crizon
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*** Long post ***
You've missed my point.
One either has free will, or one doesn't. Man either has free will, or he does not. (I'm using "free will" "volition" "choice" equivalently, referring to the same phenomena, mans ability to select among alternatives, fundamentally a phenomena of his consciousness, his conceptual consciousness.)
If man does not have free will, then his conceptual knowledge is an illusion, which has been your contention, at least with respect to free will. You either believe it's an illusion, think it's an illusion, have doubts it's not an illusion, etc.
If man does not have free will, then he is determined, his conceptual faculty is determined. What he thinks, he had to think. (It doesn't matter how he is determined, if he's determined, he's determined, he doesn't have free will.)
This is not true. If man does not have free will, he does not have to be determined; he could also act (partially) random.
The Law of Causality does require that the same entity in the exact same situation will act in the exact same way.But causality for man's conceptual consciousness is not causality for billiard balls. Or, it is and it isn't, depending upon what you're talking about. It's the same in the sense that causality applies as surely to the one as to the other. Both obey causal law, both are bound in their actions to their identity, neither can act contrary to its nature, its identity.
Let's say that you and I play a game of pool, you know, the game with the balls on the table. It doesn't matter, for this discussion, what particular game we play, but we can play eight-ball if you need to know what game.
The point is, when you strike the cue ball with the cue stick, the ball rolls, and if it hits another ball, that ball will roll as well. If you have studied the layout of balls well, and if you make the right calculation and then strike the cue ball the right way, the "one" ball, let's say, will go into the corner pocket.
However, if you strike a human being with a cue stick, he may do many things, but he will not roll into another ball on the pool table and cause that next ball to roll, nor will he go into the corner pocket, etc.
He may in fact become angry with you and hit you back.
Billiard balls do not get angry at you when you hit them. People do, or might at least depending on the situation.
Why? Why the difference in actions of the different things given the same action on your part?
Different entities act differently because they are different. The Law of Causality is the Law of Identity applied to the actions of entities. What a thing does is caused by it's identity.
Causality doesn't require that a human act like billiard ball, and it doesn't require that a billiard ball act like a human. It merely says that each will act according to it's nature, it's identity.
Repeatedly, you have insisted that only were we able to create the exact same situation would we be able to test whether or not a person could make another choice than the one they made the original time.
So, I'm accepting your ridiculous challenge to show that it's not necessary and that even were it possible it would not serve the function you claim it would. It would not "prove" one way or the other that the person has free will, the person who hypothetically goes back in time to the exact same situation.
Again, as a reminder, causality only implies that a human being must act as a human being, now, in the past, in the future, even were it possible for him to be in the exact same situation, exact in every way. A human being is a human being, not anything else. A is A.
What's ridiculous is your condition on the "proof" of free will or volition. It is literally not possible to go back to and repeat the exact-same-conditions in which a person made a choice.
Literally, if they could go back again to the exact same condition, they would be in the exact same condition. That's not possible, but let's say it can be done.
And, with You.
Let's send you back to the exact same condition, standing there at that shop you mentioned previously, choosing between chocolate ice-cream and strawberry ice-cream.
Ready?
Okay, you're back there confronting the same choice. I, the head of the research department for Ridiculous Experiments, watch to see what you choose, chocolate or strawberry. I record the event, and make the needed entries into a log.
So what?
Let's say you choose chocolate the second time, just like the first time. (Of course, for you, it's the first time. Only for me or others observing this experiment is it your second time.)
Are you now convinced of free will?
What if then on the third time, you choose strawberry?
Are you now convinced of free will?
Let's say that we run this ridiculous experiment over and over and over.
Now, obviously, for you, each and every repeat is just like the first time, so you can't compare them, you're totally ignorant of what you did previously or what you will do on the next occasion. This is, after all, the exact same situation.
So, as yet, you're in no better a position than you were the first time, nor with each and every choice you confront now, have confronted, or will confront. They're al the same to you, regardless of whether you pick chocolate ice-cream or strawberry ice-cream, you are confronting and making the same choice each and every time, by design of the experiment, and by fact of your own experience, excepting that you do not know that it's the same as any other time. For you, there is no other time, else we've failed to comply with your ridiculous requirement for the "proof" of free will.
We have got to do something about that, else you'll never have your "proof."
Oh, I know.
We bring you back to the lab of Ridiculous Experiments.
Okay, you're back to where we were when we decided to do the experiment, and now you remember all the many exact same situations of your choosing between chocolate and strawberry ice-cream. (To aid your memory, if needed, of course we have recorded the exact same event over and over, but we've been sure to use new media for each recording, and we've properly filed them all. There's no question about the recorded evidence of the experiment.)
So we have given you the memory now of all of those exact same events or conditions of your making the choice between chocolate and strawberry ice-cream. You're requirements are met, in full, in sufficient numbers for you to now have the data that you claim to be necessary to "prove" free will or volition.
So, what can you now conclude from the data?
What if we ran the experiment for 60 times, and the results varied. (Hypothetically, we can do such things.) Say that we ran two sets of 60 times each, or as many more sets of 60 as you demand.
For the first two sets, the results are:
First set: You chose chocolate all 60 times
Second set: Sometimes you chose chocolate; sometimes you chose strawberry (If the proportions matter to you, you'll have to let me know. I assume that it's not important how many times you choose strawberry, only that you at least do choose it in some of those exact same conditions.)
What would the results in the first set tell you? (All 60 times, you chose chocolate ice-cream.) Would you then have your "proof" of free will?
What would the results in second set tell you? (In this set of 60 times of the exact same conditions, sometimes you chose chocolate ice-cream, sometimes you chose strawberry ice-cream.) Would you then have your "proof" of free will?
Again, Causality doesn't demand that all existents act the same as all other existents in the exact same situation; it would only require that the exact same thing act the exact same way in the exact same situation, were it possible to have everything exactly the same again, and again, etc., however many times necessary for your ridiculous requirement on the "proof" of free will.
