phibetakappa

The subject matter "man in action" covers just about every scholastic subject: philosophy as such, epistemology, politics, nature of man, history, economics, business, applied engineering, anthropology, psychology, construction and all vocational arts. It's hard to find a subject that is not included in your description. If you are going to accuse me of trying to make the subject of ethics "too narrow," I think you've managed to make it far, far too broad.

Thanks for the response.

I hope this statement is not in answer to something I said. I never made the claim that alchemy was a "false science." (I am not sure what a "false" science would be.) I know it is not a science. That was my point. It is the same point I am making with regard to Kant's so-called ethics. Kant's "ethics" is not an ethics. It is OK to treat it as if it is a kind of ethics for academic and polemical reasons, but it is not part of the science of ethics. I.e., treating Kant's "ethics" as if it properly belongs in a valid concept of ethics has a limited value, e.g., as a good source for comparing the use of valid concepts in relation to the use of invalid concepts. * * * Again, this is your second interjecting post, and again you have only muddled things. More importantly, you have avoided responding to the major points and questions I asked you. Why does Kant's so-called "ethics" qualify as a unit of the concept "ethics"? And how do you know?

No I am not. This is the third time someone has made this assertion and it is false. I am not equating a concept with its definition. I understand that fallacy.

I would not and am not. I understand the issue of concepts being "open ended," i.e., that they stand for not just of a given objects essential characteristics, but all a given object's characteristics. I don't think this is in question here.

LOL. You're still thinking about that last primacy of existence topic. I'm not sure about your question. In a sense they are the same issue. The issue doesn’t have to be as abstract as metaphysics or philosophy in general. It could be about the proper classification of anything: of apples and oranges, cars and trucks, alchemy and science. Are concepts as such objective or not? Are definitions objective or not? See ITOE, Chapter 4. Further, the issue is are we mentally active, or are we mentally passive? Do we constantly revisit, our conclusions and revise them when necessary, as new information becomes available or do we freeze our abstractions at some arbitrary point in time? (See what Ayn Rand describes about "versions" of the concept "man" in ITOE, Chapter 4.) There's a great passage in the "Objectivist Ethics," which is often quoted where Ayn Rand makes this point. I've highlighted the clause of particular relevance:

OK. When men take various actions, they really do take those actions. It's hard to disagree with you there. However, I'm not sure what argument has this premise as a precondition. Also, I do not know of an argument that claims that the actions people take don't really happen and/or are not objective facts. So, I'm not sure why this is being stated. There have been some people who have acted in certain ways, and have then explained themselves, and sometimes those reasons are written into history, providing a record of their explanations? The consequences of people's actions in the past could be a matter of history, if they have been evaluated as significant enough to include in any given historians history. If this is what you were intending to say? There are normative values? Are there non-normative values? What are "de facto" values? I assume you are not contrasting "de facto" here with "de jure," because that does not really clarify what you are saying. If we use a loose definition for value such as the "object of man's action," you are asserting there are "de facto" objects of man's actions? As opposed to what? I really don't understand what you are trying to claim here, and the contrast seems a little dubious between "normative" values and "de facto" values? Are you trying to say there are cultural norms which direct some peoples behavior? I.e., something like the idea of "cultural mores"? If you are then what is a "de facto" value in that context? What makes a false ethical theory as opposed to a true ethical theory? By what standard is any given "theory" included into the class "ethical" as opposed to non-ethical? Further, I still don't understand what object is supposed to be distinguished by the concept of "def facto" value. Please define this term. It is on the basis of [false ethical theories] causal relationship to the values they actually achieve that they are classified as ethical theories. How does this work? Could you please provide some examples? * * * I asked for no more floating abstractions, no more generalities without content, no more assertions without examples, and you have given us a bunch more assertions without examples, generalities without content etc. Can you or anyone demonstrate how Kant's so-called "ethical theory" qualifies as an "ethical" theory? Can anyone here do it? Anyone? I have been stating some of the so-called "ethical theories" which are given in the history of philosophy do not qualify as ethics at all. E.g., Kant's "theory" is one such example. What I have stated is that I do not believe that what we are told is an "ethical theory" of Kant does not qualify as an ethics, under any valid definition of ethics. (Note: I chose Kant's theory because it is so bizarre, well known, and short in length. Also, I do not believe it is really an ethical system using any valid definition of ethics.) Therefore, what "philosophers" have seemingly done is to steal a valid concept of "ethics" and turn it into a meaningless, elastic, floating term so they can cram some of these "theories" like Kant's in to ethics. Amusingly, so far, some of the people here have been arguing that we keep it that way, and never question what it is we place under the concept of ethics. "Ethics" is apparently what prominent philosophers and authors say it is, and/or whatever has been called "ethics" in the past. Can you or anyone demonstrate how Kant's so-called "ethical theory" qualifies as an "ethical" theory? What attributes does Kant's so-called ethical theory have that qualifies it as an "ethics"? Does Kant state why man needs ethics at all? Does Kant define value? Does Kant have a standard of value? Does Kant provide a "code" of values? Are these necessary conditions for a given "theory" to qualify as an ethics? Kant proposes a mechanism (the categorical imperative") which he claims is supposed to be used to guide man's choices and actions. Is this enough? Is an ethics any proposal which asserts a method to guide men's choices and actions?

