StrictlyLogical

Mental "state" is a misleading term and a clumsy concept.
The mind does not have discrete and persistent "states"; it engages in processes.

Consciousness is not an attribute like vertibrae or thumbs; it is an activity.
So mental "states" are like respiratory or circulatory "states"; unintelligible without the previous and subsequent "states" (processes).

And whether mental processes cause neural processes, or vice versa, is an invalid question; mental processes ARE neural processes, from a different perspective.

That's like asking whether the computations of an active video game cause the images on your TV or are caused by your controller: the options aren't exclusive and no matter which you choose, you'll be wrong.

In the body, principally in the brain. It is distributed over the volume of the brain, and in general the entire nervous system.

An attribute may be non-material, but no attribute can be acausal. Nothing violates causality, including consciousness.

Move very far away then get psychological therapy.
Learning Objectivism is not your most pressing need now.

Sense of life is likely more of a passive component: how a man sees the world and his interaction with it.  "Sense" implies an input or means of "viewing" or contemplating.
 
Character although there is the passive component of how a man sees himself, is more active, and deals with something a man introspectively participates in, choice of principles and values.  It is also more akin to "nature" or "identity", i.e. what a man IS, and as a result likely to do.
 
These two are of course closely intertwined, but a man with a strong principled character can still have a sense of life which is for lack of a better term is "pessimistic" and a person whose sense of life is more on the sunny side can still be unprincipled.

Severinian, I think any one who "proves" free will would be deserving of the Pulitzer prize, since such a knowledge would no doubt allow us to create and/or assess complex artificial thinking systems approaching, and thanks to the discovery, actually having free will.
 
I seriously think the problem we still have here is a definition of just exactly what "free" means in the context of "free will".  When we say "Will" or "choice" is free, "what" exactly are we saying it is free from?  External influence?  External determination?  The past nature of the actor?  The nature (identity) of the actor at the very moment of acting? The context?  Everything in reality that IS or ever WAS?
 
We must recall that we are in the context of a philosophy that has "causality" as a corollary of the law of identity, specifically the law of identity as applied to action, which states that an entity of a specific nature (in a specific state) in a specific context, can act only in a singular inexorable way (rather than freely from a number of multiple actions) doing the one thing its unique specific nature and the unique specific context together determine. So causality is argued to be a logical inevitability.  The reasoning is that to assert something as acausal, with any degree of freedom undetermined, would be to assert a contradiction of the law of identity.  This holds in reality only if identity (of the entity and context) and possible action are related in a 1 to 1 mapping. 
 
We must also recall that we are in the context of a philosophy that does not ascribe to any form of supernaturalism whatever.  All of reality, whether described by biology, chemistry, physics, comprise systems of existents which at any one time exist in accordance with the law of identity.  Whatever it is at a time t it is what it is at that time t and not what it is not.
 
What does it mean for you to have "free" will?  I have heard it is not "freedom" from external influence, or even "freedom" from external determination.  I have heard it said, given your nature, at time t and the entire universe as it was at time t, even if you made choice B at t+dt, you COULD have chosen differently.  It matters not whether this choice is to devote your life to becoming the president, or whether to raise a finger, or whether it is the choice to think or abstain from thinking... THAT choice made by you (the complex natural system of existents in reality) could actually have been different.  AND how is it "free"?  The particular choice say B (from A, B, C) as against A, was not determined by ANYTHING.  This is one definition of "free" will.
 
I cannot speak to the position of Objectivism itself, but I am of the view that whatever any system is free from, whether you speak of it physically, chemically, biologically, or psychologically, it cannot escape the laws of "causality" and specifically with respect to the law of identity as applied to action.  In other words IF there is a law of identity as applied to action, if it is a law, it must be applicable to all of reality, any combination, system, group, sub-portion, existent, all of reality.  If it is applicable to SOME of reality or only some of the time, then we have something OTHER than a law of reality.
 
Others will appeal to experiments based on your ability to introspect.  I ask you to indulge in a critical examination of what you experience as you experience it:
 
1. set up a decision context, give yourself two choices, make them as arbitrary as possible (no preference for either) say choosing to write down letter J or K.
2.  Prior to making the choice solidify your introspection that you a. do not know what you will chose, b. are "free" to choose J or K
3. Make your decision: with full introspection.  Can you identify exactly when or why you chose what you did?  Try to focus on the EXACT instant of your choice not before it was final, and not after it was made...
4. Recall the process 1 through 3.  Assess what it means for you to think to your self "I could have chosen differently" and upon what evidence it is based.
 
