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altonhare

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Posts posted by altonhare

  1. What bothers me is how Objectivism handles the question of "why do things exist?". My current understanding sees this as a big blind spot. The question is simply defined away. See #4 and #1. Things exist. End of story.

    How close am I to properly summarizing the Objectivist view? What am I missing?

    "Why" questions are leading questions. "Why" presupposes purpose, i.e. the result of a conscious act toward a goal. So the question "why do entities exist?" presupposes that a conscious entity had a reason to make entities exist. To avoid "what made the original conscious entity exist" question we might declare the original conscious entity to be "eternal". Then we are stuck asking why other entities need to be brought into existence whereas the original conscious entity does not. We realize that this is an arbitrary distinction, there is no reason to think that entities were suddenly brought into existence by the act of a conscious will. Not only is it an arbitrary assertion, but it asserts that something can be created from 'nothing', an explicit contradiction.

    So we avoid the arbitrary and the contradictory by stating that entities exist.

    In general, we should avoid "why" questions except in the context of consciousness. Why did she go to the store? Because she wanted milk.

    Why did the rock fall down the hill? Because it wanted to get to the bottom? In the context of inanimate objects we generally (not always) replace "why" with "how". HOW did the rock fall down the hill? A gust of wind came along and pushed it. Why did the rock fall down the hill? Because Jim decided to kick it down the hill.

    Why is the sky blue? I donno, because the sky wants to be blue? Because God wants the sky to be blue?

    The better question is, HOW does air interact with light in such a way as to make the sky appear blue?

    Why do objects fall to earth? Again, do they want to fall to earth? Does TFSM push them toward the earth?

    Instead, HOW do objects fall to the earth? i.e. how does the mechanism called "gravity" work?

    I realize that in most daily conversation "why" questions are used in the context of the inanimate, with no problems, because it is usually assumed that the person means "how". What I mean is, we usually don't assume the person thinks a rock, or other inanimate object, has a purpose (a why). However this doesn't always get across, and it is important to remember the underlying, implicit assumption in "why?"

  2. I'll give you the last word with regards to our discussion.

    I'm wary of making positive claims about the nature of objects, on account of them probably not comporting with Objectivism. The mods get unhappy with that.

    Understood. Hopefully this discussion got us both to think a little harder and possibly even learn something, even if neither of us is any closer to agreement.

    I'll close by making a statement based on my limited reading and knowledge of Oism. Rand seems to have said, on a number of occasions, that an entity is that which is "bounded" or "finite" or many other such synonyms. This would rule out "groups", since each unit in a group is bounded. However I believe it is also true that she never formally laid this down as part of Oism.

    I would also point out that, in addition to Euclid, Aristotle's Metaphysics speaks of "form" and other such synonyms for shape in reference to what an entity is:

    “...by form I mean the essence of each thing, and its primary substance”

    from Aristotle's Metaphysics

    Also, in general, substance ontologists focus on "that which is common to all". Shape, form, boundedness, etc. is common to all entities. This is exactly the criterion by which we distinguish physical objects from conceptualizations and avoids ambiguity, circularity, or individual opinion.

  3. 1. Proper nouns and definite descriptions never refer to actual entities unless those entities are objects of perception at the time of utterance.

    What will you refer to, if not something that exists? How will you refer to it before you observe it? How will you communicate with the ET?

    2. The dots left on my eyes by staring at the sun are entities in a metaphysically strong sense.

    An entity is an entity. There is no "strong sense". When we're being rigorous it's either an entity or not.

    If it has shape, it's an object. It may not exist because it lacks location. I am visualizing a unicorn. The unicorn I am visualizing has shape, it is an object, but it lacks location. I am visualizing a spot, it has shape, but it also lacks location.

    The lake you "see" at the desert has shape, it's an object, but it lacks location (assuming the lack is not actually there).

    The distinction between objects that exist and objects that do not is location. The distinction between that which is something and that which isn't, i.e. what we can refer to as the subject of a sentence, is shape.

    3. There does not exist an entity such that it has parts.

    I said earlier that of course we can describe this entity as being made of this or that. But we cannot define the word "entity" nor define "music box" as "made of parts". This begs the question, what are the parts? The entity itself is the shape you see before you, a single discrete unit.

    4. Objects are incapable of changing shape.

    I never even said this.

    Whether you call a ball that's been squeezed "Ball2" and the original unsqueezed ball "Ball1" or you call them both "ball" is a personal choice. A person is justified in classifying them separately on the basis that one is oblong and the other is spherical. Another person is justified in classifying them together based on being round.

    5. Things don't have color, duration, mass, motion or texture when we look away from them. But they have shapes.

    They have shape *and* location.

    What's color to a blind man? What's color to Nature, when no humans have ever been born? What's duration or mass? What's sound to a deaf man? Or again to Nature? Nature doesn't recognize these.

    It's important to distinguish between two definitions of "sound", the vibration of entities and the human act of perceiving and identifying "sound". If a tree falls it vibrates the atoms of air around it. If there is a human present they perceive "sound".

    Now apply this to "color". An atom by itself may emit light. If there is a human present they may compare their perception of it to their perception of another atom emitting light differently and call the difference "color".

    In general when people say sound or color I interpret this as the human experience of hearing and sight. If I'm not referring to these human experiences I usually talk simply about motion and light. But there is no *guarantee* that every single entity that exist emits light, so light emission cannot be a fundamental, primitive aspect of all entities. As far as motion is concerned, we cannot even conceptualize or talk about motion without talking about *that* which is moving. So again motion cannot be a primitive aspect because it begs the question of what is moving? What distinguishes it?

    6. Shape is an objective property. All other properties are irreducibly subjective.

    I never said this either. Shape is *primitive*. By this I mean that, in order to perceive, identify, conceptualize, and talk about any of the other properties we first need a shape before us. We cannot conceptualize motion without *that* which is moving. We cannot conceptualize light emission without *that* which is emitting light, or without visualizing light. What is doing all these things, what is vibrating, emitting, etc.? To answer this question you will irrevocably have to point at a shape.

    7. Entities have no properties other than shape.

    The property that is intrinsic to ALL entities is shape. An entity may have more characteristics, but shape is the bare minimum to qualify as an entity.

    Additionally entities that exist have location.

    8. Vast amounts of our everyday discourse are wholly meaningless.

    What typically happens is the person listening has an association with the words you're using. The imbue your statement with their own meaning. When talking about mundane or everyday things we all tend to imagine or mean the same things and this works fine. In other kinds of discourse it is catastrophic. The person listening takes your statements to mean what THEY would mean if THEY said it. The end result is that you neither conveyed any meaning to them and they did not learn anything from you. The only way around this is to point at the entities that serve as the subject of your statements. At a bare minimum, what you point at will have shape. It will have to.

    ...are in themselves sufficient reason to discard your epistemology. I don't think we'll get any closer to agreement by continuing to hammer back and forth.

    You offer a lot of criticism, although it's clear you don't yet fully understand. But I have not seen anyone provide a definition of "entity" other than as a "self evident primary". But this is unacceptable, this means that what qualifies as an entity is a matter of personal opinion. X is something for me but not for you, and that's okay cuz everyone's different and special. Nature doesn't care about your personal opinion. Shape does not make provisions for opinion, it restricts the word "entity" to that which you can point at. This leaves it clear, rigorous, and non-circular.

    Other definitions, such as that which you can see/touch, are circular because they invoke another entity to do the seeing/touching. It's not a definition, it's a proof. An entity was an entity before you saw it or touched it, what qualified it as an entity before then? Another definition, an entity is "made of X", is also circular because it says an entity is that which is made of entities.

    So, can you offer better the circular see/touch and made off criteria or the useless "self evident primary"?

  4. I'll argue against it. As neither altonhare or cmdownes are debating from an Objectivist perspective, someone needs to keep the thread on track or it will have to be moved.

    An entity is what it does because action is the only means by which identity matters. Even in sitting still and "doing nothing" from a superficial human perspective (and without a human present), it is reflecting and refracting all manners of electromagnetic radiation, and attracting and being attracted by all of the mass in the universe. "Doing nothing" is as much an impossibility as "being nothing". Considering identity as though it were a contextless absolute is a mistake. No single thing that actually exists is without its relationships and interactions with everything else that exists. Relationships are what make identity real and absolutes possible.

    This dualism between what an object is and what an object does is false. It is an example of intrinsicism.

    None of what you said addresses the incident issue. What is the attribute which is intrinsic to all entities? Do all entities emit light? Do they all have inertial mass? When we strip away these attributes, what is left? What is the last attribute which, if we strip it away, we no longer have an entity?

  5. Stunning. So when I say "The current president of the United States", it doesn't actually refer to Barack Obama unless I'm in his physical presence. You can add this to the list of objections to your epistemology - it totally disconnects the referents of concepts from reality.

    If you have never perceived Barack, then when you say "the current president of the United States", you are using a floating abstraction. You have no idea what you're referring to. On the other hand, if I perceive this keyboard on my desk, *then* talk about it, then I am dealing with *this* keyboard on my desk.

    If I close my eyes, I see shapes. Clearly defined shapes against my field of vision. But to say that I am perceiving existents/objects when I do is an absurdity.

    It's the opposite of absurdity, to deny what you see right before you is absurd! There is absolutely no doubt whatsoever that you are perceiving an object. If you see a shape, you are obviously perceiving that shape. Now, whether you conclude that there is an object *there* (at some location), that it is wet (like a lake), or any other of a number of characteristics about it is up to your prior experiences with similar shapes. Your prior experience being limited, you could be wrong.

    However, obviously if there is a shape there, there is a shape there. If you see a shape, you see a shape. That you deny this is beyond me.

    I don't see any reason to reject all dispositional properties as necessarily not common to all objects. "No object IS what it DOES" - that's a slogan, not an argument. Regardless, what an objects DOES is completely dependent on what it IS. Like Rand says, things act in accordance with their natures. Even if I only come to know some fact about an object's nature via the manifestation of dispositional properties, that doesn't somehow make that fact illegitimately derived.

    All irrelevant. An object is not what it does, which is all I said, and which you did not argue against.

    Of course I don't. But objects reflect light in different ways, and this is an objective feature of the world. This is the property which undergirds our phenomenal experience of color. The fact that we identify certain ranges of this difference with measurements and terminology doesn't mean that somehow color is all in our heads.

    Okay now we're moving from color to interaction with light. Does an entity have to interact with light to be considered an entity? The argument here is that there is only a single criterion for entity-hood: shape. An entity doesn't have to emit or absorb light to be considered an entity. All it needs is shape.

    CERTAINLY YOU DON'T PROPOSE THAT ONE SHAPE IDENTIFIES ANOTHER AS TRIANGULAR! I really just don't see how you're distinguishing between shape and other properties in a meaningful way.

    Of course not. Shape doesn't refer to a specific shape. It simply refers to the quality of having shape. This quality is static. Unlike color/light, which is dynamic, i.e. 'a' photon must be emitted or absorbed. Also unlike "mass", which involves acceleration. Also unlike "tangible", which involves the action of touching.

    What I'm not getting from you is an argument for the special status of shape. You just keep asserting that it doesn't require conscious identification and every other property does.

    An object doesn't have to move, make a sound, emit light, etc. to be an object. Do you agree? Does the apple have to emit red light to be an entity? Does it have to fall off the tree? An entity would still be an entity, even if it never did anything. What makes it an entity in the absence of conscious observation and actions? The fact that it has shape. Without shape, there is nothing. We are not visualizing an entity anymore. In our minds we can strip away photon emission, inertia, etc. and there is still shape.