CORRECTION: After as much research as I could stand, I have resigned myself to the conclusion that the term "deontological" did not arise from using its apparent root "ontology" and prefixing it with "de-" to signify a morality with out "empirical" reality. (Which is Kant's own stated purpose in "The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals" see below). However, given Kant's own statements regarding how he saw "pure philosophy" in relation to his conception of morality, I still believe my statement of the essence of Kant's "ethics" is better characterized as "de-ontological" i.e., ethics without reality, than it is characterized as an ethics of "duty." But alas . . . I've done an extensive etymological search for the origin of the term deontology, and its initial intended usage. The earliest usages I can find so far (see below for an 1834 usage by Jeremy Benthem) states it comes from the Greek "that which is binding". This is the same origin we can find at dictionary.com. (Note: the date matches very closely to the actual 1834 Benthem reference I found below). Also, I found this reference for the term, so I search for the book. However, this is not the first use of the term. Using Google books, so far, I've been able to find this term used prior to 1834. In particular there is a book entitled "Deontology or The Science of Morality: Duty and self-interest, virtue and felicity, prudence and benevolence by none other than Jeremy Benthem of Utilitarianism. Found here: "Deontology of The Science of Morality:" Note: Jeremy Benthem lived from 1748 to 1832, while Kant was a contemporary of Benthem, living from 1724 to 1804. This seems to suggest that the term probably existed in popular "ethical" usage prior and was probably known to Kant himself. He does use the term several times in works such as "The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics" In my defense However, given Kant's epistemology, taking the words root of "ontology" (the study of being qua being) and prefixing it with "de-" made more sense to me, especially given how he describes his "ethics" in "The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals"where he begins laying down the so-called "basis" for his "categorical imperative." It is supposed to provide guidance "purely" without any reference to "empirical" information to corrupt it. In other words, he wanted a set of "pure" imperative statements 'a priori', cut off from concrete facts of reality. In the first few paragraphs he states, Later, when he makes his purpose clearer he states: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy" summarizes the point this way:

I haven't seen you define any terms. All I've done is observed that you use terms in wishy-washy floating ways, apparently not intending them to actually have firm meanings, i.e., to actually have real referents. I understand that when people who like to hold floating abstractions, feel "stuck" when they actually have to define their terms, because they don't know how to do it. They want to be able to "jigger" words together into sentences, which hang together enough to sound as if they are saying something, i.e., they want to appear to be having a rational argument, without the responsibility of actually producing one, and to that end they like to take over general terms like, philosophy, ethics, values, virtues and use them as a front for their own hodge-podge brand of philosophic agnosticism. This question "begs the question" assuming what we are talking about are already "ethics", i.e., it already assumes we are stilling in front of a bunch of "ethical systems" which have been identified. Identified and/or recognized as ethical systems how? How are you identifying them as ethical systems? Let's stop talking in generalities without content. As I asked above: take Kant's so-called ethics and demonstrate how it qualifies as a science of ethics. If you want to use a starting definition use Ayn Rand's provided in VOS on page 13. (Note: If you do not like this as a starting point that ask what facts of reality give rise to the need of the concept of ethics, reduce the concept and then induce your own definition of ethics.) What is the "code of values" in Kant's "ethics"? What is a value to Kant? I.e., what does Kant prescribe man acts to gain and/or keep? Why? and How?

