[Nihilism]

It is impossible to reason with a person who rejects reason on principle. The best way to combat Nihilism is to ignore it, and to provide people with a better philosophy. If they tire of destroying themselves, they will begin to seek reason and to reject Nihilism. Otherwise, they will end up destroying themselves (which is no one's responsibility but their own).

As a way of externalizing their own drawn out suicides, Nihilists often turn to the initiation of force against others. In this scenario, the proper way of combating Nihilism would be retaliatory force. That's the exception to the rule of ignoring Nihilists.

[Psychology of Self-Interest]

There might be some subtle jab at Branden implicit in that article, but I think Dr. Hurd is referring to the Self-Esteem Movement in a much broader sense than that contained in Dr. Branden's work. For instance, the mystical "self-esteem" of which the Public School System stands as self-proclaimed guardian is utterly antithetical to that which Branden advocates.

Both Branden's and Dr. Hurd's approach focus on what would be referred to in more clinical or academic works as an "internal locus of control." Implicit in such a condition is a feeling of personal efficacy (Dr. Hurd's "responsibility") and a feeling of personal worth (Dr. Branden's "self esteem") which are reciprocating and psychologically indivisible characteristics.

By criticizing the "Self-esteem Movement," Dr. Hurd could only be interpreted (IMO) as criticizing Dr. Branden inasmuch as Dr. Branden frequently takes credit for "launching" this movement, just as he takes credit for "launching" Objectivism.

I agree that Branden's earlier work was far superior to his more recent publications. His later stuff reads too much like an infomercial, selling his "approach."

Though I have to admit that I remain more skeptic of Dr. Hurd specially quoting his cheeky article in CapMag  http://capmag.com/article.asp?ID=3801

The Error of the Self-Esteem Movement

by Michael J. Hurd  (June 24, 2004)      (why not just mention names ?)   

[Your thoughts on my rambling critique of O'ism?]

That's right. A Metaphysics ("nature of the universe") is prior to any Epistemology ("nature of knowledge").

Similarly, an Epistemology is prior to any verifiable knowledge of metaphysics. In any philosophical statement, an Epistemology and a Metaphysics are implied. These are the two corollary foundations of any philosophical system.

An attempt to establish Epistemology without Metaphysics is Empiricism. An attempt to establish (knowledge about) Metaphysics without Epistemology is Subjectivism.

So an axiom such as "Existence exists," is Metaphysics, because it describes the nature of the universe. But it's Epistemological in that it is an irreducible intellectual primary, which validates and makes possible the potentiality of knowledge, and is an example of something that can be known.

["talking To God"]

I was reading the 17th century ("heretical") Jewish philosopher, Spinoza, yesterday, and I came across the most eloquent answer to the initial question in this thread:

"I must further premise that the Jews never make any mention or account of secondary, or particular causes, but in a spirit of religion, piety, and what is commonly called godliness, refer all things directly to the Deity. For instance, if they make money by a transaction, they say God gave it to them; if they desire anything, they say God has disposed their hearts towards it; if they think anything, they say God told them. Hence we must not suppose that everything is prophecy or revelation which is described in Scripture as told by God to any one, but only such things as are expressly announced as prophecy or revelation, or are plainly pointed to as such by the context." (From The Philosophy of Spinoza, Random House, 1954; pg. 38.)

This was given as a rule of thumb for interpreting scripture, but it fits in with my hypothesis regarding modern religionists also. For the record, I do recognize a difference between religion and superstition. But the former (a primitive attempt at philosophy) often contains the latter, and Judeo-Christianity is no exception. Observe how Spinoza anticipates my last post on people using the supernatural to explain things they don't understand:

"If the Jews were at a loss to understand any phenomenon, or were ignorant of its cause, they referred it to God. Thus a storm was termed the chiding of God, thunder and lightning the arrows of God, for it was thought that God kept the winds confined in caves, His treasuries; thus differing merely in name from the Greek wind-god Eolus. In like manner miracles were called works of God, as being especially marvelous; though in reality, of course; all natural events are the works of God, and take place solely by His power. The Psalmist calls the miracles in Egypt the works of God, because the Hebrews found in them a way of safety which they had not looked for, and therefore especially marveled at.

