JeffS

That's assumptive. There are many people who take illegal drugs and live long, productive, happy lives. Jake Ellison seems to be one of them. He hasn't stated it specifically, but that's an assumption I made based on one of his posts. Is he immoral? Is the person who sells him his drugs immoral for selling him those drugs? If not, why not? Then it's contextual, as aequalsa pointed out early in the thread. Simply by nature of being "illegal" does not make the sale immoral. So, the seller's thought process would go something like this: "I know the buyer has chosen to be an addict. The buyer has chosen to destroy their own lives, and is choosing to do so with my product. Improperly used, my product can destroy lives. If I sell my product to this buyer, they will destroy their own lives. Selling my product to them would satisfy many values for me. It allows me to lead a productive life; it allows me to earn money through voluntary trade with others so that I may in turn use that money to trade freely with others and obtain the things I need to further my life - my highest value. I should not sell my product to this buyer, even though doing so serves my highest value because..." Why? I can think of only one valid reason: it's not rational to sell a product which eventually kills all your customers. The immorality rests on the fact that your choice of career leads to a dead end, quite literally. That doesn't serve your long-term interests. Selling illegal drugs is not immoral for what the drugs do to others; selling a product which eventually kills your customers is immoral because doing so does not serve your rational self-interests, nor enable you to thrive and flourish long-term. However, I would also argue the product's characteristic of being illegal is not related to this decision. Someone could morally choose to sell marijuana, an illegal drug, only to cancer patients, or even recreational users. I'm not sure what being a "champion of humanity" has to do with Objective ethics and morality. As Objectivists, does our sense of life extend to others' sense of life? Is our morality dependent upon others valuing their own lives? Does "sense of life" mean "value all life, regardless?" How would selling illegal drugs contradict the trader principle? I think you stopped short in your emphasis of Ms. Rand's quote; the final prepositional phrase, "... by their own independent judgment" is important. It specifies that both buyer and seller are independent in their estimation of what is beneficial to them. The seller can't judge what is best for the buyer, only what is best for himself. Well, there were very few referents given. To assume referents at all is invalid. Perhaps the OP believes such an action is wrong because he's lived his whole life with people telling him it's wrong. Or perhaps he believes it's wrong simply because it's illegal and he believe breaking the law, even an improper law, is wrong. Without more context we can't decide either way. Which simply isn't true. We can firmly arrive at the conclusion that using some drugs, in some dosages destroys the consciousness, harms the body, and yields no rational benefit. But simply using "illegal" to describe a drug doesn't impart any other qualities upon it. I meant the state arbitrarily decides which drugs should be legal and which should not. Since that decision is arbitrary, we can't assume anything about which drugs are included in the concept "illegal drugs." The referents are arbitrary. If the state suddenly decides to make aspirin illegal, does that make all sellers of aspirin immoral? It does not. The legality or illegality of the drug has no bearing on the morality of its sale. It's morality is dependent, it appears, upon the intended use by the buyer. I do not. Nor have I stated or implied that I do. My argument has only been that the legality or illegality of a drug has no bearing on the morality of its sale. I've answered that question. It's moral in the same way that selling any product is moral. Selling heroin would be a rational career if the people you're selling to aren't going to kill themselves with it, just like selling a car is rational if you're not selling cars to people who drive off cliffs. Selling heroin is still illegal even if you take great pains to ensure your customers will still be around to keep buying from you. Selling cars is still legal even if you sell only to lemmings with driver's permits. The former is moral, but illegal; the latter is immoral, yet legal. With all due respect, David, you seem to be the one changing the context. You're expanding it to include your assumptions about what drugs, what usage, and what the buyers are doing with those drugs are.