I submit in performing 4 you will note that you cannot believe you actually made a different choice (of course you cant you are not insane), you will recall what it was like to realize you had just made a decision, and you can recall the feeling BEFORE you chose of the possibility of choosing either.  Remembering 3, the very instant of choice, you may find things blank or possibly unreachable (it is very possible the subconscious is involved in the very instant of choice).
 
What do you know?  I would say A. you know nothing about the exact mechanism of choice at the very instant of choice, B. You know you cannot choose otherwise now that the choice is made, after the choice, and C: You know before the choice you felt as though you could choose either but did not know what that choice would be.
 
It seems an open question to me whether choice is independent of your nature and hence truly acausal and non-determined by anything in reality.

I just realised that empathetic joy... "feeling" joy via empathy or happiness in response to knowing someone else's happiness.. IS a very selfish and natural thing.
 
I think only a person who feels anger when someone else feels happiness or feels happiness when someone else feels sad would ever come to the thought that empathy is somehow selfless or laden with duty.. but such a selfless concept of empathy is fraudulent and dishonest... in some sense anti-empathy, strained-empathy, or pretend-empathy.
 
It's a little off topic.. but I felt something here and thought I'd mention it.
 
LaBogala it was wonderful hearing you speak like that in post #19! I selfishly enjoyed it!

I have a particular interpretation of "information" which may or may not be relevant to others interpretation of the term.
 
 
Information is a potentiality of knowledge,  In a sense it is pre-mind,  But for information to truly be something connected with knowledge, something which can help give rise to it, it must be causally linked. 
 
So a pattern in the sand is information precisely of what caused it or what the sand is because something did create a pattern in the sand.  Knowledge can be gleaned from the pattern, i.e. from the information.  this is to be distinguished from mental contents which may or may not be information for other people (imagination is not information .. and is causally not linked to reality) so when someone tells you something it can be information if causally linked or a lie (if imagination etc.).
 
Is a random pattern information?  only insofar as it reveals its source, which would be a contradiction for random "information" (stolen concept).  This leads to questions of whether any process is truly random... since only a pattern created by a truly random process would be truly random, and hence contain no information.
 
Edge cases I have heard of which seemingly are exceptions to the causal definition of information is the purported random information which is somehow actually information (but acausally so).  
 
E.g.  Imagine if you will a billion monkeys typing on keyboards or a billion monkeys painting, We could categorize all that they produce as simply random, and since it is causally connected to nothing, simply meaningless (except perhaps as a compendium of knowledge of the tapping or paintbrush waving proclivities of primates). 
 
if in a trillion years one of the monkeys reproduces a Mona Lisa or a Shakespeare sonnet, has "information" magically been created?  I would say no.  The patterns are still random tappings or brushings of a monkey.  why? Because in reality that is all they are...  causally speaking they represent physics of paint, or typwriters and biology and psychology of monkeys no other information of reality is contained therein.  When someone looks at the words or the paint and identifies them as being coordinate with something else, the words or paint in combination with the identification by the person, becomes information, i.e. capable of being used as knowledge.
 
How?  A person ignorant of the Mona lisa or the sonnet, now can be supplied with the Monkey text or the painted sheet, and assuming they can trust the person as being honest they can know that there is in reality a correspondence between the text or the paint and respectively the mona lisa or Shakespeare.  this is causal because the original work (mona lisa or shakespear) and or copies thereof are causally linked to the person who saw or read it and that person after seeing the Monkey work has identified the correspondence.
 
 
So information is simply states or arrangements of existents which can be used as evidence or as starting material for an individual's gaining of knowledge of something in reality, and as such (by implication) information must be causally linked to the entities of which knowledge may be gained. 
 
 
Just a few ideas.

With animals-it's not immoral, just disgusting. It's like to ask is it immoral to eat vomit? As for family members-no, it's not immoral. But a person who sleeps with his mother obviously has deep psychological problems.

"your children and grandchildren might get mediocre education, but it will be worth it, for the eventual common good."
"you want what's best for your child, but your child doesn't need it. . . She may not learn as much or be as challenged, but take a deep breath and LIVE WITH THAT." [obnoxious caps mine]
"Im saying that i survived it, and so will your child, who must endure having no AP calculus so that in 25 years there will be AP calculus for all."
[final few paragraphs]

I reiterate: the twisted little creature which defecated that article is not human.

