StrictlyLogical

William and Doug,
Electromagnetic waves are not composed of electrons, but of photons. The former are fermions (which cannot be in the same state as another fermion, including particle location), whereas the latter are bosons (which can be in the same state with another boson, including particle location). E-M waves, including radio waves, are quantum waves. They can interfere which each other, as waves, and thereby degrade the ability of the carrier wave of radio broadcast to carry information. (Also, if I remember correctly, in cases of waves in matter, such as ripples on the surface of otherwise still water, interference of waves with each other [cancellation or other alteration of each other] is not essentially due to the impenetrability of molecules [fermions].)
Of related interest: Energy Wave Theory

"You can't take the sky from me"
Damn straight. That's one of the things nobody can take from you without your consent.

To my mind, this is the most compelling argument for off Earth colonization.

Yes.
Space is a relationship between things, defined thereby and it is relative. Those things exist in space and at points in space.  Space cannot exist "in space" or "at points in space" it IS the space.
Anything whatever that can exist at or in space or exhibit any property, attribute, is something other than space. 
Particles, fields, potentials, probabilities, are all things or aspects of things at or in space, not properties OF space, on the contrary... the positional parameters of those things, i.e. the spatial coordinates or those things, are properties or attributes of those things, in relation to other things.
 
No thing is a property or attribute of space. Space, position, location, extension, area, volume... these are all properties of things in relation to themselves and each other.
 

The realization
that every individual's contextual surroundings, metaphysically is becoming such that freedom to choose to live outside of a wrong society, outside of its grasping, oppressive, insipid, nanny-tyrant grip...into some pristine environment abundant enough to support a human life... not free from hard work but at least a free one ... is fast disappearing... 
is existentially depressing.
 
A few centuries ago a free man could tell his village he wanted no more... and could leave... and if he ranged far enough, and was ingenious and productive enough, and with perhaps others of his ilk, he could make a living in supporting and sustaining himself and his family, and escape, if at least only for a while.  A totalitarian or a socialist might try to go after him, but perhaps they would stop at only chastising him as he left.  "Don't like it here? Good riddance!"
Now, or very soon, there literally is no where to go
Nowhere to escape the many many hands, in our pockets, bedrooms, education, entertainment, speech, economics...everywhere...   "You'll own nothing... you'll all pay minimum wage and minimum tax or earn a minimum "living salary" have a minimum of health care and you'll love it"...  I am disgusted and outraged beyond description at the insanity, which seems to march incessantly onward... the whole world is going from shirts to shirtsleeves.
 
Instead of escaping our enslavers, instead of walking away peacefully from a fight with our petty screaming redfaced despots next door... who know what's best for us (and them), wielding that all mighty ballot box...
must we choose to fight forever or be enslaved forever?  sigh
 
So really true freedom comes again... when... in a few millenia?  Perhaps never...
 
I know will never see the day where I or my son, or my ancestors live in a truly free society... I will be taxed, redistributed, and redtaped into submission every day of my finite life.
 
Perhaps... there is after all an actual morality in escapism... morality in perhaps living in a video game, or with a belief in the afterlife ... 
if death is all that can ever set me free..
perhaps a morality based on life is profoundly misguided.
 

I think the GCR is typified or at least described in terms of high energy nuclei, rather than photons... heavy ions... travelling at incredibly high speeds, almost the speed of light.
Space itself does not impart any drag on a free ion travelling near the speed of light, although a stray atom in space might collide with it.  
https://www.nasa.gov/analogs/nsrl/why-space-radiation-matters
 

It would appear that the next half century will be crucial in determining whether freedom lives anywhere on Earth.
 
It also seems that space technology, and its becoming more ubiquitous and accessible to pioneers, is critical for plan B: any escape from a One World Order to the great free expanse.
 
The next iron curtain that goes up will "surround" Earth itself, and the next space race will be between that curtain and free individual's ability to leave and sustain ourselves elsewhere.
 
