2046

@LER, I think you are missing the contextual nature of moral evaluation. If I have a choice between buying 5x toilet paper and having no toilet paper at all (returning to the sponge on a stick days), I will spend 5x on toilet paper. The proper question is not whether the law of supply and demand is overridden by some theory of non-governmental price controls, the question is why my supply (of money) is and what my demand (for TP) is, and how that relates to supply and demand of other people (stores and online sellers). Where the supply is very low and the demand is high, you expect the price to go up. If you actually have TP in your store, that changes the supply equation for you, so of course you would not spend 5x on online TP, you would only spend 1.5x to buy it at the store. The reality is that the shelves are still bare (ymmv).
Your analysis of the situation is wrong, when you imply that the online seller is the creator of the shortage. This implies that there is some constant natural force which provides our needs without any effort on our parts, which the “speculator” has unnaturally interfered with. If you want to assign blame, you can blame the store for not getting more TP, or the manufacturers for not making more TP, or your neighbor for buying TP (whether it is in ordinary amounts or in horder amounts). It is morally inconceivable that blame should be assigned to a person simply because they recognized an opportunity to make a buck. This goes for TP as well as eclipse glasses. Temporary shortages exist all the time, and in a free market are generally solved when the producers increase production. That TP on the shelf is the property of the store owner. It becomes the property of the bulk-buyer when he puts it in his cart and pays for it. That TP is not your, until you actually buy it. It’s a risky business, reselling.
There is no such a thing as a moral economy that predates modern capitalism: “moral economy” is the same as and came into existence as modern capitalism.

That's what's entailed by what she wrote about rights. Rights are about living in the social world, and the various social interactions required, and the expectations we can have of others with regard to how they treat us, and so on. Plants can't initiate force; cows can't initiate force; viruses can't initiate force; tornadoes can't initiate force. If something lacks any conceptual capacity whatsoever, it can't initiate force, nor can it have rights. Sure, you might want some kind of defense or insurance against things that go wrong, but things that are not sentient don't require government intervention for you to fight, because one doesn't need to relegate the use of force against those without rights (viruses).

My comments should be interpreted as stand-alone and not as related to Rucka or alcoholism. The guy is just weird. What's up with the super old picture that obviously is not what you look like? Are you trying to catfish your audience? Most of what he says is just unoriginal and uninteresting. The universe is eternal. The choice to live is an irreducible primary. Free will is the choice to focus. Okay, yes I too have read Peikoff. Combine that with constant pretentious posturing and ad hominem, with all the standard Randian tropes ("you're evading and have failed to focus your mind!"), crankish delusions that he's the greatest living philosopher of our time and ARI is immoral because it didn't accept him to OAC, and no one is as smart and virtuous as him, etc. 

If one views free-will/focus/choice as a sub-type of causality, how does doctrine of determinism square with this?
The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action. Determinism applies this to every action, including the action of choice, which fundamentally is to focus, an exercise of free-will. The contradiction arise when one considers the action of choosing performed by a mind as preordained by antecedent factors.
If the action of an entity is determined by the entity which acts, the complication arises when one cannot physically identify an entity called the mind, much less the action that asserted to arise from it. And while a refutation on the terms set by those who claim to be the gate-keepers of such matters has not been identified, the opposing horn of the dilemma has been well established, demarcating morality as physical actions arising such as to be judged as good or evil.
Results, such as inexcusable deaths in Nazi concentration camps are easy enough to categorize as evil. Individuals have been held accountable in numerous court trials for actions taken under the guise of following orders. Such verdicts grant credence to a sub-type of causality operating within the wider theater of inanimate materialistic causality.
A rock, rolling down a hill, crushing a carload of occupants has no moral culpability. An individual, leveraging a rock to roll down a hill in order to bring about that same result (knowingly or unknowingly) is the basis of the differences between homicide, negligent homicide, etc.
Under societies familiar with how varying nuances can color the moral character of the actor, the choice/focus/free-will as agencies available to a mind of a conceptual being should be guiding the verdict accordingly and give its rightfully deserved consideration.
The metaphysical basis of morality was not articulated clearly and concisely until Miss Rand explicitly provided the correlation between the two. If you grant the validity of her discovery, then it was true in every philosopher's time from before Thales, and even beyond.
 
There is something amiss (or inherently wrong) with the notion that assertions need be refuted. The onus of proof lay on he who asserts the positive, comes to mind. If an onus of proof has been met, then those who fail to accept it should fall suspect, not the one that supplies the criteria necessary.
 

