gnargtharst

But this doesn't distinguish the fetus from an infant, which also doesn't use reason for survival. If -- to use a silly example -- the fetus somehow *were* able to use a rational faculty in vitro, it could still not claim rights. Its life would still be the property of its mother, by virtue of its occupying her space. If the rational fetus were clever enough to escape its host, and incubate outside the mother, then, well maybe it would have an argument. I'll defer judgement on such, until one of them posts its case here on this forum.

No. Rights are inapplicable to a fetus (just as rights are inapplicable to food) since observing those rights would necessarily abrogate already-existing rights.

Oakes, it may be that you are misunderstanding the meaning of "closed system" (I could be wrong here, but I'm remembering that I mistunderstood thee term myself for a while.) Objectivist principles can be applied to anything and everything in the world. In that sense there are no "limitations" to Objectivism. Whether you are interested in science, literature, adventure, industry, etc., the methods you learn from Objectivism will help you understand and appreciate these areas. But, the actual philosophy of Objectivism is "closed", meaning its principles and methods have already been formulated. Whether they are right or wrong is a different matter, which each of us has to discover independently, but, right or wrong, Objectivsm is only *one certain thing*. If you have an emotional attachment to the label, because of all wonderful things you've learned about it so far, and wish to still label as Objectivism something which isn't, then, well, you're out of luck. That it's "closed", should no more imply dogmatic narrowmindedness, than, for example, the fact that mathematics is "closed". An anology, for what it's worth: "bicycling" is a closed system; it can refer only to those activities involving a pedal-powered, 2-wheeled vehicle. You can bicycle on the road, in the woods, on the moon, or anywhere else you wish. But if you instead want to pedal a 3-wheeled vehicle all those places, that's fine; you can't logically call it "bicycling", though. It's "tricycling". It might still get you where you want to go, but there's no point calling it one thing when it's another. (In the case of Objectivism, I think you'll find the perfect vehicle to get you wherever you want to go.) P.S. You've indicated that you're very new to Objectivism -- this issue of "closed" vs. "open" system is a very abstract issue. I would think it would be a very difficult topic to tackle early in your interest in Objectivism. It took me years, back when I heard of the Kelleys and Libertarians espousing the "open system" theory, to figure out what the issue was. What finally helped me was seeing what sort of nonsense they presumed was compatible with Objectivism in their "open" systems.

From Betsy: "The mere fact of existing as a separate entity confers rights. That doesn't happen until the fetus is outside of the mother." From Aynfan: "This does not conform with Ayn Rand's view on the subject. No that that is required of you." First, I would think that "conforming with Ayn Rand's view" is not what we're trying to accomplish here. Second, it *does indeed* conform with her view, anyway. Beings have rights by virtue of being volitional, rational entities (making "rights" necessary), and by being *separate* entities (making "rights" applicable). Presumably, it's not controversial here that a woman has rights. To grant rights to a *part* of a woman's body, residing in the same *space* as her body, is to contradict her rights. A fetus cannot claim rights, regardless of its degree of development, because it hasn't acheived separate-ness yet. Until it does, one cannot ascribe rights and interests to it apart from (and opposed to) the organism which supports it. In short: fetuses cannot have rights because you'd have to go through the mother to grant them.