So in the sense of mental fuel I get from anticipating the welfare of my children, grandchildren, etc. going to Mars, and all the technology and infrastructure that would entail, for me, is good.  Although I can't vote with my wallet for space tourism (I cannot afford it)... I'd donate a few clicks to and maybe buy some merch from a firm like SpaceX precisely because of this... and maybe Virgin Galactic as well.
 

Only if China could maintain its authoritarian model over such distances. History suggests otherwise.
That's the beauty of any frontier.

What if the chances of your being alive by the time terraforming is complete is exactly 0%. 
When could it be possibly rational for you to contribute your money/wealth to something like that?  Does it matter if you have children?  Could it be rational if thinking about a future after you are gone gives you some kind of mental fuel?
 
 

Once the context were such that there was a market for passage and colony building, and free people chose to pay passage to live there (as settlers who crossed the sea to NA did), then I suppose it would at least seem "good" for those who were taking the risk and making the choice to start a new life on Mars.
Unless and until free peoples do so, any "colonization" would probably be premature, involving coercion and/or taxation.

To save mass, instead of cladding the entire ship with the idea humans should be able to run around essentially naked  everywhere inside... designate only a small percentage of ship for "relaxation" areas (where people can wear jammies and slippers) and the rest of the ship requires full protection of specially designed radiation (but not pressurized) suits.
Of course sensitive electrical and other equipment will need proper shielding... and the greenhouse/chicken coup as well.

I was tempted to suggest a set of ear-plugs. If an idea can't be heard, it can't be as easily spread. Since insane ideas can inexplicably be detrimental to a rational society, ear-plugs should be worn by all in order to prevent any insane idea(s) from being heard and potentially spread to others.
<tongue-in-cheek>

The experience of your own reaction is your payment for your understanding or misunderstanding of the world.  Rationality/Justice counsel proportionality, not only for those others whom your sentiments are about, but for your own "experience" of other people, which you put yourself through.
Hatred is the most vile and extreme sort of emotion which takes a toll on the experiencer which has to be paid for by the benefits of the extreme action it urges one toward... be it elimination of a mortal enemy, or complete disassociation with a thoroughly toxic and irredeemable person in whom no value whatsoever may be found... but make no mistake it does not leave one unscathed, whether any action, appropriate or not, is taken in response.
Upon reflection, you may find disappointment, sadness, regret, lowering of esteem are more rational for you to subject yourself to as an experience and more Just and proportional a response to others.
Be rational in your assessment of the whole person, be it your brother or your father.
 
Also, final responsibility for an adult person of sufficient intelligence lies with that person alone... fault the father a lack of fatherhood as a factor but you cannot negate the son's final responsibility in making his own soul.

The experience of your own reaction is your payment for your understanding or misunderstanding of the world.  Rationality/Justice counsel proportionality, not only for those others whom your sentiments are about, but for your own "experience" of other people, which you put yourself through.
Hatred is the most vile and extreme sort of emotion which takes a toll on the experiencer which has to be paid for by the benefits of the extreme action it urges one toward... be it elimination of a mortal enemy, or complete disassociation with a thoroughly toxic and irredeemable person in whom no value whatsoever may be found... but make no mistake it does not leave one unscathed, whether any action, appropriate or not, is taken in response.
Upon reflection, you may find disappointment, sadness, regret, lowering of esteem are more rational for you to subject yourself to as an experience and more Just and proportional a response to others.
Be rational in your assessment of the whole person, be it your brother or your father.
 
Also, final responsibility for an adult person of sufficient intelligence lies with that person alone... fault the father a lack of fatherhood as a factor but you cannot negate the son's final responsibility in making his own soul.