    The shape is what you point to and name. Its ALL the ET sees. Everything that comes after is treating the word as a concept. It's an entity before you ever pointed to it and named it. It was an entity not because it had color or weight, but because it had shape. By shape I don't mean it was triangular or pyramidal or whatever. By shape I mean it does not spontaneously spread out and become infinite, i.e. shapeless. It remains a finite, discrete thing.

    There should be a presumption in favor of the notion that people say meaningful, intelligible things most of the time.

    Intelligible, usually. Meaningful, almost never.

    Therefore if there exists one object, there must exist at least one other object.

    Flawed logic. Let me translate:

    (1) Either there is something outside of a bounded space/shape x, or there is nothing outside of a bounded shape x.

    As:

    (1) Either there is an object outside another object x, or there is not an object outside another object x.

    This is all "nothing" means, it means "no object".

    When you say "there is no nothing" it is implied that you are saying "there is no nothing that exists". This just means "there is no no object that exists" which means "there is an object that exists". This is the only way to make this statement meaningful, avoiding contradiction.

    3 does not follow from 1 and 2. There's either a 2nd object or not. Either way, an object is that which has shape. Surely an object doesn't spontaneously acquire shape only by virtue of rubbing shoulders with another object.

    I said objects aren't identified as extended in space without a consciousness to do so because identification is by definition a conscious act. I'm not saying that an object has no shape when you're not looking at it - I'm saying that objects have color, tastes, textures etc even when we're NOT sensing them.

    Let's take this a different route. An object does not have to have taste, color, etc. to qualify as an object. It needs shape as a minimum. Without shape, how will you see it, touch it, taste it, visualize it, etc.? Without shape none of the others are possible. Without shape, what is coming up against your tongue? What hits your eyeball?

    It's not about the name. It's about it being the SAME OBJECT - despite the change in shape

    Obviously a puddle is not a candle and they are not the same object.

  6. I think this statement shows most clearly that you don't understand what measurment and observing means. Your subject that is taking photos must be part of your system and is therefore not "frozen".

    Also when you are talking about measuring 2 entities you need a subject first. You can't measure without interaction.

    If it is not part of your system, it can never measure the system. That is _fundamental_. So that thought doesn't make any sense in a physical perspective. You might use it for a movie.

    I didn't read all your posts in this forum but i think you did not understand what QM says about the relation of object and subject since i never saw you taking that into account in the right way. I suggest you read "dr bertlmanns socks".

    You're the one who is not understanding. The purpose is to step back and ask what the universe would be like if we were omniscient. Then we draw deductions about what humans will observe in such a universe. If what we observe is consistent, this is support for the universe as we imagined it.

    I'm gad crizon dug up this old thread, I have something to say that is on topic.

    Space is suffused with at least electric and magnetic fields.

    Replace the word "space" with any other word. If you claim X is "suffused" then I have a right to ask you what IS X? Then it is your responsibility to point to X. If unable to point to the actual X, you will at least have to show a picture or model. If you cannot fulfill this simple minimum condition, then "X" is a wildcard, a floating abstraction.

    These are real in that they store and release energy and obey conservation laws.

    What's 'a' field? I'm not asking for a description or a quantification, I'm asking you what IS it, paleface? I'm an ET.

    Electromagnetic waves transport linear momentum.

    Impossible. Motion cannot be transferred like an entity itself. Transfer itself involves motion. You're talking about the motion of motion.

    We still need to see 'a' field/EM wave, so we can even know what's moving.

    Fields have indefinite boundaries,

    Then they are most certainly not entities.

    Empty space has measurable properties

    Empty: nothing

    Are you saying space is nothing or that it is an enclosure, inside of which there is no entity present? Is space like a box?

    Are fields entities? Well, a photon is routinely regarded as an entity which propagates, carries energy, transfers linear and angular momentum.

    transferring motion? Moving motion? You've gotta be kidding me.

    But it is merely a pair of fields. Fields are entities.

    Point.

    Space is measurable attributes.

    Space is an attribute? And all this time I thought you were saying it was an entity!

    Attributes are not separable from entities. Therefore space is an entity.

    This is insane. This summarily converts all attributes into entities, a completely absurd notion.

  7. True, I misspoke there. In fact light would still seem to be moving at the same speed, even if you were moving very fast in the same direction as the light you're emitting. (That light would be blue-er though, right?)

    That doesn't work out. Someone travelling at half the speed of light doesn't have time slow down by half:

    post-5684-1240619305_thumb.gif

    According to that formula, at 1/2 the speed of light t' = t * sqrt(1-1/4)=t * 0.866...

    That's 866/1000th of a clock tick, for every tick of the stationary clock.

    That leaves the original question unanswered. (That's the main reason why I revived the thread)

    I shouldn't have stated that the "friend" was moving at 0.5*c. What I said wasn't meant to be taken quantitatively but rather qualitatively. When you move faster relative to your friend you both calculate the same speed of light, although you both perceive different distances-traveled and different "times".

    So if you're moving toward the light source at .5*c and your friend is "stationary" s/he sees light going at a speed of 1/1. You see it going at 0.577/0.577 = 1. You will of course observe a doppler blue shift but a relativistic red shift. To know which way it goes you'll just have to calc it, wikipedia has lots of great articles on rel, here's the one on the relativistic doppler shift:

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativistic_Doppler_effect

  8. But this object's particularity IS one of the properties it has by definition. If I find a single keyboard on your desk, then I've verified it's existence and it is "the keyboard on altonhare's desk", not something resembling a mental object I've been carting around.

    You need to distinguish between the concept of a keyboard, something this long, this color, this shape, etc. and *this* keyboard on my desk. When you simply utter "the keyboard on altonhare's desk", unless you perceive it, you're not referring to *this* keyboard on my desk. You never verified its existence because you never identified it in the first place. You may have verified a claim i.e. there is something this long, this shape, etc. at this location. You verify whether this statement is true or not.

    Uncertainty argument. v.1.2

    (1) It is possible to doubt whether or not an object exists.

    (2) One comes to know that an object exists directly via perception.

    (3) It is impossible to doubt that which one comes to know directly via perception.

    (4) It is impossible to doubt whether or not an object exists. (2&3, contradicts 1)

    The terminology here is really unimportant. I'm trying to find an expression that matches your notion that the observation of an object's existence isn't a rational or intellectual process. I invite you to respond to the content of the argument.

    Since 2 and 3 contradict 1, we must discard 1. It is not possible to doubt if a particular object exists since I am perceiving it.

    That seems both arbitrary and plainly false. I might as well pick any other random property, say color or duration, and assert that it is REALLY what is primary about entities. How does color require the conceptualization of a conscious observer in a way which shape does not?

    First of all, color is an awful counterexample. Color is a dynamic concept, it requires motion to observe and conceptualize color. Since no object IS what it DOES, we immediately discard all dynamic attributes as primitive, intrinsic characteristics common to all objects.

    How is there color without a consciousness to name something yellow and another thing blue? How is there color without a consciousness to conceptualize "color"? Certainly you don't propose that one atom identifies another as blue.

    Shape does not require a consious observer. Shape, in the primitive sense, has nothing to do with conscious identification or comparison. Objects have shape whether you're looking or not, even if all humans (or life for that matter) die off. With no life, no consciousness, there is no "color" or "rough". There are only shapes at locations.

    Now you're just flagrantly contradicting yourself. You said before that an entity qua entity doesn't have parts. Earlier in discussion you said: "Groups of entities" do not consist of entities. I have no idea at this point what you're arguing for.

    The concept "group of entities" does not consist of any entities because... it's conceptual. Entities may be described as consisting of entities, but not concepts. Also, since "made of" is a description by a conscious observer, entity in the primary sense refers to a single, discrete unit. In the moment where you point to it and name it, it is just itself. You have not begun to describe it in any way. This thing you are pointing at is associated with this sound you utter. So yes, at that moment, entity in the primary sense is referring to a single unit.

    The distinction you're arguing for (or at least your articulation of it) creates an artificial distinction between objects qua things which have shapes and objects qua things which have all the other properties we care about which generates absurdities like my inability to kick pieces of furniture (since being a piece of furniture is a property of concepts and not entities).

    The distinction is not artificial in the least. People make this equivocation all the time and it's the source of a lot of confusion and absurdity. You can certainly kick a table or a chair. Technically you cannot say that you kicked a piece of furniture, but we know what you mean. In everyday casual language this distinction is generally unimportant because we all have similar ideas about furniture and baseballs. But in deeper discussions, especially in science, the distinction is absolutely crucial.

    So no, no absurdity is present except insofar as one feels comfortable in using loose, casual speech and uncomfortable otherwise. You're used to saying that you can kick concepts because everyday concepts are widely agreed upon and well understood. You've become so used to it that you think it's absurd not to be able to speak this way. What you mean by "I kicked a piece of furniture" is "I kicked an object that is either a chair, a table, a cabinet, .... etc." In casual speech we don't have time for this kind of precision and it's just not necessary. But scientific language demands more precision than everyday speech.

    As noted earlier, it actually makes everyday speech ridden with ambiguities and equivocations.

    And indeed everyday speech is riddled with imprecision! That's why we call it "casual" instead of "scientific". In casual language we can speak of actions as causal primaries! i.e. her jumping caused the boat to rock. But we know only entities are causal primaries, not actions or attributes. In casual speech we can say completely ridiculous things like "anger took him over" or "love brought them together" or "parliament voted". All of these casual sentences speak of action, but what's acting? An entity? Do you really propose everday, casual speech as the standard by which we should decide the matters we are debating? If it leads to an absurdity in everyday speech, no good, not allowed?

    In more rigorous terms we say she hit the boat repeatedly then the boat rocked. Here "she" is the subject of the sentence, which must be an entity with shape (unlike love and jumping). "Hit" is the action she performs, boat is the entity she performs the action on, and "repeatedly" is an adverb that qualifies her action. "She" is the causal primary, boat is the entity being acted upon, and rocking is the resulting action.

    If you want to communicate with the ET, what will you say? A concept caused the boat to rock? An action? If an action, an action of what? You will have to point at the entity and illustrate the action. "Jumping caused the boat to rock" absolutely will not do it for the ET. You can't show the ET 'a' jumping.

    Groups seem to be where we're having the most friction. Mental groupings are concepts though, just as love and anger are. Therefore it is just as irrational to say that 'a' group hit you as it is to say that anger hit you.

    Only by taking the nuclear option of saying that NO groups of objects are objects. Under your account "eiffel tower + my toe" is no more absurd than "table leg + table top".

    No group of objects is an object. "Group" is summarily conceptual.

    And exactly, in both your examples you are naming TWO entities. TWO entities is not ONE entity. No GROUP of objects is ONE object.

    How are mass and the frequencies of light reflected by objects somehow less objective features of the universe than shape? These aren't things that require differences or human perceivers, and they are the physical characteristics of the universe that underlie color and heaviness.

    You already said it, they are "physical characteristics". They are comparisons/conceptualizations that humans have made. An object, all by itself, just "sees" shape. An atom does not recognize mass or frequency. You absolutely need a human being to make observations and take measurements and then conceptualize "mass" and "frequency". I did not say they are "less objective". I am identifying the most primitive characteristic intrinsic to *all* objects. The table has shape *before* you point to it and name it. It is not brown, mahogony, hard, flat, etc. until you compare it to something else. The table doesn't have shape only when you're looking at it.