In all of those hypothetically exact same situations of you standing there at the shop making a choice between chocolate ice-cream and strawberry ice-cream, regardless of whether you always chose chocolate ice-cream or whether you chose chocolate ice-cream sometimes and strawberry ice-cream the other times, you fully acted in accord with the Law of Causality: You were in the exact same situation, and you did the exact same thing.
Get it?
Regardless of the choice you made, chocolate or strawberry ice-cream, you made a choice, a single choice, the exact same choice.
Each and every time in those many exact same situations, you had to make the exact same choice in the exact same conditions, and you made this exact same choice whether you chose chocolate ice-cream invariably, or you chose chocolate ice-cream sometimes and strawberry ice-cream other times.
You understand? You made the exact same choice because you were in the exact same situation. That choice was: chocolate ice-cream or strawberry ice-cream.
And you made your choice each and every time. You either chose chocolate ice-cream or you chose strawberry ice-cream.
Why did you choose chocolate some or all the times you made that exact same choice (between chocolate ice-cream and strawberry ice-cream)?
What was the cause of the choice you made between chocolate ice-cream and strawberry ice-cream?
You're absolutely not going to like this.
The cause of your particular choice of chocolate or strawberry ice-cream is the same cause for every choice you have ever made, are making, and will make:
YOU.
Now you'll protest, I'm sure. (I wonder why I'm sure of that.)
We've met your ridiculous requirements. You've made the choice of chocolate ice-cream or strawberry ice-cream over and over and over in the exact same conditions, and you have acted completely consistent with the requirements of Causality -- that in the exact same situation the exact same thing, you, will act in the exact same say.
But you see, you're in no better a place for your "proof" with respect to free will than you were, and are, without running the ridiculous experiment.
So, what did you get out of the experiment?
By your nature, you will have to make choices. You cannot get around that fact. You've been making choices all your life. By your nature you are determined to have to make choices, and what choice you make in each and every choice is 100% up to you. You are the cause of the choices you make.
There's a somewhat confusing equivocation there in the use of the word "choice."
By your nature, you are caused to have to make choices. That you can, and must, make choices comes with the territory, comes with being a human being. You have the capacity of choice, of volition, of free will, of necessity, due to causality, determinedly so, because of the kind of entity you are. But what you pick or select or choose with each and every choice you make is yours to choose.
There's no proof of free will; it's self-evident.
In 10 seconds, make a choice between saying "Green" or "Purple" out loud (you don't have to yell) or not saying either "Green" or "Purple" out loud. (I've given you more than a simple this versus that, A versus non-A, choice to make.)
I'll wait.
.
.
.
.
Okay, what was your choice? What did you do?
Did you say "Green" out loud. Or did you not say "Purple" out loud? Or did you choose not to say either out loud?
You cannot escape the fact that you had to make a choice. I pushed that choice onto you by presenting it to you. Once you are aware of the choice, you have to make it, one way or the other.
The way you make it, the choice you make in that choice, is entirely up to you. And, you can observe yourself making that choice directly. [Did I hear you say, "No way, I'm not going to make that choice! I'm not saying either "Green" or "Purple" out loud." That's your choice, and it's the third option I presented.]
Although your nature is the cause of the fact that you have to make a choice, You are the cause of the choice you make, the selection among the alternatives presented to you in the choice.
So again, what did you choose to do? Did you say "Green" out loud? Did you say "Purple" out loud? Or did you not say either out loud?
Whatever, whichever, you chose, YOU chose.
The same happens all the time in life. You become aware of the need to make a choice, and you make it. Once you are aware of the need to make a choice, there's no escaping it. You have to choose. Even the refusal to choose is a choice in such a context.
Who makes your choice? You do.
What causes you to make the choice you make?
You.
And you know it.
[Edited for clarity.]
You are right, that this experiment would _not_ proof free will (I never said it would), it could merely disproof determinism (if I picked different favours), but the explanation for 2 different actions in twice the same situation could simply be randomness.
Here is where one of my problems lies: Volition is supposed to be neither determinism nor randomness, but it offer any information on the level of causation. You wouldn't proof or disproof volition with such an experiment, because it simply does not say where the claim that a human "could have done otherwise" in the same situation differs from randomness.
You often said, that I have to make a choice, that choice is in the nature of man, that I can't get around of making choices, but you still have not given me a definition or your understanding of the word choice.
Your argumentation rests on the assumption that I do in fact make choices, so I can't agree or disagree until I know what you mean by choice.
And I don't understand why you claim that this thought experiment was my "requirement". It was Peikoff who wrote "[...]he could have chosen otherwise." So Peikoff made a claim about the outcome of an impossible experiment, not me. It is not me who argues for the existence of free will.
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I think there are important differences between Christianity and Islam on a basic and one a "practical" level. The second testament is a lot more pacifistic than the koran, since Islam was spread by war by the Muhammad himself.
Sure you'll find some pretty brutal and violent parts in the first testament, but Jesus did "overwrite" quite a lot of it with stuff like “Let him who is without sin cast the first stone.” In the Islam on the other hand war against Unbelievers is very prominent, because it was what Muhammad did for most of his life.
Now that didn't stop Christians in the middle-ages to do the most terrible things and go to war in the name of god.
So the more important difference is the "practical" level:
A foremost chritian society managed to come with the concepts of secularism, democracy and individual freedom itself during a long a bloody battle with itself. That is the biggest difference between Islam and Christianity. Christians "learned" to live with those concepts of the modern society over the last 2 centuries or so; they adapted. Today the overwhelming majority of christians in the west do not fight secularism and democracy and advocate a state of god and those who actually do that, do it mostly peacefully (I can't remember a christian motivated act of terrorism).
