JeffT

I'll respond to the first part of this quote at the end: The objective fact of reality is that a little bit of safety margin is built into speed limits, so slightly speeding is not an inherent threat whereas larger amounts of speeding are. In a real-world situation if we had privatized roads, the police and property owners might operate under an understanding. If somebody is speeding under a certain amount, the property owner's private enforcement vehicles would be responsible for fining the driver (or whatever remedial action is specified in the contract). However, for larger amounts, the police would regard it as a threat. I am not really sure precisely where the breakdown would fall. The point is that police don't proactively enforce all contracts between two private parties. No, my speed limit example is different because there is a prior contract involved. My "arbitrary value" was speculating about when the police would regard a behavior as threatening above and beyond the fact that it might also be a contract violation. Therefore, it does not imply that I regard shoplifting below some small, arbitrary value to be not a crime. Shoplifting any amount is a crime. Correct, it is not necessarily fraud. Fraud means it must have been willful. And then, fraud is a crime. One of the effects is the same. The loss to the victim is the same. Another of the effects is not. The threat that the perpetrator presents society is not the same. Furthermore, the material loss to the victim is not the sole determiner of punishment. Killing another is such an egregious case that even many cases of unintentional deaths are crimes, because a high degree of care is expected in activities that might result in the death of another (for example, in gun handling). Ask a different example: If I accidentally knock over and destroy a vase in a store, should the police not get involved if it appears that I am remaining at the scene to speak with the store owner about reimbursing? Particularly if the police see it and ask the store owner "Everything handled?" And the owner says "Yep, we've worked it out." I think they shouldn't. Yet if the police observed me smashing a vase deliberately, they might well arrest me and charge me with a crime regardless of whether the store owner separately is able to extract compensation. A well-known concept in criminal law. The degree of intent is what distinguishes murder from negligent homicide, for example. Indeed, you determine it through the available facts. But in the case of speeding on private roads, civil recompense to the property owner is provided for regardless of intent, so it's not an issue. In most situations it isn't the purview of police. But it might be if they are investigating organized crime, or planned heists. But the primary distinction that is relevant to most of the examples in this thread is whether something is a contractual violation or not. Sometimes, police do need to make the determination of intent, but mostly it is evident from the type of act being observed. Do you really think that returning a rented item late is no different than shoplifting the item? Do you really think that if you are behind on a rented item by one day, the police should be able to enter your house to arrest you or reclaim it (absent evidence of prior intent to not return it)? Eventually, there is a process of repossession--if the contract calls for it--but that's initiated by the lender, not the police. On a private road, neither the courts nor the police would need to get involved in most cases. The government police would not be doing the work of enforcing minor traffic violations on private roads as that would be a subsidy. The road owner would be doing it at their own expense (ultimately paid for by the users, or by fines of violators, or some combination of both). That's exactly why an "arbitrary" limit on the amount over the speed limit is rational. In Ayn Rand's essay "Government Financing in a Free Society", she stated, regarding court enforcements of contracts: "Yet, today, this service is provided gratuitously and amounts, in effect, to a subsidy." (The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 136) I shouldn't have said "severe". Rather, any immediate physical threat. I stand corrected on that point. (Separately, it could be worth making the point that government should allocate resources to more severe threats, but in contrasting to crimes vs. contract violations, "severe" doesn't come into play.) Going back to your first paragraph, and also the post by RationalBiker: I was thinking under a possible system of private roads, where the same determinations would not necessarily be in effect. I will defer to what you have stated regarding prima facie evidence of intent regarding public roads. What I had in mind with my distinction is the difference between occasional, unplanned speeding (under the knowledge that anytime one speeds one has a random chance of getting fined and thus cannot do it with impunity) and something like routinely speeding using a radar detector, or live reports of the location of speed traps, only slowing down when a cop is nearby--basically, operating under a pre-planned routine by which one can (attempt to) continually beat the system.

