Ferg

And it is something I am focusing on with the suicide examples. Does it follow, then, that if you are no longer pursuing that purpose, every action you commit is amoral? I can certainly agree that anyone who negates the foundation of morality will not be moral. The question remains whether such a person would be amoral or immoral. I'd be willing to accept that life is the foundation for morality if we can first define what we mean by life, keeping in mind that, in order for it to be the foundation, it has to be worth pursuing in and of itself, not because anything else gives it value. I'm not following you. If morals are objective, I don't see what is wrong with this course of action. If they are subjective, then surely I am mistaken. I was always under the impression that Objectivist ethics are objective. Given your line of reasoning, how would Objectivism label altruism, or anything for that matter, as immoral? But judging his actions is exactly what I'm trying to do. And they may be irrelevant to him in the sense that he would dismiss the judgement, but they are still relevant to him in that they can objectively describe the nature of his actions, regardless of what his personal opinions might be. I agree. Clearly immoral. I just don't understand how you can call it immoral rather than amoral given your previous line of reasoning.

We've been talking about the ethics of suicide for quite some time. Namely, the ethics involved in sacrificing your life for someone else. I was told that such an act is amoral, since it involves a decision to end my own life, morality no long applies. So I thought we should test that statement by applying it to other suicide situations. And nowhere else? That would mean it is not objectively, only subjectively, wrong to violate someone else's rights unnecessarily. Is that the case? I think we can all agree that the label the offender ascribes to them is irrelevant and that punishment is a separate issue entirely. The question is whether ethics applies to these people or not. Is the action immoral? If so, I think that tells us something about the relationship between the ultimate choice, value, and ethics. Look at the Columbine massacre. According to Objectivism, was that act immoral or amoral? Either way, I'm not going to throw a fit or anything, I'd just like to know. Okay. Glad to hear it. But if it is wrong, then ethics and values are still pertinent even if someone has chosen to no longer exist. In which case, they could apply even when it comes to the decision to sacrifice your life for someone else's.

For the record, I largely agree with what you have said here. I don’t think values disappear just because you have made a choice that will result in your death. Well, that is partially because I believe that it is morally wrong to violate someone’s rights unnecessarily. Most Objectivist I have met agree on that point. I do believe that it is possible for someone who has chosen to no longer exist to, between the time they have made that choice and the time at which they actually cease to exist, commit a moral wrong. I reject the premise that morality only applies to those that have chosen to continue existing, but I am willing to hear argument for that case. I read an essay recently discussing the Objectivist view on suicide, and I think it contradicts what you are saying here. It says that suicide bombers are different from other types of suicide because the suicide bomber is not seeking their death as an end, but as a means to and end (namely, to harm others). Since the cessation of their existence is not their end, but only a byproduct, values and ethics still apply. If that is true, and I think that it is true, then the same would go for my decision to sacrifice myself for the sake of my wife. My goal is not to stop existing; my goal is to preserve my wife's life. As such, it would seem that ethics and values still apply. What would you call that, by the way? What would you call my desire to preserve my wife's existence even if it means that I am not around to appreciate it. It seems intuitively to be value. Indeed, by most definitions of the term it would be. But if it isn't value, what is it? Also, do we not agree on what I said before? Are you saying that it is not immoral to hurt someone else while committing suicide? Do you think other Objectivists agree? Not quite. I can still see why a suicide that hurts others would be wrong apart from intrinsic morality. That depends. I’m still having trouble understanding exactly what Objectivist morality is. That’s why I’m here: to find out. I’ve read Objectivist works on the subject, and spoken to Objectivist friends, but I am still confused. And, quite obviously, I want to subject what I do learn about Objectivist ethics and morality to reason. I’m not quite sure what you mean. My question was basically whether it is morally wrong for someone to hurt someone else while committing suicide. How are you suggesting that I restate it?

Thank you. I think that explains things very well. I disagree with the definition of value you provide, but I see how it leads to your conclusion. By "morally permissible" I simply mean either moral or amoral. I.e., anything which is not morally forbidden. But I'm afraid your answer is only making me more confused. I think that you are saying that the decision to commit suicide is amoral, that morality only applies when one makes the fundamental choice to exist. But I think we can both agree that it is wrong to hurt other people when you commit suicide. Why is that? It can't be, given your previous argument, that the reason it is wrong has anything to do with your values, and it certainly can't have anything to do with your rational self-interest.