Islam on the other did not undergo such a fundamental reform like Christianity has with guys like Luther. Islam did not develop a secular society, the concept was imported from the west and therefore mainstream Islam (which is conservative Islam) does perceive democracy as a foreign unislamic concept.
Even the most modern islamic country turkey, still struggles to unite Islam and Democracy even after ~80 years after Kemal introduced western reforms.
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What bugs me mostly about this debate is, that it mostly consits of predictions about the future that are no where certain. And as JeffS said: "We've never had a free market", so we don't have any reference.
Just to give you an example:
A: "A free market health care would be best, because bad care by a company would cause them a loss of costumers and therefore cause that only the best health providers would stay in the market in the long term."
B: "No, only the most profitable companies will stay in the market, which does not necessarliy mean, that they provide the best health care. Denying care or only giving the cheapest will be more profitable than always providing the best treatment, which is why a non-profit solution will be best, because then the aim will not be to do well at the stock market, but to provide good care"
A: "That is not true. Health-care companies do want to make profit, but they have to do it by providing care. They sell a product and if theirs is bad, people will soon notice and switch to better products and in order to always provide a good product most of the profit has to be reinvested anyways. So the main-focus will be providing good health-care _through_ profit."
B: "That is not true. The maximum profit is achieved by selling the most profitable product, not the best. People don't necessarily have to notice a bad or mediocre product, when the company invest enough to create a positive image of the product with advertising, lobbying and combating critics. Since health-care is a huge industry, big companies can create an enormous pressure on media-companies who intended to broadcast / print negative feedback about their health-care. People who are denied expensive treatment often times don't live very long anyways, which reduces their danger to affect the public opinion negativly"
A: "That is not true [...]"
And so on and so forth..
I think the only way to find out, is to simply try it out and see if it works. We do have models, but they are noway close to give a prediction of the enourmous complexity that todays economy is.
I wouldn't be surprised either if it works very well or if it fails terribly.
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Mr. Miovas,
Could you please give a definition of the word "choice" since you use it a lot to argue for free will?
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Why is doubting free will make it necessary to believe in determinism? I for one deny any proof or indication for the existence of free will and yet don't believe the universe is deterministic. I think there is a fundamental randomness.
The problem again with some proofs like "observe yourself making choices" is that they simply try to smuggle in free will by definition. I don't observe myself making "free choices". I observe myself solving problems.
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Sorry for my triple-post.. can't seem to edit them though. Don't know how that happened.
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The cat either lives or dies, because it is bound by the Law of Identity, which means that things cannot exist in contradictory states. Schroedinger wants you to think that there is some physical reality to the superposition of states that falls out of his equations, that things can exist suspended in multiple, mutually exlusive states, waiting for their wavefunction to collapse to force them into one state of existence. That is flat out nonsense. A thing exists as it is, not as a collection of maybe's.
Nor does X happen to the cat in "our universe", and Y happens to it in "another universe". The universe is everything that exists; there are no "other universes". If it exists, then it exists in our universe, because, by definition, that's the only one there is. You can talk about what happens in different regions of the universe, but that is not what Schroedinger and the other Copenhagen Interpretation peddlers are pushing.
If you want to get anywhere in QM, you'll need to understand why the physicality of the superposition of states is nonsense, and that the universe is everything that exists.
I personally have a much wider understanding of the law of identity (against what rand said). I wouldn't consider the coppenhagen interpretation against it. I simply state, that it is in the nature of the electron to act random with all it's implications. It is it's identity to be a fusion of a wave and a particle. Saying it is both, is obviously wrong because of the definition of wave and particle.
I don't see how you can reject some QH-Interpretation with the law of identity, because I think it really doesn't tell much at all about reality. It merely says that everything has a certain nature. But what nature that is and how they act is a different story. Saying: "Coppenhagen must be wrong because it violates the law of identity" IMO begs the question.
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The cat either lives or dies, because it is bound by the Law of Identity, which means that things cannot exist in contradictory states. Schroedinger wants you to think that there is some physical reality to the superposition of states that falls out of his equations, that things can exist suspended in multiple, mutually exlusive states, waiting for their wavefunction to collapse to force them into one state of existence. That is flat out nonsense. A thing exists as it is, not as a collection of maybe's.
Nor does X happen to the cat in "our universe", and Y happens to it in "another universe". The universe is everything that exists; there are no "other universes". If it exists, then it exists in our universe, because, by definition, that's the only one there is. You can talk about what happens in different regions of the universe, but that is not what Schroedinger and the other Copenhagen Interpretation peddlers are pushing.
If you want to get anywhere in QM, you'll need to understand why the physicality of the superposition of states is nonsense, and that the universe is everything that exists.
I personally have a much wider understanding of the law of identity (against what rand said). I wouldn't consider the coppenhagen interpretation against it. I simply state, that it is in the nature of the electron to act random with all it's implications. It is it's identity to be a fusion of a wave and a particle. Saying it is both, is obviously wrong because of the definition of wave and particle.
I don't see how you can reject some QH-Interpretation with the law of identity, because I think it really doesn't tell much at all about reality. It merely says that everything has a certain nature. But what nature that is and how they act is a different story. Saying: "Coppenhagen must be wrong because it violates the law of identity" IMO begs the question.
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The cat either lives or dies, because it is bound by the Law of Identity, which means that things cannot exist in contradictory states. Schroedinger wants you to think that there is some physical reality to the superposition of states that falls out of his equations, that things can exist suspended in multiple, mutually exlusive states, waiting for their wavefunction to collapse to force them into one state of existence. That is flat out nonsense. A thing exists as it is, not as a collection of maybe's.
Nor does X happen to the cat in "our universe", and Y happens to it in "another universe". The universe is everything that exists; there are no "other universes". If it exists, then it exists in our universe, because, by definition, that's the only one there is. You can talk about what happens in different regions of the universe, but that is not what Schroedinger and the other Copenhagen Interpretation peddlers are pushing.