Well yeah, we'd all love to read a scholarly essay from Rand on a lot of things, but that is not going to be available to you.
Compatibilism could look something like Rand's position in the following way: what most people mean by "determinism" (in the ordinarily held belief set "determinism is true") is just that "things have causes." They don't happen randomly, or magically. They "obey laws" or act orderly. In that sense, free will is something compatible with "determinism construed as things having causes." Generally, at the level this concern is presented, it is when the person has reached a certain level of reflection about nature and causality and it's relation to choice.
But you're right that compatibilist views have, historically, rested on shifting the meaning of "free" to modal notions about our power or ability to bring things about, and the absence of restraints on those powers. Additionally the classical compatibilists tended to conceptualize "determinism" in a stricter way than I just did above, but in the sense of "necessary due to things that are not up to us."
In that sense, Rand's position has nothing in common with compatibilism. Rand's position seems to entail not merely that we faced no constraints on our power or ability to do otherwise if we desired, but that we have an agent-causal power to direct our consciousness that is ontologically irreducible to event-causation alone (her "focus theory.")
But if you're looking for some in depth informational resource: there isn't any. Rand's philosophy is underdeveloped on this point.
 
 

if (argument.understand == false) ;
system.out.Print ("REEEEEE") ;
      Run sys.exe
[ lexicon.cite ("www.aynrandlexicon.com) ] ;

In Socratic fashion, in order to know how to normatively apply a concept, we have to know what your definition and meaning of those terms are. Socrates, being accused of impiety, asks Euthyphro "What is piety?" To which he responds (summarizing here), "That which pleases the gods," Socrates responds, "The gods disagree..." To which Euthyphro responds "That which pleases all the gods..." Socrates then says well that doesn't tell us what it is, and then gets some basic definition to work from.
Rand has this idea of hierarchy and context, that you start off with a paradigmatic case and then develop a meaning based off that, then you obserbve other problematic cases or integrate it with your other beliefs, then you go backwards and refine it as needed. Again, summarizing here.
So what facts of reality gives rise to the need for these concepts, what knowledge is already presumed by the time you get "honor," "pride," "traditions," and "cultural identity," and what context are you attending to when you apply it in the propositions like "I'm proud of my cultural identity." So we can start off with some initial meaning and then refine it from there.
My initial thoughts are that honor and pride are proper virtues when applied to individualistic human flourishing, and not the nation-state as a whole. I think one can be proud of, or take pride in one's cultural identity insofar as that identity promotes the proper values that one has formed, in the general sense of "I'm glad we're doing this right," or "our polis (so to speak) is right for living in reality and functioning properly. This is good that it exists, and I am in it, as opposed to a different city." 
The honorable man then, is one that defends his city, but only insofar as it is right and promotes human flourishing. To the extent it doesn't, I would be inclined to say the honorable man is the critic, the reformer, the protestor. 
In the same way, I think there's invalid uses of this concept. If you're on a baseball team and the other members of the team make skilled plays that facilitate winning, you'd be "proud of them" in some sense. But you're not going to say something like "we have the same color jersey on, therefore I get credit for his good plays." It doesn't make sense to claim "pride for x" when you didn't contribute to or aren't a part of x, or on the basis of some nonessential, like "he is virtuous, he is tall, I am tall, therefore I am virtuous." Likewise, just simply being born in one human community versus another isn't a source of honor or pride, since they'd have to be achieved by your own character development and discipline.

Consider this portion of a paragraph from "What Can One Do?"
There are also a great many men who are indifferent to ideas and to anything beyond the concrete-bound range of the immediate moment; such men accept subconsciously whatever is offered by the culture of their time, and swing blindly with any chance current. They are merely social ballast—be they day laborers or company presidents—and, by their own choice, irrelevant to the fate of the world.
While being able to state things collectively this way, the quantitative  singular nature of Rand's expression can shine through.
Sometimes I wonder if it is agreement and accordance sought by those with which Rand's words resonate, or if discordance and division are the "natural" line of demarcation.

