Dante

You're asking the wrong question. We don't need to examine individual choices and try to parse out what was possible and what was not for the chooser. I don't know how you could even approach a question like that. The argument for the existence of volition is much simpler and more basic; it's an axiomatic basis for any claim of knowledge. Any claim of conceptual knowledge is a claim that the knowledge-holder has performed a conscious act of determining the truth or falsity of a proposition. Defending the existence of knowledge without defending the capability of people to choose to think or not is contradictory.



The fact of volition is axiomatic, and self-evident through introspection. However, how volition actually works is an incredibly complicated scientific question, and furthermore we shouldn't expect it to be simple. There's a big difference between experiencing something working within our own consciousness and understanding enough about human biology to explain how that something works. It's the difference between being able to use our eyes to get around and understanding everything about the human eye, the optic nerve, and the visual cortex.

You're asking the wrong question. We don't need to examine individual choices and try to parse out what was possible and what was not for the chooser. I don't know how you could even approach a question like that. The argument for the existence of volition is much simpler and more basic; it's an axiomatic basis for any claim of knowledge. Any claim of conceptual knowledge is a claim that the knowledge-holder has performed a conscious act of determining the truth or falsity of a proposition. Defending the existence of knowledge without defending the capability of people to choose to think or not is contradictory.



The fact of volition is axiomatic, and self-evident through introspection. However, how volition actually works is an incredibly complicated scientific question, and furthermore we shouldn't expect it to be simple. There's a big difference between experiencing something working within our own consciousness and understanding enough about human biology to explain how that something works. It's the difference between being able to use our eyes to get around and understanding everything about the human eye, the optic nerve, and the visual cortex.

That is clearly not what Rand meant when she discussed the choice to live. Acceptance of man's life as a standard of value is an act of fully realizing the implications of one's choice to live. The original choice, however, only reflects the fact that the individual wishes to remain in existence. It does not say anything about the type of ethics they will adopt. You are simply misunderstanding the argument. No one is saying that a full acceptance of life as a standard of value is pre-moral. The argument is simply that an individual has no reason to care about any ethical code unless he or she at least wishes to remain alive. It is this 'choice to live' which then gives moral import to one's knowledge and decisions.

Any claim to the contrary amounts to a claim that morality has some sort of 'higher' hold on man, that it should be adhered to for the sake of something other than one's own life. This is the stance taken by most religions, Kantianism, etc, that 'duty' or 'God's commands' or some other outside force makes morality binding on us. According to Rand, all of this undermines morality's core purpose as a chosen tool to aid us in living our lives. We first must choose to remain alive before morality can become binding.

Any attempt to treat reality as split or dichotomous can only result in negative consequences.
The "theologians" who are content to believe that which is set against Science are conceding that what they believe are fairytales and that is how there work should be treated.
The scientists who are content to leave morality/ethics/etc.. to "matters of faith" are conceding that they believe that morality/ethics is non-real, non-important, and non-objective... and they will cause trouble (like Dr. Stadler in Atlas Shrugged)

The key (as always) is Philosophy...or a commitment to knowing objective reality and having an entire, coherent, and comprehensive worldview.
Any of those "theologians" that are rationally convinced that God exists would do well to study philosophy and to understand that IF God exists, then He is not afraid of Science.
Likewise, the Scientists who don't care about morality would do well to study philosophy and understand that without a proper moral code, they and their studies would be covered in blood.
Additionally, I think far too many scientist ignore philosophy at the peril of their own studies-- they don't have a proper philosophical (i.e. logical) foundation and so they waste a lot of time and energy in search of proof for irrational theories.

I agree that a standard is something you measure against. And yes, value requires a "to whom" and "for what."

I agree that choosing is a natural ability of man and thinking is a natural ability, but valuing and reasoning are not. Value is choosing + a standard, reason is thinking + a standard. And the the standards in both cases have to be discovered (we are not born with the knowledge).



I think we're pretty much on the same page here. I don't disagree that pleasure/pain can get us to a concept of value. But once we're on the conceptual level we realize that anything that has a "to whom" and "for what" can also potentially serve as a standard. Then there's comes the question of proof of any given standard. And life is the only provable ultimate standard.

The benevolent universe premise refers to the fact that value achievement is possible, and in fact should be expected with a conscious commitment to achieving values. It refers to the fact that the universe is open to value achievement. It does not make any statements about humanity. It is entirely consistent to believe that the universe is benevolent, and at the same time that most humans are short-sighted and destructive.