If you want to get anywhere in QM, you'll need to understand why the physicality of the superposition of states is nonsense, and that the universe is everything that exists.
I personally have a much wider understanding of the law of identity (against what rand said). I wouldn't consider the coppenhagen interpretation against it. I simply state, that it is in the nature of the electron to act random with all it's implications. It is it's identity to be a fusion of a wave and a particle. Saying it is both, is obviously wrong because of the definition of wave and particle.
I don't see how you can reject some QH-Interpretation with the law of identity, because I think it really doesn't tell much at all about reality. It merely says that everything has a certain nature. But what nature that is and how they act is a different story. Saying: "Coppenhagen must be wrong because it violates the law of identity" IMO begs the question.
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You have stated several times in various ways that we can't prove that we have free will because we cannot go back in time, as it were, to the exact same situation and demonstrate that we could make an alternative choice.
You are setting up, and accepting, a ridiculous, impossible, unnecessary requirement.
Quoting from your links:
“Volitional” means selected from two or more alternatives that were possible under the circumstances, the difference being made by the individual’s decision, which could have been otherwise.Because man has free will, no human choice—and no phenomenon which is a product of human choice—is metaphysically necessary. In regard to any man-made fact, it is valid to claim that man has chosen thus, but it was not inherent in the nature of existence for him to have done so: he could have chosen otherwise.Choice, however, is not chance. Volition is not an exception to the Law of Causality; it is a type of causation.
This ridiculous requirement is obviously in the very definition of volition, which means the same as free will.
If you could go back in time to the exact same situation, you would be exactly as you were in the exact same situation, but unlike what you seem to imply, you would not be facing some alternative fact. You would be the same person, in the same situation, confronting a single fact, not alternative fact(s): You would have to make a choice. (The same choice, if you like. The same choice, but not necessarily the same choice among the options you are aware of.)If you were aware of the fact that you are going back in time to the exact same moment of the "choice", then you have more information compared to the first time, therefore changing the situation. But that doesn't matter, since it's impossible anyways.
You keep putting forth this so-called requirement, but there is nothing special about a choice you had to make in some situation in the past, versus a choice that you have to make in the present, or for that matter, any choice you will have to make in the future. In each and every case, you confront one fact, not alternative facts (requiring some, even impossible, double-blind experiment), the single, irrevocable, fact that you have to make a choice. There's simply no getting around that one.So drop the lame "requirement."
In every case when you are confronted with a choice, the choice is up to you. There's no difference between your being in some unrepeatable situation in the present versus some unrepeatable situation in the past or the future. Every situation is unique, unrepeatable, in that sense, but you still have to make a choice when you are confronting the necessity to do so, past, present, or future.
Now if you are going to insist that you still could not have chosen other than you did originally, then you are in fact arguing for determinism.
How do you define choice?
I mostly heard Objectivists define choice with the attribute of free will. IE "choice is the exercise of man's volitional faculty" or variations like that.
If you define choice similar to that, then no, I do not observe that I make choices and I see no proof or self-evidence for that.
Your "definitions" confuse metaphysics with epistemology, existence with consciousness. Perhaps these will help:Hardly any of those links are definitions. The first one merely states that chance doesn't exist but nothing about what it means. The other ones (except for volitional) aren't that great either, because they touch other topics right and left and are generally quite vague in their formulations and mostly consist of assertions.
I heard Dr. Peikoffs Podcast the other day and as part of one of his answers he mentioned that the Oxford Dictionary was his favorite source for definitions.
You sound like Objectivism's definitions are the only right ones, which is obviously false. You asked me for my definitions and I gave you mine.
I'm aware that you are only giving your personal view.For the record, Objectivism does not offer a proof of free will. Free will doesn't require proof; it's a self-evident fact. Further, the concept of "proof" genetically depends upon free will. You couldn't even conceive of the concept of "proof" or ask for proof of anything without having already accepted free will, self-evidently.
[Edited for clarity.]
Well those are all just assertions:
What do you perceive that makes you conclude that free will is self-evident? (please provide your definition of choice here, if you haven't already done so. I have a feeling you will use that word here)
Why does the concept of proof or my ability to think require free will?
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Okay, given that you think that free will, as presented by Objectivism, is neither provable nor disprovable, then you apparently understand free will as presented by Objectivism. In other words, you couldn't go so far as to say that free will as presented by Objectivism is neither provable nor disprovable unless you understood the Objectivist presentation of free will.
Leaving aside whether or not your claim about the Objectivist view of free will is true — that it can neither be proven nor disprove — please then tell me what it is that you hold to be the Objectivist presentation of free will.
Well as I said: I don't understand it on the basic level, where it is supposed to be a third option to chance and determinism. (Maybe I did not choose the right words.)
I do understand the claim though, that we can do different things in the same conditions. I don't need to understand a concept totally to reject it's proof.
I don't need to understand god to deny a proof like: "1+3 = 5, therefore god exists", because 1+3 does not equal 5.
I think any claim like "We can do different things, in the same conditions" has no basis and is not observable (or self-evident.. however you like to call it).
As to the rest of what you say, it seems that you are merely jumping from one side of the fence to the other. The world is fundamentally random, you're not arguing for determinism, but you believe that you're part determined, part random, etc. Free will is an illusion, you have to "choose" what you "choose," etc.How about defining a few terms, as you are using them, and explaining a few things.
Random?
Determined?
Fundamental randomness of the world?
Causality?
Smart randomness?
Now you are getting a bit hairsplitting. I said in my last post, that this was my personal subjective opinion of how the our mind works. I am not claiming that this is a solid proof and I'd have no problem to acknowledge that this is wrong, when I'm pointed to information that contradicts my view.
I have no problem with you asking for definitions of words that I use, but maybe you should try to understand what I meant to say before we go into a lengthy discussion about definitions again.