As, then, unusual natural phenomena are called works of God, and trees of unusual size are called trees of God, we cannot wonder that very strong and tall men, though impious robbers and whoremongers, are in Genesis called sons of God." (pg. 44; Ibid.)

I find Spinoza's approach more effective than my own, since its targets are Biblical, therefore less controversial than my Exorcist representatives of Christianity, which could with some legitimacy be dismissed as a straw man. Thomas Aquinas believed in angles and miracles too, but my point wasn't that all Christians walk around with torches and pitch forks looking for demonically inspired illnesses, only that the essential metaphysics presented in the Bible contains nothing to explicitly contradict such a practice-- if you take it literally.

[Your thoughts on my rambling critique of O'ism?]

One must not "verify" that animals are secretly superintelligent space aliens who control the human race with their mind-altering psychic abilities.

I meant: "One must not 'verify' that animals are not secretly superintelligent space aliens..."

Conceptualization in animals has never been proved-- not even in the higher animals.

I mean the higher animals, besides humans, of course. Sorry about making a new post-- the "Edit" button is missing. I posted this today- why is it I can sometimes edit my posts after I've posted them and other times not? Moderators? (Like this post! I could edit it, but not the other one? )

[Your thoughts on my rambling critique of O'ism?]

Ah! I wish I could have had an opportunity to read your post and reply sooner, dariusnoir.

...I have to search through tomes and ask myself if whether or not Mises was a Kantian, and why some crackpots and cranks might consider him a Kantian or not a Kantian--etc, etc...

Based on what I've read, he regarded himself as a Kantian. But I haven't devoted a lot of my time to Von Mises yet-- I'm very interested in his economic theories, but I've never heard anything good about him philosophically, including from Ayn Rand, and that was my point: Rand disagreed with Von Mises' epistemology, and said so herself-- whether you agree in essence with his epistemology was a side issue. I might recommend an essay called "Philosophical Detection" in Rand's _Philosophy: Who Needs It_ for insight in to how to locate a particular philosopher's basic underlying premises-- or at least how to tell, maybe, whether a "Randian" (Objectivist) would decide whether someone is "Kantian" or not.

I never defended a groundless argument--what I said concerns having epistemology without a foundation--an epistemology is not a system of axioms which find themselves upon the shoulders of some axiomatic Atlas!

I apologize, I didn't define my terms. For me, "groundless" means: "without a foundation." Specifically-- without any reference point "grounded" in objective reality, arguments become "floating abstractions," which fall apart, like a building without a foundation. When you say "an epistemology is not..." do you mean that an epistemology cannot be such a system, or just that it is not necessarily? The latter, I would agree with; the former is incorrect. The axiomatic "Atlas" in Objectivism is sense perception-- specifically, the realization that Existence exists, and that consciousness is there also to perceive it, with the Law of Identity as an inescapable corollary. I call this an "axiomatic Atlas" because that is the epistemology which is presupposed by every consciousness. Even an epistemology that opposes it depends on it for reification and intelligibility.

Why do I have to play this stupid "one-of-these-things-is -not-like-the-other" game and go round and round?

Are you asking why you have to discriminate and excercise your faculty of judgement? You don't, of course, but I won't continue this dialogue much longer if you contintue not to (I don't mean that as a personal insult, but literally.)

You can easily say that animals have only sensations and perceptions while humans have that and the ability to conceptualize, but what data confirms this proposition?  How do we verify that animals have no ability to conceptualize?

You are evidently unaware of an epistemological principle known as "The Onus of Proof," (on which Objectivism and other systems frequently rely.) This is a philosophical "razor" which states as follows: "The burden of proof is always on the positive assertion." In other words, it is never necessary to prove that a given proposition is false, provided there is no evidence for its actuality. For example: One must not "verify" that animals have no ability to conceptualize. Or: One must not "verify" that animals are secretly superintelligent space aliens who control the human race with their mind-altering psychic abilities. Etc.

One may easily say that animals have only sensations and perceptions, and one may easily prove this assertion. Conceptualization in animals has never been proved-- not even in the higher animals. If evidence for this were ever found, we would adjust our context of knowledge accordingly; at some level of development, however, there would still exist an animal which does not have the ability to conceptualize, thus Rand's analogy remains intact regardless.