Well let's hope they don't "behave like Objectivists" because most people running calling themselves that are dumb as hell. But it's not really clear what the question is. There's like 5 or 6 different questions in there. 
One thing is, it doesn't really follow from "the world is nothing like X, and never has been" to "mankind can never achieve X." That's just bad reasoning. It's not really clear what we're supposed to be inferring here. It's also not really valid to use a premise about how many people are rational or irrational from the armchair. Unless you're just speaking anecdotally, you're going to need some social science research.
Industrial societies haven't been around that long. Individualism is still pretty widespread. More people are being lifted out of poverty and ignorance than ever. There was once a time when all "great" countries were monarchies. There was once a time when slavery was widespread in every country. The Soviet Union used to control half of Europe. What got these things to change was, partially, people changing their ideas and seeing what worked and didn't work. I mean if we're going to say everyone is just in principle irrational and can do no other, then no political philosophy is going to be acceptable.
Another approach would be to figure out why people believe what they believe, and do the things they do, and try to then account for that, and that's part of what we do in political philosophy and poli sci, economics, etc.: Finding workable solutions to political problems that takes into account what human beings are actually like and what motivates them.
But overall, I mean, modern democratic liberalism is pretty good as a political system, if you ask "compared to what" in human history. Markets and peaceful cooperation brought about by liberalism didn't happen by an absolute monistic conception of politics that the Western world overnight suddenly read a single book and then decided to adopt. Liberal institutional arrangements are themselves spontaneous order mechanism that facilitate discovery processes to the things that make human flourishing possible. And things change on the margin, little by little, for the most part. You're not going to beat people over the head with Atlas Shrugged, silly.
 
 
 

Well let's hope they don't "behave like Objectivists" because most people running calling themselves that are dumb as hell. But it's not really clear what the question is. There's like 5 or 6 different questions in there. 
One thing is, it doesn't really follow from "the world is nothing like X, and never has been" to "mankind can never achieve X." That's just bad reasoning. It's not really clear what we're supposed to be inferring here. It's also not really valid to use a premise about how many people are rational or irrational from the armchair. Unless you're just speaking anecdotally, you're going to need some social science research.
Industrial societies haven't been around that long. Individualism is still pretty widespread. More people are being lifted out of poverty and ignorance than ever. There was once a time when all "great" countries were monarchies. There was once a time when slavery was widespread in every country. The Soviet Union used to control half of Europe. What got these things to change was, partially, people changing their ideas and seeing what worked and didn't work. I mean if we're going to say everyone is just in principle irrational and can do no other, then no political philosophy is going to be acceptable.
Another approach would be to figure out why people believe what they believe, and do the things they do, and try to then account for that, and that's part of what we do in political philosophy and poli sci, economics, etc.: Finding workable solutions to political problems that takes into account what human beings are actually like and what motivates them.
But overall, I mean, modern democratic liberalism is pretty good as a political system, if you ask "compared to what" in human history. Markets and peaceful cooperation brought about by liberalism didn't happen by an absolute monistic conception of politics that the Western world overnight suddenly read a single book and then decided to adopt. Liberal institutional arrangements are themselves spontaneous order mechanism that facilitate discovery processes to the things that make human flourishing possible. And things change on the margin, little by little, for the most part. You're not going to beat people over the head with Atlas Shrugged, silly.
 
 
 

Yeah man, plus all of reality should be communist because we're living in the visible light spectrum. It's passing through us! Blind people are the real capitalists, man. **Bong hit** 

So like, not only is this wrong, but wrong according to just about every moral theory I know of, except maybe Hobbesian absolutism (where the dictator or sovereign establishes right or wrong by its will.) Wrong according to utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, liberalism, Randianism, Marxism, nationalism, whatever. And that's because most theories require that you actually have to have done something wrong, or met some probable cause standard of doing something wrong before the police can accost you. Almost every moral theory thinks that pre-crime is wrong.
Moreover, if you can restrict someone for what "some dude might" do, it can't be denied that some babies being born might go on to commit crimes. All childbirthing must be restricted on those grounds. Or someone might be moving from the Bronx to Brooklyn, and this dude might have a bomb that no one can see. All movement from the Bronx to Brooklyn might be restricted on those grounds. Etc.
Why is it that these arguments are so bad? It seems like every time some argument is made, and shot down, another one pops up. First it was the old "clubhouse" argument, or the US as some collectively owned entity, then it's pre-crime, next it's going to be "because foreigners don't have the same rights," or something else. We've already seen the "culture argument," the "they're going to vote wrong" argument, the welfare argument. Why do the goalposts keep shifting? Once these arguments are shown to fail, if you keep believing in them, you're being dogmatic.
The Simpsons character Nelson punches Ralph. "Why are you hitting me?!" exclaims Ralph. "You're breathing my air!" answers Nelson. This "you're breathing my air" is really what the argument boils down to, and why the every shifting goalposts never seem to land on a coherent argument that doesn't beg the question. There is widespread anti-immigrant bias. Whether that bias is racism, xenophobia, or just dislike of different people, some people just have a priori decided they don't like immigrants, and they have bad arguments. 