No. I have not said anything about O'ist ethics.

If that is the case then the author has stolen the concept man. You would be stealing the concepts science, identifying, and principle. There is no such thing as an irrational science, or irrational identifications. An principle doesn't mean any statement of the form: All S is P. Its always hard for me to understand why some people try to hold and use valid definitions of concepts only when it is convenient. Man qua animal and/or animals do not objectively need conceptual codes of action, because by definition they are not on the conceptual level. Accomplishing these outcomes: . . . are not an objective need of man qua man. Ethics has to have a subject matter. Only one subject matter gives rise to the need of ethics, and that is man qua man. I didn't realize you were suggesting that the concept of virtue is a tautology. I emphatically disagree with you. Just as value does not refer to any action taken, virtue does not refer to any so-called method suggested to get to a given arbitrarily chosen "value". As I stated before: Ethics serves are real, objective need for man, i.e., it is an objective value for man, i.e., it is a necessary condition for man's survival. It is the fulfillment of this need that the real science of ethics serves. Man like all of existence possesses identity, he has a very specific nature, which means that not just any random actions, floating abstractions, stolen abstractions, or arbitrary imperatives will serve as a means to sustaining his life. Only a very specific course of action will work. Ayn Rand makes the point in "The Virtue of Selfishness" on page 24, Ayn Rand continues stating why man needs a code of ethics . . . Your argument seems to be that anything an author writes which steals the concepts of "should or ought", and then prescribes arbitrary actions for men to take qualifies as "ethics". (Note: it even more unclear what you believe would qualify as a "science" if this does.) If we call anything that makes such prescriptions: "ethics," then we are still left with the problem of conceptualizing man's real, life and death need, which means we would then need a new word for it. The need of ethics is real, vital, life threatening, so to call any document that contains arbitrary prescriptions of action for men to follow, "ethics," is just as I said above: it is like calling alchemy "science", or calling "science" alchemy, it is foolish and/or dangerous. So, what are we left to do? Do we invent a new term like "Living-ics" where men can go to find solutions for his real problem of how to live on earth, and then abandon the words ethics and/or morality? No. I argue we reclaim the concepts that only we, qua men, are entitled to use.

I was not talking about the "validity of the ethical system." I am not sure how the term validity applies to "ethical system." I was talking about the validity of the actual concepts being used in a particular argument made by the author of a particular proposed ethics. If some of the essential concepts used in an argument are not valid, i.e., the do not have a general relation to the facts of reality.

I definitely agree! I would say it is implicit in any (literally) "valid concept" of ethics. I.e., if the author is trying to pass some work off as "ethics" and it does not contain an exposition on "virtues" then that is a good indicator that the author has not been proceeding from a valid concept of value, and/or has not been proceeding from a valid concept of man qua man (i.e., qua rational living being, i.e., a being whose consciousness is of the type volitional/conceptual.) E.g., it may very well be the author has been proceeding from a conception of man qua animal. After all man has to be man by choice, i.e., rationality is a matter of choice, because the nature of his particular kind of consciousness is that it operates both volitionally and conceptually. There are many ways for an author to hold a concept of man qua animal. For example, he can implicitly or explicitly deny the volition of man or he can implicitly or explicitly deny that man possesses a conceptual faculty, or he could generally implicitly or explicitly deny that man's consciousness possesses identity at all. Whatever the case if the author is not proscribing action for man qua man then what ever he's proscribing can hardly be called an "ethics." Man qua animal does not need a conceptual code of anything. Only man qua man needs a conceptual code to guide his choices and actions. And that need is rationally demonstrable, i.e., ethics is a life or death, objectively necessary condition for sustaining and/or enhancing his life. So, this begs the question: why is the author attempting to go through the motion of developing a "conceptual" work if he explicitly or implicitly believes in some way or other that man is not a man? Why is the author attempting to direct men's behavior? If he's presumably giving advice and that advice is not for sustaining and/or enhancing a man's life, then what is his motive? For the answer see the title essay of Ayn Rand's "For the New Intellectual," or the final chapter in "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology" or even the title essay from "Philosophy Who Needs it?"