  Assuming that we are all rational and believe in the evolution of species on this planet, where did the human ability to conceptualize emerge within the chain? (or tree, bush, whatever you choose to think of as a model) Whence comes this stage (or state)?  How do we know that animals do not perform "abstractions" and are not able to "integrate. . .by choice" or through their own volition?  If there is evidence that clearly delineates the human being from an animal in terms of volitional consciousness and conceptualization, I would like to know.  Perhaps one of you will actually find something that will truly help my understanding on these matters.

If you want the exact point, Anthropologically-- well I'm sure I would win a Nobel Prize if I could tell you for sure. Personally, I wasn't there when the first human conceptualized for the first time. But for individual humans, all the evidence suggests that conceptualization begins very early in infancy, even before the infant learns to speak-- but when the infant pronounces its first (meaningful) words, then he can be said to be conceptualizing in the fullest sense of the word.

There is evidence that clearly deleanates the human from the animal inasmuch as there is ample evidence for human conceptualization and no evidence for conceptualization in animals (or in rocks, rivers, planets, or solar systems, etc.-- or in societies or human collectives for that matter.)

But incase you begin to wonder, the Objectivist epistemology is not dependent entirely on deductive reasoning from axioms-- and this gets to the heart of what I think you're after. The essence of the Objectivist approach to epistemology is in the principles of induction. That's more advanced than I could possibly sketch in one post-- Leonard Peikoff has, I believe, done the most groundbreaking work in this subject. Do a search at the ARI website for his brilliant lectures and essays on the nature and principles of induction.

Carl Jung.  (c.f. "The phenomenology of the psyche," "Mysterium coniunctionis," "Psychology and alchemy")

Carl Jung went a step beyond his mentor, Freud, and made no attempt to hide his mystical presumptions. The only important thing about Freudian constructions is that they illustrate the principle that an arbitrary system that can be used to explain everything explains nothing. As to the specific clinical contributions of Freud et. al. into the specific mechanical functionings of human consciousness, that's another story and a whole other topic that's irrelevant to their underlying theories (as Von Mises' epistemology is irrelevant to his contributions to the science of Economics).

It is impossible to know just how much of the ego is circumvented by our own subconscious designs, but I know that everyone in this forum has experienced such a "subversion."

The subconscious is not as ghostly as you make it out to be. It is the entire content of an individual's mind that is not presently held in conscious awareness. That means that when you're not concentrating on a particular concept, memory, or emotion-- it still exists in your mind, ie, it hasn't vanished from existence-- it's in your "subconscious" mind, where you can later retrieve information from it and choose to concentrate on some particular, specific thought. The mechanics of the exact nature of how this works in the brain, and the pathological study of various malfunctions in this extremely complicated, still barely understood, process, is fascinating. But it's not within the scope of philosophy-- these are psychological and physiological issues. All philosophy can tell you is how to pursue knowledge in these fields (and in any field), not the specific knowledge you will acquire.

[Your thoughts on my rambling critique of O'ism?]

One of the ironic things about this thread, is that Von Mises was a Kantian, epistemologically-- and his philosophical beliefs were hated by Rand, as she always stated any time she said something favorable about his economics.

Dariusnoir is also a Kantian, epistemologically. Although he presents his case as though he maintained one position, whereas Von Mises and Rand maintained a counterposition, the reality is that his epistemology and Von Mises' are identical, whereas Rand refutes them both.. and in his case, earlier(!).

Well, sorry, Dar.. but as soon as you assert that groundless arguments are the only ones that are valid, everything else you say is pretty much worthless.

[My Weimar Culture Presentation]

I started a new thread about the specific issue of the Communists voting for the Nazis in the 1933 election here.

Punk, Peikoff's style of writing took a little getting used to for me, but now I love his works (while we're stating our unsupported subjective opinions on the issue.) I also think he's an excellent public speaker. You should try downloading some of his speeches from ARI sometime. If there aren't any there, there is at least a link to his webpage where some can be downloaded.

[Did The Communists Vote Nazi In 1933?]

