LS121

Of course I recognize this! Remember that I'm not deceiving myself, only others. In principle, anything which leads to my own self-deception is immoral. I am of course not talking about such cases, only those which lead to the deception of others. Agrippa: enough with the rhetoric. I've read Rand's fictional novels several times over and I understand how emotional/impacting they can be. The point is that as a rational egoist I am only interested in one thing: the furtherance of my life. I don't give a damn what consequences I have on others except insofar as they impact me. What is in my long-term, rational self-interest is what I pursue. Fraud, murder, etc. are for another debate. For now let's talk about honesty (unless you think they're so related we can't help but talk about them). Again I restate my challenge: show me that the long-term consequences of my choosing to lie can, in principle, fail to lead me to what is in fact in my long-term self-interest.

David, I appreciate the interest. I'd love for someone to respond to these objections (it doesn't matter by whom). This is definitely a free for all. LS121

Objectivism claims to be a philosophy built upon man's rational pursuit of life. Unfortunately, objectivism fails to be rational when it tells man he should uphold the "virtue" of honesty in any context that isn't an "emergency." I wish to argue that there are contexts in which it is not in one's rational self-interest to maintain honesty even in non-emergency situations. Now, it seems fairly plausible that it is always in one's rational interest to be honest with oneself. That is, lying to oneself can never lead to one's long-term self-interest. Objectivism is right when it tells us that we have to deal with reality as it is, and self-deception is obviously one step short of suicide. My qualm, however, is with the notion that it is in one's rational, long-term self-interest to be honest with others. Such a fallacious notion has been argued by such authors as Leonard Peikoff and Tara Smith. I do not question their motives, but it seems that what they are doing is nothing but rationalizing some of the vestiges of altruistic morality (i.e., there is no reason why honesty should be upheld if it in fact doesn’t lead to one's long-term self-interest, other than an irrational allegiance to conventional morality conventions). In order to explain myself, I wish to now list every argument that I have seen offered in defense of the virtue of "honesty." One by one, I will offer a response which I think better upholds the tenets of rational egoism properly understood. 1) "When you lie, you jeopardize being caught. Therefore you should not lie." While no serious objectivist holds this to be a good argument in defense of honesty, it has still been offered as a basic reason to stay honest by people who at least call themselves objectivist and so I should deal with it first. The way that it falls short is by its failure to acknowledge that there are many real-world situations in which one could reasonably be assured they won't get caught after lying. In these situations, it seems they might be rationally justified in lying so long as they a net long-term value out of it. 2) "Even if you're successful at evading being caught, you have to spend a great deal of energy covering your tracks." This argument attempts to show that the consequences of one's lies span beyond the short-term. Indeed, the cost of trying to cover one's tracks can be quite high, at least in many circumstances. Still, it is easy to conceive of real-world situations in which the long-term cost of one's having to cover his tracks is far outweighed by the high amount of value he might obtain in virtue his dishonesty. In other words, if the value of my lie is devoted by V and the cost of my lie is denoted by C, it is rational to lie if V > C. As an example of a case where V > C, we might imagine something like the following. Suppose my grandmother (who has been isolated in a nursing home for the last 15 years) decides at the last second to change her legal will to donate her estate to a charity foundation. Suppose she changes her will verbally, in my face, the second before she dies. Now, I could easily deceive my estate lawyer by refusing to tell them of my grandmother's last minute change. This would result in my eventual inheritance of her entire estate (let's say worth 5 million dollars). Would any objectivist deny that there is value to be had from this inheritance? To be clear, objectivists might still deny that there is a net long-term value here, but they shouldn't deny that there is any value at all. Objectivists might (as was originally alluded to) point to the high cost © which is incurred by one's having to maintain the lie against future discovery. Still, it seems a far stretch to say that this cost © could possibly outweigh the value one receives from the inheritance. Of course, it's true there is some cost: this lie could come back to bite me in the ass. But I would be incurring no more risk than I reasonably would were I to, for example, invest in a reasonably safe bond. 3) "In lying, one relies on the irrationality