Laissez-Faire

This is what I was thinking as well, an induction is not an axiom. I've always justified it on the basis of induction but if it's an axiom then I'd like a demonstration of it's status as an axiom (I realize that an axiom can't be proved but that's not what I'm asking for).

Yes, this also has relevance to the topic of god, i.e. a divine consciousness.

Yes, both of those questions are of interest to me. That was my first point, yet you claim that existence being independent of consciousness is a corollary of the axiom of existence (i.e. what exists exists). If existence being independent of consciousness is an axiom then it must abide to "An axiom is a proposition that defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it." If you could show me how that applies to the primacy of existence then we have an agreement. That was my second point.

I am fully aware of what those axioms and concepts mean although I'm not sure that you are aware of what you can and can not deduce from them. I'll try to make this argument even clearer. "Existence exists—and the act of grasping that statement implies two corollary axioms: that something exists which one perceives and that one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists. If nothing exists, there can be no consciousness: a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is a contradiction in terms. A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something. If that which you claim to perceive does not exist, what you possess is not consciousness." This is true but this does not mean that the existent that the consciousness is aware of existed before the consciousness became aware of it. I.e. it does not prove that there were existents apart from consciousness before consciousness existed. I'm interested in how to respond to an argument of the sort: "If you're conscious of a lion, how do you know that the lion existed before you were conscious of it?" without begging the question.

The problem is that existence exists is not equivalent to existence exists independent of consciousness. If it's as you say, an axiom, then we need an argument explaining it's status as an axiom because it's clearly not a corollary of the axiom of existence.

Yeah, that's what I meant. I'm going to quote page 4 of Objectivism The Philosophy of Ayn Rand regarding the axiom of existence: "This axiom does not tell us anything about the nature of existents, it merely underscores the fact that they exist." I.e. the axiom does not tell us whether existents exist independent of consciousness. These two statements are not equivalent: #1. The primacy of existence is the axiom that existence exists. #2. The universe exists independent of consciousness, that they are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity. While #2 implies #1, #1 does not imply #2.

Ok, thanks for clearing that up.

Yep. Yeah, that's what I was referring too.

I'm not sure if we're talking past each other but if a consciousness exists then something exists but that doesn't mean that there is an existence apart from the consciousness. Yes, existence can exist without consciousness and if consciousness exists then it would be a part of existence. If that's what you mean we're in agreement but is this really what Ayn Rand meant by primacy of existence? I thought it was a premise used to conclude that a consciousness can't alter existence, i.e. wishing won't make it so. This is a notion that I strongly agree with but having recently read the Maverick Philosopher's criticisms the argument doesn't seem to hold.

But isn't consciousness itself an existent? If so, couldn't just a consciousness (which creates more existents) exist? That's true, it's obviously impossible to prove existence without consciousness. So how do we reason to the primacy of existence over the primacy of consciousness without assuming the conclusion?

I'm not really sure what you mean, but what I meant was that being conscious of an object doesn't mean that the object existed before the consciousness was conscious of it. As far as I can tell it's circular reasoning.

My mistake, what I intended to write was: It doesn't follow from the fact that a consciousness is conscious of something that the object (not necessarily physical) existed before the consciousness was conscious of the object.

If I understand you correctly you are asserting that being conscious means being conscious of something, i.e. that something (concrete or abstract) exists. I'm not sure I understand what you mean. I believe you are saying that consciousness can be conscious of something existent, such as awareness of a lion, or something created, such as desire for a teleportation device. But how does one show that the lion existed before the consciousness was conscious of it?

Ok, but isn't that essentially begging the question? It doesn't follow from the fact that a consciousness is conscious of something that it existed before the consciousness was conscious of it.

First of all I find the term "primacy of existence" to be a bit dubious because if consciousness exists then it's obviously a part of existence. But it's clear to me that by primacy of existence Ayn Rand means that everything, excluding our consciousness, exists independently of our consciousness. How would one respond to someone who holds the three axioms of existence, identity and consciousness to be true but denies the primacy of existence?