But anyways..
random: Any event that has a probability below 100% of occurring or something that follows no pattern. Dictonary definition?
Determined: Any event that has a 100% probability of occurring or something that follows a strict pattern (ie when event a, then event b as opposed to when event a then event b or event c)
Fundamental randomness: Randomness as a property of reality as opposed to randomness that just occurs because of lack of our information in a complex system, like randomness in weather. In other words that there are entities that act random in a principle way, meaning that even if we had complete information, we still could not forecast it's actions or that all information can't be obtained fundamentally.
Causality: Any relation of 2 points in time. You can say event (or point) b in time was caused by event a, without specifying if that relation was random or determined. I'm not sure if thats the dictionary definition, but I think it makes sense.
Smart randomness: Well.. somewhat like I described it. I meant that we for one thing don't act random 100%, but also don't act completely determined. As I said I think there is a part in humans that produces random ideas and another part that sorts out ideas worth pursuing.
Sort of like if you have a random number generator, and a set of rules that say "Just take numbers that can be divided by 2 and have 5 digits". The output would still be random, but "less random" than the output of the random number generator (who randomly produces numbers without restrictions).
I picture the mechanism in our brain similar to that.
But again: This all was just my personal view and not part of my argument against the proof of free will.
By "choice" I mean that at some point in time you have the option of two different actions, which you have to choose between. Before I have made a choice, there is no solution to the problem of "what am I going to do?" I have to choose, I'm not just waiting passively to see which happens automatically.Well.. waiting passively would be solution or result to the problem of "what am I going to do?"
But yes you are right, I think. We have to think in order to solve the problems that we are constantly faced with and humans do thinking consciously. Our method of solving problems involves consciouses.
I think the only time when a human is not faced with problems (in a wide sense) is when his brain ceases to be active.
It's because you can only pick one option that you have to make a choice. That is what I observe, it's not just a feeling, it's clearly a fact that I have to make a choice between one or the other or both or neither, because I am the entity that is going to act on that choice and nothing makes me act other than my deciding to do so.I don't see why you have a problem with this. My observation is that: a) before taking an action, it appears that I have a choice between one or more actions, b ) that I do decide on an action and take it, c) after I have taken the action, I can still remember my options and evaluate the results of my actions in light of what I could have done, and d) I can remember to make the same or a different choice the next time I am faced with a similar decision. What part of this do you disagree with? And why? Do you just doubt your perceptions, or do you have some reason to think that they're wrong?
What is left to be called "free will" in an ethical sense, if there is no free will in reality? You're saying that people don't have a choice of what their actions are, but because they feel like they do, they must be treated as if they actually do? But ... why??
I think the use of the word "choice" is troublesome here, because it always implies free will, which is why I try to avoid it in such a discussion. That's why I asked you in my last post what you mean by "choice".
I can agree with what you wrote here, except for one part but I would formulate this way:
a) before taking an action, I am confronted with a problem that I don't know the solution to yet
I eventually find a solution to the problemc) After I found a solution I can use the information I obtained from it's effects to reflect on whether or not it was the correct one
d) (this is where I disagree because I think the formulation is too vague)
I can remember the problem, it's solution and effects and can use these information to help myself find solutions for similar problems. The exact same problem though will never arise again, because knowing that I was in a certain situation before, would alter the situation and the problem, because you now have different information. Your set of mind is part of the problem.
The crucial part is though, whether or not you claim that a human can make different choices (or find different solutions), when faced with the exact same problem or situation.
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I believe that crizon is saying that whatever "choice" he makes (or made with respect to chocolate ice-cream, for example, instead of strawberry, which on another occasion he may very well "choose"), he simply had to make it. He is after all arguing for determinism.
crizon, would it be fair to say that your own view of yourself is that you're an automaton, that whatever you "think" (I'm using "think" loosely to mean "ideas" going though your awareness.), do or say, you simple had to "think," do or say? Etc? An automaton that is conscious, but which can't do anything but what it is caused to do by forces outside it's control? [Oh yes, an automaton that also has the illusion that it can make choices?]
I am not argueing for determinism.
The statement: "I will always do the same thing in the same conditions" can also not be proven, because once again: I will never be in the same situation again.
I am denying the proof for free will. I am not saying that I can disprove it.. I think free will, as presented by Objectivism is not provable and not disprovable.
To your question:
I personally don't think that the world is determined. I think there is a fundamental randomness in reality.
Concerning our mind, I think that we are "partially" random and "partially" determined, that we have a part in our mind that produces a "stream of consciousness" or a "brainstorming-faculty" that more or less randomly produces ideas and another part that can sort out good ideas from bad onces.. the more reasonable part that decides what ideas are worth pursuing.
In fact I believe that a human can make different actions in the same circumstances, but not because of free will, but because kind of "smart randomness".
I don't think of myself as an automaton. I am still myself and I'm not less worth or "just a computer" just because I deny a prove of something that I fundamentally can't understand (on a level of causality).
But this is just my opinion and clearly not a proof of anything.
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edit: this is a response to bluey
Well what do mean by choice?
If you mean by choice, that I could have done something else, then I don't observe that I made a "choice".
In one sense it is correct, when you say "I can either do the laundry or replying to this post", when you fundamentally mean, that you just don't know yet, what you are going to do. Or in other words, you don't know the solution to this problem ("what am I going to do?") yet.
The literal sense is obviously false. You can always do only one thing and that is all I can observe.
Looking back, I was constantly faced with problems and I always could just pick one option. This is what I observe. I am faced with problems and I find a solution, only one solution.
Sure, I have a feeling that I am in control of myself. That I can choose whatever I want. I think this is a result of the fact that we can not predict ourself.. our mind simply can not understand itself on it's own. It's like trying to create a model of a model of a model.
I do not reject the concept of "free will" as used in ethics, because one has to acknowledge that this feeling of being in control is human nature and completely rejecting it would be against human nature.
