet to be formed adult's interest. There may also be room for some sort of tort arising from negligence of the parents as well. Thus the rights and obligations are only between the adult child and the parents, and the state's role is merely to protect those implied contractual rights, not the role of ab initio "taking care" of the "interests" of anyone including children as "wards" of the state. This individual right of the child would imply a right to sue parents upon reaching adulthood for damages associated with harm caused by the parents or breaches of the implied contract. Shocking? On what principle should parents or anyone be immune from taking responsibility for harm (real harm) perpetrated on another? So when can the government step in and interfere? I think the distinguishing factor is irreparable damage. If the "damage" or harm is truly repairable then the state should not step in even if what is perpetrated by the adult is "harmful" (indoctrination into a cult of some form perhaps falls into this category?). This of course does not excuse criminal conduct which is never to be condoned. If the harm is potentially irreparable I think the state should be able to step in on behalf of the potential adult who, were he or she to come into being one day, would have had the right to ask for an injunction under the contract to prevent the damage being done by the parents, were it possible to prevent damage already done. i.e. If I had the right to ask the courts to prevent my parents from doing something to me under contract but was unable to ask the courts because of my age or mental capacity, now that I have that capacity, I should have the right to ask for that remedy now. With respect to your specific scenario, confiscation is not the proper course. The child, whose eventual adult rights include life, should be made available for treatment without interference by the parents.

Yes. Tenure did a good job actually answering the question (which somewhat different from the original) I pose as follows: "Why should Mike, in general and in most normal contexts, not sacrifice John for Mike's identified immediately apparent benefit(s)" I have arrived at similar conclusions myself. Essentially the reason is that there are an innumerable number of, some direct and some indirect, some readily apparent and some obscure, some short term and some long term consequences of any single or repeated act of sacrificing others that makes it generally, in reality, a non-beneficial thing for Mike to do and in particular application it is non-beneficial to Mike, for Mike to sacrifice John. Of course this is context dependent and incredibly complex. This is PRECISELY what I found lacking in Dr. Peikoff's answer. I heard reasons but did not see where they came from or how they lead to the conclusions. I restate my question as this: To what extent (or how) does Dr. Peikoff's answer, actually answer the original questions? i.e. how do the REASONS (which he purports "lead to" the conclusion he reaches) actually SUPPORT that conclusion? Perhaps my best answer is this: Although it is incredibly complex and context dependent it is almost certainly always the case that sacrificing John is in fact NOT to Mike's benefit, in the long-range, all consequences in their totality taken into account. There is an implicit error in the form of the question in that the purported "benefit to Mike" in almost all contexts will be short-sighted, based on incomplete information and not take into account some far-reaching long-range consequences. Adopting a principle of sacrificing others to oneself on a day-to-day basis for ad hoc in the moment identified "benefit" is with certitude a disastrous policy for Mike to adopt for himself. There are extremely rare situations/contexts (during an emergency, a war, etc.) in which, everything taken into account, John's sacrifice, even his very life, will be beneficial to Mike, and in those cases Mike, although he may or may not know it, should sacrifice John.

Hello All: There is one very HEROIC, ROMANTIC and I would say "OBJETIVIST" series of Science Fiction books which I find a tremendously magnificent vision: the Golden Age Trilogy by John C. Wright. It falls quite short of a masterpiece of literature but it is a masterpiece of imagination and celebration of the human "spirit". It is a compelling read that will resonate strongly with objectivists who appreciate a heroic sweeping tale. If you decide to look into these books, we warned, the journey is not one without tragedy... WARNING: Before looking up the author, know this: these books were written at a time in his life when he was a committed atheist and from his first three books, clearly an objectivist familiar with objectivist philosophy. He knew his stuff... and in fact may have taken it a bit far by "externalising" how morality is objective, (see note below). The work stands on its own and I CHERISH having read it. The tragedy of which I speak will challenge your objective ability to read a work, hear an idea, appreciate a piece of art for what it IS, ignoring what person who made it or what they became... i.e. it will challenge your ability to objectively judge a work on its NATURE and not its SOURCE. The TRAGEDY is this. AFTER this trilogy was published the author: had a heart attack, had life saving heart surgery (quadruple bypass?), and ... reported having visions of the Virgin Mary, Jesus Christ and God the Father Himself. One can speculate re. where these delusions originated... some undetected brain damage that occurred during or about his heart attack or his surgery, a psychotic break induced by a stark encounter with mortality... the list goes on. I truly think he really did have the hallucinations, and DID experience them AS reality. He errs (greatly) in his assessment of their cause/origin. He subsequently converted to Catholicism... I only found this out after having read the series... and after determining that I must read more of his books... I was VERY disappointed (heartbroken even?) to know these three books are the only of his I will likely read. One way to look at it is this: there once was an author who produced a great work I cherish.. THAT author understood, THAT author "spoke to me", and THAT author .. is no longer. BUT still, irrespective of the author, the WORK stands on its own, I am able to objectively appreciate it, and I DO find it wonderful. The Books: The Golden Age The Phoenix Exultant The Golden Transcendence Takes place 50 thousand years into the future.... cheers DarkOwnt Note: He may have gone a bit far at one point extending the concept "morality" to God-like thinking machines, although arguably there may be an analogous type of concept those sentient beings would hold and use as a guide for their benefit... and the author seems to have imparted a platonic slant to morality as such... i.e. "right" and "wrong" almost emerge as objective existents (out there) rather than part of an internally held (but non-subjective) abstract guide to action which is objectively correct in the long-range relationship/causality/consequences between the actor and the external world. Many objectivists can be tempted, in the spirit of accepting morality as "objective", to simply "externalize" a mystically tinged concept of morality he/she grew up with (recall morality as edict of God, or duty AS SUCH a la Kant), imbue something "out there" with the edicts of "wrongs and rights" as though the very universe were a tablet upon which is written "the code" for us to follow. This clearly would be Mysticism and Platonism. The author does not explicitly state this "externalisation"... but at one point ... it is something the reader can sense. NO matter how logical the personal code of morality, even if validly determined according to objectivist principles, to take a step of "projecting" right and wrong upon the universe itself is, is, quite simply, exactly the same mistake of crossing into mysticism persons of faith have made for millennia. In a very real sense it is the same mistake as taking a mathematical abstraction which correctly predicts the behaviour of something in reality, and projecting that "formula" onto the universe itself... (Platonism). In fact the abstraction, the concept, is internal, and only in the sense that it is useful and correct and not arbitrary or arbitrarily subjective is it objective. That said almost ALL people who accept any form of "right" and "wrong" and who are NOT objectivists, subconsciously view morality AS an external existent ... a mystical "thing" that "just IS", "out there"... so how could the author have reached that audience without using language similar to what they could understand? ...