    The hell it does. Things have shape because they have edges, boundaries. If there were only one object in the universe, there wouldn't be any boundaries between objects and hence, no shapes.

    edge, boundary, those are synonyms.

    boundary, as a synonym of shape, has nothing to do with an interface between two objects. With shape, there is no comparison taking place. Certainly an object doesn't spring into being when another object comes along.

    But objects aren't identified as extended in space unless there's some consciousness to do the identifying. All of the qualities you discuss are equally dependent for their identification on the existence of a conscious mind. Shape isn't somehow special in this way.

    You're saying an object has no shape, no extent, unless we're looking at it!? Does my infamous keyboard disintegrate when I leave then reform when I come back?

    Objects REALLY ARE colored, rough etc. Now, they are are colored and rough with respect to human standards of these things, but that doesn't mean that these terms aren't referring to underlying objective physical properties - like frequencies of reflected light in the instance of color.

    Right, you said it, human standards. Now again I'm not saying these characteristics can't be objective. However I am identifying that characteristic of an object that it had before humans ever came about. Even when nobody is around with a tape measurer, a camera, a retina, etc. This characteristic is absolutely critical to identify and maintain rigorously in scientific discussion.

    No, it's substantially wierder than it sounds.

    Again only because you're comfortable with loose, casual speech and uncomfortable with the opposite. Your level of comfort with using almost any term in the capacity of "object" is bizarre to me. Object means something very specific. Its this loose language, especially with regards to objects, that leads to huge meaningless debates, circular reasoning, absurd questions, and lots of wasted time. The question of "Is X an object? is not a matter of anyone's opnion, it is not up for debate. If it has shape, it's an object. If someone wants to propose that X is an object, they can point.

    "My senses tell me that the object on the table has nothing in common with the object I put into the fire, but my reason tells me that it's the same one. Because I changed all my percepts of the object, but maintained my awareness of the same object's existence, I must not grasp the object's existence as a perceptual determination, but rather as a rational determination justified by percepts."

    Your theory about what's happening is totally non-responsive to this argument.

    Whether you name the object before you with the same name that you used before is irrelevant. How narrow (or wide) you decide to make your criteria for categories such as "chicken" or "candle" is entirely up to you. As far as I'm concerned it's a candle, then it's a puddle. They are not the same. You may decide that it's a candle, then it's still a candle. Perhaps your criteria for naming something "candle" is "whatever is made of wax".

    My proposal is not without precedent. Euclid more or less said this, but ultimately failed to actually implement the shape criterion:

    A boundary is that which is an extremity of anything.(Bk. I, Def. 13)…

    A figure is that which is contained by any boundary or boundaries.(Bk. I, Def. 14)

  9. Hey cmd,

    I appreciate you reiterating where the whole discussion came from to keep everything in the right context and to keep us on track.

    But how is the at all responsive to cases like the ones I've given here? Why can't I verify whether or not "the keyboard that sits on altonhare's desk" exists or not?

    I was discussing this with another objectivist. I'll give some examples to illustrate the point.

    You tell me there is something round and hard in my front yard at home you call X. I'm at work. I come home and see a baseball in my front yard. Did I verify that it exists? Or did I verify that you were telling the truth? I contend that I verified if you were telling the truth or not. I observe the baseball, consistent with what you said, therefore you were telling the truth. How could I verify if *it* existed if I did not even know what *it* was before I observed it? I did not know what it was, because I had not yet perceived it.

    I form a mental conception of something that is round and hard. I visualize it, imagine feeling it in my hands. I see no reason something that is both round and hard cannot exist. Now, you propose that I can "verify whether it exists". Here, "it" immediately refers to something particular, my mental conception. I already know my mental conception exists in my mind. So I cannot verify whether my mental conception exists. If "it" is referring to "something out there that is both round and hard" then, upon discovering a baseball, you did not verify whether the baseball exists or not! You *discovered* something with characteristics you have already observed in the past. Before you discovered the baseball, you were never referring to the baseball itself. You were referring to a mental conception. So you could not verify whether the baseball existed, because you were never referring to it in the first place. You never referred to the baseball itself until you observed it.

    Fine, whatever. I was trying to use terminology you'd find acceptable. Just replace every instance of "perceptual determination" in my arguments with "perceptual observation". This doesn't change the actual force of the arguments in the least.

    It does change. Determination is different than observation. Very different. I observe that which exists. I do not determine that what I am observing exists.

    (1) "If they have not observed X then X is not something particular"

    (2) "everything that exists is something particular"

    (3) If something hasn't been observed, it doesn't exist. (follows from 2&1)

    This is wrong, I admit. I didn't think this through enough, what I should have said is that whatever I conceptualize or observe is, of course, something particular. So X is always something particular. However X is either something I observe or something I conceptualize. I don't verify whether each of these exists. One I am conceptualizing already and the other I am observing already.

    And you don't ever speak to the wax argument, btw.

    Objects move. What's the big deal? I explain the event/observation by saying that some fundamental object sticks to others. When these fundamental constituents move they shake loose from each other. This is a theory to explain the event.

    Uncertainty argument.

    (1) It is possible to doubt whether or not an object exists.

    (2) One grasps the existence of an object directly via perception.

    (3) It is impossible to doubt a perception.

    (4) It is impossible to doubt whether or not an object exists. (2&3, contradicts 1)

    Now the intended, epistemic reading of (2) should be plain

    I still disagree with (2). I observe objects that exist. I do not grasp, determine, conceptualize, etc. their existence.

    Of course, combined with your notion that the only entities are those directly grasped by perception, you put us in the remarkably awkward position of saying that all of the objects we interact with on a daily basis don't have parts. See below.

    If you refer to something like a television, computer, etc. as an object you are treating it as a single thing. As soon as you talk about how it was made, what it is made of, etc. you are dealing with the concept of a TV or computer. What you pointed at was the object. Your description of it is a conceptualization.

    I am not saying entities are only things that are grasped directly by perception. I am saying an entity is that which has shape.

    I am also not saying that you cannot describe an entity as being made of entities.

    But you don't justify or provide an argument for ANY of this! Why should I make this bizarre distinction between the table qua entity, which doesn't have parts, and the table qua furniture which does?

    Any definition besides "shape" for entity qua entity cannot be used consistently. An object has shape all on its own. Other properties such as color, sharpness, roundness, roughness, etc. require the comparison/conceptualization of a conscious observer. An object in the primary sense just has shape, it is intrinsic.

    I am not saying that an entity such as a music box is not made of entities. I am distinguishing in what context we can use a word to refer to an object and in what context we cannot. We can only use the word "music box" to refer to an object if we are referring to the shape which we point to. We cannot refer to conceptualizations and groups as if they were objects because, quite simply, they are conceptualizations and not objects. The music box is not 'a' group of gears. The music box is itself, it is what I pointed to. "Group of gears" is a conceptualization of the spatial proximity of entities. This avoids the absurdity of asserting that the Eiffel Tower and my left toe is an object. That kind of nonsense is right out.

    What philosophical work does this do or what explanatory power does it have?

    It identifies the most primitive, intrinsic quality common to all objects. It makes the word "object" unambiguous. It prevents absurdity like asserting that the Eiffel Tower and my left toe are 'a' object. Groups are not objects. A music box is NOT a group of gears. A music box is a music box is a music box. It is what I point to. It may be made of gears, this is a description of it, not a definition of it. We cannot haphazardly replace the word "music box" with the phrase "group of gears" wherever we want because one refers to an object, a shape, and the other refers to a conceptualization, the mental association of entities under some criteria. The shape criterion It is free of observers, other objects and "proof". Whether an object is big, heavy, red, soft, smooth, rough, etc. is a matter of a person's perception and comparison. An object is not identified as rough unless there is another object to compare it to that is not rough. An object is not colored unless there is at least one more object of a different color. An object is not big unless there is at least one object that is small. Shape, on the other hand, an object has shape even if it is the only object in the universe. The only alternative to shape is shapeless, i.e. nothing. There is no nothing.

    What I am presenting is not as bizarre as it sounds.

  10. Altonhare is not applying Objectivist thought correctly, and I wouldn't want anyone to get the impression that he advocating a position consistent with Objectivism here.

    The act of perceiving, identifying and naming a particular object as a music box is a conceptual act. A concept means its referent(s) and all of its attributes, known and unknown. As the excerpt from ITOE Appendix above shows, a part is a type of attribute. Regarding an entity as a perceptual primary and an entity as abstraction comprised of parts as if they were two separate phenomena is simply ludicrous. They are the same. There is not even a metaphysical vs. epistemological distinction to be made, they are both epistemological perspectives on the same concept.

    Concepts can indeed refer to attributes.

    The problem we have here is that "collection of entities" refers to some attribute of entities such as proximity. Since attributes cannot perform actions we cannot logically use concepts such as groups/collections in a sentence as if they were entities. Often we do this anyway as a convenient shorthand and, if the terminology and the abstraction is familiar enough, no meaning is lost.

    On the other hand, the entity itself is what you see before you, something you take at face value. Your understanding of the entity (how it was made, how it was put together, what it is used for...) is in your mind. The abstraction/conceptualization in your mind cannot perform actions or be acted upon. You cannot kick "it". It makes no sense to. You can kick the entity, the man or the bee or the dog. You cannot kick your mental association between entities, no matter how strong your mental association may be.

  11. Hey cmd, before I respond I want to say I appreciate your constructive criticism and commentary.

    The form of one of these existential claims is more: "I will verify whether there exists an X such that it has such and such properties."

    You are not, in this case, talking about a particular thing. You conceptualizing based on particular things you have already observed. You're guessing that you may observe in the future something that is hard, round, etc. Can a thing be both hard like wood and round like a balloon? You're not talking about verifying the existence of a particular thing.Then you stumble across a baseball. Did you verify the baseball existed? No, you just observed it and it happens to share conceptual characteristics with things you have already observed. The baseball is a particular thing that exists. Your concepts of round and hard are just characteristics of things you have observed before.

    I am simply arguing that you do not and cannot verify whether a particular thing exists.

    When I ask, "does my keyboard exist?", that's what I'm asking: Does there exist an object such that it is a keyboard and it belongs to me? This is an important semantic distinction between your reading of existential claims and mine, I think. To verify the existence of the object I go out, look for an object that satisfies those criteria, then pat myself on the back. Note that this is not trying to prove "existence exists". There is a distinction between the fact of existence as such and the existence of individual existents which you don't appear to be making.

    I'm making the distinction between verifying the existence of a particular thing and simply observing that which happens to share conceptual characteristics with things you have already observed.

    Well, you're right - we don't carry around objects in our heads. So I'm not comparing two distinct objects and fallaciously identifying like in your example. Rather, I carry around the criteria for applying a predicate, and when I observe an entity that satisfies the criteria for the predicate, I've verified the existential claim that there exists an X such that (whatever the predicate specifies).

    You may have verified that there is an entity with such and such characteristics, but you didn't verify whether *a particular thing* exists.

    My claim is that we use reason to construct our ontologies from percepts. Yours seems to be that our ontologies are direct, perceptual determinations on top of which we build an apparatus of hierarchical conceptual groupings via reason. I have three objections.

    I. Existence is not a perceptual determination.

    Wax argument (paraphrasing Descartes)

    Take a piece of wax. Melt it. It changes in color, shape, extension, smell, texture temperature, etc. But I know that it's the same piece of wax. My senses tell me that the object on the table has nothing in common with the object I put into the fire, but my reason tells me that it's the same one. Because I changed all my percepts of the object, but maintained my awareness of the same object's existence, I must not grasp the object's existence as a perceptual determination, but rather as a rational determination justified by percepts.