What I don't see is any argumentation of why and how free will is in fact a property of reality, because it always implies that you could have done something different in the exact same situation.
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I did not say, that I will only choose chocolate in this situation. This is just as baseless, as stating that I could have chosen a different flavor.
As I said, the reason why it took me some time to decide is that I (or my mind) can't instantly solve a problem. I need time to process the information I posses to come up with the answer to the question: "what flavor will satisfy my need for ice-cream the most?".
I never intended to make a distinction between "my mind" and "I". They are the same thing.
I agree with the law of identity. I don't understand your point in the last two sentences. I think free will is unprovable and it is baseless to proclaim it exists (or that we posses free will). Furthermore I think the concept of free will is unthinkable in terms of causality.
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I have a question for you. You say that you do not reject the self-eident (now you say that you don't think that self-evident is the core of your disagreement), and you've said that you accept "existence" as self-evident.
Why? How do know that there is existence? How do you prove there is existence? How do you know that existence is not an illusion?
Even if existence (or everything I perceive) is an illusion, the illusion exists. The fact that I exist must follow that something exists and that I am conscious.
You say that you have a disagreement, but that self-evident is not the core of your disagreement, and you say that you doubt that free will is self-evident, and you doubt that there's a reasonable claim that free will must exist.You're certain that you have a disagreement, yes? And you're certain that you doubt that free will is self-evident and that there's a reasonable claim that free will must exist?
How do you know that you're certain?
Is it self-evident?
Do you trust your own awareness of your disagreement and your doubts?
What is you point here?
The validity of an argument does no change when the speaker is not certain or has doubts.
In my current state of mind, with the information that is available to me right now: Yes I'm certain of my possition. It is the solution my mind came up with concerning the problem.
I'm directly aware of my making choices, just as, presumably, you are directly aware that you have an illusion of making choices.How do you determine what's an illusion? And illusion versus what?
Choice here means to pick between multiple options and in the context of free will it means that I can make different choices.
Let's say I stand at a shop and I'm unsure what flavor of ice-cream I should pick. Finally I choose chocolate.
How can you _know_ that you could have picked strawberry instead? You will never be in the exact same situation again, ever.
Yes, when I'm faced with a problem, it feels like I'm choosing between multiple options. Does that follow I could pick multiple options? No. It does follow, that I can not predict myself. It does follow that our mind does not instantly come up with a solution to a certain problem.
Illusion may be the wrong word here. We certainly have the feeling of free will. In that sense it is real, but the conclusions drawn from that fact are wrong.
Let's say a man is mentally ill and hears a voice inside his head that proclaims it is god. Is hearing the voice self-evident? Yes it is. Is it self-evident that the voice is in fact the voice of god? Of course not.
Is the feeling of free will self-evident? Yes, it is.
Is it self-evident that we in fact posses free will? No, it is not.
I think the description of what we observe via introspection is wrong. Free will is not a description of what we observe, it is a (false) conclusion.
I think, what we in fact observe is:
a) Our mind is constantly faced with problems
Our mind comes up with solutions for these problems (what chess move should I do next?)c) We can not predict ourself (in the sense that during the process of solving the problem we do not yet know which solution we are settling on)
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I think this sounded too harsh. I just wanted to make sure that we don't totally drift of
I don't think that self-evident is the core of my disagreement. I'm not only doubting that free will is self-evident, I doubt that one can make _any_ reasonable claim that it must exist. I think it is unprovable.
As I said in my post that started our conversation:
I don't know what free will is supposed to be on the most fundamental level, in the term of causality; of cause and effect.
I know that free will stands for the ability to make different choices when faced with the exact same problem and that this ability is not an instance of randomness.
Here is where my misunderstanding starts. What can causality be, when it is neither determinism nor chance?
I think any third option is unthinkable and is at best a mixture of determinism and chance, at worst a form of mysticism.
Or tell me:
What do you perceive that leads you to the conclusion that you could have made a different choice?
What is free will, when it is not random and not determined?
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Yes, self-evident equals direct perception, direct awareness of entities or objects.
See if the entries in the Lexicon on Perception and Sensations. I think the brief paragraphs should help to clarify the distinction between sensations and perceptions.
Sensations are not perceptions, and perceptions are not conceptions. To understand Objectivism, it's important to grasp the distinctions between these forms of awareness, sensations, percepts and concepts. (I think it's important to grasp the distinctions even if you're not looking to understand Objectivism. It's generally important to understand the meaning the the concepts one uses.)
Perception is not conception. A child can see and play with a red rubber ball without having the conceptual knowledge that it's a "red," "rubber," "ball." The red rubber ball exists, and the child can perceive it as an object, without having the concept of "perceive" or "object," etc. And the child can distinguish the red rubber ball from other things. He can do all of this via direct perception or direct awareness.
Thank you for the links.
So sensations are by definition only "used" by entities without awareness (like insects), while perceptions require an awareness and integration of the data in the brain?
Ok, I can work with that.
What do you mean: "The example of the child is a scientific one, in my opinion."?Also, what do you mean by, '"raw" data'?
Is it your view that when we see an apple, we don't actually see the apple, we only see an image of the apple?
Well, if we are talking the same apple, then the source of the information is obviously the same for an adult an for a child. If you mean that by "given", then yes.
It is obvious though, that we only perceive a fraction of the possible information about an object (only a small spectrum of visible light for example). Now if, as you said, the eyes work the same in the adult and the child, it does not follow that the perceptions must be the same.
This information that the senses are sending to the brain is what I meant with "raw data". This "raw data" must be the same for the adult and the child, but this "raw data" does not create perceptions. The senses do not produce the image of the apple in our minds.. they are just a part of that.
The raw data must be interpreted by the brain. If you damage the the brain region that deals with interpreting the data from the eyes, then you see nothing.
Now your question was if knowledge can change the perception of the apple. Well maybe the perception of the apple does not change, when you know how it is grown or how it's biochemical setup is.