Observe the consequentialist test in respect of "good economic consequences", as connected to morality, is only in respect of or from the perspective of the proper beneficiary, the individual.  Insofar as the individual IS moral and takes voluntary action consonant with reality the economic consequences in capitalism are maximised.
 
We here know that taking morality, consciousness and other concepts applicable to individuals and trying to apply them to aggregates, communes, collectives... is generally not effective, proper, or perhaps not even rational.  If "goodness or  "goodness for" and equally "consciousness in" is defined for an individual does it make sense to even try to think of a collective having "more goodness"  or "more consciousness" simply because there are more individuals? 
 
The proper moral evaluation is on an individual basis.. on an individual level,,, as a noneconomist I ask is this the level of economical analysis?

Greater aggregate prosperity is irrelevant.
 
Focusing on the ends is dangerous with those (general public) already predisposed to pragmatism and justifying means (immoral ones) by the ends.  Speaking of Capitalism in these terms makes us look like we are ALSO trying to justify the means (the system) by the ends - purported prosperity.
 
In fact Objectivism is focused on the individual and which system is best most moral most just etc, for that individual.
 
To name but a few principles, justice, honesty, independence are all something undermined by the concept of "aggregate" prosperity being a goal.  Imagine a villainous hybrid system that allowed people of moderate to high moral and intellectual capacity to act on their own volition but forced people (I mean literally forced like some sort of involuntary rehab... not merely persuasion but force) of objectively low intellect and low motivated self-destructive people to educate themselves, to get healthy, to become rational, to reform themselves, and then to work.  Such a system might very well lead to even greater "prosperity" than Capitalism but it would in no way be morally superior due to the use of force against the self destructive and hopeless.  In a truly free society people are permitted to be self-destructive, to be irrational, to be non-prosperous.  To the extent that the freedom of some people to be self-destructive and non-prosperous is interfered with (as in the example) "aggregate" prosperity can be raised.  This however is not moral.
 
 
Perhaps "potential for moral individual prosperity" is the kind of result of capitalism we should try to demonstrate.

tjfields,
 
If you ran across a deadly yew tree on your island and consumed the fruit, or some poisonous mushrooms, would you consider it right or wrong to consume them?
If you consider it right, why?
If you consider wrong, why?

In post #76 I said:
 
 
When others failed to keep context, I further elaborated in #79:
 
 
Others further dropped context by claiming I was stealing, reifying, or mystifying the concept "right", and proceeded to demand I break down all of their related errors of knowledge concerning Oism. (for me, a quote from someone who I thought held one idea directly contradicting that idea, is enough stimulus to go do my own homework...)  I explained further in  #81:
 
 
 
Since I am in a forum, the context of which is Objectivism, it is proper and reasonable to post in a way that is consistent with that context and expect others to realize that context is the standard. In other words here it is necessary to state if your view is not in agreement with Oism, because it is a forum dedicated to it. If I were in a forum dedicated to Kantianism I would have to post in a manner that respected the purpose of that forum and identify my self as a non-Kantian, because it is not the pretext for that forum. The only way to demonstrate that my points are consistent with Objectivism and others points aren't, is to quote the only author of Oism. (The issue of my own validation of those ideas is separate from this ! (fans of psychologism take note!... )
 
1. I maintain that Objectivism holds that all rights are individual rights, derived from the right to life, and that this is the condition for any other right, as well as the precondition for any society and government. Just as rights presuppose life and value, government presupposes the individual possessing that right and is the reason governments are formed to "secure" them.
 
   Ayn Rand said:
 
 
 
 Ms. Rand illustrated the fact that the individual right to life is not granted to one by society in Anthem by having Equality 7-2521 derive the concept of the individual introspectively within a social context that did not possess a concept for it.
 
Edit: Equality 7-2521 does not feel guilt because of there own introspective sense that the socially dictated "sins" were anti-life.  

 
 
The Island dweller can not escape the requirements of his own existence. He must discover the values required to live as man. His values must be in accordance with the full context of his life. This extends beyond mere metabolic requirements, man is an integration of mind and body.
 
Ayn Rand said:
 
 
The island dweller needs only know his own conditions for life as man, to grasp that he should not value murdering the unconscious man, and that the man has a right to his own life. The consequences for murder are not exclusively or primarily the destruction of others value and rights!
 