Yes, it is. Yes I agree with these statements, they provide wonderful support for my position. A "system of ethics" may not need a rational standard of value, but a "science of ethics" would have to because a science of ethics is an objective value to man qua man, i.e., ethics is a necessary condition for sustaining and/or enhancing a man's life. Irrational "values" can not by definition be and objective value for man qua man, neither can systematizing a collection of irrational "values". If sustaining and/or enhancing one's life qua man is one's goal, then a rational standard of value is required. However, if the goal is just to confuse and write books, publish papers, or consolidate power then collections and/or systems of irrational values will fit the bill. I never claimed throwing out concrete examples of a given object. I am stating remove concretes that have mistakenly been placed under a given classification, and place them where they properly belong.

I am not sure why it matters if I agree or disagree with Ayn Rand and/or other "Objectivist Philosophers". Am I supposed to search out a counter opinion or statement to to stop myself from thinking? If Ayn Rand wrote a whole book one why Kant's System of "ethics" is a definitive example of "ethics" is that supposed to stop me from thinking for myself? "Characterizing something vs. definition There's a difference between "characterizing some object" in a certain way, and actually working up a formal classification of it. The moderns make every attempt to "characterize" their non-objective systems as morality or ethics, but that does not mean they are. In fact, I would argue such philosophers relish when people are duped and mistakenly include their systems of rationalizations as ethics, because it pushes legitimate ethics out of consideration without argument. This is the point of anti-concepts. If the vast majority of people mistakenly believe Kant's "Ethics," is one of the greatest examples of ethics, and force us to fund the printing of text books which says that, and Kant purposely tries to "characterize" it as ethics; then it probably serves a purpose to call it "ethics," especially if our goal is to expose it as a fraud. But when new evidence is discovered demonstrating the necessary conditions required for a science of ethics to be defined, and new examples of objective ethics are produced, then we have an obligation to our lives to refine our definitions and/or our classifications. An analogy is Alchemy vs. science. Some claim that Alchemy was the precursor to the Science of Chemistry. However, once the Science of Chemistry exists, and people are producing clear examples of Chemistry, Alchemy can no longer be confused with Chemistry, because it is so easy to differentiate the two, i.e., to differentiate a pseudo-science from an actual, real science. Kant's so-called ethical system is like Alchemy. Ayn Rand, Aristotle and others produce many refined examples of the Science of ethics. In the time of transition between Alchemy and Science, a layman would look at the works of Chemists and mistakenly call them works of Alchemy. Some part time Chemists probably dabbled in both Alchemy and Chemistry for a time. But when a sufficient amount of evidence of the nature of the Science of Chemistry became available Alchemy could no longer posture as a science. Do we keep calling Alchemy a science? No, we improve our definitions and the wholesale utilization of the Science of Chemistry explodes and men prosper. However, corrupt alchemists like corrupt philosophers, love to dupe people in to believing their pseudo-science and the snake oil it produces is on par with the products of science. If we fail in our responsibility to refine our definitions and produce new higher standards, and allow the various "alchemies" to stand on par or worse as equivalents with actual science we destroy the concept of science. Kant's so-called "code of values? Please explain how Kant's ethics has a "code of values"? What values? His ethics is called de-ontological for a reason, i.e., that it is supposedly morality without ontology, i.e., without reality. What objective values are there that have no relation to reality? Or: if we are going to consider Kant's system as providing guidance for living one's life on earth, whatever it is he is providing guidance for it is not a man, certainly not man qua man (qua rational being). This is at least one precondition of any legitimate ethics, that it offers up guidance to man qua man. Using this criteria alone we could flush several so-called ethical systems. If what one is "characterizing" their work as ethics and does not prescribe a code of objective values for man qua man, then are we still talking about ethics? Can we have a science for developing a code of values to guide "man's" choices and actions, without man? Again, whatever Kant was writing for and was attempting to "characterize" as ethics, it was not for man qua man. Thinking men, i.e., beings with volitional/conceptual consciousness do not need and cannot use "categorical imperatives," nor can they use any system created to work in a figment "noumenal world" cut off from a "phenomenal world". There's no more relevant question at hand. Philosophy as such vs. ethical systems Including some set of beliefs under the classification of "philosophy" is far easier than defining what does and does not qualify as the science of ethics, especially, when we include the context of Ayn Rand's monumental derivation of the concept value from the concept life, and her theory of concepts. When new knowledge and new technologies, like Ayn Rand's discoveries regarding the concept value are available, they can provide us with tools for refining our thinking. Pluralists like you, and pluralism in general is amusing. "We have to have many classifications and types of things! Why? Uh... because we just have to have more than one... no one can possibly define something exactly!" Really, what does it matter if some of the mainstream garbage ethical theories are pushed out of discussion, qualified, and/or relegated to works of ethical pathology? Or what if there was only one major rationally demonstrable philosophy that took hold in the mainstream culture? You act as if defining/classifying an object destroys volition/freewill. But it is freewill/volition which gives rise to the need of classification, and it is our precious lives which give rise to the need for the clarification and refinement of our definitions. Precisely defining objective, rationally demonstrable standards for philosophy, including ethics enhances our lives, the same way having standards for measuring enhances our lives in every science, field and human activity. Defining a standard for the quality or the identification of a given object, does not make the phenomena it excludes (and/or clarifies) no longer exist. If we precisely define what properly belongs and qualifies under the class "science of ethics," and why they belong there as opposed to the next closes relative class; the hodge podge of primitive works does not go way. Alchemists and Anti-ethicists are still free to publish and to try to dupe people.