    First off, I don't really understand the distinction you're trying to draw between us. I take in direct percepts that define my ontology and then draw deductions/conclusions from that. You construct your ontology from percepts. So we both build our ontologies from percepts.

    Second off, I agree that existence is not a perceptual determination. I've been pounding on that, in fact. I observe that which exists. I don't determine, verify, etc. if *this* thing exists. I observe it. That's my whole argument against people talking about verifying whether X exists. If they have not observed X then X is not something particular and since everything that exists is something particular, they are not verifying whether X exists.

    You might say that the mental conceptualization represented by X exists. But when you stumble upon the baseball you cannot make the leap to saying you verified *it* (qua it) exists.

    I have observed a balloon and a block. I felt and saw sharp edges on the block but not on the balloon. I refer to this comparison as "round" versus "blocky". I also felt that the balloon was squishy/soft, I could push in on it. The block I could not. I refer to this comparison by describing the balloon as "soft" and the block as "hard".

    I wonder if there is an object that is both round and hard. I don't think there's any reason not, so I guess there is one. I discover a baseball. It is both round and hard. I did not verify whether *the* baseball existed. I simply discovered something which I could describe via previous conceptualizations. The fact that I guessed right is good luck or good intuition.

    Uncertainty argument.

    (1) It is possible to doubt whether or not an object exists.

    (2) Whether or not an object exists is a perceptual determination.

    (3) It is impossible to doubt a perceptual determination.

    (4) It is impossible to doubt whether or not an object exists. (2&3, contradicts 1)

    You have to reject one of the premises. (1) is obviously true, so that means either we reject your claim (2), or the veridicality of our perceptions, something Rand refused to give up.

    2 is absolutely not my claim. Entities exist whether we perceive them or not. I observe that which exists doesn't mean that which I don't observe doesn't exist.

    II. Groups of entities are not concepts.

    (1) Groups of entities consist of entities.

    (2) Concepts exist in the mind.

    (3) That which exists in the mind cannot consist of entities.

    (4) Concepts cannot consist of entities. (2&3)

    (5) Groups of entities cannot be concepts. (4&1)

    Your first statement is misconceived. You are misusing the word "consist". 'A' group is a concept, a mental construct, and cannot be said to "consist" of anything. This is why it contradicts your correct statement (4). Concepts, by definition, do not "consist of" entities.

    "Groups of entities" do not consist of entities. Its a concept, a mental association of entities.

    III. Some objects are reducible to their parts.

    (1) There exist entities that are nothing more than the sum of their parts.

    (2) Sums of parts are conceptual groupings.

    (3) Conceptual groupings exist in the mind.

    (4) Sums of parts exist in the mind. (2&3)

    (5) There exist objects which exist in the mind. (4&1)

    Again, you have to reject a premise, since you explicitly deny (5). (1) is just manifestly obvious (see below), while 2 and 3 are your claims.

    Why is this contradictory? There are objects which have parts, which can in turn be objects.

    The problem here is the way you're using the word "object" or synonymously "entity". When we point at something and name it (treat it as an object) it is taken at face value. It is a single standalone thing. When you start talking about *how* it was made, *what* it is made of, etc. you are describing and conceptualizing. You point at a table and say "table". The ET just sees one standalone thing. The table is an object. The ET knows nothing about what it is made of, how it was made, what it's used for, etc. When you talk about what the table is made of you are conceptualizing it, i.e. you are using the word "table" to refer to the concept of cutting wood into specific shapes and putting it together so people can eat off it... etc. When talking about table qua table, or any entity qua entity, it is not "made of parts". In the primary sense an entity is simply that which you point at and has shape. There is no caveat for being a "sum of its parts". As soon as you talk about it being a sum of other entities you are dealing with a concept and not an object. You are dealing with the concept of atoms bonding or chopping trees etc. No entity, in the primary sense, is a "sum of parts". In the primary sense "entity" encompasses a single distinguishing characteristic, shape.

    (1) A music box is an object.

    (2) Gears are objects

    (3) A music box is composed of gears.

    (4) An object is composed of objects.

    I don't understand how you can deny (4) with a straight face. It forces you to deny one of the trivially true claims in 1-3. Such an implausible position really requires some actual argument - because despite complaining about my apparantly unjustified skepticism, you haven't actually provided a single warrant for your epistemology. You've just asserted its truth.

    The problem here is in (3). You went from music box qua music box in (1) to music box that was made by putting these entities (gears) together in this specific way in (3), which is explicitly a concept. The act of putting together the music box with gears is conceptual. This is an equivocation between music box the object and music box the concept.

  12. If the object itself produced light, since light speed is constant and its speed is not increased by originating from a moving object, the object would arrive at us before its light was reflected into our eyes. If light from a source at our feet were to bounce off the object, it would again, still reach us before the light returned to us. So would it not be technically invisible?

    Something else that has been on my mind, i find it troubling to think that the speed of light is constant. Light moves away from you at the same speed no matter how fast you are traveling, so that is never possible to catch up to its edge. However if we take a source of light that is flipped on while me and you stand at its source and you begin to travel at half the speed of light at the same time the light source is flipped on, how does light stay at a constant speed for us both? Your beam of light would have to be traveling faster than my beam in order to travel at its constant speed. For those who may know of the light horizon, i think that light is for the most part instant, that it has no speed in which it must travel. It simply fades out at different lengths depending on the strength of the source.

    If atoms could move faster than light then yes, you could be hit in the head with one before seeing it with your eyes. The supersonic bullet is a good analogy.

    The reason you and your friend both calculate the same speed of light is very simple. Your friend, travling at 0.5*c relative to you, has a clock that physically ticks slower than yours. So you see the light beam traverse a meter in a single tick of your clock, your friend sees it traverse half a meter but also only sees half a tick of his clock. You both get c=1.

    Any arguments or reasons for this feeling of unease about a proven fact?

    This is a bit patronizing and heavy-handed. Frisky is trying to visualize and understand the situation from a rational, intuitive approach in hopes of reconciling it with observations.

    It doesn't stay at a relative constant speed. It stays at a constant speed period, but for the person moving, it would seem to have a different speed.

    No, light does not "seem to have a different speed" for the person moving. Light's speed is calculated exactly the same.

    The speed of light was first measured in 1676 by Ole Christensen Rømer, who was studying the motions of Jupiter's moon, Io, with a telescope. You can verify their results yourself by heating marshmallows in a microwave (they will show wavelength of the microwaves) or a cheap Walmart telescope.

    Yeah, I've heard the "light is instantaneous" argument before and I can't conceive of any way it could possibly be true. Not only do I have issues with "true instantaneity" but every experiment ever done summarily falsifies it. In particular, a very simple setup (done in high vacuum 10^-10 mbar):

    Source S and detector D are separated by 1 unit distance. Turn on the source and a timer, D detects and turns off the timer. The time for this is t and the speed of light is 1/t. If light is "instantaneous" then t is the time for us to detect the change in D, which is essentially constant.

    Now S and D are separated by 100 unit distances. Repeat the experiment. If light is "instantaneous" but only appears to have a finite velocity because it takes some time for us to detect it, then we will get the speed of light has 100/t, where t is essentially a constant temporal offset.

    Thus, if light were "instantaneous" we would expect its calc'd speed to increase with the separation of source and detector. We do not observe this effect. Until the proponents of "instant light" can surmount this seemingly invincible empirical barrier, I do not know how anyone can take such an idea seriously.

  13. This isn't to say that higher dimensions cannot exist. There are many theories of physics (none which have been accepted as real yet) which rely on the concept of higher dimensions. Many concepts can be easier to explain as being in 5 dimensions or more. These dimensions, however, are considered to be too small to detect in regular experience. For example, if you were walking on a row of cylinders, you may not notice them if the cylinders are very very small. But an ant or a small particle would have to travel across it's (half) radius and for it there would be that one more "dimension".

    Here's the catch though: Since none of these dimensions have ever been measured, it's all just a theory. In physics, if it cannot be measured, it isn't real.

    What can it even mean for a dimension to be "small"? An object can be small, but a concept?

    Brian Greene's analogies all fail. All the analogies in the world ultimately fail.

    What evidence leads you to believe that relativity is not sound?

    In the "relativity of simultaneity" two observers come to contradictory conclusions. This is unacceptable. While observers in rel agree on if A is longer than B or if A has greater velocity than B, they disagree on the simultaneity of AB and CD. As we know there are no contradictions in reality. This indicates that time, at least as measured, is not fundamental to reality. But relativity is based on the idea that time IS fundamental.

    I agree that the premise behind higher dimensions aren't necessarily correct. But to dismiss it as a whole isn't very scientific. If you can prove it, great. Or else it doesn't exist.

    How will you "prove" that my table is 4, 5, or more dimensional? In which direction will you move it? Will you show that the inverse square "law" of gravity is different on tiny scales? But here you have just shown that the inverse square "law" is not a law but just a macroscopic correlation, a good heuristic formula. You'll have a new quantitative relationship for the attraction between bodies. Will you throw the table into a collider and tell me you pumped in more "energy" than you got out? What is this "energy", can you point to it? Show me a picture of it?

    All of this said. You can be an fully objectivist (like me) with time being just an useful "idea" and not something HARD-REAL like matter,space and movement.

    I was not trying to promote subjetivism, just pointintg the different nature of "time".

    Space is not "real". Space is nothing, and there is no nothing.

    I like your ideas on time and movement.

    Question, just to learn.

    Anything that can be 'thinnked' is an 'existent' and 'exists' ?

    Any "mental something'' exists ?

    Nope. The leprechaun I am visualizing in my mind doesn't exist. The keyboard I am visualizing in my mind doesn't exist.

    It exists if it has shape and location. Concepts exist although they lack shape and location if they are perceptually derived from shapes with location.

  14. I think we're saying the same thing here, but IMO it would be strange to say that an irrational number is a process in mathematical formalism, since we can treat them along with the rationals as stand-alone "completed" numbers just fine, applied literally to physical measurements.

    How is pi() a standalone, completed "number"? i.e. a finished result? Mathematically pi() represents, as you said, a series. Not just any series, but one for which we can always write an additional term. So pi() represents an operation, something that hasn't been done yet. Specifically what hasn't been done yet is adding in the nth term in the series. So we work with the symbol pi() until we're ready to get a finished result, at which point we finally calculate a number and replace pi() with it.

    i.e., they form an ordered field, you can manipulate them in algebraic equations, and so forth.

    You cannot manipulate that which is indefinite, undetermined, or neverending. Manipulations of pi() in algebraic equations and so forth are founded on the tacit assumption that pi will be converted into a number at the end, so we can say that we were just dealing with that number all along.

  15. What about the idea of time being a 4th dimension.. not a spacial dimension, but a spatiotemporal dimension. Is that valid? Is it applicable to this question, or is it just a totally different context? What exactly does "dimension" mean, here?

    Just define the word "dimension" and you're all set.

    Dimension: Quality of an object indicating it has extent in one of three mutually perpendicular directions.

    With this definition, "time" is not a dimension. You cannot move in the direction of time. If you go with a more mathematical definition then you can justify as many "dimensions" as you want by constructing independent vector bases. But then one must ask what this has to do with real objects.

    Sorry, when I said 3 I was referring to spatial only. Sure, time as a 4th is valid I think, but I'm don't think that it also in any way implies a 5th.