I wrote this statement, and I'll stand by it. The topic of the thread is "Selling illegal drugs." The original OP, in its entirety, follows: "I do not sell or consume any illegal drugs. I do believe all drugs should be legal for adults. How should I view people that sell illegal drugs? They don't seem immoral to me, yet something feels wrong. Maybe I just dislike that it seems like they are taking the easy route and that they risk so much for money." In neither the title, nor the OP are the concepts addiction, addicts, reality evasion, life destruction, misery, or any specific drug raised. No, the question is not about pharmaceuticals, but neither is it about addiction, destruction of consciousness, or enabling such vices. To assume the OP meant any of this is strictly that: assumptive. Therefore, to accuse me of dropping a context which the OP never specified is, to be polite, disingenuous. The topic is about the morality of selling illegal drugs - drugs banned for use or sale by the state; given our state, this is an arbitrary distinction at best. You followed the OP with: "In what way is drug selling moral? Not being an initiation of force is not the same thing as being moral." To which I made the above quote. Whether you had applied your assumption of what the OP was asking by this point I have no way of knowing. Nothing in your post indicates you had. The information I had to go on at this point is you believe selling drugs the state has (arbitrarily) deemed illegal to be immoral. I provided the moral backing for selling those drugs - the same kind of moral backing selling any product would have: it provides value to the seller, and to the buyer. Drugs do enable people to live longer, more enjoyable lives. It doesn't matter if the state has (arbitrarily) made those drugs illegal. If you want to discuss specific drugs, then we'll have to establish the context. But within the context of this thread, the simple fact of illegality does not make the seller of that drug immoral. Your argument seems to be that the seller must take into account the use to which the drug should be used. If it is going to be used by the buyer to destroy their lives, then the seller would be immoral in selling it. In essence, you're arguing the seller's morality is determined by the moral decisions of the buyer. I can't imagine how this is supported in Objective literature. Is the Burger King employee immoral if he sells a burger to a fat man? Is the liquor store, or bartender immoral for selling an alcoholic a drink? Is the gas station attendant immoral for selling cigarettes to an addict, or someone with lung cancer? My morality guides my decisions, and is guided by my life and my happiness. It is not guided by the decisions of others. If Objectivism has proved otherwise, I would love the references.

You're assuming the only value in selling drugs is helping people destroy their lives. I've known at least one drug dealer who took a great deal of pride in the science of growing and refining his marijuana. Could we likewise claim employees of Burger King are immoral simply because their product helps (far, far more) people destroy their lives? There is nothing inherent to illegal drugs which indicates misuse any more than legal drugs. Drugs serve one purpose: alter the body's chemistry. Doesn't matter if it's aspirin or cocaine. To argue the former's standard is "could be misused," but the latter's standard is "if used is misused" is arbitrary. Use of either is predicated upon the same desired outcome: alter the body's chemistry. Cocaine is used as a topical anesthetic for eye and ear surgery. It's also given to cancer patients. Clearly applications such as these enable people to live longer, happier, and more productive lives. I doubt users of the drug in this context would argue their use is misuse. What is the legitimate use of "a bottle of whisky or a bottle of T-bird," or tobacco? Isn't the purpose the same as any drug? And if so, would their use constitute misuse? Given that both are far more addictive than cocaine, would sellers of these drugs be destroying the long-term advancement of their values by helping people destroy their lives? I guess we should devote another thread to why prostitution is immoral.

I don't understand how someone offering a product for sale has anything to do with another person's decisions. Selling the product can certainly be the moral choice for the seller - it allows them to lead a productive life and provide for the furtherance of their lives. Whether taking the drug performs the same function for the buyer is a moot point in determining the morality of the seller. If we were to apply the same standards to other products, tobacco sellers, alcohol sellers, weapon sellers, rope sellers... anyone who sells anything which could be used to detract from living life qua Man would be immoral.

Drugs enable people to live longer, more enjoyable lives. Selling them provides a value to those who value them.

Congratulations, John. Considering we know more about the moon than our own oceans, that's like getting a ticket to space.

I'm in complete agreement with those last two posts. Thank you, David and Grames, for staying with me on that.