If I can grow crops and they'd be mine then can I mine gold and that would be mine? What if I build a gold mine, does that make me the owner of the mine? Suppose I build a house on the land and then through gardening work make a beautiful garden, does that make me owner of the garden? My point is that there's no essential difference between these examples. Also, how would you determine the value of the land? Just out of curiosity, would it be possible for someone to rent all the land around your house (and keep you out) simply by paying a higher rent?

Suppose that I've paid the rent for the land and built a house on it. Georgism states that I own the product of my labor (i.e. the house) but not the land. Then suppose that I'm suddenly unable or unwilling to pay the rent for the land, according to georgism this would mean that I don't have the right to the land but I do have the right to the house. This is absurd, since the house and the land are inseparable. Also, how would one determine the rent of the land? The value of the land would have to be determined through the free market, but since the house and the land are inseperable the value would be that of the house and the land not the land itself.

Firstly, eating at McDonald's is not a threat to your health in itself, it depends on what you eat and how often. I seldom eat at McDonald's and when I do the long term health effects are neglible to none. Secondly, the answer is discipline which is not always an easy task, but a common approach seems to be the establishment of basic personal rules and then proceeding from there with the more advanced.

Loving and caring for someone is not altruism. It's like Howard Roark puts it: "to say I love you one must first be able to say the I". Neither is advocating a rational philosophy altruism, she did it because she believed in it and was proud of her achievement, knowing that it could/would benefit herself and mankind.

Haha, I'm actually a frequent reader of your blog That is basically my objection, but isn't rationality necessary to gain or keep any value, not just life? If you want A then you need to act gain A. As I see it, the problem with life being the ultimate value is that it does not follow that you can't act to gain a value at the cost of your ultimate value. But if I understand you correctly, do you mean that acting to gain a value while losing life is a contradiction in terms (and thus irrational) because the value is severed from it's root, life?

I agree that life is the value that makes all other values possible. Peikoff identifies this as a truism and then proceeds to draw the conclusion that life is the standard of value, and this is where I'm having issues bridging the gap. I agree that it would be irrational to pursue values contrary to your life if your life is your highest value, but what if your life is not your highest value? Why isn't it permissable to change your decision? For example, if you value stealing some specific object more than your life all you need to do is live until the specific object has been stolen. How is he irrational/immoral?

Ok, but what about someone who does not choose survival as his primary goal? Then the rest does not follow. I realize that the choice to die doesn't pose a problem (it's a default and no additional values are required) but that does not mean that someone can't choose to live in order to pursue something else. In this case life would be an instrumental value in order to pursue that something else. I agree that pursuing pleasure over life will eventually lead to your death, but claiming this to be irrational rests on the basis that life was the ultimate value (not an instrumental value). If you die pursuing pleasure aren't you acting in accordance to your ultimate value? If yes, then why is this irrational and not rational? If no, why not?

I've read both OPAR and the Virtue of Selfishness, but I still don't see how this makes ethics objective. Just as one can pursue life one can also pursue, say, pleasure. Why are the values required for life objective when the values required for pleasure are not? As this is a matter of choice, how does one motivate pursuing life as being more rational than pursuing pleasure? For example, what is wrong with this line of reasoning? "If you wish to survive, you ought to adopt value system X. You wish to survive. Therefore you ought to adopt value system X "

I came in to contact with this article and came to wonder if there's a sufficient response to it? http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/7_1/7_1_4.pdf (specifically the top of page 10) It doesn't seem possible to derive an ought from an is through the means of logic/reason. For example: One ought not to murder human beings. Socrates is a human being. Therefore, one ought not to murder Socrates. which follows from the initial ought. While: Human beings have a right to life. Socrates is a human being. Therefore, one ought not to murder Socrates. does not follow without an ought (namely that one ought to respect the rights of others). How does one motivate life as the standard of value as being objective as opposed to subjective?