Has anyone provided a definition of "physical" yet? Might be helpful.

As I pointed out already, it is unreasonable for you to expect every general question about ethics to have a clear-cut yes/no answer simply because we claim that ethics is scientifically discovered. To present an analogy, presumably we both agree that all questions about physical human health can be answered scientifically. Yet if I were to ask a health professional, "Is drinking milk healthy?" they would be crazy to give a simple yes/no answer without first discovering more of my context. For example, am I lactose intolerant? Am I already drinking three times the daily recommended serving of diary products? Simply making the statement that human health can be explored through science does not commit one to having a simple answer to every complex question about health.

Objectivism approaches morality as a tool for living a full, complete, flourishing life. As such, there are many parallels to the health example. There are some general moral principles which apply to everyone (it is this type of principle that is generally elucidated in any exposition of the Objectivist ethics), and there are some statements which are more particular and require more context. Likewise, some questions about health have answers which are universal to all humans, by virtue of our being human (Is consuming calories necessary to maintaining one's health?). However, some vary from individual to individual (e.g. Is short-term exposure to sunlight harmful? Usually the answer is no, but to someone with xeroderma pigmentosa, the answer is definitely yes).

Under the Objectivist ethics, your question about cannibalism, for example, is equivalent to asking, "Does it further an individual's life to engage in cannibalism?" There is not a general, true-in-all-contexts answer to this question. In order to discover the answer in a particular case, you would have to trace out the long-term physical and psychological effects of the action. With the proper framework, you could figure it out.

As I pointed out already, it is unreasonable for you to expect every general question about ethics to have a clear-cut yes/no answer simply because we claim that ethics is scientifically discovered. To present an analogy, presumably we both agree that all questions about physical human health can be answered scientifically. Yet if I were to ask a health professional, "Is drinking milk healthy?" they would be crazy to give a simple yes/no answer without first discovering more of my context. For example, am I lactose intolerant? Am I already drinking three times the daily recommended serving of diary products? Simply making the statement that human health can be explored through science does not commit one to having a simple answer to every complex question about health.

Objectivism approaches morality as a tool for living a full, complete, flourishing life. As such, there are many parallels to the health example. There are some general moral principles which apply to everyone (it is this type of principle that is generally elucidated in any exposition of the Objectivist ethics), and there are some statements which are more particular and require more context. Likewise, some questions about health have answers which are universal to all humans, by virtue of our being human (Is consuming calories necessary to maintaining one's health?). However, some vary from individual to individual (e.g. Is short-term exposure to sunlight harmful? Usually the answer is no, but to someone with xeroderma pigmentosa, the answer is definitely yes).

Under the Objectivist ethics, your question about cannibalism, for example, is equivalent to asking, "Does it further an individual's life to engage in cannibalism?" There is not a general, true-in-all-contexts answer to this question. In order to discover the answer in a particular case, you would have to trace out the long-term physical and psychological effects of the action. With the proper framework, you could figure it out.

Taking Iraq would be a good base of operations for other middle eastern targets. Plus, we get the oil.

Measurement is the identification of a relationship, established by means of some standard that serves as a unit. In dealing with value-judgments, we are not engaging in mathematical measurements (adding, subtracting, multiplying, etc.), we are dealing with teleological measurements, because there is no numerical unit involved. A moral code is a system of teleological measurement which grades the choices and actions open to man, according to the degree to which they achieve or frustrate a given code's standard of value. A rational code of values establishes a graded relationship of means to end, the end being man's life qua man. It is that objective moral standard (the requirements of a rational being for life and happiness) that the Objectivist ethics deals with as a means of measuring man's values. If you had actually read Rand on ethics, you would know this already, but since you have raised such an objection without even being familiar with what you are objecting to, you are likely just trolling.

Not everyone on this forum even knows everything about the Objectivist ethics, much less about the scientific relationships involved in certain behaviors and their biological and psychological effects on those acting individuals involved, especially since the examples you gave were sarcastic situations things that would obviously require specialized investigation. Your assertion that a rational ethics must be impossible because people on this forum can't or didn't want to (or didn't in the time frame you demanded of them) respond to your arrogant demands is an example of the informal logical fallacy of argument from ignorance.

That being said, now back to your questions:



No. Go read Rand.

The moral code he assumes here appears to be completely altruistic. He describes the two ends of the spectrum as "depraved" versus "generous," and defends the average person as "selfish but reasonably so."