I'm assuming by "it" you mean entity, so if I'm mistaken, please correct me. I think I'm wrong though, because that would make your response more appropriate to a question such as: "What are the different senses the word 'entity' can be used?" That was not my question, and I apologize if anything I wrote misled you. My question is: "What are the different senses of an entity?" Dr. Peikoff wrote: "This term [entity] may be used in several senses. If you speak in the primary sense, “entity” has to be defined ostensively—that is to say, by pointing. I can, however, give you three descriptive characteristics essential to the primary, philosophic use of the term, according to Objectivism. This is not a definition, because I’d have to rely ultimately on pointing to make these points clear, but it will give you certain criteria for the application of the term in the primary sense…" Which your use of the term above follows. In short, he's saying, "This word 'entity' has a couple different meanings, but it's primary use, it's philosophical use is things I would ultimately have to point to in order to make it clear to you." Peikoff is using "primary" to distinguish which definition, or sense, of the term "entity" he is using. Peikoff is saying, "There are entities, and there are non-entities (in the primary sense, the philosophical definition, of the term 'entity')." But the OP is not using "primary" in this way. He is using "primary" (and "extended") to classify entities. He's arguing there are "primary" entities and "non-primary" entities. It's not clear from the Peikoff quote that Peikoff meant to imply there are "primary" entities and "non-primary" entities. (Rand uses the term "primary existent," but these are simply entities.) You seem to agree with this interpretation of the Peikoff quote, so I'm trying to determine what the different senses of an entity are, or examples of non-primary entities. I agree. I was attempting to include the criteria that the entity be perceptual in size. I suppose "perceptual in size" works pretty well. I agree.

In other news, Hell froze over yesterday. Wonder how that little bit of rationality slipped past the censors.

Okay, I think I get it now. Is this a correct understanding: To directly perceive something is to see it and/or touch it in its entirety and without altering Man's perceptual faculties (without giving him special perceptive powers beyond his natural perceptive abilities). All entities are existents, but not all existents are entities. Some entities can be perceived directly - they can be seen and/or touched in their entirety without altering Man's perceptual faculties; these entities are referred to as "primary entities." Some entities require altering Man's perceptual faculties (e.g. to see the microscopic, to see the very far away, etc.), but in order to gain knowledge of these entities we must first understand the entities perceivable to the unaided senses. Classifying entities in this way helps us understand the way we form concepts.

I can certainly understand and agree with that. If I can perceive it, it exists. However, I must specify the mode of that existent if I am to gain any knowledge of it. For example: molecules exist. They exist as physical entities at the atomic level of reality. As such, since atomically small is one of their attributes, I must use a microscope to learn about them. I lose none of the context by specifying molecules in this way (by specifying their mode), and I take nothing away from their entity nature - which classifying them as not-primary entities seems to do. Classifying them as not-primary entities seems to bestow special entity status upon some entities - as if those not-primary entities are somehow inferior existents.

What are those other senses? Mr. Odden, I have no preference for their existence or not. I simply don't know what they are if they do exist. Ontologically, an entity is a physical existent, as opposed to qualities, attributes, or actions of entities. I see no gain in calling an existent a primary existent, or a primary entity. I see no loss in not using these terms either. I do see a loss in using them, though: I see confusion. Why create concepts for which there is no use? Pluto is an existent. It is a physical existent and an entity in reality. Molecules are existents. They are physical existents and entities in reality. What do I gain by asserting, and accepting, that Pluto is a primary entity, but molecules are not?

Isn't this subjectivism though? An entity could be a primary entity to some, but an extended entity to others?