    I disagree very strongly. In fact, there is no reason to insert "time" into equations of motion at all. Motion is relational, i.e. the relationship between the locations of objects. When mathematicians say an object "is moving with respect to time" they are eschewing the physical nature of the situation in exchange for a mathematical convenience. They cannot say A is moving with respect to B until they point to A and B.

    time: motion + observer

    My opinion on this is simple. We don't know how many dimensions exist until we define the concept "dimension", and put the word "dimension" in context. If you are talking about how many dimensions exist in reality (that is, how many sides an object can have), the answer is 3 (height, length, and width).If you are talking about dimensions, as in a fancy rational database that I made for work, then the answer can be 10 (assuming that i made a 10 dimensional database!). Of course, I can come up with a lot of different examples, however, I trust you understand my point.

    So what is a dimension exactly? I think thats a different debate (or thread).

    Sounds very good. In physics, i.e. the study of objects that exist (*this* keyboard), all objects are three dimensional.

    Here's a case where I think words are failing us. The three spatial dimensions are a valid concept, but the same is true of space-time. Unfortunately, the same word is used for both concepts., thanks to The Time Machine. There's no question that time exists in reality.

    What do you mean by "exist in reality"? There is a fundamental difference between an object's dimensionality (its length, width, and height) and my experience of getting older, of before/after, etc. "Time" is dependent upon the conscious observer. When we remove the conscious observer there is no "time" thing lying around, there are only 3D objects at locations. Only when the conscious observer looks and says "A is moving twice as fast as B" or something similar, does the concept of "time" even arise.

    There are only 3 spacial dimensions: it is an impossibility for a 4th line to be perpendicular to the origional 3 intersecting lines at the same time.

    Dimension means a measurable aspect. For example, a thing can said to have 5 dimensions if one measures its heigth, width, length, mass, and temperature. Dimensions are measures of certain existents in reality.

    Not just any word we utter or anything we can measure qualifies as a dimension. Dimension, at least in physics, has a very specific and unambiguous meaning. It refers to the quality of an object having extent in one of three mutually perpendicular directions. When we introduce the conscious observer s/he may conceptualize temperature, time, weight, etc. but these are in his/her head. Nature didn't "know" about them.

    Time doesn't exist in reality. In reality there is only matter and movement. Time is a mental human construction, a side effect of humans having memory.

    Exactly. It takes a conscious observer, with memory, to conceptualize "time". When we remove him/her there are only 3D objects changing location.

    Nonsense. Time is no more and no less a "mental human construct" than space, matter or movement. Where do you get your strange ideas about existence?

    Movement does not require the human mind. Motion is just two or more locations of an object. A human doesn't have to observe the object or measure the locations. If it was at two or more locations, it moved.

    Space is "nothing", a 0. Matter is a shorthand term humans use for the sum total of all objects that exist.

    Time is a conceptualization of motion or change; it doesn't exist outside the human mind as a type of substance which is needed for things to be able to move. One can say that given enough time, that super nova that exploded light years away about six billion years ago led to the creation of the solar system when its shock wave hit a cloud of gas and dust, but it is not as if time is a sort of energy source one must have in order to be able to move. In this sense it is a human mental construct, but it is based upon actual observations of things moving or changing centered around before and after, as Aristotle first recognized.

    Say one tosses a ball at the wall, but it doesn't hit the wall because the pet dog grabbed it. Because we can conceptualize, we can form the concept of time by abstracting from this and other such events, and comparing it to a standard motion from which we can compare to all other motions. We say the dog got the ball before it hit the wall, or if it bounces off the wall and the dog grabbed it then we can say that happened after the ball hit the wall. Similarly, we can take a standard motion -- say the motion of a stop watch -- and use it to rate other motions as before and after the sweeping hand crosses a certain distance.

    So, the concept of time is based upon observation, but we don't directly perceive time, what we perceive are things acting or changing, and we develop the concept of time from these observations.

    I think what confuses some people is that we do have several mechanism like a clock and a stop watch in our heads that make it seem like we are observing the passage of time, when actually we are doing the same thing internally that we do when we look at a clock or a watch.

    Time would not be a forth dimension, except figuratively, in the sense of one more parameter that can be measured.

    Very well said :P.

    If time is not a dimension of reality, then how do you explain hundreds of thousands of experiments that show that motion in the spacial dimensions slows down motion in the time dimension. The faster you travel ghrough space, the slower time passes for you relative to to someone who is stationary or traveling slower then you through space.

    All the experiments in the world cannot change the definition of "dimension". Whether time is a dimension or not is not a matter of experiment or verification.

    I propose time is a dimension.

    My pendulum swung fewer times when I was running than when I was standing.

    Therefore time is a dimension.

    How will you "verify" if time is a dimension, if you do not even know what a dimension is!? You have to settle the definition first so we know what you're actually going to prove.

    Which is entirely different from saying that time does not exist. Space also does not exist outside of the mind as a type of substance, and for that matter no attributes "exist as such, as entities, outside the mind". I find it very useful to recall what Rand had to say on the subject:

    The building-block of man's knowledge is the concept of an "existent"—of
    something that exists, be it a thing, an attribute or an action
    .

    and understand the source of people's confusion about the nature of things that exist -- the adherence to a very concrete understanding of existent by limiting it to what children are first aware of:

    The first stage is a child's awareness of objects, of things—which represents the (implicit) concept "entity."

    This adherence to child-like epistemology explains why many people are confused about the difference between entity and existent.Why would you think that the other three so-called dimensions are dimensions, except also figuratively?

    Length, width, and height are ubiquitous and self-evident attributes of every object we observe. Where is time? Can you point in its direction? Can you point at it? A picture of it?

    When you think about the issue critically you realize that "time" is a mental conception of the relative motion of objects. We pick a standard mover and say everything else is moving X much faster or slower than it. We can then say something takes 1/X "time units" to go a unit distance.

    How do you explain a particle such as a muon, which has a certain life span, and is traveling at a certain speed. At the speed it is traveling and the life span that it has, traveling from the top of earth's atmosphere toward the earth it should not even make it a fraction of the way before it diseapers, however it makes it all the way the surface.

    If the physicist cannot even imagine or illustrate a muon, let alone point to it, then s/he has nothing. All the measurements in the world do not make up for an arbitrary and/or nonexistent hypothesis. Without this crucial step the word "muon" remains a Joker and all statements based on it are arbitrary.

    Assuming the physicist can get past this hurdle, now s/he will have to explain the physical process of muon decay, since his/her theory is based on it. What causes the decay? If s/he cannot explain this process then s/he cannot possibly draw meaningful scientific conclusions from experiments based on it.

    Assuming the physicist can get past this , at best s/he has shown that the physical processes governing muon decay are altered at high velocity.

    As long as decay processes are treated as random physicists cannot even begin to base conclusions so fundamental as "time is a dimension" on decay experiments.

    You're not answering the question I asked or Thomas, you're addressing a totally different question (one which I have yelled at Thomas before, and to quote Jake, arrgh). How does that have anything to do with the concept "dimension", and why does the concept "dimension" not apply equally well to time.

    The reason the concept "dimension" does (or does not) apply to time depends solely on the definition of "dimension". There is the physics definition, which I stated, and there is the mathematical definition. In mathematics "dimensions" are essentially anything you can measure but can't equate mathematically to another measurable. This seems highly arbitrary and rationalistic to me. It also seems a little dishonest since those reading mathspeak outside the field are generally thinking about physical dimensions.

    If spacesial dimensions are not real, then why experiments show that lengths and distances change depending on how fast you are traveling?

    Distance doesn't change with perspective. Distance-traveled changes with perspective. Distance is a static concept. In relativity and most measurements you are NOT measuring the static concept "distance" between the floor and ceiling of the train but the dynamic concept "distance-traveled by a photon" from the floor to the train. It seems this misconception is nearly universal and inevitably leads to misunderstanding.

    An object can, of course, expand or contract under various circumstances for a variety of reasons.

    I measure a brick and a block of metal, concluding the metal is longer than the brick. You measure them and conclude the brick is longer than the metal. I measured on a summer afternoon and you measured on a January night. Do we suddenly conclude that time or temperature are dimensions? Of course not! We formulate a hypothesis (atoms perhaps) and a theory that atoms stick together, some more than others. When the atoms are moving fast they loosen from their stickiness and have a greater distance between each other. Metal atoms bind less rigidly so, when they move faster (are heated), they slip and slide away from each other more than in the rigid binding of brick.

    So if a pendulum seems to swing fewer times when you're running you don't conclude time is a dimension. This is at best a restatement of what happened, not an explanation! That the clock swung fewer times is just an observation. What's the scientific theory/explanation? Time dilated? If you cannot point to time this "theory" is a non-starter.

    Space and Time are two different "types" of dimensions. From experiments and (theory) space and time are one entity in which matter exists.

    No amount of experimentation in the world will suddenly make my keyboard 4D. It is clearly and unambiguously 3D.

    To say that space and/or time is just a construct designed to deal with movement is trivial. It's akin to saying that velocity doesn't exist, it's just a product of momentum and mass. You need a certain number of fundamental independent variables and as far as we know, that number is four.

    The product of momentum and mass is just m^2*v, so not sure what this means.

    Time is a convenient paramter to use when dealing with the motion of many objects. If we have only three objects A, B, and C we can just describe their relative motion directly, using only their relative location:

    AC = 2*BC

    i.e. A is moving twice as fast as B.

    If we have many objects this becomes more difficult, so we let everything move "with respect to time". This is essentially laying down a universal standard for everything's motion, so that we don't have to deal with purely relational motion anymore. Since physics has never found a "preferred frame" i.e. a preferred standard in Nature, the correct physical representation is purely relative motion with no "respect to time" while inserting "time" is a mathematical convenience.

    This is not to deny everyone's everyday experience/conceptualization of "time". However this is more a subject of philosophy than physics. Physics seeks to understand purely the physical situation, i.e. the objects. Philosophy seeks to study concepts like consciousness and the mind.

  16. I think Altonhare and Aleph_O are trying to define the term "Entity" in some formal logic manner, when it cannot be so defined because it must be grasped inductively and ostensively. one mental thing.

    But this is exactly what I'm doing. I have never pointed at a thing without shape. I have never imagined a thing without shape. In fact, I can neither induce nor rationalize 'a' shapeless "thing".

    That is, it can only be grasped by pointing to individual entities and saying, "This is what I mean." And I don't think shape is the basic criteria, since an entity has so many more attributes and aspects, why single out just one of them as being the most important?

    I didn't say "most important". I'm saying the most essential, primitive attribute. Just try to imagine an entity without shape. Visualize it. Or try pointing to one. It cannot be done. You point and say "swarm" and the alien just sees bees (individual entities, shapes).

    Shape, in fact, seems axiomatic. How will you argue for 'a' shapeless "thing"? First you will have to visualize or point to a thing, which will already have shape. You try to talk about or imagine things for the purposes of discussing if it can be shapeless, but you already see its shape.

    Regarding concepts as being claimed to be mental entities, I agree with what Miss Rand said in that perhaps another term ought to be used, but no one has come up with anything better than a "mental entity." A concept is one thing in the mind, and it is specific, it is a mental integration of information into one mental thing.

    I don't see the difficulty with a quest to name "mental entities". They're called concepts. Up is a concept. Love is a concept. The leprechaun I'm imagining is a nonexistent entity. This keyboard is an existent entity.

    I agree with Thomas.

    Juxtaposing the Lexicon entries for Entity and Axiomatic Concepts leads me to conclude that "entity" is an axiomatic concept. The definition of entity must be ostensive, therefore entities as different things that can be pointed at are not necessarily commensurate with each other in their attributes.

