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2046

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  1. Like
    2046 got a reaction from Boydstun in Russian invasion of Ukraine/Belief of Mainstream Media Narrative   
    One thing I've noticed among the pro-Russian right wingers is that they spend a lot of effort telling you about all this stuff about the US/NATO expansion, leaked phone calls, Azov, etc. to keep focus on the US/NATO as the "bad guys" in their current programming. But very few of them (?) either (a.) continue to say that since the US/NATO did all this stuff that therefore Russia's invasion is justified and amounts to self defense on the part of the Russians, or (b.) continue to say that nonetheless Russia's invasion is not justified and in fact they are committing a grave injustice worthy of resistance on the part of the Ukrainians.
    Question: why is that? 
    Possible answer: They're not interested in the typical philosophical questions surrounding the issue. Finding out what one ought to do about a given situation in accordance with some set of general principles. (I mean in a Socratic sense that "care for one's own soul" would lead one to make sure one wasn't supporting or condoning or excusing injustice.) The interest here isn't even philosophical or practical at all. There is no truth one is trying to get at. One's goal is something else, like promoting one's self being an exciting contrarian "maybe I can make myself look like a really cool transgressive thinker." It's kind of a role play in one's head. 
    The use of one's faculties is not aimed at guiding action, but is rhetorical in nature, as if to say "don't look there!" To remind one "we're bad too!" is designed to shift the focus of the listener and leave the rest to implication.
    Counter proposal: Putin/the Russian government does not have a legitimate security interest in NATO not expanding eastward or in the Ukraine wanting to be part of Europe. The reason is very simple: Putin is not a legitimate ruler and the Russian government is not morally legitimate. Putin has no right to rule at all, not over Ukraine and not even over Moscow. Indeed I, 2046 have more of a right to rule over Russia because at least I haven't violated anyone's rights or liberties and would immediately resign. It may or may not be strategically prudent to not upset Putin, to include tactical deception about one's intentions to join NATO, but he has no moral claim to keep NATO from his doorstep.
  2. Thanks
    2046 got a reaction from EC in Russian invasion of Ukraine/Belief of Mainstream Media Narrative   
    One thing I've noticed among the pro-Russian right wingers is that they spend a lot of effort telling you about all this stuff about the US/NATO expansion, leaked phone calls, Azov, etc. to keep focus on the US/NATO as the "bad guys" in their current programming. But very few of them (?) either (a.) continue to say that since the US/NATO did all this stuff that therefore Russia's invasion is justified and amounts to self defense on the part of the Russians, or (b.) continue to say that nonetheless Russia's invasion is not justified and in fact they are committing a grave injustice worthy of resistance on the part of the Ukrainians.
    Question: why is that? 
    Possible answer: They're not interested in the typical philosophical questions surrounding the issue. Finding out what one ought to do about a given situation in accordance with some set of general principles. (I mean in a Socratic sense that "care for one's own soul" would lead one to make sure one wasn't supporting or condoning or excusing injustice.) The interest here isn't even philosophical or practical at all. There is no truth one is trying to get at. One's goal is something else, like promoting one's self being an exciting contrarian "maybe I can make myself look like a really cool transgressive thinker." It's kind of a role play in one's head. 
    The use of one's faculties is not aimed at guiding action, but is rhetorical in nature, as if to say "don't look there!" To remind one "we're bad too!" is designed to shift the focus of the listener and leave the rest to implication.
    Counter proposal: Putin/the Russian government does not have a legitimate security interest in NATO not expanding eastward or in the Ukraine wanting to be part of Europe. The reason is very simple: Putin is not a legitimate ruler and the Russian government is not morally legitimate. Putin has no right to rule at all, not over Ukraine and not even over Moscow. Indeed I, 2046 have more of a right to rule over Russia because at least I haven't violated anyone's rights or liberties and would immediately resign. It may or may not be strategically prudent to not upset Putin, to include tactical deception about one's intentions to join NATO, but he has no moral claim to keep NATO from his doorstep.
  3. Thanks
    2046 got a reaction from AlexL in Russian invasion of Ukraine/Belief of Mainstream Media Narrative   
    One thing I've noticed among the pro-Russian right wingers is that they spend a lot of effort telling you about all this stuff about the US/NATO expansion, leaked phone calls, Azov, etc. to keep focus on the US/NATO as the "bad guys" in their current programming. But very few of them (?) either (a.) continue to say that since the US/NATO did all this stuff that therefore Russia's invasion is justified and amounts to self defense on the part of the Russians, or (b.) continue to say that nonetheless Russia's invasion is not justified and in fact they are committing a grave injustice worthy of resistance on the part of the Ukrainians.
    Question: why is that? 
    Possible answer: They're not interested in the typical philosophical questions surrounding the issue. Finding out what one ought to do about a given situation in accordance with some set of general principles. (I mean in a Socratic sense that "care for one's own soul" would lead one to make sure one wasn't supporting or condoning or excusing injustice.) The interest here isn't even philosophical or practical at all. There is no truth one is trying to get at. One's goal is something else, like promoting one's self being an exciting contrarian "maybe I can make myself look like a really cool transgressive thinker." It's kind of a role play in one's head. 
    The use of one's faculties is not aimed at guiding action, but is rhetorical in nature, as if to say "don't look there!" To remind one "we're bad too!" is designed to shift the focus of the listener and leave the rest to implication.
    Counter proposal: Putin/the Russian government does not have a legitimate security interest in NATO not expanding eastward or in the Ukraine wanting to be part of Europe. The reason is very simple: Putin is not a legitimate ruler and the Russian government is not morally legitimate. Putin has no right to rule at all, not over Ukraine and not even over Moscow. Indeed I, 2046 have more of a right to rule over Russia because at least I haven't violated anyone's rights or liberties and would immediately resign. It may or may not be strategically prudent to not upset Putin, to include tactical deception about one's intentions to join NATO, but he has no moral claim to keep NATO from his doorstep.
  4. Like
    2046 got a reaction from Boydstun in What Has the 'Pro-Life' Movement Won?   
    After reading the leaked draft, this is indeed the main line of reasoning presented: the argument from democracy. Highly contentious moral views ought to be decided by the people, this is one, therefore this ought to be decided by the people.
    A second line of reasoning in the draft is an appeal to history or tradition. He argues that if a freestanding individual right to bodily autonomy is appealed to, well there's no historical basis for that, and after all it would lead to legalization of drugs and prostitution and that would just be crazy.
     