The importance of conscience in Objectivism is tremendously overlooked by many of its proponents. Psychological harmony/integration is essential to mans life and therefore plays an important role in Oist literature. The harmony of Galt's actions and premises with his own life/identity derived values, showed in his body/face. Rearden's path to inner integration required him to realize the he "placed pity above [his] own conscience" etc.
 
The selfish value of a man who lives with integrity, is because of what violating what one knows to be "right" does TO HIMSELF,  to his own conscience.
 
When a rationally selfish man doesn't cheat on his wife when no one would find out, it is primarily because HE would know!
 
EDIT: Fixed sentence below
 
The unconscious mans right to life is not predicated on his value to the island dweller as such. The island dweller doesn't violate this right because of the island dwellers value of himself! As a secondary he will rationally derive the respect for life in general from this knowledge.
 
 
As to the question of the hypothetical being a social context, the idea that it isn't is so obtuse I refuse to debate it further.

Yes, the answer will make a difference, as it would determine whether it's any kind of rational decision. By rational, I mean an evaluated choice to achieve the most for your self-interest. Now, if this stranger were a friend, it's rather easy to see how killing a friend is harmful to yourself, so I wouldn't need to go into it really. Friends provide value to you as an individual, in whatever manner their life is important to you. But extend that choice to kill a little: consider a friend saying, while chopping onions, "I'm going to kill you" as a joke because you did something silly. If you were grumpy that day because you slept funny, perhaps you'll just say "eh, I don't like him today, so I'll kill him". Destroying your value because of motivations like that is largely immoral because you're destroying the sort of interactions that help you attain further values. You'd basically be taking an action that harms your ability to attain values you want. Suppose the same event happens. "I'm going to kill you" when they have a knife pointed at you and genuinely angry. That's the only difference. In this case, if you killed your friend to protect your life, that is actually  protection of yourself. But if your reason was still "I don't like him today", then your action would be immoral to the degree you're killing for no particular reason at all - if you kill on whim, there is no basis to say what possibly improves or worsens in life. Your motivations matter, because it reflects how you make decisions, and by what standard, if any. Motivations are a way to identify what you gain. If there is a loss, then that's immoral, and if you base a decision on some momentary feeling, then you're not even trying to note values.

Objectivism isn't consequentialism. Consequentialism doesn't care about motivations if the results are the same, all that matters is what happens. Objectivism isn't deontology either. Deontology doesn't care about results, as long as your actions are within ethical boundaries - nor does deontology care about what happens to you in particular. Objectivism has more teleological ethics to anything. Right or wrong is determined by what an entity is (not that all teleology is sensible, it depends on how you evaluate the entity). That is, actions are tightly linked to who you are, as opposed to the other two I mentioned that are mostly concerned about actions as such. Consequences matter to teleology, but the concern is consequences to you, not just a consequential event (i.e. the consequence of a person being dead has to be related to what happens to your value. So, when you ask "is murdering this stranger wrong", motivations help to answer what happens to you. As much as you want to say everything continues on as if nothing happened, that's impossible, as very literally, you are being impacted indirectly by all actions you take.

Suppose you killed the stranger on the beach because the sun was in your eyes, like The Stranger. You don't know anything about him, so he's not a friend at all. So you kill him to preserve the food you have on the island. But you have to ask: what do you get out of killing him? If you just say "I just felt like it", then you're admitting you have no idea of what you gained or lost. Whether your action had a positive or even neutral effect on you would be impossible to know, so you couldn't evaluate whether it was good or bad. Objectivist ethics presumes that ethical actions help or improve your life and that you can make such decisions objectively. Skipping any thought is irrational and immoral because what you do might have a profound negative impact on your life.

One reply might be "if I kill him the island won't change, and since he's unconscious, I won't know what I'm losing out on". Pretty standard idea that your ignorance of additional information can't ever hurt you. But that's wrong. What you don't know will hurt you. Not attempting to make any evaluation is equivalent to willful ignorance and evasion. You look at coconuts and figure out how to drink from one. You learn which fish are easiest to catch and then feed yourself. There's nothing about another person that makes the process any different, you should learn what another person can provide in terms of value. Perhaps he has a waterproof cellphone and can call for help. Maybe he'll help build a house. Who knows? You won't know until you ask. If you fear he'll take away your resources, that's bad reasoning - value isn't zero sum, not even on an island. An interesting point Rand made is that people are neither lone wolves nor social animals. They are traders.