Apologies for my late responses; I hadn't subscribed to the thread and forgot to check back for replies. Yes, if police have evidence of intent. Particularly if one or more individuals are scheming to find ways to frequently speed and avoid detection. However, small-scale speeding, like within 15mph above the speed limit, is more evidence of carelessness or accident than intent. Once we're looking at large amounts, like more than 25mph over, then intent (or gross negligence) can be presumed, and police may rightfully act without consulting the property owner on the basis that the person is a threat, rather than that they are violating a contract. No, I'm not arguing this (if this question is directed at me). If the police observe behavior that appears to be a crime, they can presume that it is, in fact, the plain thing they are seeing, and they don't need to refrain from acting just on the slim possibility that such behavior is sanctioned by the property owner. How do you get this from my posts? I made clear that according to my view, the police can act in crimes. A person going on a shooting spree is not a contract violation; it's a crime. He has no right to set such terms, as police can rightfully enter a property without permission to stop a crime in progress. Therefore, the owner's "terms" are not the issue. I agree with this--shoplifting is a crime because no prior agreement exists. I don't agree with this. If a person doesn't return their rented DVD on time, that's a crime? Forgetting by a day is no different than walking out of the store with unpaid merchandise? I'm not arguing that it's not a rights violation, but that's different than a crime. I suggest you rethink whether accidental, unplanned contract violations are as "odious" as intentional acts to harm another. They're not morally in the same category, and they're properly legally regarded as separate, as well. A criminal is a threat to everyone. A person who fails to uphold a contract (except in cases of intent or fraud) is not a threat to society at large; it is each person's choice of how much risk to accept when dealing with him. The courts will back up a contract if the wronged party sues but the lack of an open-ended threat means that the police don't proactively get involved. It's somewhat misleading to describe the courts as the "back burner" of government protection as the police will enforce a court order. Rights violations in a contract are ultimately backed up by the same force as the police can provide to stop a violent crime in progress. But in another sense, I disagree--the different branches of government should disproportionately place resources on stopping immediate, severe physical threats, as contract violations can be worked out after the fact and recompense paid.

The courts would decide disputes relating to contract violations. The police would only enforce specific court orders--not interpret the contract. This is not a contract situation. It's simple trespassing, once the person has been asked to leave. If the person has a contractual right to be there based on an earlier agreement, and the restaurant owner lies to the police about this fact, then the removed person can sue the restaurant for recompense later. Your earlier message suggested that police would proactively enforce speed limits on private roads, which does require that they know the terms of the contract. Rather, I'm suggesting that in a proper system, the police would only enforce a request by the owner to the police to remove somebody. They might additionally gather evidence or serve as witnesses as to whether speeding occurred, at the request of the owner. They are charged with stopping crimes in progress, investigating crimes, and enforcing court orders (including carrying out arrest warrants for crimes being investigated). The entirety of your response ignores the difference between crimes (direct initiation of force or threats of force from one individual to another, anywhere) and contract violations (failure of one party to carry out the terms of an agreed-upon obligation, which spans a duration of time, between two people who have previously agreed to such). A violation of a contract is, in most cases, not a crime, barring certain exceptions such as fraud (an intentional act), or entering the contract with prior intent not to fulfill it. A violation of a contract (even unintentional) is a rights violation, but it's under the purview of the courts, not the police.

"Criminals are a small minority in any semicivilized society. But the protection and enforcement of contracts through courts of civil law is the most crucial need of a peaceful society; without such protection, no civilization could be developed or maintained." ("The Nature of Government", The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 130) "All credit transactions are contractual agreements. A credit transaction is any exchange which involves a passage of time between the payment and the receipt of goods or services." ("Government Financing in a Free Society", The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 137) In the same article, Ayn Rand writes: "It may be observed, in the example given above, that the cost of such voluntary government financing would be automatically proportionate to the scale of an individual's economic activity; those on the lowest economic levels (who seldom, if ever, engage in credit transactions) would be virtually exempt--though they would still enjoy the benefits of legal protection, such as that offered by the armed forces, by the police and by the courts dealing with criminal offenses." (p. 140) (Bold emphasis added by me.) Police don't enforce violation of a contract. In fact, that they would do so implies that all contracts must be preemptively provided to the government, and that it is forbidden for two people to make a private contract (which might only be revealed if one sues the other). What if two people have an amendment to an earlier contract, which the police don't know about? What if such amendment is verbal? (Which is, of course, risky to either party, but should not be illegal, as each party may trust the other.) By "enforcing" the first contract in lieu of the amendment, police would be violating their rights.