     
  5. Like
    2046 got a reaction from Grames in [W]hat is the objective basis of politics?   
    The concept to be placed opposite is seeking correspondence in the appropriate ways as opposed to just having correspondence. I do think there is a concept of seeking correspondence (a long winded way of saying seeking truth) in inappropriate ways. An example might be phlogiston, a substance thought to be released during combustion. They early chemists really were trying to understand something, had various reasons for why they postulated this, and began to abandon the concept after it became clear that there was no such thing and the reasons were methodically bad.
  6. Like
    2046 got a reaction from Boydstun in [W]hat is the objective basis of politics?   
    I mean if we're going by Rand's honesty, that isn't even what she says honesty is. The pivotal feature of Rand's egoistic honesty versus the conventional account is one's relationship to facts, not to the beliefs of others. 
    Independence can be contrasted with dependency, but the moral 'pull' of independence comes from the responsibility one has to oneself.
    Justice, in common parlance we often speak of resiliency in terms of not being unfair to too harsh or unjust to oneself. 
    Rationality is often a cooperative enterprise and is inherently connected with language use, productivity without others to trade with is impossible, and pride often deals with commitment to one's moral conduct in the face of criticism or disapproval from others, as well as giving and receiving honor from others.
    Integrity deals with congruence with one's words and behavior, which far from being a redundancy with "be virtuous" is a sharpening of the focus on something that comes up almost every day in life.
    There are a lot more aspects to the virtues from different angles than are accounted for here. It's not easy to just put ones "founded in ethics" over in this basket, or "requiring others" in that basket. If by ethics we mean anything pertaining to our character, then they are all for that. If living well requires others, then they are all for that as well. Rather it seems they all interpenetrate in both individualizing and social ways (as one would expect who knows what logikon and politikon point towards.) We are left asking again, "what was the need for this distinction?" "What problem is it solving?" We may as well divide the virtues into those with even amount of letters and those with odd, or those over six letters long and those under. 
  7. Like
    2046 got a reaction from KyaryPamyu in [W]hat is the objective basis of politics?   
    I mean if we're going by Rand's honesty, that isn't even what she says honesty is. The pivotal feature of Rand's egoistic honesty versus the conventional account is one's relationship to facts, not to the beliefs of others. 
    Independence can be contrasted with dependency, but the moral 'pull' of independence comes from the responsibility one has to oneself.
    Justice, in common parlance we often speak of resiliency in terms of not being unfair to too harsh or unjust to oneself. 
    Rationality is often a cooperative enterprise and is inherently connected with language use, productivity without others to trade with is impossible, and pride often deals with commitment to one's moral conduct in the face of criticism or disapproval from others, as well as giving and receiving honor from others.
    Integrity deals with congruence with one's words and behavior, which far from being a redundancy with "be virtuous" is a sharpening of the focus on something that comes up almost every day in life.
    There are a lot more aspects to the virtues from different angles than are accounted for here. It's not easy to just put ones "founded in ethics" over in this basket, or "requiring others" in that basket. If by ethics we mean anything pertaining to our character, then they are all for that. If living well requires others, then they are all for that as well. Rather it seems they all interpenetrate in both individualizing and social ways (as one would expect who knows what logikon and politikon point towards.) We are left asking again, "what was the need for this distinction?" "What problem is it solving?" We may as well divide the virtues into those with even amount of letters and those with odd, or those over six letters long and those under. 
  8. Like
    2046 got a reaction from Boydstun in [W]hat is the objective basis of politics?   
    NOL doesn't have anything to say about a "basic political unit," though. It certainly doesn't try to put a number on it (like saying two or more, of three or more.) Obviously you do need two or more, but just two or even three isn't a political community. There, the concept of a polis, or political community is the proper object of political theorizing. It needs to be sufficiently large that law and customs have a need to be institutionalized.
    If there is anything like a "basic political unit," it would be the individual. The argument for this is the same as the argument for individual substances being the most real things. Societies or communities aren't substances in themselves, but are composed of substances. That you would need a "basic political unit," though isn't clear to me. The political community is composed of individuals and the political community is for the happiness of the individuals composing it.
  9. Like
    2046 got a reaction from Boydstun in [W]hat is the objective basis of politics?   
    I mean this talk of a "basic political unit" what does it mean? What problem is it solving? There is a question about the foundation of politics and there is a question about the basic political unit. Are those the same thing? What work is the basic unit doing?
     