I am disappointed you would simply lump me in with any other forum member.  I am not a member of any clique, subgroup, commune, or gang.  I addressed you individually as an individual.
 
 
Secondly, I am disappointed you would accuse me of adopting a "tactic" as though my statements were disingenuous or intended to deceive. 
I find that insulting and disrespectful and in fact not consonant with reality: I was respectfully engaging in an exchange of ideas.
 
 
This is below the threshold of normal forum etiquette, and certainly below what I would expect from an Objectivist.
 
 
 
UPDATE:  Everyone, I have received no PMs regarding EITHER the example piece of music I suggested, or the video posted/linked to by Nicky.
 
If I get 4 or more responses in re. either of them I will let everyone know the results.  

Mysticism is the reification of a contradiction.

I'd like to know their answers to your and my questions, not in terms of what they FEEL as parents in the legal framework of a modern STATIST society but what they THINK morally...as Objectivists (if the term applies).

What do you mean by moral authority?  Is this a moral "right" of the parents to ownership of gifts given to their children or "income from a job" their kid had earned?
 
On what Objectivist principle does a parent have moral "right" to such ownership?  Does it derive from the nature of Man "as parent" to actually own (rather than act as steward for) their children's earnings??  Is this actual ownership a blank check (it must be if it is actual ownership by the parents) for the parent to do anything whatever with those earnings?
 
 
Child actors, celebrities or musicians who have had millions of dollars bilked and stolen from them by their parents (examples of which abound) are not victims of any crime?
This in the name of some moral authority??
 
I would need a solid rationale to identify such ugly vice as proper and moral. 

I would say the proper objectivist society should adopt the following re. rights as between children and parents in respect of property.
 
1. Parents have no obligation to transfer ownership to the child of any real or personal property.
2. Equally children have no claim to any property of the parents.
3. A child comes to own property like any other individual in a free society, he can receive it as a gift or as a trade from someone who rightfully owns and thus can give or trade the property. 
4. Parents cannot destroy the property, give it away or otherwise divest the child from ownership of it.
5. Given a parent's responsibility (as between the child and parent) to act in the best interests of the child (a separate matter) until the child is a full adult individual, the parent can prevent the child from ACTING in a manner, in connection with the property which is not in the best interests of the child... or perhaps more rationally the best interests of the adult person the child may become.  This means the parent may need to prevent destruction, prevent imprudent sale, prevent gifting... IF the child does not know what he/she is doing and would likely regret doing it etc. i.e.  not in the best interests of child.
6. If to protect the interests of the child the parent must take possession (NOT ownership) of the property, lock it up, or otherwise take control of it, the parent will do so in a manner which protects the value of the property and the rights of the child to that property until such time as the child may regain possession, or until the child becomes a full adult individual at which time the parents shall be obligated to deliver up the property back to their child if so requested by the child.
7.  At all times, until and unless, the child has voluntarily disposed, destroyed, sold, given away etc the property (subject to the parents responsibility to intervene in the child's best interest or in the best interests of the person he/she will become) the property will properly be owned by the child.
8.  If the parents divest the child of ownership, rather than simply dispossess the child of the property, either by destruction, unwanted sale, or gift etc. the child will have, upon becoming a full adult individual the right to restitution from the parents for the unjust theft, destruction etc. of that property by the parents.  The damages shall be at least the value of the property wrongfully destroyed, divested, plus interest, and may include damages connected to the parents unjust benefit from the property (if for example they sold it and kept the money or used it themselves), and possibly damages for any pain and suffering. 
 
Oh yes,  In an objectivist society children should have the right to sue parents for damages once they reach adulthood, based of course on rational standards.
 
so my answer is, morally children HAVE property rights... the mere fact there are parents is an aside and a complicating factor with respect to the way the child can ACT in respect of that property but OWNERSHIP itself, as a right, is unaffected. 
 

Seems that "part" is meant to be a portion of the substance of something, like a protrusion, or an extension or a sub-portion.  This type of thing is quite different from a quality or attribute correct?  I would think the thing and its parts equally could have attributes and/or qualities.
 
So did we arrive at a conclusion re. what Rand meant by attribute and what she meant by quality in the quote given at the start of the thread?