and ignorance of those whom one has deceived. This makes one a 'second-hander' and living as a 'second-hander' makes it harder for the accomplishment of one's long-term, self-interested goals." This seems to be nothing but rhetoric. Why? The answer is that it is very obvious that I can GET VALUE out of taking my grandmother's estate. The property allows me to better operate my business, be more productive, raise my family, etc. The insistence that I must be honest because otherwise I will be a "second-hander" doesn't seem to get around the fact that, at the end of the day, I am getting value out of my lie. Now it is certainly true were I to lie I would be dependent on the few that I had to deceive to receive my estate. But this seems to be no different than the way I am also "dependent" on my local grocery store to provide me with food (i.e., to a certain extent it's out of my hands as to whether or not I will actually get food). It might be argued that the type of dependence gotten by deception is somehow different (in a non-trivial way) from the type of dependence gotten by the specialization of labor. Here is a way in which this might be argued: "well, when you depend on your grocery store to provide you with food you are dependent on other's rationality whereas when you are dependent on your lawyer not finding out the truth about your inherited estate you are dependent upon other people's irrationality." In response, it doesn't seem to matter from the standpoint of rational self-interest. Yes, in most circumstances you want to be relying on people's rationality (i.e., makes it easier for you to trade with them in the future), but there are cases where you would be most irrational yourself not to rely on others irrationality. These are the cases where honesty is NOT the best policy (where you would stand to lose more long-term value by refusing to be dishonest). 4) "Lying hurts you psychologically. Living 'two lives,' the life of what is real inside your head and the life of what is not real outside is mentally taxing. Furthermore, you will know your wealth was not the product of your own efforts. This sort of self-knowledge will hurt your self-esteem." This argument falls short in two ways. First of all, even if it were the case that lying gave somebody psychological damage, this is not a reason for it be morally forbidden. Indeed, one of objectivism's great strengths is that it forbids the idea that just because somebody "feels" a certain way that this feeling has anything to do with what sort of person they are from a moral standpoint. How does this translate to the example? Well, if lying to your estate lawyer and receiving your grandmother's inheritance does indeed cause you psychological harm, then this is nothing more than another cost © which can be added to the original cost of managing your lie for the long-haul. Even if there were such a cost ©, this wouldn't prove that (V) still outweighs it. Furthermore (and this is the important point), it is not clear at all that lying does cause psychological/self-esteem damage. In fact, the very claim that psychological/self-esteem damage would be present begs the question since such damage would only be present for one who held values contrary to the lying to begin with. For example, if I believe that lying is wrong and I lie, I will inevitably face psychological damage as a result of my failure to live up to my values. But if my values fully embrace occasional lying as a necessary part of my moral life, then I will face no such psychological pain.. 5) "Just because one lies and happens to get away with it, even in the course of his lifetime, does not prove the principle that lying is actually good for him. In principle, one should still never lie." This reply, worst of all them, begs the question. Honesty is no virtue and those who embrace it as one are acting irrationally. Rational egoists know that honesty is, at best, only a derivative virtue from selfishness. While often honesty might be the best policy, this will not always be the case. In principle, "craftiness" (or something like it) is a much better virtue for the rational man to possess. When the rational man senses that there are situations in which lying is in his self-interest, he will revert to lying. When the situation does not deem it to be so, he will stay honest. This is no different then when the rational man must sense that he is in the context of an "emergency," only instead of an "emergency" we might say we are faced with an "opportunity." Thus, perhaps now the objectivists could prove that honesty is the best policy, always and everywhere (excluding emergencies). Remember, just because you prove that in one case honesty is the best policy does not prove that in principle something like "craftiness" is the true principle one should live his life by. In conclusion, rational egoists should not let conventional morality dictate the logical outcomes of its own ethical conclusions. Honesty is merely the vestige of an altruist code. Since I am no altruist, I refuse to serve any such god as "honesty" when it fails to actually serve my interests, properly understood.