b7b5 says: "Why is there necessarily a contradiction in ascribing rights to a thing located inside the mother's body?" I think a lot of the disagreement here stems from an inversion of logical heirarchy. b7b5 seems to be saying "rights exist and they are valid... now who or what should we apply them to?" Instead, we should start with the life of an actual person -- a woman, let's say -- and realize that "rights" are a concept we use to protect the ultimate value of life. ...Actual people's lives, like that woman over there, for example. Now that woman owns her own life and body, and it follows logically that if she produces a fetus, then that fetus, insofar as it resides in her body and cannot be removed (or otherwise controlled) but by violating her right to life, belongs to her. She is in the position of Bill Cosby when he said "I brought you into this world, and I can take you out!" That fetus, as a part of her body, can claim no rights of its own, because to do so would be an attack on her sovereign space. In simplest terms, the mother's right to life takes precedent because *she was there first*. She may grant rights to her fetus by bearing it, and thus removing it from the automatic support of her own body, and by implication accepting the reponsibility to raise it now that it's survival is not automatic. That is her choice. "Chewing" this issue a little by answering some of b7b5's questions/comments: b7b5: "It is because of her, whether or not it was her intent, that the ball has started rolling." So? This is begging the question. One "starts the ball rolling" when one eats tainted meat, too, so is one morally obligated to refrain from vomiting? b7b5: "Why is a mother not morally obligated to carry the fetus to term?" For the same reason she's not obligated to carry a cancer to term. b7b5: "Why does the fetus suddenly become the mother's responsibility once it comes out of her?" The "fetus", as such, is always her responsibility, just as the contents of one's stomach, for example, are one's responsibility. By giving birth to it though, she changes the nature of the responsibility to an specific obligation of treating it as a human. b7b5: "Why not say that the mother gives up some of her rights in the act of becoming pregnant?" For the same reason a person doesn't give up rights by having teeth. To deny rights on the basis of a person manifesting their own capacities -- i.e., to say a human may forfeit their rights by virtue of being a human, by having teeth, or getting pregnant, etc. -- is to undercut rights, and the *reason for rights* at their base. b7b5: "There may well be a fundamental difference implicit in biological dependence that destroys the humanity of the fetus. What is it?" Separateness. The fact that a mother's life is a fact, and she does not forfeit that life by virtue of choosing to partially incubate a parasite within her own body. (btw, this question is made somewhat circular by phrasing it "what..destroys the *humanity* of the fetus...", with the implication being that it somehow already is a rights-possessing organism, and what does it *do* to contradict that? In fact, only the mother can grant the fetus "humanity" in this sense, by allowing it to enter the world as a separate entity). b7b5: "Who are you to say that biological independence [i.e., separateness] is an essential characteristic of man?" Separateness, i.e. individuality, i.e. *identity*, is an essential characteristic of *anything*. It is especially so if the question is: should a *part* of a person's body possess the right to dispose of the person? b7b5: "There seem to be two separate arguments for the right to abortion here: The spatial arrangement of the mother/fetus and the big difference between man and fetus." The two issues are one. The fact that a fetus occupies the space of another human, *is* the big difference between man and fetus (in the context of which posseses rigths). b7b5: "...Neither of these are sufficiently supported to prove that the fetus does not have the rights of and is not a person." The connectedness of a fetus is not sufficiently supported? I challenge you to touch a fetus, without touching the mother. After you have done this, you may then be able to explain to me how granting "rigths" to one does not nullify the "rights" of the other.

I agree with Fred Weiss above; I think the crux of the issue is *separateness*. If a fetus developed, hovering at arm's length from the mother, 3 feet above the ground, then perhaps viability or the onset of conceptual capability would be an issue. But it doesn't. A fetus resides within its mother and any granting of rights to a being which occupies the same space as another necessarily implies contradictions. The right to abort (and the flip side of the same coin, the right to forego abortion -- relevant to woman in China) is essentially the right of a woman to control her own body. The question of whether the fetus could be kept alive *outside of her body* is irrelevant, until and unless the fetus *is* outside. It's not a scientific debate either, involving quesitons of viability or DNA, etc. The morality of abortion hasn't changed through the ages as technology has allowed for survival of premature babies, or as DNA was discovered. The moral principle rests on such a low-tech issue as: the baby resides in the same space as the mother, and no action can be directed to the fetus without *going through* (literally) the mother. The first manifestation of the right to one's life must necessarily be the sovereignty of one's own body, including any contents thereof.