In The Prince, Machiavelli speaks of how a ruler who needs to do something unpopular can simply get one of his subordinates to do it for him, and then, if worst comes to worst, he can not only deny responsibility, but make a public spectacle of punishing the subordinate.
A government can not only use that to wield "unpopular" powers, but also powers that it is not supposed to have in the first place. In the United States, censorship is one of these powers -- and the subordinate in this case is the "privately owned" corporations, who "volunteer" to be subordinates because they have to, because the government wields various carrots and sticks. The government has figured out a way to get the practical effects of censorship while not doing it itself, thus having plausible deniability. This depends on allowing a few big corporations to have their hands in almost all speech -- and then the government "delegates" the power of censorship to them.
I think it's actually is proper to call this "censorship," because, when it comes down to it, it is the ruling regime doing it -- indirectly.
The corporations aren't really doing it of their own free will. If somebody puts a gun to your head and makes demands, then whether you agree with the demands or not doesn't really make any difference -- although the gunman might tell you that things will go better for you if it seems that you do agree. But it's a little different when the gunman is the government: people who really do agree might not mind the gun at their heads, because they figure, "the bullets in that gun are for other people, people who disagree... but I agree, I co-operate, so I don't have to worry about it."
When the corporations become unpopular, the government can make a big spectacle of "trust-busting," and the showmanship on this has actually already begun -- but you'll find in the end that, even if the government theatrically breaks these companies up, it won't make any practical difference. A few new rules will be announced, nobody will go to jail, and if you end up with two or three Facebooks or whatever, they will all toe the same line.
In a free market, companies would compete for people's business, and a company that started banning people for their political views would simply drive those people into the arms of the competition. A company in a free market wouldn't ban people for political reasons, because it's suicidal.** So why are companies doing it? Because they're confident that there is no competition for those people to go to. Why are they so confident? Because the government is guaranteeing it. We don't have a free market.
Trump has failed to grasp the nature of this problem and thus is proposing incorrect solutions.
However, once again we see some people claiming that there isn't really a problem at all, and that if people are being kicked out of the public sphere for their political views, it's just "the free market at work." That isn't true either.
(Some Republicans are doing one other thing wrong -- when they see the power being wielded, they don't want to eliminate that power, they want to take it over for their own use. That's not right, either: some powers cannot be used for good, at least, if good is defined as "promoting human survival.")
Over the decades, there have been a lot of people complaining, rightly, about smaller "public-private partnerships" than these, and how such partnerships somehow manage to wield government powers while simultaneously not being subject to any constitutional restrictions because "they aren't part of the government, they're privately owned."
Well, now we're coming to the culmination of the trend: companies and government are, for all practical purposes, just aspects of the same thing.
To save the free market we need to separate these things: the only ultimate solution to this censorship problem is a separation of state and economics, which would include the elimination of all of these powerful regulatory agencies, so that the regime has no way of compelling compliance with its censorship desires.
** This sentence isn't correct as worded. A magazine publisher, for example, is not "suicidal" if he only accepts certain kinds of articles for his magazine. A phone company, on the other hand, would be "suicidal" if it tapped in on people's calls and cancelled their service over their views.

The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies - Summer 2021
 

I do not doubt an enviro-terrorist will soon unleash such plastic attacking organisms into the biosphere with little thought to unintended consequences.
 
Soon people will have throw out their disintegrating plastic hooks, hangers, pens, waterbottles, computer equipment, TVs, previously safe electrical appliances, recycling bins, and replace rotting composite patio planks, vinyl siding on their homes, car interiors, and replace crumbling and unsafe plastic-based safety equipment all crumbling slowly before their eyes.
So much for my "permanent" CD collection... oh well, we'll just release another plague of organisms into the biosphere to take care of the first plague.

My paper Existence, We which I worked on from 2014 to 2019 is now published.