    Like I said, it's impossible to point at that which lacks shape. Shape is axiomatic.

    A proposed entity which is the sum of two disparate elements, such as the Eiffel Tower and a banana peel, cannot be pointed at so it is invalid. A collective noun such as the wind or a swarm (of bees) or flock (of birds) can be validated by pointing at it.

    When does the swarm suddenly not qualify as an entity then? When the bees are each an average of an inch apart? A foot? A meter? A light year?

    What if I bring a banana peel and slap it against the Eiffel Tower so it sticks and point at them?

    A valid collective noun has elements that are causally related to each other but not themselves necessarily entities.

    Everything is causally related to some degree. When do you draw the line?

    I have been working specifically on the issue of shape and boundedness in relation to the concept entity. I think when I'm done I will be able to show from Oist epistemology that one cannot induce the concept entity without either. It is the essential characteristic that separates it from the concept existent.Ill add that this is not from "deduction" but rather verified by ubiquitous observation.

    Looking forward to seeing that.

    How, if infinity is disallowed, can something have range and domain over the real numbers?

    What do you even mean by an entity having "range and domain"?

    If we're talking about pure mathematics, a real number can always be expressed as an infinite sequence of digits in any base.

    Could you show me an example of a number actually expressed as an infinite sequence? What's this "infinity" and how will I know when I've reached it?

    Furthermore, there are more real numbers than integers in a very fundamental way.

    Did you count them?

    If we're talking about practical application, how many measurements would it take to verify that the length of two rulers were EXACTLY the same qua real numbers?

    Measurement is always limited by one's reference standard, which is given 1. If a ruler is a little shorter than your reference standard all you can say is that its length is <1. If its a little longer than it's >1. You can guess at values in between, but all we can *know* from a measurement are statements of the form "A is longer than B". Any quantitative information, such as A and B are around the same length, or A is twice as long as B, are guesses.

    You can't, because it would take infinitely many-- for physical measurements we're stuck with the rational numbers. That's just because to specify a real number always requires some infinite process of completion (like regarding them as infinite decimals, Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts) that can't actually be performed with physical measurement, as whatever you're measuring with has nonzero length and hence some error associated to it, and you can't make infinitely many measurements. So real numbers are concepts of method; applying them as lengths of physical objects is improper. This, of course, doesn't make real numbers any less important in mathematics.

    These measurements are contextual anyway, so infinite measurements really wouldn't be of much use. The ruler that you'd like to verify has length exactly pi is at some microscopic level a ragged collection of atoms anyway. But that's what sigfigs are for.

    The section "Exact Measurement and Continuity" in ItOE is a really good exploration of the issues.

    Irrationals such as pi are not actually numbers, but processes (operators). Pi expresses an operation such as making successively high order polygons. The term "irrational number" is a misnomer. Pi invokes the *concept* of a circle, i.e. the concept of incessantly making a higher and higher order polygon. This is different than O, which is an object many would call a circle.

  17. I think we need to distinguish mental entities (i.e. conceptualizations) from existential entities (i.e. The Eiffel Tower) in order to resolve this.

    A mental entity is just any object I imagine, a square, a leprechaun, etc. The distinction from an existent entity (Eiffel Tower) is that existent entities have presence i.e. location. The leprechaun is not located anywhere, I am just visualizing it.

    1) In the primary sense, an entity is one thing out there -- one object, like a baseball or a glass of water;

    This is circular, an entity is a thing, these are synonyms. When you say "out there" I think you're invoking presence/location.

    2) in the secondary sense, an entity is something considered in isolation from its surroundings -- a two foot by two foot section of your yard or the top of one's desk. Those are existential considerations made by a human mind.

    I don't know what you mean by "in isolation from its surroundings"? A portion of your yard is conceptual in the sense that you draw an imaginary line in your yard. There is no independently existing entity "portion of yard" lying there. You had to perform an imaginary operation (drawing a boundary) and then identify the result of this operation. At best I can think of this as an entity you imagine, that has shape but not location.

    3) Concepts are mental entities, something specific in the mind -- the concept "cat" or the concept "table."

    I must strongly disagree with this. Concepts lack shape and cannot qualify as entities in any sense.

    What is the shape of up?

    What some people seem to be claiming is that 4) anything considered by the mind at one time is also a mental entity -- i.e. the stuff on my desk (which might be papers, a computer, an ashtray, some pens, etc.).

    Right. Essentially anything that can serve as the subject of a sentence, whatever we can utter that we have a mental association with, somehow qualifies as an entity. However entities are causal primaries. This means there are concepts which we understand that are not causal primaries, which means not everything we understand and think about qualifies as an entity.

    Regarding the swarm of bees, I think this would be an entity in the secondary sense of the term"entity" in that the swarm tends to act together -- i.e. to ward off intruders to the bee hive. This would be like Dr. Peikoff's example in the Lexicon of a breeze being an entity in the secondary sense.

    I think having more than one "sense" of using the word entity just muddles communication and leads to confusion at best, while at worst it can lead to paradox, misintegration, and a logical breakdown. We need a single way to use this word, and I propose shape. When you look you just see bee. The "acting together" is a mental criterion by which you group multiple entities. Allowing groupings of entities to qualify as an entity leads to absurdity.

    What I am arguing against is the idea that one could mentally group together the bee swarm, the tree they live in, the dog running away from them, and the leaves that are falling as being one entity, which seems to be similar to one's left toenail and the Eiffel tower. That is they might be temporally grouped together (things happening at one time) or psychologically associated together (Harvard and stumping one's toe); but I wouldn't call these an entity.

    But you decided a bunch of bees could be an entity. So there is no reason a priori to say other groupings of entities can't be entities. This is avoided if we just stick to the shape definition.

    A psychological association might perhaps be considered one mental entity if the association is so tight that one cannot separate them (and this can lead to psychological ills, not being able to separate them, that is); but I don't know I would consider that to be one entity even mentally.

    A psychological association is an entity? Why? What qualifies as an entity? It sounds like you are just saying that whatever seems significant to a person is an entity. However, irrespective of our identification, entities just have shape.

  18. Huh? Objects exist independently of belief THEREFORE one cannot verify whether or not an entity exists? That doesn't follow in the least. I don't see how you get total epistemic agnosticism about the existence of objects on the basis there being an objective reality.

    It's not a matter of "following". It's a simple matter of logic.

    "I will verify whether X exists"

    Since X is a specific entity, i.e. *this* keyboard, it makes no sense to say I will "verify" its existence. It's this keyboard. I don't see how this can be debated with Oists, since existence is the first axiom, and Ayn Rand makes it clear that we don't "verify" or "prove" the axioms.

    Maybe I imagine something in my head, and think (for whatever reason, insanity, delusion, religion, prior experience with something similar to it) that something like it exists. One day I stumble upon something that resembles what I imagined. Did I "verify" that the entity *in my head* exists? The entity in my mind is mental, it doesn't exist, it lacks location. I cannot "verify" if it exists because it doesn't exist by definition. I didn't "verify" whether the entity I stumbled upon existed either, I just observed it. Nobody has ever verified an entity's existence, we just discover entities that exist.

    This just seems pigheadedly silly. I can point to a swarm of bees and say "swarm". Oh look, an entity, an object.

    This shows you do not understand the difference between a product of the mind, a concept, and an entity. If you point to it and name it, you are treating it as if it were a single entity. However most people will take your implied meaning by the common definition of swarm: a group of... Now you are defining a concept "swarm" as the grouping of all these little bees.

    Let's remove linguistic connotation. You point and say "X". I look and I see a bunch of buzzing dots. I'm not sure if you are pointing at the dot and naming it X or if you are telling me that you will you "X" as a convenient shorthand to mean "a bunch of buzzing things close together". The issue is that I have already identified the entity "dot" because each one has shape. Perhaps your vision is poor or whatever and you see a single shape, a blob. You look and see "buzzing blob". You do not identify the entity "dot" (or bee). You point and say "X!". I am not sure what you mean so I catch a bee and show it to you, or I bring you closer to the bees. Now you understand. You point at a bee and say "bee", then step away and hold out your arms and say "X". Now I understand that "X" is a conceptual grouping of bee entities, and I assume the grouping criteria (the relationship) is proximity/distance.

    If you look at the bees and see individual bees then "swarm" is a concept, a relationship amongst entities (bees). If you look and do not identify the individual bees *at all*, then you are identifying it as a single entity. As long as what you point to has shape, it is identified as an entity.

    But the swarm is composed of parts, namely individual bees.

    To everyone, I think, the collection of symbols "swarm" does indeed refer to a conceptual grouping of individual bees by proximity (perhaps a biologist would have more criteria but the common man probably not).

    The objective existence of an object isn't impugned by saying that it is composed of parts. Your argument seems to be that somehow bees "really" exist but swarms don't.

    Who said anything about existence being "impugned"? I'm talking about logical communication. You have not understood my argument. Concepts (such as mental groupings) exist as products of the Mind IF that concept is based on perceptually identified entities (such as bees). So when you point at a bee and say "bee" then point at a collection and say "swarm", the conceptual grouping "swarm" exists as a mental grouping of bee entities. However, only entities themselves can logically perform actions or be acted upon. Therefore it makes no sense, logically, to talk about kicking 'a' swarm. Swarm just refers to a mental grouping! Are you kicking someone's mental processes? Whatever you're kicking, it has shape, it's an entity (a bee).

    As above, I don't see how you can meaningfully distinguish between entities and "conceptual associations".

    Easily. Entities have shape. Concepts do not. Concepts are mental relationships between entities. An entity is a single, independent existent. Concepts are plural in that we need at least two entities to form a concept and dependent in the sense that they depend upon the Mind.

    Which is the cloud of atoms I call my body? The group of cells I call my blood? Which is the association of gears I call my grandfather clock? Which is the association of letters I call a word, or words I call a sentence? I think these kind of cases show why the retreat into the self-evident existence of some limited class of objects is problematic.

    No, it only shows your lack of understand the difference between objects and concepts. When you point to blood and name it, without identifying any other parts, you are treating it as a single independent entity not comprised of parts. As soon as you point to cells and define "blood" as "group of these entities" then "blood" is referring to a conceptual grouping.

    This is a matter of logic. When you identify individual entities and then mentally group them together, the word you use to refer to this mental grouping refers to a concept.

    This seems the most obviously false thing you write. The first counterexample that comes to mind is the search of physicists for black holes.

    If they cannot even imagine it, let alone point to it, they have no idea what they're even searching for. This reminds me:

    "It is not possible to put forward a strict definition of... existence."

    "Catholic teaching virtually asserts that God's existence can be proved."

    "Existence is at once familiar and rather elusive. There is more than a little difficulty in saying just what existence is.

    from the Catholic encyclopedia.

    The idea is similar. How can they even begin to "prove" that God exists if they don't even know what it means to exist? What the hell are they proving? Likewise, how can a physicist "verify" a black hole exists if s/he cannot even imagine it, let alone point to it?

    We have some entity we think exists,

    If you claim X exists, your first step is to point to it.

    If you want us to assume X exists, you at least have to show us what it looks like.

    that our working model of the universe predicts exists, so we go out and look to verify its existence.

    Predict that a thing exists? This is highly illogical language. Predict means to guess something about the future. You're predicting that a entity will exist at some time in the future?

    Verify its existence? Before you can verify it, you have to know what you're looking for.

    The second is, well, the everyday experience of accepting through testimony the existence of things that aren't self-evidently obvious, like atoms or Somalia.