The original topic where the issue was brought up ishere..

I only have CUI on the Objectivism Research CD Rom, and I'm not good at navigating through that yet. So I didn't check the bibliography, or realize that there was one. I'll have to next time I go to my mom's house.

I thought that _The Ominous Parallels_ had a reference to that event as well, but I ran about a dozen searches on the CD Rom and I couldn't find anything about it.

I only found quotes from the German Liberal Democrat Party about working with the Nazis to fight the common enemy of Capitalism.

But again, I'm a newbie with that CD Rom and its search feature, and my mom's computer is slow.

[Weird Argument For Socialism]

if it wasn't for jumping trains.

Oops, I meant to say "holding up trains," like Butch Cassite used to do. Jumping trains is just stowing away on a train without paying for it. Still immoral, but not as powerful of an analogy.

[Did The Communists Vote Nazi In 1933?]

In chapter 17 of Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal, Ayn Rand says:

"It is a matter of record that in the German Election of 1933, the Communist Party was ordered by its leaders to vote for the Nazis - with the explanation that they could later fight the Nazis for power, but first they had to help destroy their common enemy : capitalism and its parliamentary form of government."

This claim has been disputed in another thread, so I wondered if anyone knows where I can find evidence of its validity.

[My Weimar Culture Presentation]

I haven't "blanked out" my reference as to the Communists voting for the Nazis. But I, being only a proletarian supporter of Capitalism, do not always have access to a computer. Sorry.

Well, I thought it was in _Ominous Parallels_, but it's actually from Ayn Rand's _Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal_. The reference comes from chapter 17: "'Extremism,' Or the Art Of Smearing." Ayn Rand's statement is as follows:

"It is a matter of record that in the German election of 1933, the Communist Party was ordered by its leaders to vote for the Nazis-- with the explanation that they could later fight the Nazis for power, but first they had to help destroy their common enemy: capitalism and its parliamentary form of government."

Unfortunately, a reference to the exact "record" from which this information was obtained is not included.

[Your thoughts on my rambling critique of O'ism?]

Perceptions, on the other hand, are not necessarily conscious actions of the organism in general, but can stem from both voluntary and involuntary processes--circumventing the domain of the ego.

No, they can precede the "domain of the ego" ie, the conceptual realm, but not "circumvent" it. For example, when you are startled by a loud noise, such as a gunshot, the physiological experience of fear begins before it has been processed by the conceptual faculty (as has been demonstrated in experiments.) But then it is up to the judgements of the "ego," after conceptualizations, as to whether the fear should continue or what should be done about it.

it cannot be said that integration and differentiation of things at the perceptual level are a necessary and sufficient condition for consciousness

Things can be differentiated (and associated) at the perceptual level, but integration occurs, as I understand it, at the conceptual level.

(this stems from the zero-sum nature of the logical proposition forwarded by Rand and her associates and followers.)

(As a corollary to A) that the nature of cognitive integration and differentiation lies totally within the domain of consciousness.

Another epistemology that was destroyed by (earlier!) researches in cognitive science was the idea developed by the Austrian Economist, Ludwig von Mises--i.e. that the "ego is the unity of the acting being."  As shown by researches in the domain of analytical psychology (and even some researches treating the living organism as a "black box"--behavioristic analysis), and cognitive neuro-linguistics, if objectivist epistemology is anything like that of Mises then  it should fail the test of science most miserably.

::yawn:: See David Odden's post above. Are you unaware that research, to be interpreted, must be interpreted based on some epistemology or other? Opposing premises (sometimes) lead to opposing conclusions. Look further into what the Objectivist Epistemology actually says, before making arbitrary, hypothetical claims about what it *might* mean to so and so if it *maybe* means this or that, please. And don't believe everything you hear from the "Scientific Authorities."

[Did Ayn Rand really create Objectivism?]

Is Ayn Rand the source, or is reality?

I think it's worth mentioning, too, that Ayn Rand was real. Human consciousness exists, and ideas exist-- as separate, although derived, from the metaphysical facts of physical reality.

In that sense, it's a mistake to ask "Is Ayn Rand the source, or is reality?" Just as it would be to say "Is Plato the source of Platonism, or is reality?" The relevant question is: "Did Ayn Rand's ideas (or Plato's) correspond to reality." Or: "Was she right?"