At the entry PROOF in the Index of OPAR, we see:
– proof as presupposing axioms: 8, 10 –12
– nature of proof: 119 –21
– proof defined: 120
– proof as reduction: 137 –38
– evidence presupposes a standard of proof: 176 –79
(nice Index)
“Being implicit from the beginning, existence, consciousness, and identity are outside the province of proof. Proof is the derivation of a conclusion from antecedent knowledge, and nothing is antecedent to axioms [cf. Met. XI.4]. Axioms are the starting points of cognition, on which all proofs depend. / One knows that the axioms are true not by inference of any kind, but by sense perception. . . . Axioms are perpetual self-evidencies. There is nothing to be said in their behalf except: look at reality” (OPAR 8).
What is the nature of axioms of the Objectivist philosophy and what is the content of those axioms is part of what the Objectivist philosophy is and indeed part of what is essential to that philosophy. The preceding excerpt from OPAR is a rendition of GS at 1039–40: “proof presupposes existence, consciousness, and a complex chain of knowledge: the existence of something to know, of a consciousness able to know it, . . . . / An axiom is a statement that identifies the base of knowledge and of any further statement pertaining to that knowledge, a statement necessarily contained in all others, . . .”
Peikoff in OPAR introduces Rand’s conception that logic is the art of noncontradictory identification by proposing that “the avoidance of contradiction is at the heart of every process of logic, whether deductive or inductive”(119). (Aristotle had maintained this point with respect to deduction at Metaphysics IV.3, 1005b33–35.
Leading into her definition of logic in GS, Rand had maintained, in step with Aristotle (Met. IV.3, 1005b14–20; IV.6, 1011b13–22), that one kind of object cannot be another kind of object at the same time, an object cannot possess throughout one attribute and at the same time possess a contrary attribute, and an object cannot be undergoing one process throughout and at the same time a contrary process (AS 1016).
She maintained that knowledge is based on sensory connection to existence and that logic rests on the axiom existence exists. Further, “all thinking is a process of identification and integration” and all through such a process one is asking “What is it?” and establishing the truth of one’s answers by means of logic. That is to say, logic is the holding of identifications to thoroughgoing noncontradiction, and “no concept man forms is valid unless he integrates it without contradiction into the total sum of his knowledge” (ibid.).
Peikoff writes in OPAR: “In essence, logic is the method of observing facts (the premises), then consulting the law of contradiction, then drawing the conclusion that this law warrants” (119). (Though it is tangential to present purposes, I’ll reiterate, as I have for many years now, that in an inference to the conclusion ‘x is M’ from ‘all A are M and x is an A’, one’s direct consult is the law of identity, not its lack-of-contradiction offspring. For that reason, Rand’s definition of logic is defective [Aristotle at 1005b33–35 is likely partly to blame]; I remedy that defect in my definition of logic given in the forthcoming paper “Existence, We”.)
Peikoff continues: “It is important to note that the process must be grounded in observed fact. To derive a conclusion from arbitrary premises . . . is not a process of logic. . . . If logic is to be the means of objectvity, a logical conclusion must be derived from reality; it must be warranted by antecedent knowledge, which itself may rest on earlier knowledge, and so on back, until one reaches the self-evident, the data of sense” (119–20). This is a devised sense of the term “proof” special to Objectivism. (I like it, and I take logical reasoning on mathematical or on fictional topics, however abstruse, to be transplanted from logic as it rightly goes in reasoning about empirical reality, and the transplant being itself capable of further development in the land of mathematics.) It is in very close step with Rand’s conception of logic and proof in GS, could easily pass for essential to the philosophy that is Objectivism, I expect, and was being put about in the 1960’s in Branden’s BPO.
Peikoff would know, from his dissertation work completed in 1964, that John Dewey had put forth a view of logic and proof along these lines in his 1938 work Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, but with an interesting difference. Recall that in Rand’s ITOE, she described logic as being a method. That conception of logic was also in GS and was carried into BPO, into PO, and into OPAR. That logic was a method sounded perfectly uncontroversial to me when I read the installments of Rand’s ITOE as she was publishing them. But when Dewey had argued logic to be a method in his 1938, he was making an innovative and controversial move.
(To be continued.)

There are reviews of OPAR by Henry B. Veatch and by David Ramsay Steele (along with their critiques of the philosophy) in the January 1992 issue of Liberty, pp. 60–68, available here.
Detailed critique of a particular point in epistemology in OPAR and beyond is given by Robert Campbell in the fall 2008 issue of JARS here.
David Kelley’s 1992 review of OPAR is here.
By the way, in summer of 1992, I attended an Objectivist conference in which Peikoff was delivering a series of lectures. I recall conversing with a middle-aged woman there, who surprised me when I asked what books of Rand’s she had read. She replied, none yet. She had only read the book OPAR, which had been issued the preceding December, and through that alone, she had come to the conference to learn more.

