Iudicious

You just gave an altruistic reason and claimed it was self interest. It's not self interest if your reason begins with "so (other) people can...". What's your actual reason for not wanting to attend a publicly funded college? If it's not in line with your philosophy, you have no real argument here - I'm sure you do tons of things that aren't technically in line with your philosophy as a result of the world you live in. Relying on any public service or publicly funded service at all is a violation of your philosophy by these standards, and I guarantee you that you use more than a few public or publicly funded services. If you claim to be an Objectivist, then doing it for the benefit of other's isn't a very good reason either. Besides that, you'd hardly be benefiting others in the first place - as another user pointed out, by not going to public colleges, you're just ensuring that the only people who get educated are the people who support the current system.

DonAthos said: This. This is what I've been trying to get at, apparently less successfully. Yes, an axiom presupposes all proof - but one's identification of an axiom could be wrong. This is why evidence contradicting an axiom has to be considered: because either the conclusion drawn from the evidence is wrong, the evidence itself is wrong, or your identification of an axiom is wrong. That's three points of failure, each of which are equally valid. I did qualify that if evidence existed to contradict an axiom, the axiom would not be the first place I'd look for a failure. I'd re-examine the evidence and the conclusion endlessly, because presumably if I hold an axiom to be true, I've repeatedly re-affirmed that the axiom is necessary for all other things I encounter. Plasmatic said: It seems to me that I've either mis-stated my case or you've misunderstood what I've stated. I agree that any kind of proof presupposses the axioms that I hold to be true. My issue is that the axioms were not handed down to me by divine will - I identified them myself, and I am fallible. If evidence contradicted my identification of the axioms, I'd be very hard pressed to accept the evidence or the conclusion drawn from it... but if the evidence and conclusion proved incontrovertible, I would have to re-examine my identification of the axioms, because I am fallible and I may have mis-identified or misinterpreted the axioms. Your disagreement here seems to lie in me misusing terms, I suppose. No, if an axiom is truly an axiom, it cannot be disproved. Axioms are not subject to truth values. I, however, am. I'm entirely capable of mis-identifying an axiom. I'm entirely capable of misinterpreting an axiom. I can make mistakes. So if the evidence of reality truly, incontrovertibly, contradicted something that I believed to be an axiom - well, I'd be forced to consider the possibility that I mis-identified it as an axiom, or I misinterpreted the consequences of that axiom. If such a thing ever happened, it would imply that the axiom is, perhaps, not an axiom at all. However, as I have said previously, it would take a whole hell of a lot of examination, re-examination, and re-re-examination of the evidence and the conclusions drawn from it before I would even entertain that possibility. An axiom is considered so because it is necessary for me to believe anything that I have seen up to that point. Something that tells me my belief in an axiom is wrong would have to be convincing enough to also make me think that everything else that I've seen and believed in my life to that point is also wrong - and proving that to me would be one hell of a feat. My issue was originally with someone criticizing a scientific idea on account of it being "bad philosophy." My contention is simply that that's not an appropriate response to scientific evidence and a scientific conclusion. If there is an absolutely miniscule chance that I mis-identified an axiom, there's still a chance. I'm not saying that I would immediately assume my philosophy to be wrong if science contradicted it - but I would also not use my philosophy as a basis for criticizing the scientific idea. I'd examine the idea, the evidence and the conclusion drawn from the evidence on a scientific basis until I found where the fault is in its conclusion.

I'm not seeing where your disagreement with what I said was. The questions I asked were not rhetorical. What specifically were you asking me? I wasn't interested in explaining why I feel it necessary to consult reality for proof because I've never met an Objectivist (and very few people besides Objectivists, for that matter) who believed otherwise. There was a lot to write besides that, and seeing as your question was unclear in the first place, I didn't want to assume that you were asking me why reality is the final arbiter of rightness and respond to that when it could very well have been a waste of time. I'm also not seeing how my posts are a confused mess. I organize them by quoting something that I feel should be responded to, and then after the quote I write my response. I've tried to explain myself as clearly as possible. What would you like for me to clarify or make less confusing? Edit: That was also not the only point from your post I addressed. Again, what is confusing about my posts, making it untenable for you to read through them and respond to them with anything other than what you have offered so far?