Yes. I agree. "Virtue Ethics" does have a concept of virtue. Aristotle really did have a concept of virtue. O'ism really does have a concept of virtue. So, if one wants to classify O'ist ethics as "Virtue Ethics" go ahead. My argument is that all proper ethical systems are necessarily "virtue ethics" so making such a division is non-essential, i.e., possessing virtues is not fundamental to classifying ethical systems. The implication is that we would have to throw out most of what we are told are "ethical systems." I think in 1000 years, what we are told are "ethical systems" today may still exist as a sort of pathology of previous attempts at anti-ethics. In O'ist terms, I believe the vast majority of what we are told are "systems of ethics," such as deontological, utilitarian, pragmatic are not just "bad" ethics, but they are fantastic "package deals", intending to destroy the actual valid concept of ethics. http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/package-...fallacy_of.html http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/package-...fallacy_of.html This is not the place to elaborate my entire thesis, but the idea, is that a so-called ethical system like Kant's, is an attempt by Kant to put forth a fraud and call it "ethics" in the hope people will accept it as "ethics". http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/package-...fallacy_of.html (Note: also see "anti-concept" http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/anti-concepts.html) Proving the thesis would probably take a book, one that I'm not going to write.

I never said that you cannot categorize them. Obviously, they have been categorized. I am not arguing for not classifying them. But are those others "actual ethical systems"? I think that is highly debatable. What makes them ethical systems? That we are told they are? What facts of reality give rise for the need of the concept of ethics? Just because someone tells you something is an "ethical system" does not mean it actually is.