The thoughts in OPAR move smoothly. It is as easy to read as GS. The two have the same range of readers to whom they are significantly understandable.
Peikoff begins OPAR with remarks on the nature and function of philosophy (1–4). Rand had taken on that issue in her 1974 address at West Point, and Peikoff excerpts from that speech for his springboard into what is philosophy, in Rand’s conception of it, and how he will proceed to present the areas of philosophy hierarchically in his book. He then proceeds in his first chapter to point out that philosophies build on starting points, and that Objectivism begins by stating and validating its starting points. He continues in that chapter under five headings:
Existence, Consciousness, and Identity as the Basic Axioms
Causality as a Corollary of Identity
Existence as Possessing Primacy over Consciousness
The Metaphysically Given as Absolute
Idealism and Materialism as the Rejection of Basic Axioms
Rand had touched on the what and why is philosophy in Atlas Shrugged through her philosopher character Hugh Akston, who had been an esteemed professor of Galt, d’Anconia, and Danneskjöld. In those undergraduate years also, Robert Stadler had been their preeminent professor of physics. “‘I did have a rival’, said Dr. Akston slowly. ‘It was Dr. Robert Stadler. . . . [If, as Stadler thought of it] we were rivals for these three students, . . . I had one advantage: I knew why they needed both our professions; he never understood their interest in mine. He never understood its importance to himself—which, incidentally, is what destroyed him’” (789).
Rand exhibited her conception of philosophy and its place in human existence by the whole arc of Atlas. She addressed the topic explicitly in the title essay of FNI, beginning with “The sound of the first human step in recorded history . . . .”
Peikoff began his 1976 lectures The Philosophy of Objectivism by posing the question What is man? Rand had situated and addressed that question in GS. Peikoff remarked in this lecture that the essence of a philosophy can be seen in its view of man. Man’s nature is not the basis of philosophy; a view of man’s nature presupposes a view of metaphysics and epistemology. There is a metaphysical view of man, which then is presupposition of ethics, politics, and esthetics. Concerning man’s metaphysical nature, these loom large: Human living being requires achievement of values, therefore action and production, therefore reason. / Reason is an attribute of the individual. / Mind and body are rightly a unity; no purely mind, no purely body; reason is not for own sake, but for life. / Nature of emotions and their right relation to reason. / Free will and determinism.
For entry of that first lecture into OPAR, see these Index entries of the latter: Consciousness / Emotions / Idealism / Individualism / Man / Materialism / Metaphysics / Mind-Body Dichotomy / Philosophy / Reason / Volition
The first lecture in Nathaniel Branden’s series The Basic Principles of Objectivism (1960’s) was titled “The Role of Philosophy.” Transcription is available in The Vision of Ayn Rand (2009).
Answer to what is the nature and role of philosophy in the lineage of Rand is partly kin to Aristotle on the nature and role of metaphysics. But with Rand the beginning and ending is man, whereas, for Aristotle, at least in metaphysics, the end is the Prime Mover, not we mortals.
My own treatment of What is philosophy? is given in the opening section ‘Philosophy Frames’ of my fundamental paper “Existence, We” issuing next month in JARS 21(1):65–104.