He refers to some amount of selfishness as "healthy," and refers to "striving for their own happiness and the happiness of their families" as a "noble end" for people, but phrases it such that we understand this as a less than fully noble end. People could be more morally perfect by disregarding these ends in favor of complete "generosity" or "saintliness." Thus, his perspective seems to be that most people are morally imperfect, but they are perfectly justified in not striving for moral perfection. This is a perspective that really doesn't take morality too seriously, and it's the perspective that altruists almost inevitably have to take. When complete moral perfection involves total disregard for yourself, it's just not appropriate to expect people to take morality all the way. Unfortunately, this viewpoint of morality is very heavily entrenched in the mindsets of a huge segment of the population.

The pitfalls of using this type of moral code to defend the free market is that it only works under the belief that it's okay to be satisfied with being morally gray. You don't have a rigorous moral defense of people pursuing their own interest in the marketplace, other than to simply say that morality should be balanced with other things (like practicality).

The part on regulation was okay; I agree that the two specific types of "regulation" that he mentioned are indeed appropriate for the role of government (enforcing contracts and stopping fraud). And he's right that regulation has gone far beyond these types of things into places it has no business being. However, in this section he fails to point to the principle differentiating the "appropriate" regulation from "inappropriate" (which is individual rights). Without this crucial piece, his argument does not give a convincing stopping place for this rolling back of regulation, or any principled way to determine which regulations to roll back and which to keep. All he can say without that is that we currently have too much regulation, and we should get rid of some of it.

I've actually heard this guy speak a couple of times and sat down with him once a few summers ago. He's an incredibly bright and inquisitive guy, very well-informed on a lot of things. Even though obviously I think he's very wrong on a lot of topics, I do have a lot of respect for him.

Ultimately, morality is all about the well-being of the moral agent. Morality should be a tool to assist you in living your life well. This means that if some action you're thinking about taking is "right," then the consequences of not taking that action are worse for you than the consequences of following through. There should be no dichotomy or distinction between what is right and what is practical, when practicality and morality are properly understood. If you look at the positive characters in Rand's novels, every time they underwent hardship, it was because by not doing so, they'd lose something that was worth much more to them.

Oh no, an anti gravitational theory. Hold on to your hats, kids.

Your viewpoint has famously been advocated by Stephen Jay Gould and termed by him Non-Overlapping Magisteria. He wrote a book on the topic, called Rocks of Ages. He basically maintains in the book that values and morals are the realm of religion while facts and empirical theories are the realm of science, and never the two shall meet.

The problem with this view is that human values are empirically based and scientifically discoverable. Ayn Rand presented the case for this viewpoint in her essay, "The Objectivist Ethics." Basically, she noted that our concept of values is tied inextricably to the phenomenon of life, and the need for living things to maintain their lives (a vast oversimplification, and if you want to truly understand the argument, you should read the essay... several times). This leads to the viewpoint that an objective system of values is empirically discoverable by examining what actions humans must take in order to further their lives. If you rigorously define the topics that religion attempts to address, you will find that many refer to things which don't exist (questions about God, the "purpose" of the universe or of our presence in it, etc) while the rest can be answered through an in-depth study of values and human well-being.

Thus, what we should do is not encourage coexistence, but rather figure out which questions about what you have broadly termed the "spiritual world" are valid questions, and address them scientifically, ignoring the others. The "answers" provided by theology are usually non-answers.

Your comparison completely misses the mark of the "paying for friends" question (I don't mean to speak for sN, but before he posted I was thinking about asking something very similar to what he asked, so I think I know what he's getting at). The value of friends comes from their independent judgment of you as a good person, and from their own independent decision to spend time with you. Attempting to pay someone to do that undercuts the source of the value. Another comparison to think about (this is the one I was going to use): would you pay someone to give you complements? Would that make sense? The answer, I think, is that it would obviously not make sense at all. The point of complements is that they are another person's expression of their own positive, independent judgment of something about you. Trying to elicit that value through payment completely undercuts the purpose of it, because the basis of the value of a complement is the fact that the other person actually believes what they are saying.

Rand viewed sex in this same way, as an expression of a positive evaluation of your sex partner. Paying someone else for sex would then be tantamount to paying someone else to fake a positive evaluation of you as a person. Any feelings of self-worth or self-esteem gained from such an exercise would be completely faked and worthless.

Paying for soldiers is completely different; they provide a service which is valuable simply because it is performed. There is nothing inherent in the value of the act of fighting a conflict which is undercut by paying for the service. It's not just about something you'd "rather not do;" it's about something that's only worthwhile if the other person actually believes what they're saying or actually feels what they're expressing.