I think though, that we can consciously influence the brain regions that are used for interprating the "raw" data from the senses and therefore change our perceptions.
A deaf boy actually managed to "develop" a kind of echo-sounding system and I think it is unlikely to think that he just happens to have exceptionally good ears; it is much more likely that the brain adapted after years of training.
Another interesting example: If you put on glasses that let you see everything upside-down and wear them for a certain amount of time, your brain adapts and you see things normally again. If you take the glasses off then, you see everything upside-down again until your brain readapts.
So even if the child and the adult have the same eyes, ears, and sensory cells for touch, it does not follow that the perceive the apple the same way.
I think that you are confusing perception or direct awareness with identification, which is conceptual. Perception, direct awareness is valid, perception results from an interaction between our senses and that which we are aware of. Only our conceptual level of awareness is fallible.Concepts such as "illusions" and "hallucinations" are only possible if you first are capable of valid identifications, only if you can distinguish between illusions and hallucinations and valid identifications. That we can be in error does not mean that we have good reason to suspect that we are always in error.
Didn't I say the same thing, just without objectivist terms?
I don't know what you are trying to say with your second-last sentence.. Sure that is true for the concept of illusion and hallucination, but you don't have to understand the concept of an illusion to experience one.
I have no idea what you're asking, "Is a mathematical axiom considered to be "evidence"?" Evidence of what?What I mean by evidence is data that supports a logical conclusion. Evidence is the data that makes it possible to prove a hypothesis. To prove that the suspect is the murderer, you need evidence to prove it, evidence and logic. Evidence in the case of a murder would be things like data that connects the suspect to the crime conclusively.
I think a mathematical proof is in fact a proof in the definition of the word proof. Peikoff said that you need evidence to conduct a proof and I don't think that word works well in terms of math.
The proof for Ferman's Last Theorem only required the logical methodology of math and the mathematical axioms. That's why I think Peikoff's definition is too narrow.
Existence: certainly.If you agree that we are directly aware of existence, what do you mean if not that we are directly aware of objects and attributes of objects? Do you think that "existence" is an attribute that can be separated from objects such that you can have two apples, for example, each one fully an apple excepting that one has the attribute of "existence" and the other doesn't?
To be directly aware of existence is to be directly aware of objects and their attributes.
Well as I said: We are directly aware of _certain_ attributes of objects like
a) It causes me to think that it is a stone
It causes me to smell the scent of a flowerIs it therefore self-evident that it is a flower or a stone? No.
Existence is always self-evident because no matter what I perceive, I perceive something.
and by the way.. could you please tell me where we are going in terms of discussing my questions about free will?
Also I did listen to those Peikoff podcasts, but they didn't address my issues at all.
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Do you agree with that statement by Miss Rand?
She said direct perception is self-evident. Does she mean that self-evident equals direct perception / awareness?
Its not clear to me how she distinguishes from percepts and sensations.. those two have the same translation in German.
Do you agree that percepts (perceptions) are self-evident, that via perception we are given direct awareness of existence,Existence: certainly.
of what is, of objects and their attributes, some of them at least, etc.? We don't need proof of what we're given directly; that it is is self-evident. The self-evident is sufficient evidence to us (our self) of itself. Nothing more is needed to be aware of it but simply to be aware of it.Would you agree that when I, who may have learned many things in my life about apples, perceive an apple -- see it, touch it, smell it, taste it, etc. -- I am given the same self-evident information that a child who is only perceiving the apple for the first time, and no more?
In other words, what's self-evident to me is similarly self-evident to a child, assuming we're both normal, that our senses function as they should, etc.
We are both given direct, self-evident, awareness of the apple and certain qualities, attributes and characteristics of it. We each directly perceive it as an firm object, we perceive its color and even the variations in color, its stem if it's still attached, its taste and texture, it's smell or odor, etc.
All the rest that I know, yet the child does not, beyond the directly perceivable, is learned, conceptual knowledge, not given, not self-evident.
Agreed?
I think we are broadly on the same side here. The example of the child is a scientific one, in my opinion. The feeling of touch, smell, taste and the image we see of that apple are not pure "raw" data, but are interpretations of that date by certain brain-regions.
I am not sure if these specific brain-regions actually adapt over time and change our perceptions. Evidence could be that people who loose their eyesight tend to develop a more acute hearing.
Concerning direct awareness of attributes of objects:
Well, you certainly are aware, that a certain object looks like it has 4 edges and looks like a stone.
Is it therefore self-evident that there is in fact a stone with 4 edges in front of me? Certainly not; it might be a hallucination or a illusion.
The information I got about this object is real (something must have caused me to see what I see) and some of the information about it must be true ("To me, it looks like a stone").
Are the physical attributes of something that I see self-evident? No (illusions, hallucinations).
Also, you say that "proof is a statement, that was verified with the laws of logic." That too is confusing to me.Do you agree with Dr. Peikoff's definition of "proof"? That proof is a proces of drawing a conclusion on the basis of evidence and logic?
To prove that someone committed a murder, for example, you have to present the evidence that supports a certain conclusion (statement) that the person committed the murder. There has to be evidence of a murder, and there has to be evidence, like motive and opportunity and means, etc., that logically supports the conclusion that the suspect is the one who committed the murder.
Agreed?
Not really.. or I'm not sure what he means by "evidence". Is a mathematical axiom considered to be "evidence"? I think the word does not fit there.
I don't think you need the criteria of evidence, because the laws of logic alone tell you, that you need a starting point in form of an axiom and "evidence" is a too narrow term.
There is no "evidence" for a mathematical axiom flying out there in the universe and yet once you found a proof in math (without errors), it will be true forever (with the same axioms).
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Yeah sorry about that. I think there are self-evident concepts or entities, like existence and consciousness. They can't be refuted without using them, they form the base of our thinking.