Sure, some specific individuals existing at some time owning some stock of personal goods could come together and contractually form a voluntary corporate body, and thus decide together on some means for the discharge and use of these goods held corporately. But here's an alternative view: the US is not such a corporate entity and your argument has not (or even attempted) to show that it is such.
You only say "if we apply this principle to the entire nation we get..." Etc. Sure. If "we" apply all sorts of principles to the entire nation "we" can "get" whatever "we" want. But there is no "we" here and assuming there is begs the entire question.

Oh Eiuol I'm sure they're fine with all illegal immigrants that don't try to fraudulently get welfare, then, and totally won't all of a sudden manifest some new goalpost to shift to.

Not to mention that one of the main points of Smith's economic work is in free trade and against what he called mercantilism, so it's not exactly clear how name dropping Smith is supposed to work in order to be a defense of Trump.

“We stand for free enterprise!” cried Dr. Ferris...“You don't understand us!” 
“I'm beginning to.”

Indeed. It is quite typical among some people to see objectivity being associated with the universal, impersonal, or "the view from nowhere." Notice how he characterized the deliberative process as unresolvable until these "fillings" are introduced, then it becomes trivial, by which I take it as being resolved. What exactly would be "reality without fillings" seems a lot like Nagel's "view from nowhere." Daston and Galison (2007) trace objectivity-as-impersonalism to the Kantian turn (although not without seeds already planted in the Scholastic version.) 
Of course you can't make a decision without the "fillings," all of the particular, personal, contingent things that characterize actual reality. Once you empty reality of that the things that actually make it up, what could end up guiding your thought process? Factors unique to each person is desperately needed for objectivity when trying to give a weighting or balancing between various goods and option. You need to take your circumstances, talents, endowments, interests, beliefs, and histories that descriptively characterize each individual precisely because reasoning about ends is done by real life individually situated people and not detached Cartesian egos or Kantian noumenal selves. 

Related, but not the same. I can read a philosopher then see a line that inspires thoughts that help me find out what's true, without necessarily sorting through with a fine comb every detail. I also can read a philosopher to figure out what they are trying to convey, in which case the details matter a lot, even the individual words of a sentence sometimes - sorting out their thoughts so you can fully understand them as a philosopher.
I agree. But none of us are Rand scholars here, so I don't see the point of constructing an argument for something you already read. It sounds like you're saying that Rand isn't as precise as you would like, not that you don't actually understand. If you want an in-depth discussion, take a look at the recommendations from 2046. Since this is a forum though, I don't see why you wouldn't just construct the argument yourself, then ask if any of us think you got it right. 
It can be difficult because her writing style often assumes you've read her other stuff, but I don't think sloppy is the right adjective. People who don't like Nietzsche usually think of him as sloppy, because his style is so literary and deliberately poetic. That style makes them hard to interpret. Heidegger made up words a lot, and wrote a lot of that stuff about those words, and that can come across a sloppy because he doesn't convey information plainly. I'm using those phosphors as examples because they are closer to how Rand wrote than someone like Leibniz. On some level, you just have to do the work yourself, and consider the totality of a given essay, and better yet, the totality of all the work of hers that you know. If something is weird or confusing, it requires thinking about what the philosopher is getting at, rather than deconstructing a sentence to find the exact logical breakdown of each proposition. Works great for Kant or analytic philosophy, but you'll be much more limited if you try to analyze Rand's own words that way.
You could imagine anything you want. The quote is about the soundness of the concept value, not the validity of connecting one concept to another. It's more like the concept value is empty of meaning unless and until you have something about life conceptually speaking to build on. Is it correct to say that the concept life must come first? That part is left open, and would require some interpretation. Why is there a developmental order to concepts? Why isn't it good enough to the concept death instead for the logical relationship? Does Rand really have an argument in mind, or is she just saying what sounds true to her? If you want to ask questions like that, I can tell you how I would think about it and where in her work I would look for some insights. You need to be more specific though, what exactly don't you understand, and is that you don't understand, or just didn't like her style? 

There's a sense in which they are. Rand wanted her heroes to be perfect. So, it would not be enough to give Howard Roark his single-minded passion and rationality; she also had to have him be right in his choices.