Your comparison completely misses the mark of the "paying for friends" question (I don't mean to speak for sN, but before he posted I was thinking about asking something very similar to what he asked, so I think I know what he's getting at). The value of friends comes from their independent judgment of you as a good person, and from their own independent decision to spend time with you. Attempting to pay someone to do that undercuts the source of the value. Another comparison to think about (this is the one I was going to use): would you pay someone to give you complements? Would that make sense? The answer, I think, is that it would obviously not make sense at all. The point of complements is that they are another person's expression of their own positive, independent judgment of something about you. Trying to elicit that value through payment completely undercuts the purpose of it, because the basis of the value of a complement is the fact that the other person actually believes what they are saying.

Rand viewed sex in this same way, as an expression of a positive evaluation of your sex partner. Paying someone else for sex would then be tantamount to paying someone else to fake a positive evaluation of you as a person. Any feelings of self-worth or self-esteem gained from such an exercise would be completely faked and worthless.

Paying for soldiers is completely different; they provide a service which is valuable simply because it is performed. There is nothing inherent in the value of the act of fighting a conflict which is undercut by paying for the service. It's not just about something you'd "rather not do;" it's about something that's only worthwhile if the other person actually believes what they're saying or actually feels what they're expressing.

Whoa now, I think you are misunderstanding Rand's reasoning involved in her conclusion that sex can't be separated from values, and that therefore “mindless pleasure-seeking” is immoral. Simply because she and the Catholic church agree on the latter point, we cannot logically infer therefore that she endorses their views until we know her reasoning. And I think once we figure out her reasoning we can see that it is certainly not an endorsement of those views.

You are right that the morality of the action depends on its beneficial or detrimental relationship to the life and well-being of the people involved, and therefore a sex trade is not intrinsically immoral, since nothing is intrinsically immoral. But what does that mean in regards to sexual pleasure?

The religionist theory is the intrinsicist value-theory here, in that the good involved is in glorifying a transcendent fantasy realm, which necessarily devalues this one, thus you ought to obey God's will and pleasure is out of the question.

Rand does not simply copy this theory and say that sexual pleasure is intrinsically valuable so it can't be taken apart from values. Rather, it is simply her rejection of the hedonist theory, that is, the subjectivist value-theory here. This theory, unlike the religious one, does uphold pleasure as a value, but separates it from rationality and its relationship to life-affirmation (i.e. its moral objectivity.)

In other words, morally speaking, to separate sexual pleasure from values, says Rand, replaces happiness as the purpose of moral life with pleasure as the standard of moral value. X is good because it gives pleasure, then anything goes if its relevant to one's internal (physical, mental) desires, rather than relevance to external facts (i.e. the requirements of man's life and well-being qua man.)

If because of that train of thought, she comes to view prostitution as immoral, i.e. because she rejects the subjectivist value-theory, it can't be said to be endorsing the modern Christian view, i.e. accepting the intrinsicist value-theory.

So what about her conclusion that “mindless pleasure-seeking” is immoral and in regards to your question about prostitution (which is what “sex trade” is)? Well that is another long chain of reasoning that isn't easy to get to, but what the hell, let's try.

The issue isn't primarily even a moral one. Its morality is a secondary consequence of the consideration of that action's beneficial or harmful relationship to a person, but determining whether prostitution actually is beneficial or harmful (leaving aside from the obvious considerations about diseases and whether or not there are more important things to be doing with one's time and money and other contextual minutiae) is primarily psychological. She views this type of sexual pleasure-seeking as immoral in that the motivation for engaging in this behavior arises from a neurosis and is therefore psychologically unhealthy, hence immoral.

From my understanding, it goes something like this: First, the relationship between morality and emotions/desires is integrated in the nature of man. Emotions and desires are automatic mental responses to value-judgments, and they involve both mental and physical components in the human body. Sexual desires are therefore determined by premises, that is, value-judgments. In fact, all desires are. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as “bodily desires.” The capacity to experience sexual pleasure is physical/bodily, in that the body possesses nerve endings and organs and all the necessary tools to engage in intercourse or pleasuring, but these organs are not autonomous machines that run by themselves. It is the mind that determines their use, and the mind determines their use through judgments of value. This is what she means by “sex is to love what action is to thought.”