  10. Like
    2046 got a reaction from Boydstun in That Kelley Creature   
    Might I suggest a different thread specifically for this tangent, I'd hate to interrupt the latest open vs closed reattack.
  11. Like
    2046 got a reaction from Harrison Danneskjold in How exactly does objectivism disprove skepticism at all?   
    I mean, not really. While there is a great deal of exegesis of "the arbitrary as neither true nor false" in ch. 5 of OPAR, but the burden of proof principle is a logical commonplace.
    On the second point, I had made the following remark already: "The one way we could know whether we were in error about a given faculty is by discovery of some truth which reveals us our error." This is the way to counter the method of Cartesian doubt with regards to individual faculties, that all of our faculties couldn't be in error all the time.
    But the point of the simulation or BIV scenarios is not to deny existence, it's to deny your knowledge of it. Imagine someone saying you are really a brain in a vat, you are hooked up and experiencing a simulation. They're perfectly content to say yes, existence exists, you just don't genuinely experience it beyond what is fed to you. And since we can imagine this being the case, it is therefore possible, unless the realist prove it's not.
    The way to counter this is the burden of proof principle, and a denial of the assumption that because something is imaginable it is possible.
     
  12. Like
    2046 got a reaction from Boydstun in How exactly does objectivism disprove skepticism at all?   
    You're confusing some things here. "Skepticism" does not mean "we're living in a simulation"/BIV scenarios. Those are two different things. Skepticism comes from the Greek skepsis or skeptikos which can mean questioning or doubt, and is associated with the suspension of judgment. The historical skeptics cultivated a refusal to assent to anything. (See Popkin's History of Skepticism.)
    There are two basic types of skepticism, universal and particular. The number one argument against universal skepticism is the self contradiction argument. This argument proceeds by pointing out that the act of professing universal skepticism requires one to process knowledge about something and thus would involve contradictory beliefs. Note this isn't an "objectivist argument" at all. It's like the first thing any philosopher would probably say in response to skepticism.
    The simulation scenario is a variation of Rene Descartes evil demon argument, from the Meditations. The connection with skepticism is by way of the method Descartes uses called methodical doubt. It doesn't really matter all the details of this, but the reasons Descartes gives for doubting one or more part of our faculties, but the point is it doesn't really make sense. The one way we could know whether we were in error about a given faculty is by discovery of some truth which reveals us our error.
    The point is more about differing starting points in epistemology. The introduction of the evil demon, or the simulation or the BIV, the exact mechanism involved is besides the point, the point is the method. It doesn't really make sense to believe any old thing until it's disproven, that's not how cognition works. Instead you need a reason for believing something, not a reason for disbelief in something. That was the point Russell was trying to make.
    It's also just not true that "everybody but objectivists" thinks this. Very few people think skepticism is the way to go, or think methodical doubt is the way to go. To know this you could spend time talking to people who do philosophy professionally. Or like attend a basic undergraduate course in knowledge theory, where undergrads are usual given Descartes as a low-ball target.
    Another way you could know this is by looking at the 2020 Phil Papers survey, which surveyed the philosophical views of 1785 English-speaking philosophers from around the world on 100 philosophical questions.
    For instance, the exact question that Cartesian demons and BIVs was constructed for, external world skepticism, the results were:
    External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?
    Accept or lean towards:
    idealism
    6.63% (5.44%)
    Accept or lean towards:
    skepticism
    5.44% (4.76%)
    Accept or lean towards:
    non-skeptical realism
    79.54% (78.17%)
    Other
    11.62%

     
  13. Like
    2046 got a reaction from Boydstun in How exactly does objectivism disprove skepticism at all?   
    I mean, not really. While there is a great deal of exegesis of "the arbitrary as neither true nor false" in ch. 5 of OPAR, but the burden of proof principle is a logical commonplace.