IF induction IS
 
"inference of a generalized conclusion from particular instances"
 
and if the totality of any individual person's life is a collection of particular instances of experiencing reality, then is not claiming "induction is wrong" tantamount to claiming "knowledge" is impossible to every individual?  Is it not an attack on the process of conceptualization itself?
 
 
I think I hear echoes of skepticism and rationalism...
 
 
Assuming omniscience, mystic revelation and platonic forms do not exist (and they do not), perhaps the issue of "knowledge" is one of semantics.  An Objectivist knows that whatever "knowledge" IS, it must at least fall within the scope of WHAT an individual can HAVE in his or her brain and can gain from experiencing reality (there are many other steps of course)
 
It would be utterly senseless to speak of a kind of "knowledge" not possible to man.. such a definition takes the concept outside of the range of what it is meant to identify.
 
SL 

Plasmatic:
 
Although originally the intent of my questions were to understand what you WERE thinking and what you HAD thought, I am sure it will be just as, if not more, illuminating to understand what you WILL think once you have had a chance to finish devouring and digesting that new book. 
 
Any new and useful information which ends up contributing to the upkeep (including any modification, strengthening, deletion, or addition) to the structure which is the integrated unity of my knowledge will be very much appreciated.  I await selfishly to hear your thoughts!! 
 
-SL

Harrison: your comments look interesting but I am focused on an exchange with Plasmatic right now.  Please forgive me if I address them later.
 
Plasmatic:
 
You stated: 
"The impossible in it is the idea that meaning can be transferred to higher level concepts while denying their source and context in perception. That induction or deduction somehow allow us to bypass the foundation of perception to ALL HUMAN knowledge"
 
This is the very misunderstanding I thought you may have had.  I will be clear:
1   induction or deduction CANNOT bypass the foundation of knowledge which at its base is perception... the only link to reality.  I am not a rationalist, and as an objectivist reject all forms of mysticism, religion, Platonism, communism, primacy of consciousness...etc.  Induction and deduction ... are my tools I use to make sense of my perceptions, conceptually in an integrated, noncontradictory fashion.
2   I do not deny that perception and our perceptual apparatus are fundamental to obtaining information from reality.  They are fundamental, in fact they are the ONLY tie a consciousness has to reality no many how many or few (blind deaf.. etc.) or how weakly that consciousness is able to get input from reality, that input IS all it has (inner self-knowledge, intuition, "remembering" platonic forms... are NOT sources of knowledge of existents.. these are introspective musings, delusions, and imaginings only).
 
 
These two things I state above ARE my philosophy.  The question arises: what have I said that could have been misconstrued to mean the exact opposite?
 
 
 
I think perhaps it may be due to my identifying (attempting?) concepts not commonly referred to, or perhaps I have referred to something known in special circles according to some specific jargon which I have not used.
 
 
What is the hypothetically flawed objectivist (and by no means do I mean every objectivist) doing which I identify as a mistake?  Certainly, relying on perceptual input is NOT a mistake.  The pencil appearing bent in a glass of water is in no way "wrong" it is the way the light refracts through the water, enters the eye and is processed by the visual cortex.  The possible problem which can arise is the prescientific instantaneous judgement that the pencil must itself be bent.  It is in this sense only that I refer to "common sense intuitions" which can be erroneous if the whole of knowledge, experiments, analysis etc, is not integrated with the process of assessing the appearance of the pencil.  As an objectivist, maximal integration is my voluntarily chosen "duty" (not the best word but you get my meaning)
 
In a sense the error I am thinking of is focusing too much on or giving too much weight to common-sense "feelings" and intuitions  humans (including unwary objectivists) have, which interferes with proper cognition.  Feelings and intuition cannot form a  basis of knowledge... this is precisely my point. 
 
E.g.  We all know from specialized knowledge of the science of physics that atoms, nuclei and their surrounding electrons, exist and form all forms of everyday solid, gaseous, and liquid matter.  I know of no objectivist who rejects the concept of atoms, but we should recognise that there is an accomplishment involved in the acceptance of this fact.  We have had to forego the application of concepts such as solidity and "continuity of entity" as applicable to our interaction with "a ball of steel" and "a rock" at our time and length scales, when dealing with electrons, nuclei and atoms.  This is not trivial.  I note we used our rationality and our perceptual faculty to imagine, construct, conduct  an experiment and analyse the results to arrive at this state of counterintuitive knowledge. 
 