Peikoff’s book on the philosophy of Ayn Rand covers all of the basics of the philosophy. Is every point the book includes as part of the philosophy essential to that philosophy? I should say No.
As I mentioned earlier, Rand’s measurement-omission theory of concepts (which I have championed and developed further in my 2004) as well as her theory of esthetics are not essentials of the philosophy. Those things were not in Galt’s Speech, whose doctrines suffice to cover all the essentials of the philosophy. (Amplifications of those essentials Rand subsequently published could also be taken as part of the essentials.) Additionally, all points in OPAR for which an endnote is attached that gives a source in remarks of Rand that she did not publish are not points essential to the Objectivist philosophy.
OPAR does not portray Rand’s development of her mature philosophy across the philosophical points made in her novels from 1936 to 1957. That development, though interesting, would not be necessary for stating what the mature philosophy is. Comparison of the mature philosophy with other philosophies, though helpful in characterizing what the Objectivist philosophy is, is also not necessary for stating what the mature philosophy is. At least not for purposes of persons not students of philosophy.
Coming back to what is essential to the philosophy, there are things in GS and in OPAR and in Peikoff’s 1976 lecture series “The Philosophy of Objectivism” (PO) and in Branden’s 1960’s lecture series “The Basic Principles of Objectivism” (BPO) that are not essential to the philosophy. In my assessment, such non-essentials would be those compiled below. (For my own part, I do not think all the essentials are true or fully accurate, though many are, and I do not think all the parts of the philosophy that are not essentials of it are false.)
GS – psychologies and motives of religionists and of materialists (e.g. Marxists, Behaviorists) / psychologies of savages and of dictators. These portions are not part of philosophy. What is known as philosophical psychology is necessary for a philosophy to answer the question What is man? but I reject a conception of these portions as properly part of philosophical psychology. I should maintain that these portions are not necessary to setting what is man in the Objectivist philosophy, and they are not essential to the Objectivist conception of what is man. These portions are not included in OPAR, and in my view, they are rightly omitted for the book’s purpose of portraying what is this philosophy.
BPO – psychodynamics. Theories of neurosis and repression and psychological types and sexual psychology are not part of philosophy, hence not part of Objectivism as a philosophy.
PO – (I’m leaving topics from the Q&A’s out of consideration here.) – esthetics is part of the philosophy, though not essential to it (as shown by absence from GS.)
OPAR – like PO / and, as remarked already: "all points in OPAR for which an endnote is attached that gives a source in remarks of Rand that she did not publish are not points essential to the Objectivist philosophy."
There are such things as philosophy of physics, biology, theater, music, film, language, technology, history, dance, education, humor, architecture, or sport. But for a full general philosophic system that has been formulated, such as Objectivism, it is not plausible that such specializations of such a philosophy results in the specializations being essential elements of the general philosophy.
In saying something is not part of philosophy or is not part of the essence of the Objectivist philosophy, I don’t mean to imply or insinuate that such things are not worthwhile or wonderful realms of understanding.
(I'll stop here. –S)

Notice that my immediately preceding post contradicts what I said in the first post of this thread, in respect of OPAR containing the essentials of the philosophy. It is the later post that is the more considered assessment and that demarcates some inessentials of the philosophy that are included in OPAR. That the book contains more than the essentials is no demerit to its aim.
If one goes, as many do, in looking at who is an Objectivist in their philosophy by whether they concur with the essentials of the philosophy, I should not want to leave the impression that everything in Peikoff's book is a thesis that must be concurred with to rightly count one as an Objectivist. Which would be the implication from my imprecise assessment of the book in the initial post.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Whether one is an Objectivist, a Heideggarian, or whatever is of secondary importance to what one holds as true and right. Concern over correct classification is a matter of keeping labels and conceptions straight.
One thing more about judging essentials of a philosophy, for example, Objectivism. Whether one concurs with essentials is not a matter of merely agreeing with high-altitude essential theses of the philosophy. That there is nothing supernatural is packaged right in the fundamental axioms of Objectivism. That the state has no right to commandeer one's life into personal service of its projects is straightforward implication of the Objectivist ethics and conception of what is man. So anyone who is a believer in the supernatural or in the military draft is not an Objectivist. That is not rocket science, and if one is a supernaturalist or a believer in conscription, one should just get some balls and stand up for what is one's own conviction and its difference from Objectivism. On the other hand, if one does not agree that there is such a thing as a sense of life, then one is not disagreeing with an essential of the philosophy.