    An atom is a hypothesis, an entity that is assumed to exist for the purposes of a theory to explain a phenomenon of Nature. "Let us assume atoms exist, and they look like tiny little balls" *point to a ball*. You don't "verify" that atoms exist. At best you provide evidence and argument to convince someone to believe your theory. The hypothesis is just an unjustified, unverified assumption for the purposes of explaining the theory (by definition of hypothesis).

    And third, you've inadvertently answered the question in arguing that its incoherent. Your answer is that only self-evidently existent objects exist, and that there do not exist any objects such that they are the sum of two or more distinct objects.

    lol, of course, no object IS two objects, much less the "sum" of two objects (whatever that means). That would be a contradiction. An object is an object is an object. "The sum of" objects is a conceptual grouping of objects.

    We live in a radically impoverished universe if this is accurate. But more to the point, you don't actually argue for why any of this is so. You just assert it.

    I'm sorry you see it this way.

    Skepticism is fine, but not skepticism for skepticism's sake. If you disagree you need to provide an alternate version or say why what I said is wrong.

    Dr. Peikoff: "This term [entity] may be used in several senses. If you speak in the primary sense, “entity” has to be defined ostensively—that is to say, by pointing.

    Agreed.

    A random mental collection of things or even a real random collection of real things, is not an entity. I was going by Aleph-O's presentation of mereology re one's left toe nail and the Eiffel Tower as an example of a mereological entity when I was arguing against mereology as a legitimate field of research.

    A key word you use is "random". I think you use this to distinguish between collections of entities which you have already mentally grouped via your experiences thus far in life and those which you have not mentally grouped. The ones you have not grouped (such as a toe and Harvard) you describe as "random". Someone else, however, may have stubbed their toe repeatedly while at Harvard and thus have formed the mental grouping "Harvard and toe" because s/he associates his/her toe with Harvard. Aleph will probably argue similarly, that your use of "random" is more an indication of your personal groupings than a reason to discount 'a' group as "an object".

    This is why we need to distinguish clearly between object and concept. An object is that which has shape. We point to it and name it. You cannot point to 'a' group. You point to what you have identified as "swarm" and the alien from another planet just sees bees (individual shapes). It is when you make clear that you are referring to their spatial relationship when you say "swarm" that the alien understands the concept "swarm". When we look, independently of conceptualization, we just see individual entities, bees.

    This summarily precludes all groupings from qualifying as objects, be it "toe and Harvard" or "arm and leg".

    By the way, a human being qua entity is not a collection of three trillion cells; a human being is an entity -- one thing.

    Human the entity is of course, an entity you point to and name "human". Human the concept may be referring to a spatial relationship amongst 3 trillion cell entities, although I think it is considerably more complicated than that.

  19. I don't see why a thing loses shape when it doesn't contain its boundary.

    The reason you're having difficulty is because you're not thinking logically. Or perhaps you are, I don't know what's in your brain, but what you're expressing isn't logical. "boundary" is a concept and not an object. Things can't "contain" concepts the way a box contains a rock. What kind of sense can it make to ask if the box contains up, love, or insanity?

    This is not a trivial semantic issue. In science and philosophy we demand rigorous, unambiguous communication. Nobody can entertain a question or claim which invokes such irrational ideas as a box containing wideness (i.e. an entity containing a concept). This is one way we distinguish our discipline from religion.

    I don't understand the point. I can talk about whether a chair exists, and I can verify it by observing a chair. I can also talk about whether there are heat calories (in the sense of caloric theory of heat) and then verify or deny.

    You do not verify whether an entity exists. You observe an entity that exists. The chair was already there, you're just observing it now. Did it not exist before you observed it or after? Obviously an entity exists even when we're "not looking", therefore we never really "verify" the existence of an entity. We just happen to observe one.

    A big difference with the caloric theory of heat is that you're simply verifying a *theory*. Theories we may provide evidence for or against because they're just that, theories. An explanation is neither Right nor Wrong, it's just an explanation. One's believe in an explanation is either Right or Wrong, but the theory itself is just a theory. You provide evidence for (i.e. verify) a theory empirically and attempt to convince your audience to believe the theory. If they believe it they may be Right, but they may also be Wrong in their belief. New specific empirical observation may repudiate it, of course, and may even resuscitate a theory that nobody has believed for a long time.

    There's a big, BIG difference between verifying if *this* keyboard exists, and verifying if *this* keyboard is hard because it's made of tightly bound atoms. In the former case I am attempting to "verify" that which is axiomatic and self-evident. This is a circularity and defies the meaning of "axiom". In the latter case I am posing a hypothesis (i.e. an unjustified assumption) and using it to explain a phenomenon, then trying to find empirical evidence that will convince an audience that my explanation is True. The hypothesis you ask the audience to take at face value for the purposes of your theory. You don't prove a hypothesis, it makes no sense, because a hypothesis is an unjustified assumption by definition. It is the first step, so it must be unjustified (the empirical evidence comes last).

    My thoughts have no shape. Sub-atomic particles may have no shape.

    Your thoughts aren't entities, of course they don't have shape. Thinking is an action, "thought" is convenient shorthand term referring to some specific sequence of thinking. i.e. when you say "I had a thought" you're not saying you suddenly acquired an entity called a thought. You mean you performed some action called thinking, the aggregate of which you refer to as 'a' thought. Obviously actions such as thinking or "having a thought" are not entities. Can 'a' thought run, jump, swim, or play?

    If your "subatomic particle" has no shape then its chances of being an entity die right there.

    This makes no sense, and either contradicts itself or demonstrates a lack of understanding. The set of points on a sphere defined by x2 + y2 + z2 = 1 is infinite yet has shape.

    I thought we just completed the lesson on groups/sets. "The set of X" is not an entity itself, so it of course lacks shape. X itself may be an entity, though.

    Your comment shows your lack of understanding, not mine.

    The idea of something being “infinitely infinite”, or “infinite in every way,” makes no sense. But infinity itself does not mean indefinite, or indefinable, or without boundary. It means that, in one respect, there is no limit. The universe may have infinite matter, and this would not be self-contradictory.

    The biggest problem with "infinite" is that it is used in so many different ways and, even in the individual ways it is used, it is misused. Infinite as an adjective is unacceptable because adjectives describe entities, which have shape, and that which is infinite in extent does not have shape.

    The other way it is used is as an adverb, when someone says something like "there are an infinite number of objects that exist". Since number is a concept, specifically an action (to count), infinite objects can only mean "to count incessantly". What this is essentially saying is that we could count entities and never stop, if we so desired. But when will we stop and decide that there are now an "infinite number"?

    Matter may be infinitely decomposable and this would not be a contradiction. You may never find a smallest unit of matter, and yet you can observe it, see (or know) space that contains it, and space that doesn’t, it can interact with things in a determinate way, and so on.

    Again you are being illogical and contradictory. You say I may never "find" a "smallest unit of matter" (fundamental constituent) and yet I can "observe" it. How do you find something without observing it?

    Additionally, you are again talking about "space" as if it were an existent. You say that one might see the space that contains an entity. This contains two instances of treating space as an existent. First you say that one might see it. Second you say that it may contain an entity. A concept (such as nothing) cannot contain a rock like a box (entity) contains a rock. Does Objectivism surround a rock? This is just as absurd as talking about space surrounding/containing an entity.

    That’s patently false. 1 + 1 = 2 describes no motion when you’re telling someone how many rabbits are in a field.

    Wrong. When you tell someone "there are 2 rabbits in the field" this is a shorthand way of saying "I counted a rabbit in the field then I counted a rabbit in the field". How else do you know there are two rabbits, except by performing a process/action?

    Equations like 1+1=2 do indeed express actions except in the trivial case where it is a restatement of Identity "A=A, 2=2". Therefore some criteria must distinguish the LHS and RHS. One criteria is distance. On the LHS we have an object at a distance >X from another object. On the RHS we have the same two objects at a distance <X. The equation, then, states that two objects moved closer. It expresses an action.

    Why can’t you define something negatively, if its essence is negative?

    When you talk with objectivists it will be the most productive for everyone involved, including you, to strive to speak in the most essential language. I mention this because, here, I do not know what precisely you mean by "negative" or "essence". I'll try to answer, but it may be irrelevant because I have to assume your meaning.

    Essentially, no existent's "essence" (its identity) is "negative" (the lack of an identity).

    A IS A

    as opposed to

    A is not B

    A is not C

    A is not D

    .

    .

    .

    ad nauseum

    The former is identity, the latter is, at best, a description of A to someone that has never observed A, but has observed B, C, and D. No existent IS what it IS NOT. This is an explicit contradiction. You may be able to describe an entity to someone in terms of what it is not, but they will never know what A IS until they observe A. Then they know what A IS (rather than just knowing how it compares to other entities).

    How do you define negation? Sure, you can use examples of things which are not defined by negation—but that doesn’t prove that it is, in principle, forbidden. (Hey, “forbidden”! That which you are not allowed to do!)

    I donno, how would you define negation? I don't use terms like space, negation, annihilation, etc. nor make claims about them. The burden is on you to define what you mean by the symbols "negation".

    I take it “matter” is a loaded technical term in physics, while “object” is just anything that exists.

    In physics "matter" just means "all objects that exist" and an object is that which has shape. Shape is a necessary but insufficient condition for existence. Not only must A be something, it must also be somewhere. So an entity that exists has shape and location. The elephant I picture in my head has shape, but it is not present, it lacks location. *This* keyboard has both shape and location, it exists.

    I’m not. I’m asking about the metaphysical possibility of the reality of an open sphere.

    The whole discussion of whether entity X exists is irrelevant and arbitrary, as Nate pointed out. Can a unicorn exist? Can a *)08ds80S)h exist? I have some equations, now can *)08ds80S exist?

    The relevant question is whether reality can be accurately described by a particular method, such as with a particular geometry.

    I find it simply ridiculous to say that a group of pencils is not an object, or a fleet of ships, or a lamp (which is just a grouping and configuration of plastic, metal, cloth, glass, etc.).

    Because you are not thinking in essentials. What is an entity/object? Is it anything that can serve as the subject of a sentence? Certainly not, because then even "nothing" could be something! This would turn "entity" into a God word, a Joker in the card deck.

    An entity is that which has shape. Does a GROUP of X's have shape? What kind of absurdity is that? X is an entity. X X X is an X, an X, and an X. Three entities. Each one is an entity. Mentally you group them together and think about a "group of X's". This is not an entity itself, this is entirely in your mind. Entities are what we visualize or point at. Concepts are what we *understand*. We *understand* that there are three X's a small distance from each other, and we refer to this understanding as "group".

    Concepts are products of the Mind. However all concepts are some relationship amongst 2 or more entities, i.e. concepts are first predicated on entities. So, to express your concept to another (to make someone else understand what you understand) you will first have to present them with some entities with which you will demonstrate your concept. To understand above" you will *first* need two entities, such as a table and a coconut. Sit the coconut on the table and utter "above". Put the coconut below the table and utter "below".

    Put an apple on the table, then put another apple on the table. Utter "two apples". Put an apple on the table. Utter "three apples". Etc. "One" refers to something. "Two" refers to the act of bringing something and something else close together, and so on.

    So far, "open sphere" remains a concept disconnected from entities. First you will have to show us the relevant entities, then we may begin to understand the concept "open sphere". If "open sphere" is an entity itself, you have but to point to it.

    It’s a technical term meaning “junk”. It’s the things you can kick and feel.

    Sure, the formation of groups as a mental act may be conceptual, but the groups themselves are just stuff.