Perhaps it is only my intuition, but when I imagine things, entities in reality, something which is solid and continuous tends to appear in my mind: not something mostly empty, made of pointlike (if not actual point) particles interacting in a manner which gives rise to an arrangement which is static and yet utterly discontinuous and full of space.  
[[[As an aside: when writing this, my common-sense intuition is screaming "point particle... nothing is a point.. a point has no length, no area, no volume such a thing is impossible because ... all things have volume are solid and are continuous...." I note this is circular and unsupported, then I have an infinite regression type argument with myself INVENTING spherical particles which are solid...for which there is no evidence whatsoever that they exist... soon I realise my intuition is simply not applicable and is simply not based on any data relevant to that which I am trying to apply it]]]  
This intuition (solidity and continuity) about the way the universe is, does work at the level of everyday objects we interact with and operationally makes perfect sense and in that sense is true.  I cannot pass my hand through a block of steel, and I can (on a macroscopic scale) divide it to my heart's content.  This is useful knowledge and solidity is valid.  The concept of solidity, however, is simply inapplicable to electrons and nuclei which make up all solid matter. 
 
These things give rise to solidity but they do not themselves possess it.
 
To me this is an accomplishment in abstract conceptual thinking, knowledge of atoms as they are requires rationality and careful experimentation.  This does not involve the denial of the perceptual faculty but does in some sense require close examination and vigilance with respect to "intuitive common sense" so as not to permit it to lead us astray.
 
My open question was whether certain prescientific, non specialized knowledge or experience based "common sense intuitions" may influence judgements about science in the absence of the full body of knowledge which should be integrated to make a decision about it.
 
This kind of mistake may not in fact be a phenomenon attributable to Objectivists in general... my sample is very small.
 
I hope this resolves the misunderstanding of my meaning.
 
 
SL
 
 
 

Agreed:  Although, a normally developed male (mentally, i.e. emotionally and cognitively) in his 30s will likely have different very values, experiences, knowledge, and goals from a "normally" developed female in her late teens/early 20s.
 
Unless the woman is exceptionally experienced, accomplished, and mature emotionally and cognitively etc.  OR unless the man is exceptionally UNDER developed there generally will not be the conditions for what objectivists define as a state of love ever occurring between the two or even one for the other.
 
If one were to speculate one could say that, probabilistically speaking, "real" romantic love (according to objectivism) is likely not actually being experienced by the man (irrespective of whether or not this would or even could be reciprocated by the female).

I agree with the previous two answers. Well said both of you.
 
One additional item I would like to raise is the implicit context within which Sartre's statements should likely be viewed.
 
Before Rand (and correct me if I am wrong), "Ethics" and "Morality", "Good" and "Evil" were concepts which had the status of existents, "out there" in reality, having an independent existence from Man or any man's mind, whether existing in the supernatural (religious), platonic (realm of forms), or otherwise mystical realm(consciousness of a collective).  As such these were holus bolus Mystical in nature, whether edicts, duties, imperatives, commandments, they simply WERE, and "should" be discovered and followed.  As a philosopher considering Ethics and morality, you either believed in them (and embraced them or rejected them) or disbelieved in them i.e. repudiated their existence entirely, and there was no alternative.  Either mystical moral truths EXIST (out there) or they moral truths (of any kind) do not exist AT ALL (complete subjectivism).
 
A person like Sartre (and I am guessing as to motives) speaking of "Ethics" as subjective is primarily denying the existence of mystical moral truths etc. that require mysticism, BUT going too far because he saw no alternative.  In some sense when he says you can't say what is "better" is correct, if "better" (morally speaking) is defined as having meaning only in the context of a mystical realm.  He falls back on a subjective standard for "better" - i.e. short range "what you feel like" subjective whims, because at least that IS real.
 
I think Objectivist Ethics and morality is difficult for non-Objectivists to understand because it does not really fall within what the normally mystical definitions of Ethics and Morality are based upon.  In some sense many of the problems, ruminations, conundrums of ethical and moral philosophy, which inherently are based on these mystical concepts, are simply not addressed by Objectivism which rejects mysticism (and rightly so).
 
It is ironic that Objectivism solves the "problems" of Ethics and morality by providing an alternative to the common conceptualizations of Ethics and morality.  In some sense it does not solve the previously erroneously posed problems other than by pointing out they are ill-posed questions whose premises are based on non-existents.