    On the second point, I had made the following remark already: "The one way we could know whether we were in error about a given faculty is by discovery of some truth which reveals us our error." This is the way to counter the method of Cartesian doubt with regards to individual faculties, that all of our faculties couldn't be in error all the time.
    But the point of the simulation or BIV scenarios is not to deny existence, it's to deny your knowledge of it. Imagine someone saying you are really a brain in a vat, you are hooked up and experiencing a simulation. They're perfectly content to say yes, existence exists, you just don't genuinely experience it beyond what is fed to you. And since we can imagine this being the case, it is therefore possible, unless the realist prove it's not.
    The way to counter this is the burden of proof principle, and a denial of the assumption that because something is imaginable it is possible.
     
  14. Like
    2046 got a reaction from tadmjones in How exactly does objectivism disprove skepticism at all?   
    I mean, not really. While there is a great deal of exegesis of "the arbitrary as neither true nor false" in ch. 5 of OPAR, but the burden of proof principle is a logical commonplace.
    On the second point, I had made the following remark already: "The one way we could know whether we were in error about a given faculty is by discovery of some truth which reveals us our error." This is the way to counter the method of Cartesian doubt with regards to individual faculties, that all of our faculties couldn't be in error all the time.
    But the point of the simulation or BIV scenarios is not to deny existence, it's to deny your knowledge of it. Imagine someone saying you are really a brain in a vat, you are hooked up and experiencing a simulation. They're perfectly content to say yes, existence exists, you just don't genuinely experience it beyond what is fed to you. And since we can imagine this being the case, it is therefore possible, unless the realist prove it's not.
    The way to counter this is the burden of proof principle, and a denial of the assumption that because something is imaginable it is possible.
     
  15. Like
  16. Like
  17. Like
    2046 reacted to Frank in Is direct realism tenable? Has it been successfully defended?   
    Yeah, after reading some more replies, I realized my position is too influenced by Theravada Buddhism, which, opposite of Mahayana, is strictly realist, and denies any and all agent in being. There is no experiencer in this understanding, hence, indirect realism is impossible. I understand, now, that this view is incompatible with Objectivism, which seems to hold consciousness a lot higher than Theravada Buddhism (not saying much, since Theravada breaks it down entirely to entirely empty phenomena with no doer even involved [Visuddhimagga XIX.20]), but a lot less than your average eternal soul believing religion. I need to read more about Objectivism. I realize now, that I was unconsciously, and wrongly, equating atheism with reductionism/mechanism thusly: If there is no soul, then there is no such thing as an experiencer. 
    Thank you for your mature, well written, and polite critique.
  18. Like
    2046 got a reaction from Boydstun in Is direct realism tenable? Has it been successfully defended?   
    I would recommend the Huemer book too, just for its own sake. It's a good book in the way it provides a taxonomy and introduction for many of the different ways of viewing perception and the foundation of knowledge, and provides many good arguments against indirect realism and Cartesian-style skepticism. It's also clearly and concisely written, and provides ab example of good philosophy writing. 
    There are also some ways in which Huemer's account differs from, or would appear to differ from what might be Rand's account (taken that Rand didn't really have a developed account.) The major thing is that Huemer takes perceptual experience to be propositional and can contain representational (but non-conceptual) content that can either be true or false. It is this way that perception can serve as a foundation for knowledge via the principal of "phenomenal conservatism," that we are prima facie justified in taking what seems to be the case to be true, unless we have some reason to doubt it. In this way, Huemer is closer to Moore than a Rand or Aristotle.
    I think the difference in Rand would be that she takes perceptual states to be non-propositional and non-representational, and is thus infallible or inerrant, and can neither be true nor false. Huemer sees that, if it is non-propositional, there is a wonder at how it can then justify beliefs. Certainly more would need to be said about abstraction and concept formation than has been said.
     