To the first point: Then there must be other "senses" that entity can be discussed in. To the second, and the first point: Can you provide any examples of secondary, tertiary, or any other entities that would not be primary (besides molecules)? Then the Earth is not a primary entity? Or would the primary entity "Earth" not include its atmosphere? I can understand why "Pacific Ocean" and "Indian Ocean" are not primary entities - but I'm not arguing they are. (I would argue they are concepts, which exist.) I'm arguing water is an entity. It always has a context: it could be water in my hand, or water on the ground - but I can point to it, I can perceive it. Why would it not be an entity? I disagree. At the microscopic level it's very easy to find the boundary between two miscible gases or fluids. Things become more discreet the smaller we look. Unless you're arguing that gases pass easily between boundaries at a microscopic level - but if that is your argument, then a man couldn't be a primary entity because, at the microscopic level, gases are passing between the air around him and his skin. But we're not discussing things at a microscopic level, right? We're only discussing things, entities, which we perceive directly. Do I need to be able to distinguish where one entity ends and another begins at the microscopic level in order to identify it? But then, nothing alone could ever be a primary entity. Nothing is ever "alone." It might be our nature to discover those conditions that enable space travel, but if it were our nature to be in space, we wouldn't need to discover what changes to our nature are necessary to be in space. I mean, we can discover ways to identify poison, and ways to counteract the effects of ingested poison, but you wouldn't argue it's Man's nature to ingest poison, would you? I suppose I just don't understand the necessity of categorizing things this way. I don't know what special quality "primary" bestows upon an entity. I don't understand what the requirement "directly perceive" entails, and what the constraints are upon it. It seems to me something can both be a primary entity and not-a-primary-entity depending upon who's perceiving it, which smacks of subjectivism besides being a blatant contradiction. It is not in Man's nature to perceive Pluto, either directly or indirectly. He can not perceive it from where his nature finds him. He can utilize his nature (a rational mind) to create something which will allow him to perceive Pluto (both directly and indirectly), but unless he does that he will not perceive Pluto and has no ability to. In other words, unless he creates some tool(s) for perceiving Pluto, no biological structure is possible that can perceive Pluto, neither directly nor indirectly. And, at the end of the day, what would it really matter if Pluto were not a primary entity?

Okay, I'm having a number of problems with this, and I'm not really sure why. Fundamentally, I question what we gain with Dr. Peikoff's distinction. Does it add something to our knowledge? Is it simply a way to explain concept formation? Why do we need to make a distinction between primary entities and other (secondary? tertiary? quaternary? - after all, he did write "The term [entity] may be used in several senses.") entities? I'm not sure if your answer to this question is, "I think what is more important is that when speaking of entities in the secondary sense, their perception logically relies on a prior well worked out understanding of entities in the primary sense." It seems to be, but either I don't understand your point, or that just doesn't seem right to me. What are "entities in the secondary sense?" Well, fluid and air do have boundaries - the planet. Perhaps this is negated by the fact that all the air and water on the planet would not be "perceptual in scale, in size," but what about a lake, or a pool, or a balloon? The water in a lake or pool has a definite boundary, and is perceptual in size. The air in a balloon has a definite boundary and is perceptual in size. I suppose these situations are covered when Dr. Peikoff writes, "There are contexts...." But when do we ever drop context? Nothing exists without context. As pertains to existent, I understood this to be its "mode." Mode is usually understood in everyday conversation, but when it's not, couldn't this whole issue of "primary vs. 'other'" be solved by simply making the existent's mode explicit? Why is this necessary? You argued this: From this, I infer Pluto would be a primary entity. It is directly perceivable by man because he can get on a spaceship, travel to Pluto, then look out the port. Prior to this, you wrote: Well, it's not in the nature of Man to be in space. We can't travel to Pluto - unless we alter his nature by putting him in a spaceship. We can only perceive Pluto by creating something that will allow Man, whose nature does not allow him to travel closer to Pluto, to travel closer to Pluto. If we do, then Pluto is a primary entity. We can only perceive molecules by creating something that will allow Man, whose nature does not allow him to see the microscopic, to see the microscopic. If we do, molecules will still be entities only in the extended sense.

Since you have such a solid handle on assumptions, I'll just let you finish off our discussion.

So this really boils down to whether or not something is coming between Man and his perception, right? If I put something between me (and my perceptive faculties) and the thing I'm trying to perceive, then I'm not perceiving it directly?