    So groups, which are stuff, are things you can "kick and feel". If you can kick or feel 'a' group, then you are some kind of being far beyond me. I can kick a boat, but I cannot kick a group of boats! I can kick a boat and kick a boat. I can kick a boat, then kick a boat. I have never kicked a group, personally.

    If you have kicked a group sometime aleph, could you relate this experience? What's it like for your foot to come up against a concept? Could you show me (at least a picture) of this "group" that your foot came up against, so I can go try it?

  20. Good distinction, and for now I'm going to go with "matter", though it may be interesting to later consider objects.

    What precisely is the distinction between "matter" and "objects"? Could you define exactly what you mean by "matter"?

    You're right, but that's not the claim.

    So, then, why are you talking about the properties of space at all, i.e. how it is related to matter/objects/whatever? If space is a term indicating 0, nothing, a placeholder, i.e. nonexistent, what sense can it make to talk about its relationship or properties? That which exists may have properties and a relationship to other existents.

    “Gunk” is a technical term meaning non-atomistic. I.e. infinitely decomposable.

    Ah, you mean is there a fundamental constituent, i.e. an object that is just itself, it is not made of other objects (it cannot be broken). It seems that Identity demands it. If A is made of B is made of C... ad infinitum this would seem to preclude A from having identity, since its identity is dependent upon a neverending chain of identities. So it seems there must be some "smallest entity", which is a single piece, and cannot be broken. At some point, we must have an entity that is not made of other entities, an entity with its own identity that is not a result of the relationship of other entities.

    The point against this, though, is that we want to consider what is metaphysically possible, not just physically possible. And so we want an answer to whether we can, by conceptual analysis, rule out the possibility of an object being an open surface, and if not, then what should happen when they approach each other at a constant rate of speed with no repulsive forces?

    Mathematics can, at best, tell us if one or more entity(ies) can be accurately described in a specific way we refer to as an "open sphere" or not. Mathematics has no power to answer the question of what an entity IS. Math can only describe.

    So a group of pencils is a concept and not an object?

    Correct.

    Sure, the formation of groups as a mental act may be conceptual, but the groups themselves are just stuff.

    What's "stuff"? The latter part of your sentence is meaningless unless we know what "stuff" means.

  21. This is pure rationalism. How can an open sphere be said to exist at all? With no boundary points, it is an indefinite figure that can be asserted to do anything at all with no risk of contradiction.

    I agree. An equation, set of equations, or a word are themselves just symbols without referents to reality. In order to avoid rationalism and absurdity we must start with observation as our first premise. Every entity we observe has shape, i.e. a boundary. We can, then, point at it or at least visualize it.

    I suspect it's rationalism (or something like it). But I don't think it's metaphysically impossible for an open sphere to exist. What would rule out a table being an open sphere of point-sized atoms ("atoms" in the mereological sense)?

    It is irrational to talk about whether this or that entity exists, or to "verify" it. What kind of sense can it make to verify whether this chair exists?

    On the other hand, if you are asking how best to describe an entity, this is a reasonable question. An entity may be best described as round, flat, open, etc. for the purposes of quantitative accuracy or comparison. The entity exists or not. Just because you decide to describe it in a different way does not verify (or fail to verify) its existence.

    The Law of Identity. To be is be something definite. A sphere is definite kind of shape, but your open sphere lacks any shape. How could it be said to be a sphere, or to be touching anything if its size is indefinite, or to have any relationship at all with anything? How could one find or define the center of an open sphere?

    Agreed. Shape is the most primitive and essential quality of an entity. Without shape we have... nothing. Shape is primitive (i.e. undefinable and self-evident). Similar to how there is no alternative to existence, there is no alternative to shape. To talk about shapeless is to talk about nothing, yet talking about X (or performing any action on X) implies X is a thing, thus invoking a contradiction. Just as talking about non-existence is pointless and absurd, because talking about anything demands existence.

    An open sphere is an open sphere.

    This is a restatement of identity. Saying something is itself i.e. A=A is an axiom. You are using it to prove that A can have an existent referent. This is a meaningless tautology.

    How does infinity violate the law of identity, when it is defined appropriately?

    Infinity violates identity and rationality. An object cannot be infinite because then it would lose its most essential attribute, shape. 'An' infinite object is not an object.

    It has a shape defined by a precise equation over the real numbers.

    Shape is not defined. At best it is described. Furthermore, shape is a static concept. Equations all express dynamic concepts, i.e. they describe motion. The equation of a mathematical line is not the same as the physical entity called a line. It is an itinerary describing the motion of a physical entity. Objects are what we visualize and/or point to. Equations are a way of describing the motion of objects.

    It just cannot touch--but then, we never touch tables or rocks, since we only have repuslive forces between the atoms that keep our hands from passing through solid objects. Pretty neat question, huh?

    Yes it is! Touch is a "touchy" issue so to speak. When two fundamental entities come together, close enough so that they are no longer separate, do they remain distinct entities? They appear to, now, have a single surface. i.e. two objects appear to have become one. I've more to say on the topic, hopefully I'll remember to return to it.

    By definition one cannot define the indefinite. A precise equation describing a hypothetical sphere if it existed is not the same as an actual thing that exists. Just as the meaning of a concept is its referent not its definition, having a definition does not evoke an existent into reality.

    Well said. I can visualize entities, but they do not exist (the ones I'm visualizing). They are entities because they have shape, but they do not exist because they lack location.

    We do touch tables and rocks, the repulsive forces between atoms are not identical with the macroscopic entities we interact with. Is using the fallacy of composition and reductionism what mereology is about?

    Right, of course we do. The repulsive forces can be interpreted as the blending of the electron shells of atoms, i.e. the surfaces of these shells come so close that they become indistinguishable and now possess a single surface.

    To talk about such an object, you would need to verify that it has no boundary.

    I do not "verify" that this keyboard has a boundary. What kind of sense can it make to prove that *this* keyboard is an object, or to "verify" that it has (or doesn't have) a boundary?

    Since the law of identity prohibits infinitely precise physical measurements it is inappropriate to use these open spheres rationalistically to gain knowledge about reality. You can't derive knowledge about how things touch from pure mathematics alone without reference to reality.

    Again, what do physical measurements have to do with whether *this* keyboard exists? If someone says "X exists" s/he simply has to point at it. If s/he cannot then s/he can show us what they are visualizing, and we must assume it exists for the purposes of the ensuing discussion. So the more serious issue is that this entity "open sphere" has not been pointed to or illustrated. The entire discussion is non sequitur because "open sphere" is still a placeholder, an arbitrary set of symbols that refer to a set of equations. These equations do not describe objects but rather the motion of objects, they tell us the relative location of one or more object(s) as they traverse a defined path.

    One can define infinite quite easily: That which is not finite.

    Fallacy, X cannot be defined as "not Y". A dog is not "not a tree". The issue here is that finite is the only term with relevance to reality. Infinite, as an adjective, is supposed to describe objects (and is often incorrectly used as such), but again 'an' infinite object would lack the most essential quality that makes a thing a thing, shape. So the only interpretation of defining infinite as "not finite" is "shapeless" which, at best, means "infinite" is mean to describe a concept and not an object. Since a concept is a relationship amongst entities the word "infinite" is predicated upon some entities, which must be pointed at or at least visualized first, before "infinite" can take on any meaning.

    'Finite' is perfectly defined, 'not' is a basic logical operator, and their composition is perfectly intelligible and clear.

    Ted: A is perfectly defined.

    Bill: What is it?

    Ted: It is not B.

    Bill: d'oh, but what IS it? Or what's B?

    Ted: B is not A.

    Bill: What are they though?

    Ted: They're not each other...

    A precise equation, with range and domain over the real numbers, is perfectly defined at every point--I don't know what more you could want, if you are asking for the definition of a thing.

    Things are not what we define. Things are what we point at and/or visualize. After that we may describe them with an equation or by comparing them to other things. But before we can describe or compare, first we must have the thing before us or firmly visualized in our mind.

  22. Mereology in general and the question of unrestricted composition in particular is not a scientific concern. Science will never answer whether an object such that it is the sum of the Queen of England, the Washington Monument and the quarter in my pocket exists. It's an issue of conceptual analysis, how we understand parthood and composition, what sorts of combinations of objects can legitimately be said to exist.

    Science will not answer this question because it is fallacious to attempt to verify whether this or that entity exists. An entity exists independent of your belief or attempt at verification.

    Additionally groups, groupings, and group hierarchies are conceptual, and concepts are not objects. Each object is an object, you might point to each one, but the association you have between them is entirely conceptual. A grouping or listing of objects is not an object (except trivially insofar as the symbols on the page which refer to those objects and the page itself are, themselves, objects).

    It is irrational to talk about combinations of objects "existing". An object is an object is an object. Each entity exists. A combination, group, or listing objects is a list of symbols enumerating entities that exist. You might, conceptually, associate one with another but this concept is of course not an entity. It also makes no sense to talk about "what can be said to legitimately exist". Existence is self-evident and axiomatic. There is no provision for proof, verification, or testimony. I point at something, I recognize that it exists.

    For example, I'm holding my quarter. Does this quarter exist? Sure. Even though that quarter is the mereological sum of a bunch of metallic particles. So how about the funky object I described above? We want to say it doesn't exist because it seems like an arbitrary grouping of objects. But how is it any less arbitrary than the group of metallic particles that constitute the quarter?

    The problem is you went from simply pointing at the quarter and naming it to describing it. A description is a conceptualization. The moment you point at it and say "quarter" it is an object. Then when you say it is shiny, round, etc. you are conceptualizing it. You're dealing with the *concept* "quarter". When you say it is made of atoms this is a description, and you must first tell us what an atom is, i.e. you will have to point at an atom or a model of an atom. If you can point at an actual atom then now we realize that the quarter was a concept integrated by our brain by the perception of multiple entities, which our brain automatically subconsciously grouped. The atom is an entity, the quarter is a concept. If you cannot point at what you're talking about (an atom), but only a model of it, you're now asking us to assume something like what you're pointing at exists in reality. You will not, and indeed cannot, verify this assumption. This is a hypothesis, an assumption you ask us to take at face value in order for you to explain some phenomenon involving the quarter. At the hypothesis you do not describe the object. You just point to it and name it. Why does it break, bend, etc? When you're done we can choose to believe your explanation, thus believing in the existence of atoms, or we can choose to disbelieve it.

  23. So I wonder what, if any, mereology would be implied by Objectivism. Here are a few questions:

    Is space-time isomorphic with matter? Are they discrete or continuous?

    I'm going to assume by "matter" you mean "objects", if not please correct. Space cannot be the same as objects because space is conceptually the antithesis of an object, of a thing. Space is an absence, a 0. 0 is not a number, it is strictly a placeholder. An object is a something, a 1. Putting "time" next to the word space does not change this, since time can only be the observation of relative motion, not a thing itself.

    Are the fundamental constituents discrete or continuous? Are you asking if the universe is composed of disconnected, separate entities or of interconnected ones?

    In this regard it seems the empirical evidence is pretty clear that entities are continuously connected to each other. In particular I have not heard of a rational explanation for most phenomena of light in terms of the discrete corpuscular hypothesis.

    Can you have collocated matter in a single space? Can you have overlapping matter in a single space?

    In this regard it seems that Nature has indicated the affirmative. Whatever entity is responsible for light does not seem to interact with itself, even if it is colocal. Whatever entity is responsible for magnetism seems also to pass right through other entities, although it does seem to interact with them at least. The most compelling phenomenon of Nature is, I think, that light does not seem to interact with itself.

    Is matter gunky?

    What do you mean?

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