This is why Sophia asked you if you would deny that you wanted a man to pleasure you, because obviously that would imply that it is not a “purely physical” event to you. Your reply to her totally missed the point, which was that if this where a purely physical desire, then it is incapable of explaining the phenomenon of preferences or discrimination between partners. Not only that, but it would be incapable of explaining the need for a partner at all (after all, why not masturbation or autoeroticism, or why reject alternative options for pleasure?)

So the question for Rand is then what role in man's nature does pleasure play, and what are those specific values involved in sexual behavior? Rand and Branden then come to the conclusion that the psychological need of pleasure is integrated with the psychological need of self-esteem in that all experiences of pleasure carry with it an affirmation of one's self-esteem, as pain carries with it an affirmation of one's impotence at dealing with reality.

Branden then theorizes a sort of “Say's law” of psychology, in that one's productivity and consumption of values must be brought into equilibrium. (Production = achieving a value, consumption = enjoying a value already achieved.) If there is disequilibrium, then like in the economy, a (literal) depression will be the result, i.e. frustration and anxiety. For major values, man thus has a need to concertize one's consumption in physical form (i.e. in action), otherwise frustration will result. (This need comes from the mental “Say's law.”) The problem is solved by the concept of “celebration,” which is an action undertaken as an end in itself, not as a means. The purpose is the give expression to the enjoyment of a value achieved in the past, objectifying the act of consumption of a major value. (And then the chain of reasoning goes on to explain the most major value of all being one's own moral character, and then into the concept of romantic love.) But their point is, sex is the celebration of romantic love, and a man's sexual behavior thus reveals his view of existence (in the same way art does) through his choice of partner and the meaning of the sex act to him.

So here we can only stop to mention that, like RationalBiker said, you didn't provide nearly any context for us to examine any of the above, so we can only speak generally and then you can apply Rand's train of thought to yourself and come to whatever conclusion. Basically, the act of sex trade or prostitution can be immoral in that Rand views a man of self-esteem pursuing pleasure as an effect, a reward, a celebration of himself and his partner and that the universe his open to their value-achievement. However, in a man that lacks self-esteem, he will try to reverse cause and effect, hence what he is seeking from the act determines the partner he will choose (the prostitute.) Instead of self-esteem leading to sex as a celebration (end in itself), sexual pleasure-seeking will be used as a means (that is, as a means to self-esteem.) It will be an attempt to gain pseudo-self-esteem, which means it is a neurosis, as the person is essentially using it to escape from his mind and reality, but it will fail to actually bring him fulfillment, pride, and the crucial sense of efficacy he needs. He is of course still able to perform the act and it will of course bring him pleasure and even temporarily make him feel better. But it will not bring him emotional achievement because his reason for engaging in the sex trade arises from a mentally unhealthy premise. (If I recall, this is mentioned in Francisco's sex speech in AS.)

Hopefully that makes sense? Yes, no?

Good thoughts here. Absolutely. Why should the objective evaluation of the beauty of nature be any different than than any other objective value judgement. The necessary requirements being the understanding of the absolutism of existence seen through a perspective that takes the nature of consciousness into account.

more of my (probably subjective) thoughts:
The first time I visited New York I was blown away. But for me at least, theres something about the natural world that has more effect on my sense of life. The only way I can describe it is this: New York city as beautiful and inspiring as it is, is already there. Once its known to me, theres nothing more it can offer. I already have my life to focus on, and theres nothing more I can add to it, or gain from it. It gets old. Theres something about the stars, or the wilderness that to me will always be new, a never-ending quest for understanding or contemplation.

I realize this is all a "feel" that I get and probably completely subjective, but to have a sense of never-ending wonder, whether it be scientific/esthetic (my love for astronomy) or physical and challenging like sleeping in a tent somewhere, its a personal thing, and the only sense of immortality this athiest has found.

That is not true at all. Rand's philosophical principles are formed and validated inductively through utilizing knowledge of the world and of human nature and the requirements of human life. It is quite possible to reject some philosophical formulation of hers because you are not convinced of the factual basis upon which it rests. Such an error of knowledge is not an indication of immorality or the failure to think.

There is a difference between understanding Rand's principles and confirming firsthand the facts upon which they rest.

That is not true at all. Rand's philosophical principles are formed and validated inductively through utilizing knowledge of the world and of human nature and the requirements of human life. It is quite possible to reject some philosophical formulation of hers because you are not convinced of the factual basis upon which it rests. Such an error of knowledge is not an indication of immorality or the failure to think.

There is a difference between understanding Rand's principles and confirming firsthand the facts upon which they rest.