Not even to follow one's own rational self-interest? How can there be an "ought" without any imperatives? And how can there be ethics without any "oughts"?

But if that were the case, life, even life qua man, would not be the ultimate value and would not be something that was valuable as its own end. If you are willing die for something simply because you would be too miserable without it, even if life qua man were possible for you without it, then this is something that you value more than you value life qua man. Is there some sort of objective standard for what this hierarchy should be, or is it completely subjective? And I agree totally, but all of this seems to point to the notion that life qua man is not the ultimate value. Oh I understand that completely. Some things are worth dying for and some aren't. I get that. And I get that it has something to do with your values. What I don't get is how this meshes with Objectivism. I don't understand how you can say that life qua man is the ultimate value, and you should never give up a greater value for a lesser value, and yet it is permissible to give up life qua man for the sake of something upon which life qua man does not depend.

Forgive me if I get this wrong; I am trying. It sounds to me that you are saying you should only give up your life for something if you could not live life qua man without it.

I also would like to add to this that the ideal Stoic life is not primitivism and Stoics certainly did not reject a human evaluation of life. Perhaps the Cynics advocated primitivism when they sought to live closer to nature, but the Stoics did not. The Stoics realized that different species had different natures. It was natural for a lion to eat meat, but not a bull, etc. Man's nature was to be a rational and civilized being. To forgo this to go live in the woods with a tent and a spear would be to fight against nature, not live closer to it. As far as human evaluation, the Stoics fully supported it. The virtues are a human evaluation of life and should be pursued to the exclusion of all else. I'm not a Stoic myself. I'm an Aristotelian. Stoics believe that we should align or reason with the virtues and ignore the passions (passion is a better word for what they wanted to rid themselves of than emotion). Aristotelians believe that, just as our reason should be aligned with the virtues, so should our passions. The passions are just as much a part of our nature as our reason is. I'm still learning about Objectivist ethics, so I don't know how much I could tell you regarding the similarities and differences between it and Stoicism. But my Objectivist friends describe themselves as Aristotelian (which I argue with them about constantly), so I hope that comparing and contrasting Stoicism with Aristotelianism helps.

Thank you guys for being patient with me, but I'm still trying to understand this. Life is the ultimate value, but what is life in Objectivism? It isn't biological life or even continued existence as a rational being. It sounds like you are defining life as continued existence with enough things of value within it to make it worth living. But that would mean that one's rational existence is not something that is its own end, as I have always understood Rand to say it is.

Um, how? I said they were similar and said in what way they were similar. Then I said how they were different. All statements of similarity abstract away from content. You apparently think that by "similar" I mean "identical." To say that something is similar to something else is to say that they have something in common. I was just talking about what they had in common and was doing so in response to some of the claims that had been made against Stoicism. It seems to me that you are saying two things can only be similar if they are identical.

Amen. The Stoic's answer is that the good is to live as a rational and virtuous being. Aristotle would agree. The real difference is that the Stoics believe that that is ALL the good is for a human being. For the Stoic, the good life does not depend on anything external. All you have to do is learn to not let anything external interrupt your reason or virtue. The Stoic philosophy is to lead a rational and virtuous life and not worry about anything you can't control. The Stoics take a pretty Socratic approach to this. You can take my property, you can take my freedom, you can cause me pain, you can even kill me, but you can't take away my true well-being unless I let you.

Stoicism does not say that we should value nothing. It says we should value virtue. As far as nature goes, Stoicism says we should not have negative emotional responses to things that are beyond our power to control. Aristotle and the Stoics both sought well-being. The goal of both was to seek eudaimonia and both thought that eudaimonia could be found in virtue.

So certain beliefs, principles, conditions, or people could could be worth dying for? That's all I'm trying to get at.

Sounds great. Now, I'm going to deal with a pretty unrealistic situation, but I find it useful to use such situations in order to put our beliefs to the test. I'll use the same example I used with my friends. Say my wife and I had both been poisoned, there is only enough antidote to save one of us, and she doesn't know about it. I know Objectivism says I am not obligated to give the antidote to her. I get that. What gets me, though, is my friends say it would be morally wrong for me to give the antidote to my wife rather than take it myself.

I think I get what you are saying. So, in such a case, it would still be morally wrong to sacrifice myself to save this person. Right? Not just risk, but actually give up my life so that they might live.