Hmmm, I did read very carefully. This is what you wrote: [emph. added] Humans can perceive molecules. Perception does not require input from all senses, otherwise blind people (for example) would have no perception. If you want to define perception as "being able to see and to touch," then there's a whole host of humans who have no perception. Therefore, molecules are primary existents. Perhaps you should write more carefully before accusing others of not reading carefully? I will concede that the Universe cannot be perceived. However, the Universe is an abstract concept composed of a finite number of concretes. Those concretes can certainly be perceived by humans. I don't need more than ten fingers to point to the Universe. I can simply wave my arms about and say, "Everything that exists." Objectivism needs a more complete ontology.

Molecules are perceivable by humans. So is the Universe, if we understand the Universe is defined as "all that is." Where do things like dreams, memories, and Santa Clause fit in to your definitions?

Or you kill it because it's not able to support both you and it?

Easy one: Tom Sawyer - Rush

There's no difference between "capitalism in general" and laissez-faire, that's what I wanted to get across in my first post. Perhaps this quote from Ms. Rand will help. In order to have capitalism you must recognize individual rights, including property rights. Rights can only be violated by means of force. Therefore, once force is applied, individual rights are violated and capitalism is no longer in practice. It doesn't matter if that force is applied by another man, or by the government (which is really just another man in the cloak of "the collective"). Laissez-faire is not a "special kind" of capitalism, it is capitalism. You can't have capitalism "lite" where the government only applies a little force, only violates a few rights. That's a mixed-market economy, not capitalism. It's the system we've been using since the time of our founding. Recognize that this author has presented no evidence of rights violations. He's alluded to a few actions which he uses to imply some wrongdoing, but gives no concretes. This stood out: "And where rail systems were publicly owned and could not be bought, like the municipal railway of St. Petersburg, Florida, GM bought their officials instead, according to FBI files, providing complimentary Cadillacs to those who converted to buses." You'll find this sort of thing throughout our history, yet it's ironically held up as a flaw of capitalism's: government officials being bought off. How successful do you think GM would've been if it didn't have the force of these government officials behind it? By this standard, and the evidence he provided, the author could just as easily have written, "The buggy did not die because of demographics or economics or disinvestments or evolution; it died because Henry Ford in 1908 made a conscious decision to kill it and, for the next several decades, pursued a strategy designed to accomplish this objective." Or, "The pencil and eraser did not die because of [insert mindless drivel here], it died because Bill Gates made a conscious decision to kill it." We need more Henry Fords and Bill Gates. The only people who would argue are Luddites.

You should begin by defining what "free market capitalism" is. Ask if there has ever been a time in history when free market capitalism has existed. The answer is: Never. You can then move on to ask where he's getting evidence that free market capitalism [insert effect here]. When I debate people on this topic they always refer to certain events in history as evidence of free market capitalism's failures when, in fact, everything they can point to is evidence of government interference in the market. Until you've established the definition for "free market capitalism," you'll both be going round and round in circles - neither of you talking about the same thing.

This is a concept formation problem of George's. For example: asserting one can have knowledge of abstracts before having knowledge of concretes; asserting that incorrect definitions of words are correct definitions; ascribing the attributes of one distinct entity to another entity simply by virtue of the former being contained within the latter's broad definition. I asked the first question in the debate between Dr. Huemer and Dr. Ghate, which was, basically, "Dr. Huemer, you claim there is no sure path to knowledge, but that is a statement of knowledge. How did you arrive at it if there is no sure way to knowledge?" His (unsatisfactory) answer was, "I could be wrong." Which, of course, is also a statement about knowledge. His philosophy basically sets him into a loop of not knowing if he doesn't know he doesn't know what he doesn't know he doesn't know... It appears George has fallen into the same trap. Do I have that right, Jake, Heather, Thomas? I'm going to stop responding since it appears my line of questioning is already much more ably handled by you three, but I would like to know if I understand the fundamental problem.

So, we're born with knowledge about such things as gravity and cause and effect?