Was your statement intended to be a rebuttal of my statement, or was it an attempt to support my statement? Because it seems to be in the form of a rebuttal, but it very nicely supports my argument. If "virtue ethics" (VE) is how you understand it, i.e., is as you describe it above, then you are supporting my claim that it is a bogus classification, i.e., it is utterly improper to speak of ethics/morality which does not have a concept of virtue. This is so because it is improper to attempt to divide men into two arbitrary parts, the "being part," and the "doing part." Man in a proper state is an integrated being of mind and body, and it is precisely the science of ethics, whose goal it is to maintain this integrity between mind and body, thought and action. You state that according to VE, My position is that it is improper qua man, to attempt to carve a man up into this kind of arbitrary dichotomy of a man's character versus his actions. I assume it feels like a useful division because modern philosophy has been attempting to carve man up in this way in epistemology, which gave rise to the parallel false dichotomy in ethics. But cutting man in half necessarily leads to his death, whether it is his mind or his body. See the O'ist theory of good for a lead, and more particularly see how the O'ist epistemology does not permit the false 'Mind-Body Dichotomy": For example, in "Capitalism the Unknown Ideal", page 22 regarding Ayn Rand's identification of 3 basic theories of good she states: (Note: "good" is just a concept, therefore, this last paragraph can be seen as just an extension of the O'ist epistemology as it applies to a particular concept, i.e., to the concept of good. The point being that the ultimate answer to why attempting to create a mind-body dichotomy in ethics is wrong, is that such a dichotomy is derived from one's acceptance of a false theory of concepts in epistemology.) Also, for a more motivational passage from "Galt's Speech, which is aptly fitting, Ayn Rand Lexicon: Mind-Body Dichotomy

I answered your question implicitly in my post: There is no proper ethics which does not involve virtues. By proper I mean that which is appropriate for man qua man. Once the concept of value is reduced, validated and shown to be genetically dependent on the concept life, and once it is demonstrated that man's life depends on his particular kind of consciousness, i.e., the volitional/conceptual kind, then the concept of virtue necessarily follows. In other words, there is no such thing as a proper code of values to guide man's choices and actions, which does not cover and/or elaborate on virtues qua value, i.e., there is no proper code of ethics which does not elaborate on the necessary, volitionally developed, aspects of character and/or habit any given man will need to have to achieve any given values. Virtues are the necessary conditions for the achievement of values given man's nature and given the nature of values. Man has no choice about needing virtues for the same reason he has no choice about the need of values. Virtues are the means to achieving values. It would be proper to argue about which virtues a given ethics includes and why, or argue about which, if any virtues are more important hierarchically for men to develop, and therefore, there could be a classification of certain ethical systems by how their virtues are arranged and/or emphasized, but it is completely improper to speak of ethics which don't have virtues. I suppose one could classify the various modern attempts at ethics according to how they're malformed and/or deficient, i.e., like a pathology. But once we are speaking of value, properly defined, virtues logically follow. I regard the modern study of ethics, which have classification such as "virtue ethics", "consequentialist" or "deontological" etc. etc. etc. as just scholars attempting to make sense of the hodge podge of theories floating around. As a rule, mainstream modern scholars don't ask, "what facts of reality give rise to the need for the concept... x, y, z..." That is a uniquely O'ist question. As Ayn Rand summarizes the point, "the concepts are here... how did they get here?... (They have no answer.) Any "concept" any "classification" is as good as the next, after all they are all arbitrary..."

"Virtue ethics" is a bogus classification primarily for Aristotle's ethics, given that his ethics focused heavily on virtues. What's amusing is to read about all the convoluted attempts to try to have an ethics system without a concept of 'virtue.' To deny that men need virtues to live, and that those virtues have to be chosen & fostered by a given individual is to deny the volitional conceptual nature of man's consciousness.

"How to study Ayn Rand's writing" http://www.aynrandbookstore2.com/prodinfo.asp?number=CB10M This is what you are referring too. It is not about only fiction, it is about studying as such, and primarily about studying Ayn Rand's works.

Here is an interesting free tool that may help. http://mindraider.sourceforge.net/ The tool will automatically diagram your notes. Other alternatives: Also UML class diagrams may work. There are many software tools available. I also like Rationale from austhink http://rationale.austhink.com/ Freemind may work for you: http://freemind.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/Main_Page

What are you trying to represent?

LOL... that's the quote I provided in my very first post on the topic. Post #3 Yeah, does that help you hunter? I'm finished with this... we are going in circles... All sarcasm aside... good job Plasmatic...

How do you think the O'ist primary axioms are formed?