Do you ever read an author that you totally agree on literally everything they ever said? Take a step back just one moment and forget one specific author. Before anyone accepts any idea, he should “fully understand” it, in the sense that you have to grasp the facts and concepts from which it is derived, thus to know the reasons which validate the conclusions, and since man is infallible, mistakes in reasoning or insufficient information is possible (and these are mistakes of knowledge, not immoralities.) You are only expected to accept that which makes sense to you first-hand, but you are expected to know what and why, and never to close anything off to further investigation. Immorality basically consists of saying (though not literally in words every time) “I refuse to even try to know what and why” and shutting something off from reason, that is, to evade and blank out.

That doesn't necessarily make one immoral to disagree, obviously, it depends on if they have a good reason for disagreeing and they better be able to say what and why. So if ethics is rational, then the question is not “do you disagree with X and does that make you immoral,” the question is “what and why?”

Term limits terminate Terminator!

I think your counterarguments are focusing on side issues, and you haven't addressed the point that I would make first and foremost in defense of "price gouging." If you try to defend price gouging on the premise that these things aren't actually necessities, for example, you're neglecting the fundamental error in the opposing argument. Even if they were necessities, a price hike in this situation would be entirely appropriate.

The fact is, a natural disaster has occurred. Something real and massive has happened which has changed the local situation in regards to resources. Bread and milk are now in much higher demand, and there is also a reduced supply, as well as a reduced capacity to increase the supply by shipping from elsewhere. The fact is, there simply aren't enough bread and milk to sell at the old price. The first few hundred or thousand people who went in would stock up, and everyone else would be S.O.L. Trying to pretend that nothing about the real situation has changed, by trying to keep the old prices, would result in disaster, because the fact is that things have changed.

Let's say that every store in the area agreed to sell their goods at the old prices. What would happen? The first few hundred people who got to the stores would stock up, clean it out, and then they would turn around and start selling some of what they just bought to everyone else (at a much higher price). But why would this happen? Was everyone who was struck with the flood also simultaneously struck by a case of the "greedies"? Of course not. The bread and milk situation changed fundamentally, and the new prices are merely a reflection of the scarcity. People who raise prices are merely responding to that.

Furthermore, very high prices for necessities are the best way to get other people from surrounding areas to ship in more necessities. Sure, maybe most companies would send a few trucks worth of supplies, for the good P.R., but if the prices in that area suddenly go up, businesses can actually make more money by helping those who need it the most. What's best for those businesses is also best for the people hit by the flood: to ship massive amounts of necessities into the areas that need them the most.

In short, "price gouging" serves a vital purpose in recovering from the tragedy. You can't deal with such a tragedy by pretending that the price increases don't reflect real changes rather than "greed."

I think your counterarguments are focusing on side issues, and you haven't addressed the point that I would make first and foremost in defense of "price gouging." If you try to defend price gouging on the premise that these things aren't actually necessities, for example, you're neglecting the fundamental error in the opposing argument. Even if they were necessities, a price hike in this situation would be entirely appropriate.

The fact is, a natural disaster has occurred. Something real and massive has happened which has changed the local situation in regards to resources. Bread and milk are now in much higher demand, and there is also a reduced supply, as well as a reduced capacity to increase the supply by shipping from elsewhere. The fact is, there simply aren't enough bread and milk to sell at the old price. The first few hundred or thousand people who went in would stock up, and everyone else would be S.O.L. Trying to pretend that nothing about the real situation has changed, by trying to keep the old prices, would result in disaster, because the fact is that things have changed.

Let's say that every store in the area agreed to sell their goods at the old prices. What would happen? The first few hundred people who got to the stores would stock up, clean it out, and then they would turn around and start selling some of what they just bought to everyone else (at a much higher price). But why would this happen? Was everyone who was struck with the flood also simultaneously struck by a case of the "greedies"? Of course not. The bread and milk situation changed fundamentally, and the new prices are merely a reflection of the scarcity. People who raise prices are merely responding to that.

Furthermore, very high prices for necessities are the best way to get other people from surrounding areas to ship in more necessities. Sure, maybe most companies would send a few trucks worth of supplies, for the good P.R., but if the prices in that area suddenly go up, businesses can actually make more money by helping those who need it the most. What's best for those businesses is also best for the people hit by the flood: to ship massive amounts of necessities into the areas that need them the most.

In short, "price gouging" serves a vital purpose in recovering from the tragedy. You can't deal with such a tragedy by pretending that the price increases don't reflect real changes rather than "greed."