We would say Ayn Rand's ideas corresponded to reality (and Plato's did not-- at least, not all of them.) But inasmuch as they were her ideas, they were derived from her (ie, they were not automatic, conditioned, behavioral responses to her environment, but were the product of mental effort and creativity on her part.)

[What Is The Objectivist View On Intuition?]

Albert Einstein on problem solving: “There comes a leap in consciousness, call if intuition or what you will, the solution comes to you and you don't know how or why.”

I'm not sure what the best word is for this. "Hunch" sounds okay, and maybe "intuition" provided it is clear from the context what is meant.

Ayn Rand does deal with this concept in an extremely insightful and innovative way in what might seem an unlikely source: The Art of Fiction.

She refers to techniques that can be described as "programming your subconscious mind" to give you immediate solutions to a problem- in the context of the book, the problem of selecting the perfect arrangement of words when telling a story. But the principles can be applied to other intellectual activities too. She gives the example of Newton's apple falling off the tree and hitting him on the head, when suddenly, he grasps his theory of gravity.

She explains the phenomenon with this aphorism: "Lucky accidents come to those who deserve them." Meaning, if you put in the necessary preliminary intellectual effort, the solution to a problem will appear at the right time. She then goes into detail on methods of "programming the subconscious mind."

It's not a mystical, unprecedented phenomenon-- but, as she points out, it does *seem* like that, when it's happening, if one is not skilled with introspection.

That's why I think The Art of Fiction is potentially one of the most psychologically important Objectivist works so far, after ITOE. You could almost build a whole scientific field of study off of it. You could call it "Critique of Intuition".. (I'm being ironic, but really I think you could.)

I will add that I agree with everything that has been said about the impossibility of what has traditionally been called "intuition" in philosophy.

[The Power Of Dreams]

If you know of any objective techniques for this, please tell! And also, how did you come to discover them?

Do we want to get into dream interpretation? I LOVE doing that! 

c

[My Weimar Culture Presentation]

The German Communists felt that National Socialism represented the culmination of a failing capitalist order.  After this last hurrah's attempts to maintain capitalism inspite of its collapse, the oppressed proletariat would rise up and overthrow it and impose the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Of course without allied occupation of Germany after the war, this is probably what would have happened.

I disagree. The Nazis were always explicitly anti-Capitalist. They were as vehement in their comments against Capitalism as they were in their comments against the Jews.

I believe that the German Communists voted for the Nazi party because they didn't want to divide the vote. They believed that they and the Nazi's were fighting a common enemy- Capitalism. They thought the Nazi's were more likely to win, so they supported them. I think they believed that once Capitalism was defeated by the Nazis, they would be able to sway the vote back to themselves.

But the difference between Nazism and Communism is in method, not intention or fundamental ideology. The Nazis wanted the German public to believe that they were working *with* ("tolerating") private businesses somewhat, instead of obviously and explicitly seizing absolute control. But the Communists knew what the Nazis true intention was.

[What is O'ism's view on Biological Determinism?]

I do not think the "beautiful bimbo" stereotype is one of "beautiful BUT bimbo", I think it is closer to being a case of "beautiful THEREFORE bimbo".

That would be a causal connection. But does this stereotype imply that being a bimbo makes her beautifull, or that being beautifull makes her a bimbo? Or are they reciprocal attributes?

However, within the normal range, among the people around me, I do not find any correlation between their looks and their "popularity". Do you?

That depends on the values of the specific people involved. I'm a musician, so normatively, in my experience, there is a correlation. But that's because most people would rather watch someone perform on stage if they are attractive to look at (as well as talented). But the same does not necissarily apply to, say a recording engineer. This person is more in demand (ie, popular) depending on their level of skill and efficiency, not necissarily physical appearance.

[Weird Argument For Socialism]

I can't say anything against armed robbery, because I wouldn't have anywhere to live or anything to eat if it wasn't for jumping trains.

Or getting the government to do it for me?

"well, i can't say anything against government programs because my mom was really poor and we wouldn't have had anywhere to live or anything to eat if it hadn't been for the government"

how could this argument be classified, and what is the proper response?