Sorry, but what you mean to say is "if your initial posts made you seem more amenable to my philosophy, I would have taken the time to respond in detail." Say what you mean. Unlike any of the other people who responded to me, your first responses said absolutely nothing worth even considering, other than just "you're wrong". Which is why I didn't consider them. I agree, because that's another way of saying what I already said. I understand that axioms aren't provable and that any proof would necessarily imply them. Here's the thing: you are not born inherently knowing about any axiom. Yes, an axiom is implied by knowing anything - but this is a fact that has to be deduced from working with the facts of reality. It is not something anyone knows inherently, which means some process of thought must lead to it. Which leads back to what I was already saying before: If an axiom is solidly, incontrovertibly, contradicted by the evidence of reality, you have only two recourses: either admit that your induction process is flawed and cannot be relied on, or admit that your deduction of the axiom/the thought process leading you to the axiom is wrong. There are no other options here. Again with you talking about what I do or do not understand. Don't assume to know what I do or do not know. It's rude, and it makes you seem like an ass. What you just said is precisely what led me to my conclusion. A contradiction of free will provided by incontrovertible evidence from reality would imply a contradiction. That contradiction can lie in one of two places: if there is truly no way around the evidence, no way to reject it otherwise, then you must assume that either your ability to induce anything from reality is flawed, hence producing the contradiction by giving you false evidence from reality, or that your original deduction of the axioms is wrong. I'm saying that I would at least consider the facts of reality simply because either one of those two things is a pretty big leap. Seeing as we're dealing with science here, and not everyone has to be an Objectivist to be a scientist, it's not exactly rational to approach this from a purely philosophical standpoint when the scientific evidence is hardly incontrovertible, as is the original case presented to me. If the evidence is not incontrovertible, there's no reason it can't be rejected from a scientific viewpoint - i.e. a viewpoint not based on deductive processes that most of the world disagrees with Objectivism on. If you want to offhandedly reject scientific evidence on a philosophical basis, go ahead. Just don't be upset when the Christians continue offhandedly rejecting scientific theories, like evolution, because it contradicts their philosophy. Pragmatically, the way that I propose we handle such evidence works a whole lot better. I recommend you stop condescendingly assuming what I do or do not know. Once again saying something not worth considering. Do you have something more to say about this, or are you just going to say "you're wrong, epistemologically" and leave it at that? I'll humor you anyways. In science, we don't treat something as 100% certain when based off of evidence of reality. The reason for this is that when you induce a fact, you do so using a limited amount of evidence. The full set of all knowledge of the universe is simply not available to you. But if something is true in enough cases, you can induce that it is a general truth. That does not mean that something can't come along later that contradicts it. You can work under the assumption that solidly backed theories are indeed true - but if something comes along that really, truly contradicts those theories, they are not off the table for reconsideration. The evidence just needs to be very strong before their wrongness would be considered.

Right, and that's something that you arrived at through a deductive line of reasoning. You were not born with that knowledge in your head. You do not know it inherently. No God has given that knowledge to you through divine will. You deduced that axiom by understanding what it means and the context it fits into. The point I was making is that, if the evidence of reality contradicted that conclusion, I would have to at least consider the possibility that my deduction was wrong, that my deductive abilities were off. I'm not saying that one cannot arrive at an intuition about reality through philosophy. I'm not saying that philosophy cannot guide your reasoning. What I am saying is that science is formalized induction, that its evidence and its theories come from reality. ASSUMING that we had incontrovertible evidence of free will not existing - which it is highly questionable whether such a thing could exist - one would be forced to reconsider one's deductive abilities, or else assume that reality is lying to you and you've actually gone insane and can't discern what is and is not reality. These are your only two options. If the evidence is truly incontrovertible, then your perception of reality is off and your inductive abilities cannot be relied upon... or your deductive abilities were wrong. Unless you suppose a third sort of reasoning that could be involved here that is neither deductive nor inductive, I don't see any other option. Now, if I was personally given evidence that free will does not exist, I'd consider it highly suspect. In science, there's almost nothing that can be said to be true with 100% certainty. Induction can always fail, and it's impossible to prove that it hasn't failed. With induction, unlike deduction, it's only possible to prove that it's astronomically unlikely for your conclusion to be wrong. Given a scenario where I was shown proof that free will doesn't exist obtained through science, I'd likely spend the rest of my days trying to find counter evidence - because reality can't be wrong, but the deductive line of reasoning leading me to believe in free will is pretty solid, so my natural assumption would be that either the evidence was obtained falsely or that there must be some way to find a new conclusion. But unless it was immediately obvious that one of those two things had happened, I wouldn't simply say "oh that's bad philosophy" and shrug it off.

Science journalism is bad. Now, given that a scientist in a field comes to me to say that he has proof that free will is an illusion. On both a philosophical and scientific level, I'd take him seriously - at least for a moment. Why? Because I'm not infallible. I've proved to myself that free will exists - but I am not infallible. If someone provides conclusive empirical evidence that free will does not exist - and I mean CONCLUSIVE, such that there is no scientific way of interpreting it otherwise - I'd have to seriously reconsider my philosophy, because my philosophy now disagrees with the evidence of reality. Do I think that's likely to happen? Not really. But the principle is important here: if the evidence of reality starts to pile up that something about my philosophy is wrong, I'm going to have a problem. Either I'm insane, or my philosophy is wrong. You need to understand what I actually said about science: science is a formalized process of induction. That means that it's entirely based on the evidence of reality. Nothing more, nothing less. If science says that some part of my philosophy is wrong, by all rights the philosophy that I hold should agree - because my philosophy holds that reality is the final arbiter in all things. Not what I want to believe. Not what I wish was true. Reality. Do you disagree with this assessment? If you do not consult reality as the final arbiter in all things... who do you consult? God? I'm bad at this quoting thing, so these next few responses are with regards to Nicky: I'm using precise language but leaving out what I figured to be a given. I have no choice but to believe in science, assuming that I believe in logic and reality. Science is formalized induction. If I don't believe in science, than I don't believe in induction. If I don't believe in induction... well then, what can I believe in? To me, I treat empirical evidence as valid because that is my philosophy. Philosophically, empirical evidence is valid because there is no other kind of evidence with regards to reality. I can deduce a few things without any regards to reality (there is something which exists, I am a thing which exists, a thing is a thing, et cetera) but anything else requires consulting with reality, and empirical evidence is the only means by which to do that. I am confident that no science will ever disprove free will, as a result of what I have deduced logically. But if the empirical evidence of reality firmly, unquestionably, tells me that I do not have free will, I must at least re-examine what I have deduced. Because arriving at such evidence means one of two things: either I've gone insane and cannot reliably induce anything from reality anymore, or I made an error in my deductions. It seems here you agree with me. Yes, I can believe something without ever relying on induction or consulting reality. But I can't do so reliably. I can't have any good reason for doing so. I can't truly, rationally, know anything if I base my beliefs on something other than reality. What makes what objectively right? Are you asking me what makes my philosophy that I must consult with reality (et cetera, et cetera) objectively right? I don't know, you tell me. I'm not interested in explaining it because it seems to me that, based on your responses, it should be blatantly clear to you. How do you suppose that I should discern what is objectively right if I can't believe that consulting reality is objectively right? What do you suppose I should consult instead? Should I give up induction altogether, perhaps? I think you're mostly spot on with your interpretation. I would say that, at best, science is an extension of philosophy. No objective examination of reality can extend from anywhere but philosophy, which necessarily includes science. My issue is that it's entirely possible to arrive at science with a philosophy different from Objectivism. Induction does not exist just in Objectivism. A person can have a completely different set of views from me or you, and still be a fantastic scientist, better even than you or I could ever be perhaps. So criticizing them for "bad philosophy" misses the point entirely. You can't throw out their scientific evidence on account of it disagreeing with your philosophy. Can philosophy perhaps flavor our views of the evidence? Sure. But in the end, reality is the final arbiter of rightness, and if your philosophy ends up disagreeing with reality... well, the old cliche works here: if you believe that you can fly, go jump off a building and see if gravity agrees. Science is the only means that I have of objectively collecting and understanding the evidence of reality through induction. If it tells me that my philosophy is wrong... perhaps I need to take at least a few minutes to examine my philosophy.

I'm curious what leads you to believe that colleges with government funding provide crap education. I'm all for trying to find free market alternatives to things... but many of the brightest minds in the world attended or currently work at publicly funded universities. Just because someone's philosophy disagrees with yours doesn't mean they have nothing worthwhile to say. A person can be a brilliant physicist and have differing philosophical beliefs from your own. Go to the best place that you can. Learn from the best people that you can. There's nothing immoral about picking the best possible option of schooling. We work to change the culture and the world that we live in - but unfortunately, even when our philosophical beliefs are at odds with the culture and world we live in, we must still live in it, and make the best of it. So make the best of it.

Empirically, it does work. There's nothing in science where you cannot, through some means, point to how the theory or idea relates to reality and what it does. Even the most abstract theories exist because of some real world phenomena. But that's not really why I believe in science. I believe in science because I have no choice but to believe in it. The scientific method formalizes our only means of proving anything about reality from the evidence of reality - i.e. it formalizes induction. If I don't believe in it, then I can't really believe in anything. If I don't believe in induction, then how can I have a belief in anything? Believing something requires evidence, and if I don't believe in evidence... well, nothing can help me then. I would agree that the scientific method is derived from philosophy. The only route to science is through philosophy, whether implicitly or explicitly. But that does not mean that philosophy gets a say in the evidence of reality. If a scientific theory doesn't jive with your philosophy and you can't find a scientific reason for why that theory is wrong, then your philosophy is wrong. Philosophy gave us induction, and from induction, science. Philosophy did not give us reality, and it cannot take it away. If the evidence of science disagrees with your philosophy, your philosophy has nothing to stand on. If a scientific theory is wrong, there's a scientific reason why.

I don't have a problem with pointing out flaws in science. But science has a specific method for dealing with errors, and that method works. Bringing your philosophy into it doesn't help anything. As right as we all may think our philosophies are, there's currently no great way for reassuring everyone that one particular philosophy is objectively better than all others, so basing scientific contentions on philosophical beliefs is not a very good way to do... well, anything.

Right! I forgot! Science and reality have to obey Objectivist philosophy, otherwise we just offhandedly dismiss the both of them as having a severe case of bad philosophy. I don't actually know anything about physics, but I tend to trust the statements of physicists over the statements of philosophers when it comes to physics. It itches me the wrong way that you'd suggest that physics is "corrupted by bad philosophy." Physics is corrupted by the choice to use the evidence of reality. Sorry if it doesn't fall in line with what your philosophy would have you believe.

It seems like a large part of the reason that Objectivism is so prone to schisms - on large scales and small scales - is that Objectivism, unlike many other movements, is so specific. Our beliefs are very specific, creating a much greater range of things that could create a schism than in a typical movement, which would be focused on broad, general goals and ideas. Beyond that, the intense focus on an objective reality and there being only one right answer in all situations but for matters of arbitrary personal opinion (e.g. which fast food restaurant serves the best burger) makes it that much more likely to create a major problem when a small difference of opinions occurs. I think some people interpret the idea of there being an objective, correct answer as meaning that all Objectivists must come to an agreement on that answer, and anyone in disagreement is inherently not "one of us". Polite disagreements can occur among people with the same foundational beliefs without causing a conflict. It just requires that all participants in the exchange of ideas maintain cool, level heads. Something that many intellectual leaders in the Objectivist movement over the years seem to have had issues with doing.

As a lover of the outdoors and biology, I have to say, I'm really loving the outdoors art! Your latest stuff on Ifatart.com is great. Love the Forest Trail painting, and I love the mermaid painting. The tree paintings looked extraordinary as well. You've really captured the "feeling" of a tree in them - not really sure how else to put it. A lot of art involving trees feels artificial, because it's built off of our broad conception of what a tree is, instead of looking at nature itself and incorporating the irregularities of trees in real life. Ever been down to Florida or seen a Mangrove swamp elsewhere? I think you'd have a field day painting Mangroves.

Careful with your terms. Humans are not the only animals capable of forming concepts. Arguably, a great deal of animals are capable of forming concepts - being able to regard a group of entities as a single entity, as many animals have been proven capable of (off the top of my head, several species of birds, especially crows, dolphins, apes, et cetera), is a conceptual task. I'll have to look for the paper on it, because the way they demonstrated this ability was actually quite clever. But besides that, many animals are capable of primitive use of tools, some monkeys have primitive systems of trade, and have even been taught to use currency. Simply associating sets of words with sets of actions, as many animals are capable of doing, is a conceptual task. So no, we are not the only animals with a conceptual faculty, nor are we the only animals with a faculty of reason. Our faculty of reason is far and away better than any other animal's of course, and this is a fundamental part of understanding human beings. But I would not argue that it makes us "fundamentally different" from other animals, because all naturally occurring parts of being human can also be found in other animals to greater or lesser degrees.

I would agree, though I know many who would not. However, I was not speaking of us as an organism, but more our environment. The environmental pressures exerted on us are in many ways different from other animals (though, perhaps even then not in a "fundamental" way). In any case, thank you for making this point.

Good job dealing with the several points made in my, and others' post. Yet again, you have proven your prowess at discussing points and making legitimate counterarguments. Truly, I am in awe at your rhetoric and scientific cunning.

Indeed. Which is what I meant by "negative" or "positive". Perhaps I should have been more clear - when I say a trait is "negative", it means that it's not well adapted to the organism's current environment or situation. It doesn't, in whatever situation, help the organism survive. Assume the inverse for a "positive" trait. I think you're making a very important point here that human_murda may be missing. Just because our environment and situation is fundamentally different from other animals, does not mean that we do not adapt to it. If certain traits turn out, over a prolonged course of time, to be more well suited to the environment we've created for ourselves, those traits will become dominant in the long term. This is evolution, and this is natural selection.

Except that you're only assuming that that subtext exists. I've been in similar situations on several occasions - women have invited me to their house late in the evening without me knowing them incredibly well, us having recently met. It usually means that they want to hang out and spend more time together together. It MIGHT be interpreted as being interested in something more, but without any explicit evidence of that, it's not a good assumption to make. In any case, this seems to be a subtext that obviously exists... to you. And didn't obviously exist to the woman involved, or to me, or perhaps to Eiuol or Nicky.

Do you have citations for any of this? Or anything you're saying, at this point? You're not discussing philosophy anymore. You've mixed up your philosophy with science, and now you're making a mess of the both of them. The consensus in the biology community is that humans do undergo evolution and are affected by natural selection. The fact that your philosophy disagrees doesn't really mean anything. Nature and reality don't bow to the whims of what you want to believe, as Rand would inform you. You've fundamentally misunderstood the point being made here. Humans have genes, DNA, et cetera. You've agree to this. I've pointed this out repeatedly: evolution is a mathematical construct. If a trait makes you more likely to survive - which traits are wont to do, as well as the inverse, even in humans - it will tend to be passed on, whereas a trait that makes you less likely to survive will tend to not be passed on. This is not something that is affected by the existence of reason. Reasons helps us survive, yes, but if you have two perfectly reasonable people, and one of them has negative traits that the other does not, the one with fewer negative traits is more likely to survive. This is how evolution works, simplistically.

I'm very heavily leaning towards Nicky's point of view in this so far. I've been to women's houses late into the evening, past 12 AM, to hang out, have tea, and talk and have fun. Never did I assume that sex was involved - and in most cases it wasn't involved. I think a relevant question here is this: if a guy invited you up to his house at 12 AM, you being a guy as well, for coffee or a drink, would you assume he wanted sex? If no, then why not? Why is it different for a woman? In all honesty, I treat my male friends no different from my female friends. Perhaps this is an astounding attitude or something, but it has always seemed fairly reasonable to me. If a male friend asked me into his house late into the night, he'd be pretty freaked out if I started coming onto him sexually - even given that I'm bisexual and he knows it. Where I come from, being invited into someone's house late in the evening for coffee, or any other kind of beverage, does not consistute an invitation for sex. All it means is the person likes hanging out and would like to continue doing so. The fact that there's a lot of question here as to whether or not what she did could be interpreted as an invitation means that there should have been an explicit question from the guy for consent before beginning, and that he should have listened when she said no. Edit: Also, are you fucking serious with this? "(there are two sides to every story and we only have one here, but we’ll assume she reported accurately for our purposes)." You didn't contribute a single damn thing to your post by including that. You're saying that we should assume she's not lying. But why would you include that in parentheses if that's what you were assuming? The ONLY reason that that parenthetical is necessary is to imply to the reader that the woman in this case is lying, which is a really shitty thing to do. It contributes nothing else to your article whatsoever.

The best, most beneficial, way that I've found to interact with "normal" people, is to first realize that I, and you as well, am also a "normal" person (insofar as "normal" is even a valid concept, which I hesitate to believe). When I first got into Objectivism, also in high school, I had this whole ridiculous phase where I saw everyone around me as a "Keating" and a few, select people as actually rising above the rest. This is a stupid viewpoint. Everyone around you is not a "Keating," you just don't know the people around you, so you assume. Almost everyone I've ever met has personal interests, goals, ambitions, things and people they care about. Yeah, some select few people truly are hopeless losers who will only bring you down. Learning to avoid those people isn't an Objectivist task - it's a people task, because everyone has to avoid that kind of person. But most people aren't that kind of person. But sometimes we get into the habit of tribal thinking. Everyone who isn't an Objectivist, or who doesn't strictly adhere to the tenets of Objectivism, is a lesser person, or at least you're a greater person for doing so. It's the same kind of thinking that leads to religious extremism, and it's the same kind of thinking that causes people looking at some Objectivists to pronounce that they are dogmatists or cultists: that inside-vs-outside sort of attitude, where you're somehow more special than people who don't believe, is the exact kind of thing that causes people to believe Objectivism is a cult. You are no more a "true" individual (as the first responder would have you believe) than anyone else is - this isn't to say that you aren't an individual, but rather that everyone is. If you have trouble conversing with people because of your beliefs... well, than either the problem is your beliefs (which, seeing as there are plenty of Objectivists who are capable of living normal social lives, I hesitate to believe) or the problem is your social skills. Either way, the solution is simple: whatever problems you have with other people based on your beliefs, get past them. Until someone truly slights you, you have no reason to think less of them by default. Try to get to know people, discover their interests and their ambitions instead of simply assuming that they are "Keatings". Be a good person, and discover the good in other people. Share your interests with other people, and discover people who care about what you care about - or discover new things to care about by learning about other people's interests. Ayn Rand's fiction, while brilliant, did not portray a world that reflected the real world. Its limited cast of characters were almost always on one side or another: die-hard Objectivist ideals (with resumes that most of us could only aspire to) or clear cut "moochers" and "looters". There were a few exceptions, but Rand's fiction encouraged - perhaps not intentionally - the view that the majority of people are simply mindless drones. It's an easy belief to fall into when you're a teenager and you haven't developed that sense of perspective that allows you to be aware that, indeed, everyone around you thinks, everyone around you goes through hardships, everyone around you has goals and loves and passions, and everyone around you sometimes, also, feels left out. As for the problem of not enjoying school itself, take everyone else's advice: find a subject you enjoy, and learn it yourself. I did that in high school, and I've continued doing it in college, even when I didn't need to.

Right. How could I have forgotten - Ayn Rand, evolutionary biologist and philosopher. The issue here is that you're not actually understanding what evolution is. Evolution is not some physical construct. It's not something that organisms "undergo". It's not something that humans choose to enact or not enact. Evolution is, fundamentally, a mathematical construct. Traits that lend themselves to the increased survival of an organism NECESSARILY will be passed on more BECAUSE organisms that survive longer, reproduce more. Traits that DECREASE one's ability to survive NECESSARILY will not be passed on as often, because organisms with those traits will survive shorter periods, and reproduce less. So what do you suppose MUST happen as a result? Well, gradually the frequency of the negative trait diminishes, and the frequency of the positive trait increases. As I said - it is a mathematical construct. It's a very common misconception, and has been for over a century now, that humans are exempt from evolution because of our ability to think conceptually and use tools. That's simply not true. There's nothing that we can do, categorically, that another organism cannot do in order to deal with changing circumstances. Other organisms migrate, other organisms use tools and shelter (to an extent, depending on the organism), other organisms do as much as they can to adapt to their changing environment, just like humans do. But that doesn't change the mathematical certainty that negative traits will necessarily reduce in frequency over time as a result of diminished lifespans and reproductive viability. The effect may be smaller in humans due to the existence of medical science, but it does still exist. I trust Ayn Rand's ability to interpret and explain philosophy and literature. But she is not an evolutionary biologist, or a biologist in any sense. Just because she thinks that humans are not subject to the effects of the environment does not mean that she's right. See! This is what happens when a biologist comments on neurology, entirely outside of his area of expertise! I looked into it more, and you are indeed correct. The frontal lobe inhibits primitive reflexes, which originate in the brain stem as automatic responses to stimuli. Which again leads us back to the definition of instinct - does an automatic response count as an instinct? Natural selection certainly applies to human beings for the exact reasons I listed above. No organisms' death is a "metaphysical fact". Deaths do not have to happen to any organism. Which is why organisms with traits that aid their survival, including humans, are more likely to survive longer and reproduce more, and therefore, from a purely mathematical standpoint, those traits have an increasing frequency within a population, including human populations. I'd like to repeat a point that you did not address earlier: human attraction. Instinctually, humans are attracted to the opposite sex. There are some humans that are different in this respect, but most humans are attracted to the opposite sex. This befits the definition of an instinct that I laid out earlier: 1. Universality - the trait in question can be found in all members of the species 2. Tendency - the action or set of actions is a tendency that can be overridden by conscious thought or present in a different form in different members of the species 3. Not learned - evidence currently points to sexual attraction being genetic, not a conscious choice. This is an example of an "instinct" in my mind, and the mind of the professor that I mentioned earlier. It's beneficial for the species overall to pursue a specific course of action - the pursuit of the opposite gender - and so traits that cause humans to inherently tend towards the opposite sex have been bred for. We can consciously choose to not pursue a member of the opposite sex, but it's fairly clear that our sexual orientation is not a learned behavior. This is a very, very, abundantly clear example of an "instinct". Reproduction itself is an example of an "instinct." If it were simply that we chose to reproduce as part of our value system, we'd see much greater variance in the choice to reproduce than we do - as it is, most humans want to reproduce, pretty much starting from the age that they're capable of doing so. The fact that some don't - just as the fact that some people are not attracted to the opposite gender - is actually proof that it is an instinct: there's a clear MINORITY in both examples, which makes it fulfill the criterion for being an instinct by making it a "tendency" and not a "reflex": it can be overridden.

"I'm implying that evolution applies to human beings (i.e., humans can evolve traits that allow them to survive better) but not by natural selection. I am not contesting the validity of evolution. Given our genetic coding system, it would be pretty much inevitable." In what way do you suppose natural selection does not apply to us? Off the top of my head, traits leading to immunity to certain diseases persist and grow in human populations. The pressure acting on such traits is natural selection. I'll give you that it's liable that other selective pressures, such as sexual selection, may have a greater influence in human society and natural selection may have a lesser influence than what you'd see in the populations of other animals, but there's no actual reason for it being absent. "Isn't that a learned behaviour? Given that crying is the primary means for a baby to communicate, isn't that, err.. inevitable?" Not really. Babies do it right out of the womb. It's something they inherently know to do when distressed. Other things like suckling and rooting are referred to as primitive reflexes, which, contrary to your assumption that they do not pass through the brain, do indeed pass through the brain and are associated with the frontal lobe. I'm not a neurologist, so I won't presume to explain any more than that - the point being, these aren't simply muscle reflexes. They're inherent behaviors that originate in the brain. Why is this such an issue to you? What do you suppose would lead to humans not having "instincts" when other animals do? We've conclusively shown that instincts would not, by definition, interfere with a rational faculty - by definition, an instinct can be overridden by a faculty of reason. So why is this an issue at all? Is it just because Ayn Rand wrote about animal instincts and humans not having them? Because last I checked, she wasn't a biologist. "Why? What makes it necessary that if one species has an instinct, another should have too? Considering that you believe that there is some ambiguity regarding whether there is any species at all that possesses instincts, your assertion seems arbitrary. What would establish such a causal link if you see no reason at all to believe the thinks being linked?" Evolution. Organisms don't spontaneously generate. So if we know that the organisms from which humans evolved possessed instincts - which it is commonly assumed that they do - and there is no reason for such things to be absent in human beings, and we know of behaviors that could, potentially, be instinctual, then there's no reason to think that humans do not have instincts. Humans are special in that they have a higher degree of abstract thought... but in no other ways are they special. We're not excluded from the evolutionary process. We're not exempt from the same things that affect animals. "I don't think it is merely a computational issue. Human consciousness (and all its prerequisites) is itself different." I'm not implying it's merely a computational issue. However, the categorically same kind of abstract thought that we are capable of, other animals are also capable of. Not many of them, but some of them. Tool usage, concept formation, grouping, things like that. Animals are more primitive in their ability to reason conceptually, but such ability does exist. So, categorically, our consciousness is similar. However, the LEVEL of abstract thought that we are capable of is significantly deeper - so much so that it has allowed us to become the dominant species on the planet.

Louie said pretty much everything I'd need to say, with a few exceptions. I would tend to agree that, at the least, "instinct" is a poorly defined concept. However, it's widely accepted in the Objectivist community that animals have instincts and humans do not, and since the only notable difference between humans and other animals is a deeper level of abstract thought than other animals are capable of (and note that there are animals capable of a level of abstract thought, though nowhere near approaching what humans are capable of), I can't see why one would think animals have instincts and humans do not. Biologically, it's fairly widely accepted that humans do possess what we think of as instincts, as defined in my previous post. Whether these instincts substantially affect our actions or cause us to act differently from the ways in which we might already be rationally inclined to act is murky water at best. But again, I'd agree that instincts are a poorly defined concept - my main disagreement here is that we should imply that animals have them and somehow, for no real good reason at all, humans do not. Again, thanks to Louie for pointing out some other issues, including the issue of epigenetics. If you're not feeling like reading a wikipedia page, the idea is thus: yes, things that happen in our lifetime do indeed affect our genes, and yes, those changes are heritable. "Too bad humans natural selection does not apply to humans, which necessarily implies: getting rid of instincts would be the most advantageous, evolutionarily, for humans. Your 1. and 2. are wrong (if you can try to understand why 1. is wrong, you are pretty much all set). You don't know what evolution means for humans." Now this is an interesting contention. If I'm reading this correctly, you're implying that natural selection and evolution do not apply to human beings. Considering the substantial evidence to the contrary and the broad consensus in the field of evolutionary biology, what makes you think, human_murda, that humans are exempted from evolution or natural selection in any particular way? We know that humans evolve immunities to certain diseases, we know that humans are subjected to the same processes of inheritance as all other animals, we know that humans undergo the same sort of selection for those traits... so what makes you think that it applies differently for us? I'd like to point out what I always tend to point out in discussions of evolution: evolution is not a physical thing. It is not a "guiding hand" or anything of the like. My "focus" (I hesitate to say "expertise", due to not having finished my education) is on mathematical biology, and as such I like to think of evolution as what it is: a mathematical reality. In humans, the base rate of mutation is something like 90~ mutations per generation (taking a very rough average from the citations on this page: http://sandwalk.blogspot.com/2013/03/estimating-human-mutation-rate-direct.html ). Assuming you have a basic understanding of biology - I make this assumption because you're presuming to discuss biology at all - it would be evident that these mutations are subject to the exact same selective pressures that any other animal is. If they aid our survival and ability to reproduce, no matter how little or great of an aid they are, they will tend to be passed on. If they hinder our survival and ability to reproduce, now matter how little or great of a hindrance they are, they will tend to not be passed on. This is a vast simplification, but it makes clear the mathematical reality: generation by generation, a mutation will appear more often if it lends to the success of an individual, and generation by generation, a mutation will appear less often if it does not lend to the success of an individual. " There seems to be no other way to explain, for example, how baby turtles "know" they have to crawl to sea" If you accept this as proof of instincts, than you must also accept the automatic actions of human beings as proof of instincts. How do baby humans know to suckle on a breast? How do baby humans know to cry in order to get attention? Why does a baby crying provoke an automatic response in human mothers? Again, I'm not arguing that instincts are necessarily a great concept. But if you're accepting THAT as proof for the existence of instincts, than there are very clearly instincts in human beings as well - no matter how little they actually affect our actions once we reach a level of development that allows for use of our faculty of reason.

Apologies, I'm not familiar with the way the posts on here work anymore, so I'm having a hard time figuring out how to quote individual parts of your response. In any case! Wow! The number of words you've put into my mouth is truly astounding. Did I say that mothers are just "waiting to dispose their babies at the nearest doorstep"? No, I didn't. I said there's certain nurturing behaviors that we are pre-programmed with. Does it mean we inherently HAVE to act on those behaviors? Nope. Not even animals inherently act on all instincts - believe it or not, some animals are capable of acting in a semi-reasoned fashion. An instinct, in this case, refers to a set of behaviors that we tend towards (and I say that we "tend" towards them because we do, indeed, have the ability to not act on them, as a result of having a faculty of reason) as a result of being human. Robert F. Port, professor of Linguistics and Cognitive Science at Indiana University, puts instincts this way: "It is an ability to behave in a certain way coupled with a tendency to behave that way at appropriate times." Hence my wording as well - in constructing his list of possible human instincts, he suggested that instincts can be recognized by a few traits: universality (meaning, presence across all members of the species) and a sufficient reason to believe that such behaviors were not learned from experience being two of those main criteria. Other examples, since you dislike the motherly nature example, might include our sexual behavior. We do not control our arousal explicitly, at least not initially, human beings as a whole tend towards being aroused by the opposite sex, and we get aroused by an early enough age that we lack the ability to have constructed a sufficient value system to encompass sexual attraction. The mere fact that humans tend towards attraction to the opposite sex is reason enough to believe it's instinctual - if such attraction was built off the construction of a value system, we'd have no reason to put the opposite sex so highly above the same sex, especially considering the quantitatively large number of reasons to not want to care for a child. The fact that there's some evidence pointing towards our tendency of attraction to a certain sex being genetic is physical proof that sexual attraction is an instinct - if it's a genetically learned behavior, then it's an instinct. Other programmed, instinctual behaviors include blinking and flinching. These are behaviors that, with sufficient training, humans can avoid doing, but are programmed into us to occur from birth. They are genetically inherited behaviors. "state precisely all the contradictions that arise assuming instincts need to be got rid of to evolve human consciousness." You're improperly placing the burden of proof on me. You're saying "prove me wrong", when in science, we require that one prove oneself right. In this case - show me a single reason why having a pre-programmed set of instincts is contrary to having a faculty of reason? Evolutionarily, it makes no sense to get rid of a certain set of instincts because those instincts 1. do not harm our ability to survive, and 2. in many cases increase our chances of survival. If you understand evolution on any level, it should make sense to you why I stated that, given those two premises, instincts would not be gotten rid of evolutionarily. Broadly, evolution leads to the maintenance of traits that increase our chances of survival, and the riddance of traits that decrease it. Babies, who I think most of us can agree do not have a developed faculty of reason, aren't wont to lying in place and doing nothing. Despite the lack of a faculty of reason, despite any sort of value system that they could have developed on their own, they clearly have certain things they desire - there's no way for them, without a faculty of reason, to have obtained the value system necessary to "desire" something, so we're left with one alternative: they have those desires from birth. I'm hoping that this isn't an astounding idea to you, because it seemed fairly obvious to me in my biology education. It seems to me that you're putting a lot more weight into the existence of instincts than there needs to be. There's no reason to think instincts contradict the existence of a faculty of reason. I would propose that part of the criteria for an instinct's existence is that it specifically be capable of being overridden by that faculty of reason - otherwise it's simply an involuntary behavior, like the pumping of one's heart. Instincts do not clash with reason. I'd argue that our ability to overcome instinctual behavior is a core part of understanding how advanced our faculty of reason is.

Good point StrictlyLogical. However, I'd question the tendency to put any complex psychological underpinnings to a desire for a certain set of actions. Things like that get messy quickly, and I'm quite happy to assume that, no matter how disgusting the act, one can like something "just because". Makes it easier to live with my own depraved fantasies, at least.