They are axioms and therefore can not be proven. Free will is not self-evident or axiomatic in that sense.
Proof is a statement, that was verified with the laws of logic.
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You're welcome. I actually hope they help.
Perhaps I'm missing it, but it seems like you have a problem with accepting the self-evident, as though somehow the self-evident is unreliable, as though it is an unreliable foundation of knowledge. But it's the opposite. If the self-evident is to be doubted, then there's no foundation for knowledge.
If I'm right, why is the self-evident such a problem? Why does it seem so unreliable?
I don't doubt that there is no such thing, that is self-evident. I doubt that free will is self-evident.
I have not been through all of Peikoff's podcasts yet, but so far my issues were not addressed.
Usually the argument, that free will is self evident starts with:
"I observe that I make choices", if you follow that though, you don't have anything self-evident:
"What are choices?"
"Picking between more than one alternative."
"What are alternatives?"
"Different courses of action that I could have followed."
"How can you prove that you could made a different action?"
At this point, the only answer I see is:
"I can't, since the prove would require an impossible experiment." (recreating the same conditions)
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You do not have free will.
However, you will go and listen to this:
The Leonard Peikoff Show Clip - Free Will or Determinism (YouTube recording of a portion of one of Dr. Peikoff's radio show, a discussion on free will versus determinism.)
You will then go and listen to these portions of some of Dr. Peikoff's podcasts:
Question: Did determinism hold true on this planet until humans obtained their volitional capacity? (Last question; at about 12:40)
Episode 34 -- October 27, 2008
Question: Do our material brains comprise our entire consciousness, and if so, doesn't that mean that there is no free will? (Next to last question; at about: 11:30)
Episode 48 -- February 09, 2009
Question: How did Epicurus reconciled free will with all the atoms that merely react by hitting each other? (About 4:20)
Question: If there was a being that was so intelligent that it always knew the correct action to take, wouldn't that knowledge be irresistible, determining every action of such a being, effectively negating it's free will? (About 5:20)
After listening to these various clips, you will return here and report on your experience. You have no choice in the matter!
Thanks for the links. I may not have a free choice, that doesn't mean I'm predictable
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I don't know if you heard about it but in the past days there was a crime in Germany that got a lot of attention:
Now it's obvious that the crime of the man was serious and evil, but what really bugs me is what happened in Egypt afterwards and more importantly: The reaction of our politicians.
Angle Merkel apologized for what happened so did Frank Walter Steinmeier (the biggest rival for the upcoming elections) and with no word did they say anything about the totally inappropriate reaction of the Egyptian government, press and population.
Apparently the crowd in Alexandria shouted something about death to Germany and death to Europe.
I'm not sure if this fear of offending Muslims is that strong in other countries, since Germany has some real trouble there because of our history.
Sort of reminds me of the danish cartoons and the trouble our politicians had to defend the freedom of speech.
Just a little warning: Don't let the radicals play the victim role. They are good at it and will use anything they get.
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One big and ongoing problem in this broader context of volition / free will / determinism is that I still have no idea what volition / free will actually is (supposed to be).
Volition has to be fundamentally different from determinism and randomness to achieve this task of making a "free choice". A read self-causation in relation to volition often, but that still doesn't answer this new type of causation for me.
What is self-causation? What happens when an entity causes something "itself". I can't think of anything in that term that would not simply be random (a radioactive atom causes the decay "itself").
Now I don't have a problem with an (proclaimed) entity (black holes) or concept (consciousness) that just isn't fully understood yet, as long as it is clear what the core is (very high gravitational object / being self-aware).
With volition though, this new type of causation remains undescribed and unthinkable (to me).
The only real information I seem to get is that we have to have volition because:
a) We can observe it via introspection (I don't.. if you want to know why I don't observe free will via introspection, just ask - I wrote about it in a few posts already, but I can summarize it if there's a demand)
We posses knowledge (where the argument mostly works via defining knowledge as volitional and therefore being nothing more than a play with words)c) We need it as a starting point for Ethics ("If we don't have volition then we are merely robots and I can't argue with you" obviously the poorest argument, because the correct answer to this question should not be answered by thinking emotionally about it's consequences and the interpretation is very arguable either.. sadly I feel that quite a few people have Ethics in mind when they talk about free will - don't take that as an argument please)
So the only information about what free will is, is that we have to have it. Now how can you honestly claim to have proven something, that yet remains undescribed, where the only attribute is, that it is there?
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For very obvious reasons. A common thief is not comparable to a terrorist hell bent on killing innocents. [...]
We're not talking about crime here. We're talking about terrorist and other acts in war situations.
I don't see how simply labeling someone as a terrorist and proclaiming a state of war is justified after, let's say a bombing, or how the principles may change.
If you blow up a train, it is not worse when you do it because you fight the government than if you do it because you enjoy seeing dead people. A different motive does not permit more usage of force by the government as retaliation.
Fighting Terrorism is _not_ comparable to a classical war. It was an arbitrary juggling of words to proclaim a "war on terror" and label the terrorist "enemy combatants" by the US government.
Enhanced interrogation techiniques should only be used when there is convincing evidence that the enemy has useful information.That is exactly my point. The punishment or "the amount of retaliatory force" changes not because of the crime he committed, but because of what he knows, which is no crime itself.
The key here is that you are using force against an individual that poses no current threat _not_ because of his crimes but because the society has a benefit.
Once you consider torture in this context moral, you will open the door to a lot more situations where torture may be used because the line to just use it against terrorists is simply arbitrary.
Critics of Pure Reason - any systematic criticism?
in Metaphysics and Epistemology
Posted
This can't be true. Since there is no difference between the mind and the body, the brain is our mind and we are not born with an empty brain.
There has to be a preset starting point, like every system has.
How can meaningful thought emerge out of nothingness? There must be some ground rules that enable a baby to make sense out of what it's senses send to his mind.