I don't think there is a contradiction. Think about it this way: If one could choose to improve one's quality of life by taking an action that one knew (either with certainty or high probability) would shorten it, could doing so be a moral choice? (The only example I can think of for this is indulging in unhealthy food or activities, like smoking.) I think this is a personal choice, which could be moral either way if done in accordance with one's chosen values. Here's a slightly different but similar example: Would it be moral to choose a highly dangerous career, or even short-term line of work? A good example of this is joining the military in time of war, particularly in historic times when the risk of casualty was far higher. I think this can be moral, if one values what one is producing or defending weighed against the risk to one's own life. The possibility of dying is not the motivating factor here; it's what one accomplishes during one's life, even if greatly shortened. Taking an act that will almost certainly kill one's self could still be moral, if by doing so, one achieves a great deal. What if one can save not only the life of a loved one, but many people whom one values? If the act of saving those people defends values which are proper according to the standard of man's life, then one may value this over the almost total shortening of the duration of one's life. I see the principle here as the same as in the first two examples, but taken to the highest extreme. Committing suicide because one cannot achieve values--such as in a totalitarian society--is different. I might agree that this is an action outside the realm of morality. In that case, there is no higher value being achieved--death is the goal.

One good reason not to be an organ donor is if one has made arrangements for cryonic preservation: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryonics

The standard of value is man's life. One's own life is one's purpose. Maximizing the duration of one's own life is not necessarily the goal, but rather, working to improve one's life according to the needs of a rational being is. Thus, accomplishing a great value might be worth trading off much of the duration of one's life. By giving up one's own life to save the life of a lover, it is not the giving up of one's own life which is the purpose, but of saving that of one's lover. Thus, one cannot say that it is not a moral action on the alleged basis that the goal is dying. (Apologies for replying to a year-old post, but I saw it while reading the thread along with the new posts.)

I didn't read it as necessarily attempting to discredit Objectivism, but only criticizing what he regarded as a specific fallacy. Actually, I wasn't intentionally referring to a situation where a person is rejecting Objectivism as such after significant study of the philosophy. I would actually not comment on that matter, as it's a more complex issue than I've thought about, other than to say I can definitely imagine many examples where that would be immoral. However, if we're talking about a specific debate between two people over a less broad issue, then yes, I hold that a person can reject a true proposition by honest error. To say otherwise, would imply that the only alternatives, if one reaches a conclusion, are correctness or evasion. To be clear, I don't believe the drivers of the major vices in the world today, like the diminishing freedom we face in the US and worldwide, environmentalism, etc. can be the result of honest error. A person ignoring evidence against one's conclusion is actually the example I gave as something falling outside of honest error, which I described as irrational! (My specific example was evidence one does not know how to argue against, thus implying it was clearly brought to the person's attention.) Reaching certainty about a conclusion is itself a reasoning process, which is subject to error. A person could incorrectly regard a piece of evidence as not being relevant one way or the other to a conclusion, thus not considering it any further. I believe that would depend on the nature of the "conclusion-jumping" in the specific case. If evasion is involved, then it is immoral. If the person is diligently working to reach the correct conclusion, but errs, that is not immoral. Further, if a person is working to expand their knowledge--of ethics, philosophy, or whatever field which will further their life--diligently considering all the facts available to them and never evading--it is morally good, even if they err. I agree with most of this, but not the first and last sentences as they apply to my argument: If one observes another making a choice not consistent with the Objectivist ethics, one should evaluate it in the context of one's own knowledge. However, the other person making the choice has a different context of knowledge. For example, if a knowledgeable Objectivist observes another donating to a beggar, stating they feel it is their duty, it would be immoral for the Objectivist to perform that same action because it would be blanking out their knowledge of Objectivism and what they know to be true. However, the other person may not have reached this conclusion due to evasion, but rather because they have passively accepted the virtue of altruism from constantly hearing it in society, and not realizing that there are other ethical alternatives. Yet, the action of self-sacrifice, in the abstract, is immoral as it is not compatible with man's life as the standard of value. To say that an action cannot be morally evaluated in the context of a person's knowledge is to suppose infallibility (with the possibility of evasion). I don't believe evaluating whether a person is evading is the root of Objectivist ethics--I believe there are two contexts of classifying the morality of an action--the specific and the abstract. A person thoroughly knowledgeable about Objectivism can (and morally, must) apply the abstract evaluation, in the context of the Objectivist ethics, to their own actions. Any person must morally evaluate their own actions on the basis of their context of knowledge.