Rationality can lead to the "right" conclusion in the sense that it is the conclusion that all the available evidence, known to the decider at that point in time. points to that conclusion.  Unfortunately, this is not how reality works: rationality does not lead to coming to the "retrospectively-right" conclusion 100% of the time. Rational people have to re-evaluate, correct mistake, an change path all the time. This is something that Rand's writing misses.
Further, humans are not rational in every moment. We are rational animals... not just rational "beings".  Our rationality allows us to be alert about our "animal" impulses and our irrational biases, and allows us to correct conclusions and actions that arise from them. So, once again, the process is not smooth. 
If you look at some of Rand's positive characters: Rearden is often used as an example, but you have Dominque and Steve Mallory and so on... then Rand does give them some flaws and idiosyncrasies. But, she seems to have had this idea that the hero should be flawless.

So, if you want to look for a Howard Roark in the real world, ask yourself if the real world has got people who have a single-minded vision, and pursued it against contemporary advice, and had to fight all sort of battles, but came out vindicated and successful in the end. Turn on the NPR "How I Built This" podcast, and you should find a few examples.

Sorry, it should say something like it was "my way to say that your reasoning has poor foundations".
Then I think this is the source of the disagreement. If you think that what we are discussing does not apply to science, then you are necessarily saying that whatever standard and thresholds you have for deciding when it is appropriate to apply force, is that these standards and thresholds don't have to do with figuring out what we need to attain certainty. I'm sure there are some epistemic standards you care about, but it sounds like you don't know why epistemic standards need to come in when we are applying force. I'm not saying that we are talking about scientific method, but I am talking about investigation. The thing that is the same here is applying tests one at a time in a meticulous manner, and only when it is reasonable, to go onto an even more in-depth test. Context only affects how conservative we want to be. Given that individual rights are involved, we would want to be extremely conservative about the steps we take. Individual rights are a good principle for codifying just how conservative we should be. More specifically, 4A when it comes to deciding who is worth searching. 
I'd suggest reviewing 2046's posts. It's not the same argument, but those posts at least use similar language that easily applies to what I mean by being conservative with the steps we take.
Dismissed it because I didn't understand it. I prefer warrants and probable cause because I think anything more would be a standard of infallibility. 
Yes. I mean, as set up, we are relying on what the clerk says they remember. It's too weak of a justification and unreliable. Even if you can make a good legal case, at the very least, it's better than saying something like "let's check all the safe-deposit boxes". Your search should only be proportional to the evidence you have.
It would be an active search, so it should require a warrant.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q_0F6v1_iy4

https://youtu.be/2X93u3anTco?t=101
 

Yeah, we already discussed the role that bias against immigrants plays, but also just cognitive biases in general play a role as well. Most people don't know the opposing arguments. And I don't mean they haven't seen them, like even if they've read this thread, I mean they read them and yet still don't know them because they aren't thinking. Most people that don't study the arguments specifically aren't thinking at all, they just engage in a random word association game in their minds.
Like if you're a Red Sox fan, if you see a close pitch, you say of course it was a strike (if the pitcher was a Red Sox.) If you're a Yankee fan, you say of course it was a ball. You have no incentive to judge the pitch correctly, you just boo or cheer as depending on whether it helps your team. In the same way, they see a bunch of words on the screen. There's some words that get them the result they're already committed to (keeping foreigners they don't like out) and some that get to the result they don't want (scary brown people near me.) They don't see arguments.

But like nobody is saying we should apply principles without a context. So, thanks for repeating standard Objectivist claptrap, but I mean no one is saying otherwise. Nobody is saying hey we should be rationalists. 
As far as 1-4, those have been refuted, and I mean decisively refuted, by a bunch of political philosophers and economists working on this issue. Some of those arguments have been repeated here in this thread and in other threads. None of 1-4 or the counter arguments you listed are new, bold font notwithstanding.
Yes, we need to think long term. Yes we need to think about what would happen. Right now, economists estimate world GDP (GWP) would likely double, long term. Millions of people could be lifted out of poverty. That is a good thing. The welfare argument, the culture argument, the voting argument, all of these have been addressed numerous times.