Some musical favorites: Rush Old Yes and Genesis Steve Vai Joe Stariani Gershwin Tchaikovsky & Rachmaninov (seems like a staple here) Bela Fleck & the Flecktones Eric Johnson ...plus some stuff that would go in the "sometimes like" cateogry, like Dream Theater, Dave Matthews, Queen... During the workday, I'll sometimes listen to Jimmy Buffett... keeps me in an "islands" kind of mood. Also, I notice Dismuke posted here earlier. I very much recommend his www.Dismuke.org. Sometimes, if work is tedious, I go over to dismuke.org and listen to his music from the 20s and 30s. If you're not used to it, you have to listen for a while to get used to it, but when you do, you'll find yourself addicted.

From Betsy: "That's why I said "totally unrelated items." Once you relate them -- by associating them with each other, or conceptualizing them, or using mnemonic devices -- you are reducing the units." Ah. I took your example wrong, thinking you meant actively *remembering* the items in order to recall them later at the store. I take it what you really meant was more along the lines of remembering the items for the few moments from when they were spoken, to when they were conceptualized (or written down). (Another good crow measurement is to ask somebody to remember a group of words, and then give them words in another language. Don't use tricky pronunciation or talk too fast, but don't talk too slow either, allowing the rememberer time to conceptualize them. It's interesting: people usually say "you spoke too fast, I couldn't understand you", but in fact they *did* understand --i.e. "hear" -- they just couldn't conceptualize the words quick enough to retain them). I'm a little skeptical of Betsy's theory of why men tend towards rationalism -- my first thought is that rationalist thought, though disconnected from reality, is usually conceptual. Wrongly conceptual, but conceptual. In other words, the rationalist is able to transcend his crow, so why would his conceptual ability be tied to it? Perhaps just an extension of habitualized thinking methods? I don't know -- it's worth digesting. (Do people with small feet tend to underestimate long distances?) Also, why would there be a difference in the size of the crow between the sexes? Maybe ancient Man the Hunter used a larger crow when he when out to get dinner, too.

Betsy's standard for "crow measurement" was the question: "If you are going to a store to buy a number of totally unrelated items, how many can you remember without having to write them down?" I dont' think this will measure the crow. The act of "remembering" (in the sense of *trying* to remember something) implies conceptualization -- using *some* method to *remember* the disparate items; once you do that, you're no longer talking about the crow. About the only method I know of to measure a person's crow, is to ask them to remember several items and quickly name the items before the person has a chance to form a conceptual framework into which they put your named items. If the person knows they will be asked to remember something, they will *listen* with some attempt to remember using some technique (repeating the items in their head, forming a "story" with the items, rhyming, etc.), in which case, what you get is not their "perceptual memory" (i.e., the crow), but a conceptualized version. (A variation of this, is that the person can know they will be asked to remember something, but the items named should be completely alien to the person. When someone taught me this concept years ago, they told me to remember the following names, and then quickly read the names of 5 paper companies . Since I had previous knowledge about paper companies, I couldn't conceptualize them as fast as he spoke them. I remembered 3, I think.)

Q: How many Objectivists does it take to screw in a light bulb? A: One

Regarding the essay by Alex S., linked to by Stephen Speicher, above, I had a minor problem/question with: "there is nothing in the Law of Identity that mandates every existent possess a (finite) size, anymore than the Law of Identity mandates every existent be (finite) in time. The concepts of size and time apply to certain existents, which have specific natures that allow for such applicability." Is it strictly a scientific issue to insist that every existent possess a finite size and time? Or is that near the edges of what philosophy can say on the subject? It seems rationalistic to claim, on one hand, that existence necessarily implies identity, but that the identity itself need need not consist of anything we really know for sure -- maybe size, maybe time.... but maybe something else entirely. Can't one say at least that size and time are necessary qualities of existents? Even if future knowledge should amend our contextual understanding of these concepts, the evidence for the existence of these qualities, at least, seems universal. Another question I have with the above quote is that it is used specifically in the essay to refer to the universe as a whole. As such, it is a confusing illustration, because the object of its point, is the only exception to the illustration; it says, in effect: "that the universe has no size or time does not violate the law of identity, since the law of identity does not stipulate time or size as a necessary attribute of reality, even though every existent *does* have time and size... except the universe".