Additionally, given my later, more considered examination, I should take back my earlier, imprecise statement: “Galt’s Speech confined itself to what a person needs for an integrated full framework for living in the modern world.” Rather, that confinement is what remains of GS when one sets aside “psychologies and motives of religionists and of materialists (e.g. Marxists, Behaviorists) / psychologies of savages and of dictators.”
I said also earlier in the reflections in this thread that the doctrines in Galt’s Speech “suffice to cover all the essentials of the philosophy. (Amplifications of those essentials Rand subsequently published could also be taken as part of the essentials.) Additionally, all points in OPAR for which an endnote is attached that gives a source in remarks of Rand that she did not publish are not points essential to the Objectivist philosophy.” I want to expand further on the amplification idea and to amend the not-published-by-Rand resort in source found in endnotes as a criterion for chucking into the bin Non-Essential.
Concerning amplifications, I’m thinking of post-Atlas writings such as Rand’s essays “The Metaphysical versus the Man-Made” and “Causality versus Duty.” Another candidate would be David Kelley’s argument that essentials of Rand’s philosophy beget benevolence as a major moral virtue. Each such candidate would have to have it’s argument outlined and its beyond-GS premises, if any, studied to assess whether the candidate is an essential part of the philosophy. (In the twentieth century, I recall seeing proof of a theorem about circles in the Euclidean plane which was a new discovery of a truth in Euclidean geometry, notwithstanding the external circumstance that Euclid had died a long time ago—truths of Euclidean geometry can come to light without Euclid having ever known anything about them.) Such assessments of candidates as amplifications of essentials in Objectivism will be left to the labor and sagacity of the reader as interest in a particular amplification candidate might arise.
I notice it also seems possible that the essentials of Objectivism or some natural portion of them might have a significant reformulation of them, rooted in writings of Rand, that is equivalent to the formulation expressly given them by Rand. This would be analogous to the equivalence of the epicycle model and the eccentric model that astronomers in ancient Greece used in capturing certain patterns of celestial bodies moving over the earth through a year.* I’ve seen a couple of efforts gesturing in this direction, but among the writings of Rand they draw upon are ones that are beyond GS and its implications, and their equivalence in resulting formulation to (portions of) Rand’s essentials are not entirely worked out.
The amendment I should add to counting as inessential any points supported by citing solely a saying or writing of Rand that she never chose to publish is: If the point can be argued anyway from essentials in GS by a deduction, then we can count it an essential. I make such a particular deduction myself in my paper “Existence, We” to be published in JARS next month (p. 88), and I then quote the conclusion also as an oral statement of Rand’s that she had never chosen to publish.
To locate the places in OPAR where Peikoff cites in support of a point words of Rand she did not chose to publish is easy. Just look down the Endnotes for ones citing only the Appendix to ITOE (1990) or only a private journal note of Rand’s or only a private letter of Rand’s. Compilation of the theses to which these Endnotes are attached and determination of whether they can also be reached by argument from essentials of Objectivism in GS, will be left as an exercise for the reader and maybe not this one who is the writer.
There is something not about OPAR in general, but a point within it, I’d like to comment on, particularly in connection with Aristotle and Bolzano. So there’s at least one more post coming.

My summarized take after reading all your responses:
The Benevolent Universe Premise describes an attitude that views man as empowered to survive in an intelligible universe: he can discover facts, causal connections and the unknown. He is equipped with a tool that, when applied correctly, allows him to build an ever-growing context of knowledge which, rather than being threatened by new knowledge, is strengthened by it.
It's also helpful to make a few distinctions that clarify thinking about the kind of world we live in: (1) the metaphysical vs. the man-made; (2) the unknowable vs. the unknown;
With respect to distinction #1: The differences between men and objects are consequential enough (a badly styled outfit is capable of being visually irritating, a badly developed soul is capable of murder) to separate them out for analysis.
 
 With respect to distinction #2: A quote from John Galt's speech describing the feeling of living in an unknowable universe:
 
Actually, this is something I had in mind originally too. According to the quotes below we consider “accidents” as not being the essence or the “norm” of human life. It’s still not really clear to me what kind of conceptual stepping stones I need to jump over to be fully convinced of this. I can see that we have a tool to discover the unknown, but there is still the unknown—and the unknown can include causes of negative, deadly consequences and this fact is "in the nature of existence." I don’t think I’ll get an answer until I explore lots of real-world examples of how men actually dealt with the unknown, e.g., the case of discovering blood types compatibility and how that unfolded. This is what Greg pointed out with exploring “positive reinforcements” too.
Some quotes:
With respect to distinction (1), the man-made:
Rearden reflecting in Atlas Shrugged:
“The Inexplicable Personal Alchemy:"
With respect to distinction (2), an unknown as opposed to unknowable universe:
Leonard Peikoff's lectures: