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Prospectivist_Objectivist

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  1. On the contrary, my inquiry was precisely whether or not there is a contradiction between causality and free will, and this has yet to be demonstrated-- only asserted. As I noted above, free will is not self-evident, so its non-contradiction with causality is nontrivial. I look forward to someone demonstrating this non-contradiction. Since you seem confident on the point, would you please do the honors? As for the website entry fee: your experiment would not demonstrate much. A determinist would respond that while I probably would not pay the entry fee, it would be because of physical conditions set long ago and I could not actually have done anything else.
  2. The last few posts have not been terribly productive. WhYNOT either didn't read the paradox (see near the top) or misunderstood it. Capitalism Forever's correction is right but irrelevant, as it does not actually address the paradox. Knat's argument simply re-states the already-conceded fact that we cannot definitively conclude that determinism is true based on scientific knowledge; and Knat fails to argue the actual point, i.e. that determinism actually is impossible. Still interested in thoughts.
  3. As for the first objection: I'm thinking of causality less in Aristotilian terms than in terms of modern science, which has shown over and over again that physical systems consistently follow certain laws and that the activity of physical systems is always dependent on pre-existing physical realities. As for the second objection: that a human being can indeed make choices is not a directly observable aspect of human consciousness. What is observable is that a man can think he is making choices, and he can think he actually had the ability to take an action different from the one he took. It does not immediately follow that man could have actually rejected his chosen action and taken another.
  4. In this case, "truth" is that which exists, and existence is primary. In some cases, we can discover truth through rational inquiry; and in other cases, such as the one illustrated here, we cannot discover truth (an electron has a certain set of properties, we just can't know them all). Please carry on...
  5. WhYNOT: Unfortunately, you have not addressed the content of the argument. The Heisenberg example serves only to illustrate that a proposition can be true without necessarily being provable; the real content of the argument is in the paradox. To refute my objections, you'll need to show that the paradox is not actually a paradox. It is not sufficient to re-assert the conclusion: "Surely, consciousness, free will, and choice, pre-suppose self- determinism." The point is that if the universe is determined, then volition is an illusion (and therefore so are free will and choice).
  6. I have been struggling with this argument against determinism for some time, and I'm not sure it actually holds. Input one way or another would be appreciated. (Also: if it wasn't Ayn Rand's argument originally, whose was it?) All this argument shows is that we cannot definitively conclude "that man's volitional mind is an illusion... (etc)." But from the fact that we cannot definitively conclude that a proposition is true, it does not follow that the proposition must not be true. (For example: the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle shows that we cannot ever be certain of certain electron properties, but it does not follow that an electron cannot have a certain proposed set of properties.) That is, I see no contradiction in the following thought experiment: suppose a universe exists which is completely determined. Suppose that in this universe, an organism develops, makes observations, and draws the (invalid) conclusion that its universe must be determined and its volition is an illusion. The organism's lack of logical rigor implies that the conclusion is invalid, not that the conclusion is necessarily false. The point is that this hypothetical determined universe does not place its nature at the mercy of the organisms it determines. Moving to a different objection: if modern science shows that everything in the universe is ruled by natural laws and that every effect has a cause, then how can we possibly get around determinism? That is, suppose I accept the argument I challenged above: man is volitional. Then man somehow exercises free will independent of pre-existing physical realities (otherwise, volition would be a myth); but since no physical system acts independently of the pre-existing physical realities, it follows that some aspect of volition is nonphysical. Even if we accept this conclusion for now, it seems like modern science is getting better and better at explaining the mind in purely physical (well, electrochemical) terms. Yet the conclusion that some aspect of volition is nonphysical implies that science will never ever fully explain cognition in purely physical terms. The truth of this remains to be seen, but this seems a very dangerous supposition given the historical inability of such claims to withstand scientific advances. But following my own objection: suppose science one day does explain cognition in purely physical terms; it would therefore follow that volition is an illusion. But for the above reasons, we can't draw that conclusion definitively; but neither can we ignore scientific findings. Is this just an unresolvable paradox? (Productive) comments appreciated!
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