     
  19. Like
    2046 reacted to Boydstun in KANT AND RAND – SOME THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY   
    In the early 1970's, Leonard Peikoff gave elaborate tape lecture courses on the history of philosophy. These are representations of that history with which Rand entirely agreed. Peikoff was no doubt the one who ultimately informed Rand of most of the history of philosophy she would come to know after writing ATLAS SHRUGGED. The view of Kant's theoretical philosophy expressed in Peikoff's lectures, lately come to be online here, would be what had come to be Rand's view also of Kant's theoretical philosophy by the time of the lectures. The lectures on Kant are the fullest reservoir of what Rand thought to be his philosophy and the correct comparison of her own philosophy to his.
    In those lectures, Leonard Peikoff remarks that Kant, Aristotle, and Plato are the philosophers most weighty and influential in the history of philosophy. Kant has an impact on all subsequent philosophy, he notes. That still goes, I should say. (In the broad arc, I note a polarity that goes Plato-Aristotle v. Descartes-Kant, notwithstanding all the criss-cross of affinities between these poles.) Concerning weight or stature of Kant, Peikoff says in his lectures: “Kant has one of the most ingenious, complex, integrated, comprehensive systems in the whole of philosophy.”
    In answer to an audience question, Peikoff had some recommendations for further reading concerning Kant’s philosophy as a whole:
    W. T. Jones – HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
    Gordon H. Clark – THALES TO DEWEY
    Wilhelm Windleband – HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
    Peikoff did not recommend jumping into THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON right off the bat. It is extremely hard to understand. In his own studies, he had been using the Kemp Smith translation into English. That is what I used also untill the 1990’s when two new translations appeared. Those are the translation by Werner S. Pluhar and the one by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. These translations are such that one can begin study of KrV straightaway with full profit if one wanted to undertake such a task or have KrV available for one’s reference. That is because of the plethora of helpful footnotes these two translations provide and their Introductions for this central work of Kant’s that one is undertaking.
    For a line-by-line English commentary on KrV, Peikoff recommended the 2-volume work by H. J. Paton – KANT’S METAPHYSICS OF EXPERIENCE. It covers roughly the first two-thirds of KrV, and Peikoff relied upon it. Today, I should recommend, for that sort of close commentary, Graham Bird – THE REVOLUTIONARY KANT (2006), which covers the entire text.
  20. Like
    2046 reacted to Eiuol in Is direct realism tenable? Has it been successfully defended?   
    That's basically just reductionism.
    But in any case, your reasoning doesn't really get at defeating indirect realism. If the mystical version of the soul did exist, that doesn't necessarily exclude realism, and even if were just bags of meat (which sounds like your position) that doesn't necessarily exclude indirect realism.
    This would be something like indirect realism in terms of an analogy. If this image were presented to consciousness (to make the analogy work for conscious entities), that would mean that there is another layer of perception or interpretation between reality and consciousness. Direct realism would be like saying that there is no image in between, just going straight from reality to consciousness. There would be no need to create the photograph of reality. 
    Yes, there is a biological process of perception that results in awareness of reality in a specific form. But if an image or form is constructed, then interpreted, then brought to awareness, you would have indirect realism. 
  21. Like
    2046 reacted to Boydstun in Is direct realism tenable? Has it been successfully defended?   
    The link for the 2004 paper linked by 2046 is not working for me.
    Here is another link for that paper:
    http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=485481E36BFC312084DDDB745A1AAF0E?doi=10.1.1.580.7126&rep=rep1&type=pdf
  22. Like
    2046 got a reaction from Boydstun in Is direct realism tenable? Has it been successfully defended?   
    If you're going to recap at least be accurate. I mean he said "soul theories" are responsible for indirect realism. 
    Also he started off saying "a lot of smart people" think indirect realism is true. So what is a lot? How many? And how does he know this? What is their main representative? What is their argument for it? We don't come away from his post knowing any of that.
    First it appeared indirect realism was his target, then it appeared Gilbert Ryle's "ghost in the machine" was his target, then it appeared the homunculus model was his target. Along with "soul theories," these are all different things. And they're not arguments. An argument has a minimum of 3 terms: 2 premises and a conclusion. Just staying something like "there is no little man watching a screen, no ghost in the machine!" peppered with random stuff isn't an argument, it's assuming and re-asserting the conclusion you were supposed to prove. That is bad philosophy.
    Next, in between all the "suit if armor with a camera" statements, it then seems like the person is trying to advance materialism or physicalism. It isn't clear why that would be the correct way to view things either, or how that connects to direct realism, or whether those two positions are disjunctive or not.
    Hypothesis: he watched a bunch of Daniel Dennett videos and thought he could solve everything by aping Dennett's style and throwing in copypasta from the Atlas Society. 
    Positive alternative: for an example of good philosophy writing, see Pierre Le Morvan's paper "Arguments against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them," American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3):221 - 234 (2004) which you can get for free online:
    https://owd.tcnj.edu/~lemorvan/DR_web.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjgoK6n_Pf1AhV6KEQIHSFWDycQFnoECAQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2KdrBs5qoKySFeGsL__vI2
     