That general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive and ought not to be granted. (George Mason et al., Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1776.)
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities, prescribed by the laws. (John Adams, Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 1780.)
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (US Constitution, Amendment 4, 1789.)
In 1765, the King's Messenger Nathan Carrington, along with others, pursuant to a warrant issued by George Montagu-Dunk, 2nd Earl of Halifax forcibly entered the home of one John Entick. The warrant authorized them "to make strict and diligent search for ... the author, or one concerned in the writing of several weekly very seditious papers entitled, 'The Monitor or British Freeholder, No 257, 357, 358, 360, 373, 376, 378, and 380.'" They seized printed charts, pamphlets and other materials. Entick filed suit in Entick v Carrington, argued before the Court of King's Bench in 1765. Charles Pratt, 1st Earl Camden ruled that both the search and the seizure were unlawful, as the warrant authorized the seizure of all of Entick's papers, not just the criminal ones, and as the warrant lacked probable cause to even justify the search:
"By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my licence, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing; which is proved by every declaration in trespass, where the defendant is called upon to answer for bruising the grass and even treading upon the soil. If he admits the fact, he is bound to show by way of justification, that some positive law has empowered or excused him" (Camden 1765.)
Entick vs Carrington established the English common law principle against general search warrants and of requiring some positive action (probable cause) requirement before subjecting an individual to a warrant. Camden's judgment became the basis for the Virginia and Massachusetts Declarations and later the 4th item on the Bill of Rights.
Among self-styled Objectivists and Randians, the ones that are not biased against immigrants and who support some kind of free immigration (Brook and Binswanger come to mind), they often express desire for some kind of screening and inspection at the border. This is problematic because it seems like a general warrant. It also seems like there was no probable cause that could have triggered the inspection. If you submit someone to an inspection without those requirements being met, it seems like you're violating their rights.
Why is that? Well if it's "initiation" of physical force that qualifies as violating rights, the people you're searching generally and without probably cause haven't even been accused of doing anything wrong at all. They haven't met any evidentiary standard. You're just searching them because they're foreigners and might possibly have done something. It seems like you're the one initiating physical force on them.
Indeed, if you're interested in what might normally be the traveling of private persons going about their business, and just wish to apply the normal right of liberty, property, security in one's person, papers, and effects, it seems like you don't have a basis to search immigrants. Normal here means to assume there's no unusual circumstances going on. 
People cross and transfer multiple jurisdictions all the time, every day. And yet this is normally not grounds for a search or inspection. If there actually are grounds, then a warrant can be executed by the legal system. But no pre-crime searches are normally allowed if I'm traveling from, say, California to Nevada, or Bronx to Brooklyn. It seems like normally there is no special problem of "transfer of jurisdiction." I'm just in one jurisdiction one second, then in another the next. 
If you say, well what if they're evading Mexican justice, well what if I'm evading Bronx justice by traveling to Brooklyn? Can we subject me to a "what if" search warrant? It seems not. It seems "what if" search warrants are a terrible idea. In real life, the matter is resolved by a judge in one jurisdiction being presented with a writ or warrant from another jurisdiction. Then the legal system proceeds as normally. No "what if" warrants are permitted.
 
 

So like, not only is this wrong, but wrong according to just about every moral theory I know of, except maybe Hobbesian absolutism (where the dictator or sovereign establishes right or wrong by its will.) Wrong according to utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, liberalism, Randianism, Marxism, nationalism, whatever. And that's because most theories require that you actually have to have done something wrong, or met some probable cause standard of doing something wrong before the police can accost you. Almost every moral theory thinks that pre-crime is wrong.
Moreover, if you can restrict someone for what "some dude might" do, it can't be denied that some babies being born might go on to commit crimes. All childbirthing must be restricted on those grounds. Or someone might be moving from the Bronx to Brooklyn, and this dude might have a bomb that no one can see. All movement from the Bronx to Brooklyn might be restricted on those grounds. Etc.
Why is it that these arguments are so bad? It seems like every time some argument is made, and shot down, another one pops up. First it was the old "clubhouse" argument, or the US as some collectively owned entity, then it's pre-crime, next it's going to be "because foreigners don't have the same rights," or something else. We've already seen the "culture argument," the "they're going to vote wrong" argument, the welfare argument. Why do the goalposts keep shifting? Once these arguments are shown to fail, if you keep believing in them, you're being dogmatic.
The Simpsons character Nelson punches Ralph. "Why are you hitting me?!" exclaims Ralph. "You're breathing my air!" answers Nelson. This "you're breathing my air" is really what the argument boils down to, and why the every shifting goalposts never seem to land on a coherent argument that doesn't beg the question. There is widespread anti-immigrant bias. Whether that bias is racism, xenophobia, or just dislike of different people, some people just have a priori decided they don't like immigrants, and they have bad arguments.