The status of "moral v. immoral" has two contexts, which are often confused: An action can be deemed immoral in the general sense that it is not compatible with the Objectivist ethics. For example, the initiation of force is immoral according to the Objectivist ethics. Advocating the initiation of force is also not compatible with the Objectivist ethics, so one can generally deem speaking out in favor of the welfare state as immoral--it is against the proper behavior of a rational being. When speaking of a specific action of an individual person, usually, the context of full knowledge of, and time to integrate, the Objectivist ethics cannot be assumed. Thus, one evaluates whether one is basically acting in accordance with reality--are they following the evidence of their senses, attempting to apply logic--do they ever willfully evade the facts of reality? Human beings by their nature are not infallible, so mere errors in reasoning cannot be regarded as evasion. Particularly in today's society, with so many false ideas and facts being spread, there are in fact many ways a person can reach the wrong ideas by only errors in reasoning and errors of knowledge. For example, there are so many errors of reasoning or knowledge that can lead a moral person today to advocate a limited form of welfare as a safety net. A somewhat different example is that one can initiate force against another by accident. As long as the person makes amends, there is not necessarily any immorality. (Simple example: a car accident.) Even though in the abstract sense, the initiation of force is not moral per the Objectivist ethics. How is this ad hominem? (Now, you might argue that it's simply not true. But what if the poster cited names or posts? I'm not suggesting he do that, just illustrating that it's not ad hominem.) Ad hominem is attacking somebody personally to attempt to demonstrate that a different, unrelated argument they are making is not true. I don't see that happening here. I believe the poster is citing a certain belief that he believes to be untrue--and then stating that certain people hold it. That's not ad hominem. Can't somebody reject a true proposition by honest error? To call it irrational, I think one would have to show evidence of a clear process of unreason, like deliberately avoiding facts that they don't know how to argue against. can't somebody prematurely reach a conclusion through honest error?

No. Because, (1) the Republicans won't fix it, and then we'll just have the short-term economic ruin to contend with; (2) historically, mere events don't change people's views except for the very short-term, and (3) the American people are being exposed to the rapid spread of Objectivism and are becoming more likely to adopt free-market views based on the appeal of the ideas, rather than only as a response to economic problems (though the latter is providing a short-term acceleration to the spread of these ideas, the spread of Objectivism has been growing quietly for some time, particularly with the spread of web sites, blogs and forums on the Internet). Until we have candidates for office willing to advocate and vote for individual rights, electing Republicans, or keeping gridlock, is an effort at buying time while the culture moves to embrace capitalism.

That's not what the first linked article says. The article reports, "The ad was rejected by Bloomington Public Transportation Corporation because, as its policy reads, “Statements of position in support of or in opposition to controversial public issues shall not be accepted.”" If the linked article is complete, then the policy concerns what advertising will be accepted by the Bloomington Public Transportation Corporation. Not what individuals may place on their own privately owned buses. I would probably approve of such policy. I don't want tax dollars to support a system where anyone can pay a small sum and put whatever hugely offensive message they wish on a vehicle which is impervious to boycott or other effects of the market.

I'm the same JeffT who posted on The Forum for Ayn Rand Fans. I wouldn't have felt compelled to post there except for the presence of the second-to-last paragraph in the essay. You didn't just ask people not to "endorse" and "publicly proselytize" TEW. That would indeed be unjustified in most cases, if one was not convinced thoroughly of the theory's at least probable correctness, or at least of the probability of a major, true contribution of part of the theory. You asked people not to "even mention" TEW. Two of your examples of who not to mention it to were "your friends" and "your professors"--generally not what I would consider to be "publicly proselytizing" (or even publicly mentioning). I have been aware of TEW for years from seeing Objectivists talk about it on the Internet, and I've never assumed it was true. But I have been interested in the theory because Objectivists I've highly respected in a large number of different contexts support it, and think it may be worthy of others' interest. Asking readers not to mention the theory unless they understood the physics in-depth, was, in my opinion, a pretty clear impugning of the character and honesty of these prominent Objectivist supporters. Your argument that they are dishonest requires an in-depth physics study to understand, yet contradicts the great intelligence and rationality I have observed in Objectivist communities (in non-TEW contexts) by some of its supporters, so you would be asking me to suspend my consideration of all that I already know until and unless I have such time to consider an in-depth physics argument.