[What is O'ism's view on Biological Determinism?]

I'd personally be more inclined to class it as an irrational case of stereotyping rather than "seeing attractiveness as a value".

I don't think it's necessarily irrational. Especially regarding popularity with the opposite sex. Physical attractiveness is most certainly a value-- not the only value, or the most important-- but a man's character is often displayed on the symmetry of the face. Bone structure is not all that determines symmetry- also facial expressions, hygiene, and personal style (clothes, haircuts, etc).

But what appears attractive to "people" normatively must be distinguished from the distinguished taste of a tasteful individual. For instance, I think Ayn Rand was a beautiful woman, but many disagree. Is taste innate? I doubt it- my taste has evolved with my values, therefore I think psycho-epistemological (and therefore philosophical) factors are at least a crucial element in defining taste.

I submit, as evidence, that different cultures have different opinions of what is "attractive."

That surprises me. I'm more used to people thinking in terms of beautiful but brainless bimbos or about pretty but brainless boys. Some of my male colleagues will joking rue their profession of choice (software development), saying that it attracts the smart girls but not the pretty ones.

I am confused about what you mean when you say "thinking in terms." I thought that the phenomenon of brainless beauty was noted because of its irony-- as you say "beautiful BUT brainless," implying they have one value but lack another, as if you might expect or hope for a beautiful person also to be intelligent, but that it's not always that way.

Are you suggesting that people actually find intelligence unattractive? Or unintelligence attractive? Or just that there is no causal connection between these whatsoever (in which case, why would people think in terms of brainless bimbos)?

[My Weimar Culture Presentation]

Don't forget that the Soviets originally supported the Nazis. In fact, members of the Communist Party living in Germany were ordered to vote for Hitler. There is a reference to that in _Ominous Parallels_, but I don't have my copy handy for a page number.

I wrote: Philosphy drove the intelligentsia to fail to challenge Hitler.

You replied:

Many had Soviet sympathies...  I view that as a failure to challenge Nazism.  What an awful alternative intellectually, and certainly historically.  Lenin's victims alone almost cry out from the grave at such a suggestion.  That was part of the reason fascism erupted, many europeans wanted anything but to be submitted to that.

[Self-help/self-improvement Books]

Great SN, RoarkLaughed! How about an Objectivist book on humor, to show the people who say Objectivists don't have a good sense of humor. The topic of humor is rarely discussed intellectually, and the research into its nature is scarce. You could actually potentially contribute something substantial to science and Psychology if you explore that topic, err, seriously enough.

[The Power Of Dreams]

Do you have any suggestions for realizing your dreaming when you're dreaming?  I've had 1 lucid dream my entire life but haven't been successful at having any others--I journaled for around 4-6 months with hundreds of attempts at lucidity, but none were efficacious  (I was able to recall dreams impeccably, but no lucidity!)

JMeganSnow is right that lucid dreams are not usually very deep sleep. I've found I had more lucid dreams that I could remember if there was something going on in my environment while I slept- loud music in another room, for example, or roomates awake studying and watching tv.

Also, I found that if I concentrate on the type of dream I want to have before I fall asleep, sometimes I can make myself actually have that dream. The hard part for me is not waking myself up as soon as I realize I'm dreaming. If I try to steer my dream too much in a direction it's not going, I'll wake myself up. I try to follow the rules of the dream as much as they had been established before I realized I'm dreaming, and still maintain an awareness that it's a dream, and that it's in my mind, therefore I have some control over what's happening.

Maybe it's my psychological habit of applying reason to reality that helps me realize I'm dreaming. Even if I'm in a dream, the first hint of A being non-A sets of red flags for me. Usually it will be something like that- something impossible happens and I think, "Oh, it's a dream. Let's see what I can learn and do."

And no one dreams about anything they've never seen before.

I'm not sure how literally you meant this. Part of the content of dreams is a refiling of images and sounds stored in the memory. It could be all dreams start out that way. But as the subconscious mind begins to attempt to interpret these images into something coherent, new images and sounds are created. I'm not sure about this, but I think it's possible for new images and sounds to be generated entirely from the imagination that are not taken from the memory.