  23. Like
    2046 reacted to Eiuol in Physics   
    Physics translated by Joe Sachs
    1 - Aristotle distinguishes what is clear by nature versus clear to us. Clear to us is what is clear in terms of how we come to understand the world, in the way that dog is known before animal, which is also messy and filled with many possible conceptual distinctions. What is clear by nature is what is clear in terms of logical structure, that is, in the way that after making distinctions, nature becomes more understandable.
    2 - There can be one and many at the same time in terms of potential and actual.
    3 - If being is caused by something, then the cause could not have been, because there was no something that was being. That is, in my wording, being would be caused ex nihilo.
    What is not is not something in particular.
    4 - To know something composite is to know how many things it is made of and what they are. 
    If no animal is infinite, then its parts are always finite. My understanding is that being can't be infinite because if all substances are finite, then any parts will be finite as well.
     
    5 - Opposites come into being from each other. 
    A house doesn’t come into being absolutely from nothing whatever but from parts and materials. 
    6 - Since two independent things can’t be derived from one another, there would need to be an underlying third thing.
    7 - A statue comes from bronze, not that bronze becomes a statue, because it comes from something that persists. Education comes from uneducation no longer persisting. 
    8 - Dogs come from dogs yet we don’t say that dogs come from animals, since animal persisted all along. The dog is animal incidentally, because animal is not a substance but a predicate in this case, which means apparently that the dog comes into being by the nature of the other dog. Animal is not a being itself, so it is not animal literally speaking that makes the dog come into being. 
    It's no wonder then that Aristotle does not use simply a handful of animals to investigate how animals generate other animals. It is specific animals that bring about their offspring, not some broad form from beyond that literally brings the new dog into being.
     
  24. Like
    2046 got a reaction from dream_weaver in Have any prominent Objectivists addressed this point II?   
    To confuse risk of physical force with  initiation of physical force is to confuse a potential with an actual. The whole mandatory vaccination position depends on a Parmenidean worldview in which all that exists is fully actual, combined with disregarding the need to obtain sufficient information to blame any one person for anything. It is the same fallacy employed by advocates of anti-immigration, gun control, and environmentalism. Thank you for helping to make that connection.
     
  25. Thanks
    2046 got a reaction from tadmjones in Have any prominent Objectivists addressed this point II?   
    To confuse risk of physical force with  initiation of physical force is to confuse a potential with an actual. The whole mandatory vaccination position depends on a Parmenidean worldview in which all that exists is fully actual, combined with disregarding the need to obtain sufficient information to blame any one person for anything. It is the same fallacy employed by advocates of anti-immigration, gun control, and environmentalism. Thank you for helping to make that connection.
     
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