I know I've heard people that I know in real life say words in dreams, in their own voices, that I have never heard them say in real life. And I've seen fantastic creatures, machines, and otherworldly scenery in dreams that don't approach anything I've seen in real life. But if your theory is correct, I think this could still be explained with images and sounds stored in memory, reorganized in such a way that they simply appear different.

After all, there are only, I think, five flavours that the human palate can distinguish, but combinations of these five gives rise to every seemingly disparate taste imaginable. And every color of the rainbow is made from the same three primary colors, in different mixtures.

I'm sceptical about the benefits of writing down details of your dreams. I think that using words and concepts from 'day to day life' to describe dream experiences, which are often as far removed from waking life as is possible to imagine, is going to cramp and distort them to a fairly large degree. It would be like writing coherently about an LSD trip or trying to describe string theory using nothing other than common English - that just isnt what the language is meant to be used for.

Ridiculous. Anything can be described with words. Besides, the benifit is that it helps you remember things better. Maybe it helps you become a better writer, too!

["talking To God"]

"Christianity" is a religion, not a philosophical system. Many individuals of varying philosophical premises and degrees of intelligence constitute the whole of Christianity. It is the oldest trick in the book for Christians to deny the wrongdoing of a majority of the Church by saying, "Well, those weren't the *real* Christians."

But even to this day, there are stories in the newspaper from time to time of some poor adolescent suffering from the early stages of schitzophrenia being taken to a Catholic priest, and having all sorts of unspeakable cruel and unusual things done to him in the name of driving out demons.

I'm not even saying that a majority of Christians still believe this way, just that there are some who do. And since, like most religions, the doctrines on which Christianity is based are so vaguely stated and incomplete, these people have just as much a right to the title of "Christian" as the most rational Thomist does.

"Since" the Dark Ages, Christian scientists moved forward: between the twelfth and the fourteenth centuries about forty universities were founded in Europe, partly by private initiative, partly by princes or popes, in most cases by the combined efforts of both together with the members of the university. To many of the professors' chairs, ecclesiastical benefices were applied by the popes without other obligation than that of teaching science. If you're claiming that Christians believed that illness wasn't worth studying because it was due to demonic influences, you're simply ignoring the advances in science and medicine that were made by Christians. Use facts, if you desire credibility.

[The Power Of Dreams]

And I thought so too (I remain on the fulcrum between both sides--wavering neither way).  One time I decided to read my journals from a few months back to see how many I had remembered, and after reading this particular one i thought to myself, "Oh my god...this ACTUALLY happened."  With mild incredulity, I got extremely excited and read many more, looking for other ones.  I ended up finding another one that fit almost entirely and then one that was partially true (although not enough to say that it was a prediction).

Well, it might not be 100% coincidence. Although the exact process that goes into the creation of dreams is not completely understood, it is believed that dreams are at least partially the result of things that have been on your mind during the day.

For example, if you are planning on meeting your Aunt Nadine at Starbucks next week, you might have a dream about the experience-- based on previous experiences with your Aunt Nadine, and Starbucks, and also your imagination about what *might* happen. Then, when it happens-- miracle of miracles!-- it's just like you dreamed. But if you've been to Starbucks with Aunt Nadine a hundred times, it's not so mystical. Especially considering that you remember only the details that happen to coincide with reality and forget the rest. Even if you've never been to Starbucks or met your Aunt, your imigination might get *some* details right, which still might surprize you when it happens in real life.

Perhaps because you are aware that feelings aren't tools of cognition and you're actually NOT able to do ridiculous acrobatic stunts? I occasionally dream that I have wings and I sometimes wake up with phantom sensations of actually possessing them. Which means what? That I had a very vivid dream, that's what.

Lol, I like your style of writing. It's interesting that you use that particular example about flying though. I'm almost sure I've seen Ayn Rand use that same example of a flying dream, when discussing the tremendous power dreams have to inspire us. The inspiration comes from a desire to recapture that emotion-- not necissarily from a belief that human flight is actually possible. But I agree that if you can't seperate the fantasy from the reality, you probably won't ever recapture (ie, achieve) that liberating emotion in real life.